Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and ...

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direct way even by <strong>the</strong> East German deputy minister.” Minister Kohrt also toldWiniewicz that for <strong>the</strong> GDR documents were not important, ra<strong>the</strong>r thatparticipation in <strong>the</strong> conference was what mattered. Winiewicz reminded him thatPol<strong>and</strong> also used to protect also GDR interests in international relations <strong>and</strong>provided him with a number of examples.Pending an official meeting of deputy foreign ministers in Moscow, <strong>the</strong>borders issue was not discussed. During <strong>the</strong> plenary session, Semenov pointed outthat some amendments had been introduced to <strong>the</strong> documents, especially thoseconcerning recognition of <strong>the</strong> territorial integrity <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> declaration on <strong>the</strong>renunciation of <strong>the</strong> use of force. He did not mention <strong>the</strong> Polish role in it.Never<strong>the</strong>less he made a remark that <strong>the</strong> tactics of <strong>the</strong> bloc countries should besubordinated to Western reactions, which could make any agreement forconvening a conference dependent on ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> inclusion or exclusion of <strong>the</strong>border issues. 46 Minister Kohrt said that <strong>the</strong> bloc countries should be bound by<strong>the</strong>ir common interest, <strong>and</strong> that countries undertaking individual actions shouldrespect <strong>the</strong> five conditions of normalization agreed to in Warsaw in February1967. In this way he made an allusion to <strong>the</strong> independent Soviet <strong>and</strong> Polishinitiatives towards West Germany. O<strong>the</strong>r countries also presented <strong>the</strong>ir ideas.Winiewicz presented <strong>the</strong> results of <strong>the</strong> Polish talks with Western diplomats,underlining that some of <strong>the</strong>m were very much interested in economic issues <strong>and</strong>suggested that in Prague an experts’ group dealing with this subject should becreated. The Poles were of <strong>the</strong> opinion that <strong>the</strong> Soviet proposal was too general.But <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union visibly evaded making any decisions on this problem.The meeting represented a partial success for <strong>the</strong> Poles, as at least some of<strong>the</strong>ir remarks were accepted. Yet <strong>the</strong>y still intended to convince <strong>the</strong> Soviets to holdformal discussions on <strong>the</strong> Polish draft treaty. During later bilateral consultations,<strong>the</strong> Soviets agreed to discuss some of <strong>the</strong> Polish suggestions at <strong>the</strong> foreignministers meeting in Prague, but <strong>the</strong>y refused to place <strong>the</strong> Polish ideas for25
economic cooperation up for discussion. But it soon appeared that <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rcountries did not submit <strong>the</strong>ir remarks to <strong>the</strong> Polish treaty. This was also a methodof slowing <strong>the</strong> process of discussing <strong>the</strong> inconvenient Polish draft. Warsaw wasaware of geopolitical realities <strong>and</strong> wanted to use opportunities that political <strong>and</strong>military organizations could provide in a divided world. Thus it attempted toconvince <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r bloc countries to agree that <strong>the</strong> treaty onSecurity <strong>and</strong> Cooperation in Europe would be presented as a Polish draft,supported by <strong>the</strong> whole bloc, expecting that this way it would be treated moreseriously in <strong>the</strong> West <strong>and</strong> have a better chance of becoming reality.On 30-31 October 1969, <strong>the</strong> foreign ministers met in Prague <strong>and</strong> accepted<strong>the</strong> documents prepared in Moscow. In an unofficial meeting, <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong>territorial status quo was brought under discussion by Czechoslovak ForeignMinister Jan Marko. He suggested dealing with this issue in a tactical manner.Marko was supported by <strong>the</strong> Romanian Minister Corneliu Mănescu. The reactionof <strong>the</strong> Polish Minister Jędrychowski was “sharp,” as he described it, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rministers withdrew <strong>the</strong>ir suggestion to discuss <strong>the</strong> issue again. Never<strong>the</strong>less,during <strong>the</strong> plenary session, Marko mentioned that questions which would makestarting <strong>the</strong> conference more complicated should not have been placed into <strong>the</strong>agenda. 47 Finally <strong>the</strong> Moscow documents were accepted. The ministers alsodeveloped a formula concerning participation. They declared that <strong>the</strong>y would notoppose American or Canadian participation, but <strong>the</strong> participation of both Germanstates be a condition. The idea of creating a group of economists was supported by<strong>the</strong> Hungarians who proposed to organize a meeting in Budapest. It was decidedthat Hungary would present more specific ideas for <strong>the</strong> agenda <strong>and</strong> exact times fora meeting, so Jędrychowski felt that at least <strong>the</strong> Polish idea to discuss economicissues had been accepted. The Polish draft for <strong>the</strong> “Treaty on Security <strong>and</strong>Cooperation in Europe” was not discussed, as some countries said that <strong>the</strong>y46 Ibid.26
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