Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and ...

wonder that after “sharp” talks with <strong>the</strong> Soviets <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r countries, “keepingan eye” on <strong>the</strong> wording regarding <strong>the</strong> inviolability of borders in conferencedocuments was noted as a special duty for <strong>the</strong> Polish delegates. Streng<strong>the</strong>ning <strong>the</strong>GDR’s international position was mentioned as <strong>the</strong> second aim. This goal wasderived from one of <strong>the</strong> main Polish foreign policy priorities: preventing eventualGerman reunification. In this case <strong>the</strong> Poles wanted to prevent <strong>the</strong> possibility of<strong>the</strong> CSCE accepting any stipulation which could facilitate German reunification in<strong>the</strong> future. According to Polish foreign minister Stefan Olszowski <strong>the</strong> talks oneconomic collaboration would also be very important for Pol<strong>and</strong>. He expected thatduring <strong>the</strong> conference, principles underlying bigger possibilities for economicexchange between <strong>the</strong> blocs would be elaborated, which was important for <strong>the</strong>Polish authorities looking for chances to develop <strong>the</strong> country’s economy <strong>and</strong> tohigher living st<strong>and</strong>ards, but also trying to fulfill obligations connected withparticipation in GATT. This aim was also presented as being connected with <strong>the</strong>“German factor.” Olszowski wrote that <strong>the</strong> rules of economic cooperation“shouldn’t lead to a weakening of COMECON integration or attraction of <strong>the</strong>GDR by West Germany.” Many Polish politicians <strong>and</strong> diplomats shared <strong>the</strong>opinion that West Germany would try to subordinate <strong>the</strong> conference to its nationalinterests, e.g., to lower <strong>the</strong> threshold for a final agreement, to confirm <strong>the</strong> right of<strong>the</strong> German nation to reunification, <strong>and</strong> to treat <strong>the</strong> ‘status quo in Europe’ as amodus vivendi in Europe, which was contradictory to Polish interests.The Polish delegation remained in close contact with <strong>the</strong> Soviets as well as<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r communist countries attending <strong>the</strong> MPT <strong>and</strong> conference. During <strong>the</strong>multilateral meetings, a general outline for action was agreed upon for every bloccountry. 69 Numerous bilateral talks with <strong>the</strong> Soviets took place as well. ManyPolish public announcements also received prior Soviet consultation, for example,<strong>the</strong> Polish foreign minister’s speech in Helsinki in July 1973, at <strong>the</strong> opening69 AMSZ, DSiP c.1/82, v.2, Note on <strong>the</strong> second phase MPT, 2 nd basket, 17 April 1973.38