Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and ...

participation was not dependent on international recognition. The greatestopportunity for acceptance would be to have a treaty or declaration on <strong>the</strong>renunciation of force or threats to do so (<strong>the</strong> Soviet draft of <strong>the</strong> declaration did notmention ei<strong>the</strong>r recognition or respect for existing borders) <strong>and</strong> one on <strong>the</strong>development of economic, cultural, <strong>and</strong> scientific relations, which would improve<strong>the</strong> atmosphere of political relations. During <strong>the</strong> conference, <strong>the</strong> bloc countriescould suggest convening ano<strong>the</strong>r conference to deal with more complicatedquestions of European security. The Soviets were of <strong>the</strong> opinion that a preparatoryconference was not necessary <strong>and</strong> that all problems eventually could be solved bybilateral talks. Semenov also said that <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union intended to continuebilateral negotiations with West Germany on a declaration on <strong>the</strong> renunciation offorce. Only in case <strong>the</strong> European conference would result in a pan-Europe<strong>and</strong>eclaration, <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union could think about discontinuing <strong>the</strong> talks with WestGermany.After Semenov finished his presentation, Wolniak stated that <strong>the</strong> officialPolish point of view would be presented after <strong>the</strong> party leadership had reachedagreement, but that he wished to make some remarks. He said that <strong>the</strong> two subjectssuggested by Semenov for <strong>the</strong> agenda raised numerous doubts, as <strong>the</strong> mainquestions of European security that had been pointed out in <strong>the</strong> Budapest Appeal,such as recognition of <strong>the</strong> territorial status quo, had been ab<strong>and</strong>oned. Wolniak saidthat Pol<strong>and</strong> opposed accepting “a minimum plan” as a bloc program, even withoutundertaking an attempt to resolve crucial questions in bilateral or multilateralnegotiations, i.e. during a series of preparatory meetings for <strong>the</strong> Europeanconference. He mentioned that bilateral consultations between <strong>the</strong> Warsaw Pactcountries as well as foreign ministers meetings should be a forum for elaborating acommon bloc position. The Polish official was of <strong>the</strong> opinion that a draft treaty oncollective security should be submitted to all <strong>the</strong> European countries as a32 Note on conversation with W.S. Semenov, by Z. Wolniak, 30 September 1969, in: W. Jarząbek, Polskawobec.., p. 200 f. Documents for <strong>the</strong> Politburo i.e. Polish memor<strong>and</strong>um to <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union <strong>and</strong> Shorten18