Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and ...

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process would take place before Pol<strong>and</strong> would obtain guarantees for <strong>the</strong> finalcharacter of its western frontier. Moreover, Warsaw considered Soviet policyambiguous. For example, in January 1967, Leonid Brezhnev informed <strong>the</strong> Polishleadership in Łańsk that he planned to give <strong>the</strong> bloc countries <strong>the</strong> “green light” fortalks with West Germany. Gomułka tried his best to convince <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r countries to collaborate more closely on <strong>the</strong> German question. Toimplement this plan, he cooperated with <strong>the</strong> GDR. The Polish First Secretary’saction was thus an application of <strong>the</strong> "Gomułka Doctrine," as I have called <strong>the</strong>Polish-German policy conducted at <strong>the</strong> time. 12These events directly influenced Polish preparations for <strong>the</strong> “Europeanconference” as it was <strong>the</strong>n called, <strong>and</strong> to a large degree <strong>the</strong>y related to Polishpolicy vis-à-vis Germany in <strong>the</strong> late 1960s. Authors of studies prepared at <strong>the</strong> timelooked for different options to minimize <strong>the</strong> danger emerging from Bonn’s newpolicy.At <strong>the</strong> start of <strong>the</strong> conference preparations, Pol<strong>and</strong> expected every Europeancountry to participate in <strong>the</strong> conference. Thought was even given to Vaticanparticipation, if only in an observer role. When <strong>the</strong> idea was born in <strong>the</strong> mid-1960s, plans also included US participation, as only a continued US presencecould provide guarantees in European politics, a limit to West German room formaneuver, <strong>and</strong> balance to <strong>the</strong> Soviet position. 13 At <strong>the</strong> Bucharest Declaration of<strong>the</strong> Warsaw Pact countries in July 1966, <strong>the</strong> Soviet bloc made <strong>the</strong> idea of asecurity conference one of its main foreign policy objectives. The Karlsbad11 Many Polish diplomats defend <strong>the</strong> opinion, that it was a Polish idea <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong>y did not act according toSoviet instructions. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Józef Czyrek attested to this in an interview by <strong>the</strong>author in November 2004.12 See: W. Jarząbek, “Ulbricht –Doktrin oder Goułka – Doktrine”?..., p. 112. I use <strong>the</strong> term “Gomułkadoctrine” to describe a clear line in <strong>the</strong> Polish foreign policy in <strong>the</strong> years 1956 – 1970, according to whichPol<strong>and</strong> was trying to have influence on <strong>the</strong> Soviet <strong>and</strong> bloc German policy in order to receive internationalrecognition of <strong>the</strong> Oder – Neisse line <strong>and</strong> avoid situations in which this recognition would be used as adiplomatic bargaining chip.13 According to Bogumił Rychłowski, one of Gomułka’s interpreters <strong>and</strong> a diplomat <strong>and</strong> analyst in <strong>the</strong>Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pol<strong>and</strong> was also strongly interested in <strong>the</strong> US military presence in Europefrom <strong>the</strong> same reasons. Interview with B. Rychłowski in December 20047
Declaration of European communist <strong>and</strong> workers parties in April 1967 alsoincluded an appeal to convene a conference on security <strong>and</strong> cooperation in Europe.The Eastern bloc countries included <strong>the</strong> question of a European conferencein <strong>the</strong>ir regular diplomatic activities, but different countries emphasized differentaspects of <strong>the</strong> idea. Pol<strong>and</strong> was interested mostly in political <strong>and</strong> military issues,such as freezing armaments <strong>and</strong> signing a pan-European convention on renouncing<strong>the</strong> use of military force, to include recognition of <strong>the</strong> GDR <strong>and</strong> acceptance of <strong>the</strong>existing territorial status quo, in particular <strong>the</strong> Oder-Neisse line. 14 At that time itseemed to be impossible to resolve border issues using a bilateral agreement withBonn; Pol<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> West Germany did not even have diplomatic relations, <strong>and</strong>Warsaw wanted to reach an agreement within a European “framework,” alsotreating <strong>the</strong> conference as a substitute for a peace conference with Germany. 15Pol<strong>and</strong> was aware that <strong>the</strong> USSR was thinking about concluding a bilateralconvention with <strong>the</strong> FRG, which would be limited to a renunciation of <strong>the</strong> use offorce without an explicit guarantee for specific borders. Polish politicians thoughtthat this approach had its source in Soviet economic needs, for as Soviet industrysought new technologies, <strong>the</strong> FRG was perceived as being eager for closercollaboration. Warsaw also was aware that long-st<strong>and</strong>ing foreign policy goalswere different for both countries <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union would try to realizethose it deemed paramount.The Polish government did not want <strong>the</strong> conference to limit itself toaccepting <strong>the</strong> status quo. They expected that it would be possible to create a forumfor <strong>the</strong> discussion of various political topics, especially security questions, <strong>and</strong> that<strong>the</strong>se issues would cease to be beholden to great-power prerogatives, openingopportunities for smaller (also dependent) countries to become active in <strong>the</strong>14 Archive of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (AMSZ), DSiP (Department of Studies <strong>and</strong> Planning), c.(collection) 60/77, v. (volume)1, Project of Eventual Diplomatic Action, 13 February 1969. Romania,Hungary <strong>and</strong> Bulgaria were mostly interested in possibilities of opening to <strong>the</strong> West <strong>and</strong> closer regionalcollaboration in <strong>the</strong> Danube region. The Poles wanted <strong>the</strong> legal <strong>and</strong> political matters to be <strong>the</strong> maindiscussion at <strong>the</strong> conference.8
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