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In-flight upset - 154 km west of Learmonth, WA, 7 October 2008,

In-flight upset - 154 km west of Learmonth, WA, 7 October 2008,

In-flight upset - 154 km west of Learmonth, WA, 7 October 2008,

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2.3.2 Regulatory requirementsThe relevant certification requirements for a <strong>flight</strong> control system were specified inJAR 25.671 and JAR 25.1309. The FARs had the same requirements.JAR 25.671 (Control Systems: General) dealt with specific types <strong>of</strong> failures thatcould affect the functioning <strong>of</strong> the control surfaces. It effectively stated that theaircraft had to be capable <strong>of</strong> continued safe <strong>flight</strong> and landing following specifictypes <strong>of</strong> ‘failures or jamming’ in the <strong>flight</strong> control system or associated controlsurfaces. A specific failure, or combination <strong>of</strong> failures, that could affect thecontinued safe <strong>flight</strong> and landing had to be demonstrated, by analysis or test, to be‘extremely improbable’ (see section 2.3.3 for the definitions <strong>of</strong> probability terms).JAR 25.1309 (Equipment, systems and installations) applied to a range <strong>of</strong> differentaircraft systems, including the <strong>flight</strong> control system. It outlined more detailedrequirements than JAR 25.671, including the following:(b) The aeroplane systems and associated components, consideredseparately and in relation to other systems, must be designed so that(1) The occurrence <strong>of</strong> any failure condition which would prevent thecontinued safe <strong>flight</strong> and landing <strong>of</strong> the aeroplane is extremelyimprobable; and(2) The occurrence <strong>of</strong> any other failure condition which would reducethe capability <strong>of</strong> the aeroplane or the ability <strong>of</strong> the crew to cope withadverse operating conditions is improbable...(d) Compliance with the requirements <strong>of</strong> sub-paragraph (b) <strong>of</strong> this paragraphmust be shown by analysis, and where necessary, by appropriate ground,<strong>flight</strong>, or simulator tests. The analysis must consider(1) Possible modes <strong>of</strong> failure, including malfunctions and damage fromexternal sources;(2) The probability <strong>of</strong> multiple failures and undetected failures;(3) The resulting effects on the aeroplane and occupants, considering thestage <strong>of</strong> <strong>flight</strong> and operating conditions; and(4) The crew warning cues, corrective action required, and the capability<strong>of</strong> detecting faults.2.3.3 European Advisory Circular Joint No. 1 to 25.1309Advisory Circular Joint (ACJ) No. 1 to JAR 25.1309 outlined guidance fordemonstrating compliance with JAR 25.1309. A key concept in the ACJ was a‘failure condition’, which referred to a condition that resulted from a failure in theaircraft system, and caused or contributed to an undesirable effect on thefunctioning <strong>of</strong> the system or the complete aircraft. 91 The failure condition couldalso occur due to a scenario involving a combination <strong>of</strong> failures, including failuresin related aircraft systems.91An example <strong>of</strong> a failure condition is ‘total loss <strong>of</strong> wheel braking’ and an example <strong>of</strong> a failure thatcould lead to this condition is ‘brake system control unit – power supply failure’. For furtherdetails see ARP4761 (discussed in section 2.6.2).- 84 -

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