- Page 1: ATSB TRANSPORT SAFETY REPORTAviatio
- Page 4 and 5: Published by: Australian Transport
- Page 6 and 7: 3 FACTUAL INFORMATION: AIR DATA INE
- Page 10 and 11: THE AUSTRALIAN TRANSPORT SAFETY BUR
- Page 13 and 14: ABBREVIATIONSACACACJACARSACMSADIRSA
- Page 15 and 16: FWSF/CTLGPSGPWSHASSHFIRICAOIECISISI
- Page 17 and 18: EXECUTIVE SUMMARYKey investigation
- Page 19 and 20: not be determined. However, the fai
- Page 21 and 22: 1 FACTUAL INFORMATION: GENERAL1.1 H
- Page 23 and 24: The FDR showed that the captain imm
- Page 25 and 26: Following the second in-flight upse
- Page 27 and 28: control primary computer 3) OFF. Th
- Page 29 and 30: The second officer had a first offi
- Page 31 and 32: Figure 4: Overview of a fly-by-wire
- Page 33 and 34: 1.6.4 Air data and inertial referen
- Page 35 and 36: Figure 8: Overview of the ADIRSAir
- Page 37 and 38: • NAV; the ADIRU supplied full in
- Page 39 and 40: For an A330, the typical operationa
- Page 41 and 42: 1.6.6 AutopilotThe aircraft’s fli
- Page 43 and 44: Figure 16: Overview of system fault
- Page 45 and 46: Table 3: Failure level classificati
- Page 47 and 48: • Class 2, or faults that did not
- Page 49 and 50: Figure 18: Example of ECAM warning
- Page 51 and 52: The aircraft had a technical log th
- Page 53 and 54: pitch-down) there were at least 22
- Page 55 and 56: FDR process for recording ADIRU dat
- Page 57 and 58: Figure 19: FDR plot showing key ADI
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Summary of ADR and IR data for the
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Table 9 details the number of spike
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Figure 24: Acceleration, elevator a
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Electrical flight control system co
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In addition to these two caution me
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Table 12: Cockpit effect messages d
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involved continuity, short circuit,
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• Normally the IR part would use
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position, and the faulty unit was s
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Table 17: PHC 1 anti-ice fault indi
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2006, see below). During the invest
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Table 18: Summary of the three simi
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Up until 2009, the A330 had not bee
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specific item of equipment (such as
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Servo signalsAll of the flight cont
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There were two primary comparisons
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Figure 28: FCPC algorithm for proce
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Step-changeA significant step-chang
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If this scenario occurred, the FCPC
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Potential effects during different
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A subsequent simulation confirmed t
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Following the F/CTL PRIM 1 PITCH FA
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2.3.2 Regulatory requirementsThe re
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Table 22: Probability levels descri
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System criticality was also defined
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2.4.2 Overview of the development p
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The first simulation tool, OCAS 103
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generally involves conducting a fai
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Consistent with the aircraft manufa
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data-spike failure mode because the
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technology and differing interpreta
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The safety assessment process shoul
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For example, experts have argued th
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One type of automated safety assess
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Researchers have stated that much m
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3.2 LTN-101 ADIRU design3.2.1 Desig
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To perform its functions, the CPU m
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The fields had the following functi
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Figure 39: AOA and altitude bit map
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Figure 41: Qualitative correlation
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ADR discrete word #1In addition to
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parameters is provided in Figure 45
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3.4.4 Range checkingTwenty-eight AD
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• indicated AOA, ADR discrete wor
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Table 24: Binary values for the lab
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storage could result in BITE inform
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The redesigned CPU module was incor
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Figure 46: Service history timeline
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nothing unusual regarding the fligh
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development to ensure compliance wi
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systems), radio transmitters, and i
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either of its data-spike occurrence
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error detection and correction (EDA
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estimated high-energy neutron fluxe
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• There were significant logistic
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Table 26: Evaluation of potential t
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The ADIRU’s response to a detecte
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3.7.4 False fault messagesThe ADIRU
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3.8.3 Summary analysesThe FMEA resu
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The average MTBUR for LTN-101 units
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The review identified no apparent p
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Figure 47: Cabin layout- 162 -
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Overall, the investigation obtained
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4.2.4 Events after the second upset
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After the passengers disembarked, t
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Figure 50: Example of damage to the
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Requirements in the US and many oth
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IMMEDIATELY’. Cabin crew were req
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fastened’ and 13 said they were
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wearing seat belts (Appendix K), an
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Of the 25 passengers wearing seat b
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seat belt when the seat-belt sign w
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7 October 2008 flight, there had be
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4.7.7 Previous seat belt useThe que
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Regulatory authorities and other sa
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5 ANALYSIS5.1 OverviewThe 7 October
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Nevertheless, the FCPC’s AOA algo
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Figure 54: Summary of results of SS
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conditions using a top-down approac
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problem could not be determined bas
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5.3.3 Reasons for the failure modeO
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manufactured in the same or adjacen
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effects of such failure modes need
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The flight crew of the 12 September
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as soon as possible. The diversion
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mode with the ADIRU that had not be
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• Although passengers are routine
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7 SAFETY ACTIONThe safety issues id
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and filtering of five parameters, i
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• In the event of a class 1 messa
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Vehicle Systems Institute (AVSI) he
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een important. The situation appear
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Means of recording parameter invali
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Supplementary information on probe
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No flight data was available for th
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Table D2: 27 December 2008 occurren
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The recorded data showed that the f
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FAULT’ and ‘A.ICE *’ fault me
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Table E1: Summary of testing perfor
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messages. After other tests had bee
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esult of a problem that was subsequ
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During the tests, artificial inputs
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During the tests, artificial inputs
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All measured currents and electric
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Emissions can be divided into two t
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Electromagnetic compatibility desig
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• Other particles such as heavy i
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• A non-destructive, unrecoverabl
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e regarded as appropriate since the
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APPENDIX I: PASSENGER QUESTIONNAIRE
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The demographic information for all
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APPENDIX J: EXAMINATION OF POTENTIA
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Potential for inadvertent seat belt
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APPENDIX K: INJURIES DURING IN-FLIG
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• During the period 1992 to 2001,
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In terms of measures to increase se
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APPENDIX M: PUBLIC SAFETY INFORMATI
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Australian Transport Safety BureauI
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Briere, D & Traverse, P 1993, Airbu
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NASA 1995, Formal methods specifica
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The ATSB did not consider this safe