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In-flight upset - 154 km west of Learmonth, WA, 7 October 2008,

In-flight upset - 154 km west of Learmonth, WA, 7 October 2008,

In-flight upset - 154 km west of Learmonth, WA, 7 October 2008,

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Servo signalsAll <strong>of</strong> the <strong>flight</strong> control surfaces, including the elevators and ailerons, containedservo-controlled 76 hydraulic actuators and position sensors. To execute the controlorders from the master FCPC, and change the position <strong>of</strong> a control surface, acomputer sent servo signals to the relevant actuators.Each <strong>of</strong> the five computers acted as the servo-controller for different controlsurfaces. For example, FCPC 1 normally generated the servo signals for theelevators and the trimmable horizontal stabiliser (THS). With regard to the ailerons,FCPC 1 normally controlled the left inboard aileron servos, FCPC 2 normallycontrolled the right inboard aileron servos, and FCPC 3 normally controlled theoutboard aileron servos.For the purpose <strong>of</strong> redundancy, multiple computers were connected to each controlsurface. If a computer was unable to execute the master FCPC’s orders for aparticular control surface due to a fault, then another computer would take over thatservo-controller role. For example, the priority sequence for acting as theservo-controller for the elevators was FCPC 1, FCPC 2, FCSC 1 then FCSC 2.Not all <strong>of</strong> the computers could send servo signals to each <strong>of</strong> the <strong>flight</strong> controlsurfaces. For example, FCPC 3 could not perform the servo-control function for theelevators.2.1.2 Fault-tolerant design features‘Fault tolerance’ refers to a system’s ability to maintain its functionality in thepresence <strong>of</strong> faults. Fault-tolerant design features are used extensively in the design<strong>of</strong> hardware and s<strong>of</strong>tware for safety-critical systems such as a <strong>flight</strong> control system.A fundamental assumption is that faults can never be fully eliminated, but theirprobability and consequences can be managed to an acceptable level.The A330/A340 EFCS included a range <strong>of</strong> design features to provide faulttolerance. These included:• Redundancy. The use <strong>of</strong> five different computers provided redundancy in theevent <strong>of</strong> a failure <strong>of</strong> one or more computers. <strong>In</strong> the presence <strong>of</strong> certain types <strong>of</strong>faults or processing problems, the role <strong>of</strong> master switched from one FCPC toanother FCPC. <strong>In</strong> addition, the servo-controller for a control surface couldswitch to another FCPC or FCSC.• Self-checking pairs. Each computer had two physically independent channels.The command (COM) channel computed the control orders and/or servo signals,and the monitor (MON) channel conducted the same computations andcompared the results. The two channels had their own processor, power supply,memories, and input/output circuits. The use <strong>of</strong> two channels helped to identifyhardware or processing problems (section 2.1.3).• Monitoring. Each computer had built-in test equipment (BITE) to monitor itsown performance and that <strong>of</strong> the other computers, as well as to monitor otherelements <strong>of</strong> the system such as actuators and sensors. The FCPCs also76A servo, or servo-mechanism, is a control device that uses an automated feedback loop to improveaccuracy. Servo-mechanisms are <strong>of</strong>ten used to allow a low-power signal to drive a higher-powerdevice.- 68 -

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