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In-flight upset - 154 km west of Learmonth, WA, 7 October 2008,

In-flight upset - 154 km west of Learmonth, WA, 7 October 2008,

In-flight upset - 154 km west of Learmonth, WA, 7 October 2008,

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5 ANALYSIS5.1 OverviewThe 7 <strong>October</strong> <strong>2008</strong> occurrence involving the Airbus A330-303 aircraft, registeredVH-QPA (QPA), occurred when the aircraft suddenly pitched nose down while incruise at FL370 (37,000 ft). A second, less significant pitch-down occurred2 minutes later.Data from the aircraft’s recorders and simulations by the aircraft manufacturershowed that the pitch-downs were due to nose-down movements <strong>of</strong> the aircraft’selevators. The evidence also showed that the elevator movements were not initiatedby turbulence, <strong>flight</strong> crew inputs, autopilot inputs, problems with the aircraft’sweight or balance, or a technical fault with the elevators or other relevant parts <strong>of</strong>the electrical <strong>flight</strong> control system (EFCS).The elevator movements were in fact commanded by the EFCS’s <strong>flight</strong> controlprimary computers (FCPCs). More specifically:• The FCPCs were designed to command a pitch-down if they detected that theaircraft’s angle <strong>of</strong> attack (AOA) was too high. The relevant correctivemechanisms were high AOA protection and anti pitch-up compensation.• A subsequent review <strong>of</strong> the FCPC algorithm for processing AOA data identifieda very specific (and unintended) scenario in which incorrect AOA data fromonly one <strong>of</strong> the aircraft’s three air data inertial reference units (ADIRUs) couldtrigger a pitch-down command. The scenario required two AOA spikes, with thesecond being present 1.2 seconds after the start <strong>of</strong> the first.• Two minutes before the first pitch-down, ADIRU 1 started outputting spikes inAOA data (and other ADIRU parameters), and the spikes were present at thetime <strong>of</strong> both pitch-downs.• Simulations by the aircraft manufacturer confirmed that AOA spikes <strong>of</strong> themagnitudes recorded during the <strong>flight</strong> could initiate the elevator movementsobserved during the pitch-downs.A summary <strong>of</strong> the main factors involved in the occurrence is presented in Figure 53.<strong>In</strong> essence, a design limitation with the FCPC s<strong>of</strong>tware combined with an ADIRUfailure to falsely activate the corrective mechanisms and produce the pitch-downs.The subsequent vertical accelerations led to a large number <strong>of</strong> injuries to theaircraft’s occupants, with the number and extent <strong>of</strong> these injuries being exacerbatedby many <strong>of</strong> the occupants not wearing seat belts.This analysis discusses each <strong>of</strong> these factors, and several other topics <strong>of</strong> interest,including the reporting and recording <strong>of</strong> technical faults, <strong>flight</strong> crew performance,and cabin safety aspects.- 191 -

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