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Page 2 Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2865 Edited by G. Goos ...

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Resist<strong>in</strong>g Malicious Packet Dropp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Wireless Ad Hoc Networks 1532.1 DoS Attacks on Rout<strong>in</strong>g TrafficAn attacker can launch DoS attacks aga<strong>in</strong>st a network <strong>by</strong> dissem<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g false rout<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>formation so that established routes for data traffic transmission are undesirable or<strong>in</strong>valid. There are at least three possible consequences. Firstly, data traffic may be captured<strong>in</strong> a black hole [13] and never leave out. For example, <strong>in</strong> a distance vector rout<strong>in</strong>gprotocol, an attacker can attract data traffic <strong>by</strong> advertis<strong>in</strong>g shorter distance and then dropthe attracted traffic. Secondly, data traffic may not flow through rout<strong>in</strong>g paths fairly andsome of them are dropped due to network congestion. For example, an attacker canavoid some traffic or redirect traffic to other nodes <strong>by</strong> advertis<strong>in</strong>g carefully crafted rout<strong>in</strong>gupdate messages. Thirdly, an attacker may dissem<strong>in</strong>ate arbitrary rout<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formationto mislead other routers to create <strong>in</strong>valid paths <strong>in</strong> their rout<strong>in</strong>g table. As a result, datatraffic flow<strong>in</strong>g through those paths will eventually be dropped due to network unreachabilityor life time expiration (i.e., <strong>in</strong> presence of rout<strong>in</strong>g loops).2.2 DoS Attacks on Data TrafficAn attacker can launch two types of DoS attacks on data traffic. First, it can <strong>in</strong>ject asignificant amount of data traffic <strong>in</strong>to the network to clog the network. If there is noprotection mechanism <strong>in</strong> place for provision<strong>in</strong>g data traffic, legitimate user packets willbe dropped along with malicious ones as the result of congestion control. In the worstcase, the network could be completely shutdown.Second, if a malicious user manages to jo<strong>in</strong> a network or compromise a legitimaterouter, it can silently drop some or all of the data packets transmitted to it for furtherforward<strong>in</strong>g. We call it the malicious packet dropp<strong>in</strong>g attack. Malicious packet dropp<strong>in</strong>gattack is a serious threat to the rout<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>frastructure of both MANET and the Internets<strong>in</strong>ce it is easy to launch and difficult to detect. To launch the attack, an attacker needsto ga<strong>in</strong> the control of at least one router <strong>in</strong> the target network. The router used to launchthe attack can be a specialized router or a computer runn<strong>in</strong>g rout<strong>in</strong>g software. To ga<strong>in</strong>access to a specialized router, an attacker can explore the software vulnerability of arouter (e.g., buffer overflow) or explore the weakness of logon authentication process(i.e., weak password). Many routers run vulnerable software and open the vulnerabilityto the world. For example, a survey [17] on 471 Internet routers shows that majority ofthem run SSH, Telnet or HTTP and 17% of them accept connections from arbitrary IPaddresses. An attacker can also explore the vulnerabilities of rout<strong>in</strong>g protocols to jo<strong>in</strong>the network with his own computer or a compromised <strong>in</strong>side mach<strong>in</strong>e. This is possibledue to the fact that most rout<strong>in</strong>g protocols only deploy very weak authenticationmechanisms, such as pla<strong>in</strong> text passwords.2.3 Prevent<strong>in</strong>g DoS Attacks on Rout<strong>in</strong>g TrafficSignificant work has been done to secure rout<strong>in</strong>g protocols aga<strong>in</strong>st DoS attacks on rout<strong>in</strong>gtraffic. Most of them apply cryptographic techniques (asymmetric or symmetric) toauthenticat<strong>in</strong>g rout<strong>in</strong>g traffic.Asymmetric cryptographic techniques, such as public-key based digital signatures,can be used to sign rout<strong>in</strong>g messages [24–26] to prevent external <strong>in</strong>truders from jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g

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