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Page 2 Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2865 Edited by G. Goos ...

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154 M. Just, E. Kranakis, and T. Wanthe network or malicious <strong>in</strong>siders from spoof<strong>in</strong>g or modify<strong>in</strong>g rout<strong>in</strong>g messages. Thedisadvantages are: 1) They are quite <strong>in</strong>efficient s<strong>in</strong>ce both the signature generation andverification process <strong>in</strong>volve the execution of computationally expensive functions. 2)They cannot prevent <strong>in</strong>ternal attacks.Given the <strong>in</strong>efficiency of digital signature mechanisms, some researchers [7, 27]proposed to use symmetric cryptographic primitives (i.e., one-way hash cha<strong>in</strong>s, onetimesignatures, authentication tree, etc.) for authenticat<strong>in</strong>g rout<strong>in</strong>g messages. Unfortunately,these approaches still do not prevent attacks from compromised <strong>in</strong>ternal routers.Hu, Johnson, and Perrig [13, 14] take the step further <strong>in</strong> secur<strong>in</strong>g distance vector rout<strong>in</strong>gprotocols <strong>by</strong> forc<strong>in</strong>g a node to <strong>in</strong>crease metrics when forward<strong>in</strong>g rout<strong>in</strong>g updatemessages. Therefore, their approaches can prevent compromised nodes from claim<strong>in</strong>gshorter distances. The disadvantage is that a malicious node can avoid traffic <strong>by</strong> claim<strong>in</strong>glonger distances.2.4 Prevent<strong>in</strong>g DoS Attacks on Data TrafficIt has been hypothesized that a network with QoS support can well resist DoS attackss<strong>in</strong>ce malicious packets will be dropped <strong>in</strong> the first place when fac<strong>in</strong>g network congestion.Other researchers proposed mechanisms [3, 6] to trace back to the orig<strong>in</strong> of themalicious packets which cause the network congestion and drop them <strong>in</strong> the routerswhere they first enter <strong>in</strong>to the victim network. Ingress/Egress filter<strong>in</strong>g can also be helpfulif IP spoof<strong>in</strong>g is utilized <strong>in</strong> the attack.Several approaches have been proposed to prevent DoS attacks on data forward<strong>in</strong>glevel. Perlman [22] proposed hop-<strong>by</strong>-hop packet acknowledgment to detect packetdropp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a network. The disadvantage is that it will generate significantly high rout<strong>in</strong>goverhead. Cheung et al [8] proposed a prob<strong>in</strong>g method for defeat<strong>in</strong>g denial of serviceattacks <strong>in</strong> a fixed rout<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>frastructure us<strong>in</strong>g neighborhood prob<strong>in</strong>g. It requires atest<strong>in</strong>g router to have a private address which allows it to generate a packet dest<strong>in</strong>ed toitself but goes through the tested router. This requirement is not practical <strong>in</strong> MANETs.A distributed monitor<strong>in</strong>g approach is proposed <strong>in</strong> [4] for detect<strong>in</strong>g disruptive routers.The protocol is based on the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple that any packets sent to a router and not dest<strong>in</strong>edto it are supposed to leave that router. This pr<strong>in</strong>cipal is not applicable to MANET dueto their chang<strong>in</strong>g network topology.Marti et al [19] proposed and implemented two protocols for detect<strong>in</strong>g and mitigat<strong>in</strong>gmisbehav<strong>in</strong>g nodes <strong>in</strong> wireless ad hoc networks <strong>by</strong> overhear<strong>in</strong>g neighborhoodtransmissions. Their method is very effective for detect<strong>in</strong>g misbehaviors <strong>in</strong> one-hopaway. To monitor the behavior of nodes two or more hops away, one node has to trustand rely on the <strong>in</strong>formation from other nodes, which <strong>in</strong>troduces the vulnerability thatgood nodes may be <strong>by</strong>passed <strong>by</strong> malicious or <strong>in</strong>correct accusation.Buchegger and Le Boudec [5] developed the CONFIDANT protocol for encourag<strong>in</strong>gnode cooperation <strong>in</strong> dynamic ad-hoc networks. Each node monitors the behaviorand ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s the reputation of its neighbors. The reputation <strong>in</strong>formation may be sharedamong friends. A trust management approach similar to Pretty GOOD Privacy (PGP)is used to validate received reputation <strong>in</strong>formation. Nodes with bad reputation may beisolated from the network. As a result, nodes are forced to be cooperative for their own

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