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Page 2 Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2865 Edited by G. Goos ...

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Resist<strong>in</strong>g Malicious Packet Dropp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Wireless Ad Hoc Networks 155<strong>in</strong>terest. Our proposed prob<strong>in</strong>g technique can be used as one of the monitor<strong>in</strong>g techniques<strong>in</strong> the CONFIDANT protocol.Awerbuch et al [2] proposed a secure rout<strong>in</strong>g protocol for resist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>by</strong>zant<strong>in</strong>e failures<strong>in</strong> a wireless ad hoc network. The protocol requires an ultimate dest<strong>in</strong>ation to sendan acknowledgment back to the sender for each of its successfully received packets. Ifthe loss rate of acknowledgment packets exceeds the predef<strong>in</strong>ed threshold, which is setto be slightly above the normal packet loss rate, the route used for send<strong>in</strong>g packets fromthe source to the dest<strong>in</strong>ation is detected as faulty and a b<strong>in</strong>ary search prob<strong>in</strong>g techniqueis deployed to locate the faulty l<strong>in</strong>k. The disadvantages of this protocol are: 1) it may<strong>in</strong>cur significant rout<strong>in</strong>g overhead; 2) a data packet with an <strong>in</strong>serted probe list can bedist<strong>in</strong>guished from those without probe lists, although the probe list is onion encryptedand cannot be tampered en route. Our proposed prob<strong>in</strong>g technique differs <strong>in</strong> that it canbe implemented above the network layer (e.g., based on UDP), and the end-to-end encryptionof IP payload us<strong>in</strong>g pair-wise shared keys can prevent <strong>in</strong>termediate nodes fromdist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>g probe messages from data packets.Padmanabhan and Simon [20] proposed a secure traceroute to locate faulty routers<strong>in</strong> wired networks. In their approach, end hosts will monitor network performance. If anend-to-end performance degrade is detected <strong>by</strong> a host to a dest<strong>in</strong>ation, a compla<strong>in</strong>t bitis set <strong>in</strong> all the subsequent traffic to that dest<strong>in</strong>ation. The compla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g host itself or therouter sitt<strong>in</strong>g closest to the compla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g host may start the troubleshoot<strong>in</strong>g process if itobserves enough compla<strong>in</strong>ts. It first sends a secure traceroute packet to the next hop,which can be derived from its rout<strong>in</strong>g table. The router receiv<strong>in</strong>g the secure traceroutepacket is expected to send a response back which also <strong>in</strong>cludes a next hop address. Thisprocess repeats until a faulty router is located (no response received from it) or everyrouter on the path to the ultimate dest<strong>in</strong>ation proves healthy. Our approach is differentfrom the secure traceroute <strong>in</strong> that 1) our approach is proposed for MANET us<strong>in</strong>g sourcerout<strong>in</strong>g protocols (e.g., DSR), the secure traceroute is ma<strong>in</strong>ly used <strong>in</strong> wired networks. 2)our approach does not require modification to exist<strong>in</strong>g rout<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>frastructures, the securetraceroute may need to modify IP layer <strong>in</strong> order to monitor performance problem; 3)our approach utilizes redundant rout<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation for diagnosis, the secure traceroutedoes not.Malicious nodes silently dropp<strong>in</strong>g packets exhibit the same behavior as selfish nodes,which may choose to drop packets for the sake of sav<strong>in</strong>g its own constra<strong>in</strong>t resources,such as battery or CPU cycle. Selfishness and its threat to the network performance havebeen well studied <strong>by</strong> Roughgarden [23]. Incentive mechanisms have been proposed toencourage selfish nodes to be cooperative and to forward packets for others. Unfortunately,<strong>in</strong>centive mechanisms don’t work for malicious users s<strong>in</strong>ce they never play<strong>by</strong> rules. Our proposed prob<strong>in</strong>g scheme can be used to detect and mitigate selfishnessproblem.3 Def<strong>in</strong>itions and Assumptions3.1 Node StatesWe classify the states of a node as follows. A node is GOOD if it responds to probemessages for itself and forwards other probe messages along their source routes. A

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