American Airpower Comes of Age

AMERICAN AIRPOWER COMES OF AGE
Knowing of British opposition to USSTAF and any extension of
its control to RAF Bomber Command, Spaatz may have felt
that his approach, less tactful than Eaker’s, might have given
the AAF a better chance of achieving a single Allied strategic
air command and having USSTAF remain free of Leigh-
Mallory’s command. He also may have speculated that he
might have better success than Eaker in achieving US air
goals in the preparation and execution of Overlord, given his
rapport with Eisenhower.
It is interesting to assess Arnold’s actions in this. In simplest
terms, it seems easy to agree with Spaatz’ biographer
that Arnold “seized on the command shuffle stemming from
the Cairo and Tehran conferences to cloak a decision he had
probably already reached.” 185 It could be added, however,
given Tooey’s diary entries, that Arnold found it very convenient
to accept the suggestion made by Spaatz that Eaker be
reassigned to the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, Arnold would
have conceded that he as CG AAF was responsible for the
decisions. Eaker also knew Arnold’s impetuous nature better
than any other airman except Spaatz. As a result, he was
aware that Arnold had been unyielding as well as unfair in
refusing to concede the impact of the many legitimate factors
limiting the Eighth’s operations. Arnold instead preferred to
charge these difficulties to Eaker’s lack of imagination and
aggressiveness. Arnold’s letter to Spaatz, presumably written
in February during “Big Week,” is important in explaining
more of Arnold’s reasoning. As Hap wrote, his reason behind
the creation of USSTAF was unity of AAF command in Britain
and Italy. He continued that an additional important motive
was his “desire to build an American Air Commander to a high
position prior to the defeat of Germany” that would be “parallel”
to Bomber Command and Eisenhower’s.
If you do not remain in a position parallel with Harris, the war will certainly
be won by the RAF, if anybody. Already the spectacular effectiveness
of their devastation . . . has placed their contribution in the
popular mind at so high a plane that I am having the greatest difficulty
in keeping your achievement (far less spectacular to the public) in its
proper role not only in publications, but unfortunately in military and
naval circles and, in fact, with the President himself. Therefore, considering
only the aspect of a proper American share in credit for suc-
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