American Airpower Comes of Age

ENGLAND
the graduates was his second son, William Bruce Arnold.
Although probably written by his staff and cleared through the
War Department, the speech reflected some of Arnold’s thinking
about the war. He used the occasion to emphasize the
strategic bombing campaign, insisting optimistically that the
morale of the enemy was “already beginning to crack” and that
the “tide was turning” in favor of the Allies. Insisting to the
new officers that the Axis powers had initiated the bombing of
cities, Arnold explained that, in contrast, we choose “only military
objectives.” He conceded that we occasionally “miss” our
targets but claimed that we are attaining an accuracy not
achieved by our enemies. Hap pointed to propaganda characterizing
the Allied aerial campaign as one directed against
noncombatants as evidence of declining Axis morale. He
included in the speech much of the rationale for strategic
bombing, saying that its continuation would in the long run
end the war sooner and “cut down the casualties,” an item of
concern to the young officers and their families. Optimistically,
he declared that the Allies were approaching a decisive
year, pointing out that the United States was now manufacturing
as many aircraft in 130 days as had been produced in
the entire 36 years from the first Kitty Hawk flights in 1903.
He tempered any optimism, however, by telling the new officers
that we had a “long, hard job” ahead and that Germany
and Japan were still “mighty military powers.” 20
During the Trident Conference, 13–25 May, the AAF was
represented by Deputy Chief of Staff Lt Gen Joseph McNarney.
The major strategic issue, essentially the strategy to be followed
in the European theater now that the Allied North
African campaign appeared successful, was one that had concerned
the CCS for the previous year and would prove to be
difficult for the next 15 months. The crux of the matter was
that the US chiefs wanted to get an agreement with the British
on a planning date for the invasion of northern Europe,
whereas the British insisted on a continuation of Mediterranean
operations. Two weeks before the conference began,
Arnold expressed his estimate of British strategy, which probably
also reflected the thinking of both Marshall and King. As
19