American Airpower Comes of Age

QUEBEC
operation had been agreed upon in December 1943 at Cairo.
Although Eisenhower, in the two weeks following the launching
of Overlord, insisted that implementation of this operation
was “vital” because of the need for additional port facilities, the
British had been opposing the operation for more than two
months. In their opposition, Churchill and the British chiefs of
staff argued that the troops and landing craft for Anvil should
instead remain intact in Italy, there to be part of the continuing
assault on Albert Kesselring’s stubbornly resisting German
armies. The British argued that the next Allied move, following
the German defeat in Italy, should be across the
Adriatic into Istria, through the Ljubljana Gap, and eventually
to Vienna. The Mediterranean theater, its main forces now
concentrated on the Italian peninsula, was essentially a
British one, with British leadership at the top and in command
of their 16 divisions, and naval forces—everything
except the US Fifth Army and the predominantly AAF air
assets. The British clearly did not want what they considered
their primary theater weakened in any way.
British doubts concerning Anvil had appeared as early as 14
April, when Admiral Cunningham sought “a clear cut decision
now” to abandon the proposed landings. Two days later,
Churchill, who had said at Cairo in December 1943 that the
southern France invasion “would contribute largely to the success
of Overlord,” now insisted that circumstances had
changed and Anvil should not be undertaken. 28 On the day
after D-Day, the British chiefs of staff urged Churchill to resist
the American plan to withdraw troops from the Italian battlefront
“in readiness for Anvil.” Arnold, Marshall, and King, during
their visit and meetings in London immediately following
D-Day, were exposed to considerable British pressure against
the southern France landings. 29
Churchill lost no opportunity in urging the abandonment of
Anvil on Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Marshall, and even Harry
Hopkins during the closing days of June. The British prime
minister continued to refer to the proposal in a variety of disparaging
terms. He lamented that his splendid Army in Italy
was being “pulled to pieces,” and deplored “the ceaseless withdrawal
of important elements,” which he indicated had been
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