American Airpower Comes of Age

AMERICAN AIRPOWER COMES OF AGE
assignments emanating from chance meetings with General
Arnold in the Pentagon passageways so that a proper response
could be prepared for the AAF’s impatient leader.
Hap’s wide-ranging interest and extensive knowledge about
most phases of Army aviation, combined with his driven
nature, contributed to his reluctance and/or inability to delegate
significant authority to Pentagon subordinates. As a consequence,
more issues and decisions were elevated to his Pentagon
E ring office for resolution than should have been the
case. As the diaries reflect, this tendency did not stop at the
water’s edge. Overseas commanders, particularly during or in
the wake of one of his whirlwind visits, received on-site comments,
most often followed by Washington-originated letters or
cables demanding responses about issues ranging from major
to seemingly minor ones. On the other hand, he rarely interfered
with operational decisions.
Well aware of his shortcomings, Arnold knew that his
method of operating did not allow time for the necessary
detached long-range planning and thinking denied by the
demands of day-to-day coping. As a result, Arnold established
a group in the Pentagon that became known as the Advisory
Council. It was functioning within 60 days of Pearl Harbor.
Physically located very close to Hap’s office, and having unlimited
access thereto, the Council consisted of trusted colonels
(originally all of them pilots and West Point graduates) who
were tasked with thinking in depth about the AAF, its problems,
and its prospects. One author has described their work
in relation to Hap this way: “It provided a sounding board for
the countless ideas and problems which faced him daily. This
included advance planning, strategy, organization, interservice
relations, technical equipment and manpower, and many
other things which contributed to the training and deployment
of air forces in combat.” 2
As one of its members recalled after the war, what “our
‘business’ was, however, was anything but clear to us.” But
“the vagueness of our function was a strength of the office,” as
we were “brought face-to-face with the complete range of
Arnold’s problems.” Another council member recalled Arnold
instructing him, “Your job is to do my thinking for me.” 3
2