American Airpower Comes of Age

AMERICAN AIRPOWER COMES OF AGE
Allied wartime leadership had been held in the last nine
months, that having been the second Quebec meeting covered
in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, Arnold remained frustrated
in early January 1945 by the seeming loss of momentum
by the Allies. Urged by Marshall, he wrote to Spaatz seeking
“greater destruction than we have been getting” in the
hope of bringing the war “to a close sooner.” 2 Spaatz did not
respond immediately, waiting no doubt until Arnold’s health
seemed sufficiently improved to continue a dialogue. Always
candid with his chief, the European AAF commander cautioned
Hap against “following the chimera of one air operation
that might end the war,” which, he concluded, “does not exist.”
Spaatz appeared in agreement with “Bomber” Harris that
there were no “panacea” targets. Realistically, Tooey made a
point Arnold would not have welcomed: that the “success of
our effort is unmeasurable, due to our inability to exploit the
success of our results achieved.” 3
Even if Allied military fortunes for the most part seemed to
be improving, Arnold’s health was not. On 17 January, as
preparations were being completed for Hap to accompany Roosevelt
and the JCS to meet with Churchill and Stalin at Yalta,
Arnold was stricken with his fourth and most serious heart
attack. He was flown to the AAF hospital in Miami Beach,
Florida, where he remained for the next two months under
close medical supervision. Although he attempted to continue
to lead the AAF from his sickbed, the perceived seriousness of
his illness at first limited visitors, correspondence, and telephone
calls. Early in his convalescence, his physician discouraged
if not prohibited visitors, including even his wife,
prompting rumors of his incapacitation among Army aviators.
Because of the uncertainty of his return to full duty, Stimson,
Lovett, and Marshall seriously considered replacing him as
AAF chief through forced medical retirement. 4 They were concerned
about whether he would continue his self-imposed,
punishing wartime pace even if he was able to return to duty
in the Pentagon. There were those in the capital who felt that
a journey away from Washington, even considering the exertion
required for the travel, was the only way to protect him
from the heavy demands he placed on himself. Given his
222