American Airpower Comes of Age

ENGLAND
as the Regensburg–Schweinfurt raids of 17 August. He criticized
the RAF Spitfires for not attacking the German airfields
there while the Luftwaffe was refueling to make a second
attack on the American bombers as they returned to England.
Other complaints involved what he considered the failure of
the RAF to put long-range tanks on the Spitfire and his assertion
that our “staggering air superiority” was not being used.
Asking for a candid reply to what he said was his candid
assessment, Arnold suggested that we put all our fighters into
“effective offensive action.” 159
Portal solicited comments from Air Marshal Trafford Leigh-
Mallory, then responsible for fighter defense of the United
Kingdom, and informed his superior, Secretary of State for Air
Archie Sinclair, of the contretemps. Leigh-Mallory informed
Portal that instead of the 1,000-to-3,000 fighters Arnold estimated
the RAF had, there were approximately 800 operationally
ready fighters, many of which were required for the
defense of the United Kingdom. He also told Portal that it had
been considered “unlikely,” when the AAF daylight operations
began, that the B-17s would require escort and that, even if
they were needed, they were to be provided by the AAF. Nevertheless,
he wrote that his command was making arrangements
for increasing the range of RAF fighters. 160
Portal’s response to Arnold 10 days later was no more polite
than Hap’s. Sarcastically calling Arnold’s letter “incisive” and
“detached,” he insisted that he was operating consistent with
the Pointblank directive. He said the RAF had fewer than half
the number of fighters Arnold credited them with and insisted
that one out of every three RAF fighters that left the ground in
the previous quarter “did so in order to provide protection for
the Eighth Air Force.” He further wrote that Arnold’s comparison
of the P-47 with the British Spitfire was not correct and
that any tactical advantage the Eighth had was “largely
thrown away by the slow rate of the build-up which you have
achieved.” He alluded to Arnold’s criticism of RAF use of the P-
51 by stressing the “great deal of prejudice,” clearly meaning
from the AAF, about getting that plane into production. In concluding,
however, he indicated that British fighter command
was being reorganized to provide more support for the bomb-
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