American Airpower Comes of Age

ENGLAND
were partially alleviated by the arrival of Col Hugh J. Knerr, one
of Arnold’s most bitter prewar critics and Andrews’ strongest
supporter, who would successfully head the VIII Air Service
Command. 44 Other innovations aimed at crew safety included
the flak suit devised by the Eighth’s flight surgeon, Brig Gen Malcolm
C. Grow. Its first use by aircrews was in the 1 February
1943 mission against Hamm. 45 While urging greater accomplishments
from Eaker and the Eighth, Arnold continued his
efforts to equip and support the strategic bombing offensive.
Among his endeavors was the search for an effective long-range
fighter to escort the bombers to their destination and then back
home. In his typical blunt fashion, and in part responding to
Lovett’s memos of four days earlier, Hap instructed his deputy,
Barney M. Giles, “you have got to get a fighter to protect our
bombers. Whether you use an existing type or have to start from
scratch is your problem.” One author has labeled this the most
important memo written by Arnold during the war. It prompted
Giles’ immediate travel to the North American aircraft factory,
which resulted in a vastly improved P-51 that became available
in numbers after January 1944 as an additional long-range
fighter escort. 46 Arnold journeyed to the West Coast himself for,
in his words, “the main purpose of putting the fear of God in the
. . . aircraft industry so as to keep our production from dropping
off.” He felt he had been successful in knocking “some of their
complacency out of them.” Eaker and others who had been and
would continue to be recipients of Arnold’s constant harangues
would have agreed with Hap’s self-appraisal at the time: “I’m
personally never satisfied.” On 1 August 1943, the day the
Ploesti mission was flown, Arnold directed that nose turrets be
installed on the heavy bombers “at the earliest practical date.” 47
Arnold never seemed to appreciate the reasons for the difference
between the numbers of aircraft and aircrews reported
to be in theater and their dispatch on combat missions. During
the month of June 1943, although the Eighth possessed a
daily average of 775 heavies assigned, its effective combat
strength was only 222 and on only four days during the month
were missions flown against targets in Germany. Repair and
modification of bombers, along with the in-theater training
required for the crews, were the primary causes of these dif-
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