American Airpower Comes of Age

PARIS AND GERMANY
Arnold’s support of Marshall “on the nuclear weapon decision”
(which was made by Truman, not Marshall) in return for which
the chief of staff would “support the . . . buildup of the postwar
independent air force” is far too simplistic an explanation of their
often complex relationship and interaction on this issue. Particularly
suspect is the fact that Alperovitz’ single source for this
conclusion is the recall 45 years after the events by an individual
who was not present, but who presented this as his “recollection,”
saying, “I don’t know who told me that or why or how
but that’s my recollection.” 124
Some insight into Arnold’s thinking may be gained from his
undated communication that he submitted to the JCS at about
this time. In it, he suggested that complete emphasis should be
put on the “strategic Air offensive, complemented by a Naval and
Air Blockade.” Conceding that the current “scale” of the aerial
onslaught was “expected to create conditions favorable” to the
Kyushu invasion, he suggested that an “acceleration and augmentation”
of the air campaign “culminating in a land campaign”
would bring defeat “with a minimum loss of American lives.” He
estimated that dropping 1,600,000 tons of bombs on Japan
would cause such dislocation and destruction as “might” cause
their capitulation. Further hedging his bet, Arnold suggested
that this increased tonnage “will in any event, assure the success
of the land campaign in Japan, and reduce the loss of . . . lives
to a minimum.” 125
On the other hand, the charge that Arnold failed to relate
the degree of destruction to Japanese surrender has validity.
However, this shortcoming is applicable to the military leaders
of other services who also failed to relate the results of their
operations and the resulting devastation to surrender,
whether the destruction was caused by their submarines, carriers,
blockades, occupation of large areas of enemy territory
by ground troops, devastation wrought by artillery shells, or
by the “dehousing” of thousands of enemy citizens by bombing.
Particularly was this flaw in Hap’s thinking made evident
after he viewed at close hand large sections of Germany
destroyed in Potsdam, Berlin, and other areas. Was this failure
to appreciate the will, spirit, and determination of the
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