American Airpower Comes of Age

AMERICAN AIRPOWER COMES OF AGE
others severely strained over his efforts to implement more
quickly the strategic bombing offensive.
This rift had its beginning when Arnold expressed his unhappiness
over the limited AAF bombing from English bases almost
immediately upon returning from the Casablanca meeting. As he
explained, he had been put “on the defensive” at the conference
by Churchill as well as FDR over that issue. Hap felt the explanations
coming from Eaker and Spaatz “seemed very weak” and
concluded that we are doing “practically nothing” with the heavies
in England. He suggested a cable to Gen Frank Andrews,
indicating that the 207 heavies then possessed “cannot be held
on the ground” for any extensive period “without subjecting us to
severe criticism.” 26 Part of the problem, discovered during his
trip to Casablanca and Asia, was that there was a “serious shortage
of aircraft in the hands of the units in contact with the
enemy.” He directed his Pentagon operations staff to build up the
combat units to “full strength,” requiring the noncombat units to
resort to “makeshift” means to achieve their full complements of
aircraft. 27
Even before the CBO plan had been developed, Arnold and
Eaker were communicating about acquiring and using sufficient
assets for the Eighth. The exchanges between these two
old friends were frank but not always overly amicable. In a
long, carefully reasoned letter labeled “statement of our critical
needs” and sent to Arnold in March, Eaker expressed concern
over the growing strength of the German fighter force and
the need for the Eighth to be given the assets required to
“redeem its unkept promise.” He claimed that his aircrews
“will pay for the mistakes of their superiors,” a not-very-veiled
disparagement of Washington leadership. 28 Stung by the criticism,
Hap commented to his staff, “Eaker thinks I am personally
responsible” for the dispersion of planes to North Africa.
He conceded that Eaker had been the “forgotten” man, since
others had viewed aircraft sent to England as a reservoir from
which planes could be drawn, and informed Spaatz that, if left
alone, he could get a “decent sized” air force to England by
fall. 29 His response to the Eighth leader in reference to the
needs of other Air force commanders around the world was
that he had “eight youngsters to feed” but that he “will do the
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