American Airpower Comes of Age

AMERICAN AIRPOWER COMES OF AGE
the acquisition of long-range fighter escorts. Although Arnold
indicated that the AAF had “planes and replacement crews” to
sustain a 25 percent loss rate, he conceded correctly that it was
impossible to determine whether or not this could be maintained.
Since bad weather intervened after second Schweinfurt
until early in 1944, the question was never answered whether
the American public would tolerate such losses. The problem
was on the way to being resolved with the arrival, beginning in
January, of drop tank-equipped P-51s and P-47s in relatively
large numbers. 170 Already some in the media were speculating to
members of Arnold’s staff that the American public “might not
stand” for losses “every couple of days,” the equivalent of the cost
of “half a dozen destroyers or one big cruiser or small aircraft
carrier.” 171
In no small measure, Arnold’s belief in the invulnerability of
the B-17 to enemy fighters was responsible for the lack of
long-range fighter escorts; yet he was clearly motivated by this
visit to increase his efforts in furnishing the long-range escorts
to Eaker. At the same time, Allied intelligence, in spite of the
optimism of Arnold, Eaker, and the bulk of other airmen in the
theater, was not able to evaluate to what extent these sacrifices
were necessary in order to accomplish the goal of
destroying the Luftwaffe before the Overlord invasion or, in the
long run, to validate the concept of strategic bombing. Available
statistics on German fighter production did not show any
appreciable decline. In fact, German fighter production
increased during much of 1944. 172
Among other important results of the trip, it seems probable
that Arnold felt without articulating it that Eaker’s days as
Eighth Air Force commander were numbered. One can
empathize with Eaker as he labored to achieve success, limited
as he was by inadequate resources and habitual bad
weather, while enduring with inordinate patience the hectoring
from his chief who was also one of his two closest friends
in the AAF. Arnold’s concept of strategic bombing as the raison
d’être of a current and postwar air force overshadowed
Eaker’s vision as a theater air commander. The opportunity to
replace Eaker with another seasoned airman having both tactical
and strategic experience, who was supported by Eisen-
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