American Airpower Comes of Age

ENGLAND
ments. His crash and death on 3 May lessened what had been
an important moderating influence. His replacement was a
nonaviator who, although sympathetic to the AAF and its
needs, could not effectively fill the ameliorator role.
To what degree Assistant Secretary of War Robert Lovett’s sixweek
trip to England in May, undertaken after Arnold’s second
attack, was aimed at examining and resolving some of these
issues is not clear. He was billeted with the Eighth Air Force leadership,
where he gained a clearer appreciation of their problems.
On his return, he generated a host of memos to Arnold covering
in detail many facets of operational problems in England.
Although Eaker felt that Lovett’s visit had helped smooth over
some of his difficulties with Hap, the tone of communications
between Arnold and Eaker appeared increasingly impatient and
less tolerant of each other. Particularly was this true in the
months following the Trident Conference, which had established
a target date less than a year away to achieve success with the
strategic bombing offensive. 35
Arnold’s deputy accurately described the situation in the
Pentagon to Eaker in June, following Hap’s convalescence:
“General Arnold is back in the driver’s seat.” 36 The next day,
Arnold cabled Eaker about the low in-commission rate of the
Eighth, concerned not only for the present but for what might
happen with the planned additional arrivals. 37 Eaker’s immediate
response outlined the problem of his and other commanders,
reporting that although there were 664 heavies in
the theater only 385 of them were immediately available for
operations. The Eighth commander continued very frankly:
“You are not satisfied with conditions here. Neither am I, and
I am not satisfied with the support I have had . . . We get
nowhere with recriminations. I can do this job if I get the same
support from you I am getting from Theater Commander [Devers].”
38 Relations had not improved three days later, as Arnold
asserted that his efforts and communications were aimed at
toughening up Eaker and making him a better commander. 39
Eaker’s response two weeks later was long and equally candid,
indicating that he had always felt Arnold was more demanding
of him than others lest they think his success was due to
their friendship. He identified much of the personality differ-
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