American Airpower Comes of Age

CAIRO, TEHRAN, PALESTINE, CAIRO, ITALY
131. The meeting lasted less than 40 minutes. Now that FDR had “caved
in” and Churchill had succeeded in having the Andaman Islands operation
abandoned, the prime minister described the report as a “masterly survey”
and “in accordance with the principles of war.” FRUS CT, 749.
132. Since the surrender occurred on 8 May 1945, Portal made the closest
estimate with Arnold and Brooke not far behind.
133. As indicated elsewhere, Wilson was approved as Allied Commander
in Chief, Mediterranean Theater. With Spaatz, at least in Arnold’s mind, now
slated to leave for England to command what was to be USSTAF, the question
was important in terms of an American air commander in the
Mediterranean. The CCS meeting is covered in FRUS CT, 753–63.
134. Lord Leathers (Frederick James) was British Minister of War
Transportation. Accounts of the dinner are in Arnold, Global Mission, 474;
and Bryant, 77–78.
135. Probably Osmond J. Ritland, USA, rank and assignment unknown.
No Anders appeared in the Army Register of this date. Logically it was not Lt
Gen Wladislaw Anders, Corps Commander of the Polish Government in Exile
troops then fighting on the Italian front whom Arnold would visit in Italy on
24 April 1945.
136. Payne Field, Cairo, billed then as one of the world’s largest airports,
was dedicated 25 October 1943, by Maj Gen Ralph Royce, CG, US Forces in
the Middle East. It had been rebuilt in 58 days from a former RAF reconnaissance
base. It was named for Lt Col John Payne of Austin, Texas, killed
January 1943 while on a mission with the Ninth Air Force.
137. Arnold probably visited the Musee Alaoui, located in the northwest
environs of the city near the ancient palace called the Bardo, and known for
its Carthaginian and Roman antiquities.
138. The discussion, confirmed with the Overlord commander, was on the
leadership and operation of the new USSTAF to be established in England.
This decision would eventually result in several personnel changes of AAF
personnel mentioned below. It appears strange that Arnold does not devote
more attention in the diary and in his memoirs to the decisions made at this
second Cairo conference dealing with the strategic air offensive against
Germany. Although it is barely mentioned in Global Mission, one result of
the Casablanca meeting of January 1943 had been the issuance of the CCS
166/1/D of 21 January, which although it established priorities for strategic
bombing of Germany by the US Eighth and RAF Bomber Command,
“made no mention of the system of command under which the combined
offensive was to be conducted.” No doubt the omission of specifics was
intentional and the system as it evolved provided for control of US bomber
operations to be in the hands of RAF Chief of Staff Portal acting as agent for
the CCS. This direction of US bomber operations in Britain would be in the
hands of the British as a “matter of command rather than agreement with
US commanders,” whatever that phrase meant. Actual operations would be
“the responsibility of US commanders to decide the technique and method
to be employed.”
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