Armed and insecure
pax-report-horn-of-africa-armed-and-insecure
pax-report-horn-of-africa-armed-and-insecure
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Despite being dubbed “Al-Shabaab’s number one enemy”, Ethiopia has successfully prevented<br />
major attacks on its territory, reportedly foiling several terror plans. 583 In one sense, Ethiopia (as<br />
part of AMISOM) waging ‘pre-emptive attacks’ <strong>and</strong> incursions could be seen as self-protection<br />
from the terror threat. 584 For example, up to 3,000 troops reportedly crossed the border into<br />
Somalia in June 2015. 585 The country’s return to the fray as part of AMISOM in early 2014 drew<br />
a fair amount of consternation given previous incursions. 586 Ethiopian soldiers were reportedly<br />
attacked as part of AMISOM in April 2016, in an ambush near El Bur in central Somalia. 587<br />
Though numerous, the exact numbers of casualties of AMISOM soldiers remain elusive, a thorny<br />
<strong>and</strong> disturbing issue in itself. A September 2015 report rightfully proposed that “we should be<br />
skeptical about the accuracy of all estimates <strong>and</strong> be aware of the politics <strong>and</strong> inherent limitations<br />
of ongoing efforts to estimate AMISOM’s fatalities”. 588 Still, “measured by the number of fatalities<br />
per peacekeeper deployed, AMISOM is probably the most deadly peace operation ever conducted<br />
in Africa [...] probably because there are no publicly available records of AMISOM’s fatalities”.<br />
Deemed the best estimate, SIPRI’s database on peace operations concludes that between 2009<br />
<strong>and</strong> the end of 2013, “AMISOM suffered 1,039 fatalities”, a knowingly conservative estimate. 589<br />
Looking forward, the touted gains in Somalia may be heavily infused with wishful thinking. While<br />
levels of violence have decreased, their nature has changed as well—<strong>and</strong> that may not be good<br />
news, according to Bronwyn Bruton, deputy director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council:<br />
“Al-Shabaab is simply retreating, conceding ground [...] they are not actually<br />
confronting AMISOM head-on anymore, which means that their forces <strong>and</strong><br />
weapons are mostly intact. They have shifted from a conventional force to a<br />
pure terrorist one that is increasingly focusing its attention on attacks outside<br />
of Somalia, in Kenya, <strong>and</strong> elsewhere in the region. AMISOM’s territorial gains<br />
have also spread its forces more thinly, leaving their supply lines exposed<br />
to asymmetrical attacks. Ambushes <strong>and</strong> improvised explosive devices, once<br />
relatively infrequent in Somalia, are now regular occurrences on the sparsely<br />
583 Voice of America News, ‘Ethiopia Successful in Preventing Al-Shabab’s Attacks’, September 2015, http://www.voanews.com/content/ethiopia-avoids-alshabab-attacks/2969120.html;<br />
Al Jazeera, ‘Is Ethiopia on al-Shabab’s hit list?’, October 2013, www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/10/ethiopia-al-shababhit-list-201310211211366477.html.<br />
584 Mail & Guardian, ‘Kenya, Ethiopia planes attack Somalia region, as Shabaab-held key town Bardere falls’, July 2015, http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-07-<br />
22-african-union-forces-kill-5-islamist-rebels-in-somalia-camp-including-notorious-leader-mohammed-dahir.<br />
585 Voice of America, ‘Ethiopian Troops Enter Somalia for Attack on al-Shabab’, July 2015, www.voanews.com/content/ethiopian-troops-enter-somalia-attackal-shabab/2853830.html.<br />
586 War is Boring, ‘Ethiopian Troops Have Returned to Somalia—That’s Not a Good Thing’, February 2014, https://warisboring.com/ethiopian-troops-havereturned-to-somalia-thats-not-a-good-thing-deb471d2125#.z0jlcbf5a.<br />
587 Shabelle, ‘Somalia: Al Shabaab Ambushes Ethiopian Army Convoy Near El Bur’, April 2016, http://allafrica.com/stories/201604070721.html.<br />
588 “This topic is important for several reasons. First, peacekeepers that die while performing tasks m<strong>and</strong>ated by the United Nations Security Council <strong>and</strong> AU<br />
deserve to have their sacrifice publicly recognized… Second, the families of fallen peacekeepers deserve to receive the death compensation payments due to<br />
them as spelled out in the Memor<strong>and</strong>ums of Underst<strong>and</strong>ing (MoUs) signed between the AU <strong>and</strong> AMISOM’s contributing countries… And, third, the deliberate<br />
policy of keeping such information secret has arguably contributed to undermining AMISOM’s credibility to the extent that its strategic communications are<br />
perceived by many Somalis to be unreliable.” IPI Global Observatory, ‘Special Report: How Many Fatalities Has the African Union Mission in Somalia Suffered?’,<br />
September 2015, http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/09/amisom-african-union-somalia-peacekeeping/.<br />
589 Ibid; SIPRI, ‘Database of Peacekeeping Operations’, https://www.sipri.org/databases/pko.<br />
130 PAX ! <strong>Armed</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>insecure</strong>