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in addition to Lower and Middle Juba. 347 Between January 2009 and August 2013, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) recorded 103 attacks by Al-Shabaab in Kenya, 41 of which “involved the deliberate targeting of civilians, while 62 engaged police or military forces”; 65 per cent occurred in the northeast of Kenya, 20 in Nairobi, and 15 in the coastal region. Before Kenya’s military involvement in Somalia, an attack occurred once every seven weeks; since the incursion there was almost one attack per week in the period under review. 348 One particularly gruesome attack in November 2012 saw Al- Shabaab kill ten civilians by detonating grenades in a crowded Nairobi bus. Indeed, Al-Shabaab attacks on Kenyan territory increased in 2012, including reports from Nairobi of “involuntary suicide bombers, people who were tricked into carrying objects that turned out to be remote controlled bombs”. 349 Nonetheless, the tools of violence in attacks usually showed a “preference for small arms and light weapons by the attackers (and) has clearly established the prominent role of guns, hand grenades and improvised explosive devices (IEDs)”. 350 Violence took a turn for the worse in 2013, as on 21 September a small group of Al-Shabaab militants (possibly around ten), arriving in three groups and armed with automatic weapons and grenades, began a siege at the affluent Nairobi shopping mall Westgate, holding hostages for four days; the eventual toll was over 70 people dead (including the assailants) and up to 200 injured. The operation that ended the siege reportedly included Israeli commandos, special forces, Kenyan military and armed volunteer ‘Samaritans’—a terribly disorganised response that probably added to the number of casualties. 351 The carnage continued in 2014 and 2015: between Somalia and Kenya, Al-Shabaab killed somewhere between 400 and 500 civilians. It has been considered one of most active terror groups in the world, conducting 80 attacks in Kenya in 2014 alone, and more than 200 since 2008. 352 In June 2014, 48 people were killed in attacks on hotels and a police station near the island resort of Lamu. 353 Though unclear whether Al-Shabaab was responsible for all of these attacks, several other attacks continued in the region throughout July, possibly resulting in over 100 casualties. 354 In November 2014, Al-Shabaab perpetrated an attack in Mandera County in northern Kenya, with gunmen pulling non-Muslim passengers out of a bus and killing 28 of 347 African Union Mission in Somalia, ‘Kenya – KDF’ http://amisom-au.org/kenya-kdf/. 348 ACLED , ‘Al-Shabaab Activity in Kenya’ August 2013,www.acleddata.com/visuals/trends/infographics-2/al-shabaab-kenya-august-2013/. 349 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, ‘Al-Shabaab - Civilians’ http://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo?id=1071&entityType=6. 350 ISS Africa, ‘Addressing Rising Insecurity in Kenya’, July 2012, www.issafrica.org/iss-today/addressing-rising-insecurity-in-kenya. 351 The Guardian, ‘Terror in Nairobi: the full story behind al-Shabaab’s mall attack’, October 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/westgatemall-attacks-kenya; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, ‘Al-Shabaab - Civilians’, http://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo?id=1071&entityType=6. 352 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, ‘Al-Shabaab - Civilians’, http://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo?id=1071&entityType=6; START, ‘Al-Shabaab Attack on Garissa University in Kenya’ www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport_alShabaabGarissaU_April2015.pdf. 353 BBC, ‘Kenya profile – Timeline’, July 2014, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13682176 ; New York Times, ‘Gruesome Attacks in Kenyan Villages Heighten Fears of a Nation on Edge‘, July 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/07/07/world/africa/deadly-attacks-in-kenya.html. 354 IRIN News, ‘Conflict dynamics on Kenya’s coast’, July 2014, www.irinnews.org/report/100394/analysis-conflict-dynamics-kenya%E2%80%99s-coast. 84 PAX ! Armed and insecure
them. 355 A few days later, 36 workers in a Mandera quarry were murdered. 356 Possibly the most tragic attack—and Al-Shabaab’s largest strike—came in April 2015, when 147 people, mostly students reportedly targeted for being Christian, were massacred by four gunmen at Garissa University in Kenya’s northeast. Despite a siege of over 12 hours, the security forces’ response was once again heavily criticised. 357 The brutal attack was “among the three most deadly terrorist attacks on educational targets on record since 1970” worldwide. 358 The purported mastermind of the attack, Mohamed Kuno, who had reportedly since defected from Al-Shabaab with 1,200 fighters to join a pro-ISIS faction, was killed in Somalia in May 2016. 359 Almost five years on, it would appear that early criticisms of Kenya’s intervention in Somalia—its haste in preparation (mainly in response to kidnappings of foreigners), lack of proper strategy and international support, shifting goals and ignorance of the potential blowback—were vindicated: “involvement in Somalia was partly motivated by a desire to inoculate North Eastern Province from the chaos across its border, ease a huge refugee burden and curtail the radical influence of Al-Shabaab, but the unintended consequences may prove destabilising”. 360 Indeed, it is quite feasible that rather than protecting Kenyan citizens, involvement in Somalia has brought upon them higher levels of violence, as the border “is now the soft underbelly in the war against Al-Shabaab [...] part of its strategy is to outflank the KDF and wage a low-intensity guerrilla campaign [...] behind Kenyan lines”. 361 In fact, the blowback has spread geographically, with attacks in the following locations in 2014: Mandera (19 attacks), Nairobi (nine), Mombasa (nine), Garissa (seven), and Wajir (five). 362 Now entrenched, Al-Shabaab threatens to further ignite ethnic and political conflicts in Kenya. 363 355 BBC, ‘Kenya bus attack: Military kills 100 Shabab militants’, November 2014, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30167891. 356 The Guardian, ‘Al-Shabaab militants kill 36 Christian quarry workers in Kenya’, December 2014, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/02/kenya-quarrymassacre-leaves-36-dead-says-red-cross. 357 BBC, ‘Kenya attack: 147 dead in Garissa University assault’, April 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32169080; Voice of America, ‘Threat Remains One Year After Garissa University Terror Attack’, www.voanews.com/content/threat-remains-one-year-after-garissa-university-terror-attack/3262900.html. 358 START, ‘Al-Shabaab Attack on Garissa University in Kenya’, www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport_alShabaabGarissaU_April2015.pdf. 359 The Star, ‘Garissa massacre mastermind Mohammed Kuno killed -Juba security minister’, June 2016, www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/06/01/garissamassacre-mastermind-mohammed-kuno-killed-juba-security_c1361824. 360 ICG, ‘The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia’, February 2012, www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/184%20-%20The%20 Kenyan%20Military%20Intervention%20in%20Somalia.pdf. 361 Ibid. 362 START, ‘Al-Shabaab Attack on Garissa University in Kenya’, www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport_alShabaabGarissaU_April2015.pdf. 363 “Al-Shabaab has kept its promise to bring the war to Kenya, whether by its own hand or local affiliates and by sowing divisions in a nation still not at ease with itself. Its intent is two-fold: to put pressure on the government’s continued deployment with AMISOM in southern Somalia by hitting targets that directly affect the financial interests of the middle ‘political’ class and divide them; and meanwhile insert cells and trained fighters into locations with pre-existing grievances and patterns of violence that the authorities have historically struggled to address and contain”, ICG, ‘Kenya: Al-Shabaab – Closer to Home’, September 2014, www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/b102-kenya-al-shabaab-closer-to-home. PAX ! Armed and insecure 85
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Armed and insecure An overview of a
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Armed and insecure An overview of a
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MSF NISAT-PRIO OCHA OHCHR RECSA RPG
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Weapon Use 68 Military Spending and
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Agents of Political Conflict in Afr
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Saudi Arabia Map 2 Horn of Africa S
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unacceptable humanitarian harm caus
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corruption, Somalia ranks last in t
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A few lessons learned can be mentio
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1. Sudan Once the continent’s lar
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iggest perpetrator of this type of
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documented, a few of which will be
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The relentless bombing and constant
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107mm mortars, as well as reportedl
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weapon systems are Russia, China, U
Page 34 and 35: small arms and light weapons (SALW)
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Page 38 and 39: which they deemed ineffective. 124
Page 40 and 41: Spotlight: Children killed and maim
Page 42: © Enough / Amanda Hsiao South Suda
Page 45 and 46: !Abyei South Sudan Juba The Sudanes
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Page 49 and 50: embargo on South Sudan. 161 In earl
Page 51 and 52: implement” the remainder of the c
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Page 55 and 56: Equatorian leaders complained to th
Page 57 and 58: Spotlight: An Armed Newborn—Pre-i
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Page 62 and 63: 3. Uganda With a population slightl
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Page 81 and 82: Kenya Nairobi largest city), which
Page 83: end of 2014; the remaining cases ar
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Page 89 and 90: 380 381 FN PRODUCTION Kenya has a s
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Page 108: © David Stanley Military equipment
Page 111 and 112: Eritrea Asmara severe drought and f
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also been starkly criticised. 616 M
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and extended it until October 2015,
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SMALL ARMS Because of the embargo,
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supplying enemy lines, as it has be
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consignment” seized on the MV Sha
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© US DoD / Staff Sgt. Joseph Araiz
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Djibouti Djibouti nation’s mariti
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killed. 689 Regardless, the history
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the launching-pad for drone surveil
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use of major weapons in Djibouti—
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the UN Firearms Protocol on small a
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conflict situations or homicides. 7
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For example, SIPRI has been unable
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weapons have been acquired is often
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To the governments of Horn of Afric
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Godebaldkwartier 74 3511 DZ Utrecht
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