Armed and insecure

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Conclusions and Recommendations The above overview of the transfer and use of arms in the Horn of Africa between 2010 and 2015 allows for a straightforward and far from novel conclusion: the Horn of Africa is a very volatile region and as such transferring arms to most of its nations is an extremely risky proposition. Tragically, the use of weapons in the region is not a hypothetical question. In many circumstances, arms are likely to be used, whether by government forces or armed groups. Of course, armed violence in the Horn of Africa is not self-contained; it impacts and is impacted by adjacent areas. Arms sent or held by actors in the broader region have the potential to result in civilian deaths in the Horn. Indeed, arms, and the violence they facilitate, often migrate subregionally rather than in a broader geographic scope. Military stockpiles can quickly spread across national borders into the hands of various armed forces and actors. Likewise, trafficking lanes often operate in both directions. Conflict In several countries, internal or transnational conflicts continue to cause civilian casualties on a daily basis, despite their relative invisibility in terms of global media coverage and political attention. The ‘calm’ areas or countries within the Horn of Africa are only so in comparison to their more troubled neighbours. According to the most recent estimate available (2007-2012) for the eight nations under consideration (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda), an average of 35,336 people a year are killed in the region, whether in 158 PAX ! Armed and insecure
conflict situations or homicides. 737 Rough estimates of those who died in the civil war that started in South Sudan in late 2013—up to 100,000 people—suggest that the average annual figure for the years beyond 2012 is likely to have increased. Moreover, the numbers of those wounded, traumatised or forced to flee their homes or countries dwarf the numbers of those killed. With so many already impacted and countless others at risk, it is imperative that efforts be made to better control the trade of arms, to prevent them from ending up in the hands of those violating human rights or involved in war crimes. While many of the historical, ethnic, political, social and economic factors that ultimately drive and sustain conflict and armed violence in the Horn of Africa are beyond the scope of this report, it is clear that the weapons that facilitate or render violence particularly lethal must be better curbed and restrained. As noted at the outset, governments must shift from a traditional focus on ‘national security’ to prioritising ‘human security’ as part of efforts to significantly reduce levels of armed violence. In that context, human security goes beyond military protection, to include a wide range of security areas, such as economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. 738 Likewise, efforts must be made at the local level, with successful community, cultural and awareness-raising programmes that are already in place being scaled up and supported by donors and the international community. 739 This report focuses on the national and international levels, and many lessons learned there are evident. As noted, the discrepancy between the problems exacerbated by weapons and efforts by individual governments to curb them is enormous in the Horn of Africa. Arms Control While certainly no panacea, introducing and improving arms control mechanisms can help build confidence, especially in a region characterised by conflict, porous borders and arms transfers shrouded in secrecy. Thus, better arms control structures—licensing policy, border control, stockpile management, restraints on civilian possession and transparency in reporting—are urgent and essential. One important measure of a government’s readiness to receive weapons is its ability to keep them safe from diversion and accidents. Stockpile security and management are basic but essential aspects of control over the instruments of violence; diversion to unauthorised groups or individuals (whether through corruption, malice, incompetence or omission) can be an indicator of how well a given state performs. Regional mechanisms, including work done by the African Union, IGAD, RECSA and UNREC, as well as civil society initiatives, are important in raising further awareness about the need for strict arms control in the Horn, and assist in its 737 Geneva Declaration, ‘Global Burden of Armed Violence 2015’. Average annual rate for all countries (35,336) in most recent estimate (2007-2012). www. genevadeclaration.org/measurability/global-burden-of-armed-violence/global-burden-of-armed-violence- 2015.html. 738 UN Chronicle, ‘National Security versus Global Security’, May 2015, http://unchronicle.un.org/article/national-security-versus-global-security. 739 See for example the successful Kuron Peace Village project in South Sudan: PAX, ‘Kuron Peace Village in South Sudan’, http://www.paxforpeace.nl/ourwork/programmes/kuron-peace-village-in-south-sudan. PAX ! Armed and insecure 159
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Armed and insecure An overview of a
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Armed and insecure An overview of a
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MSF NISAT-PRIO OCHA OHCHR RECSA RPG
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Weapon Use 68 Military Spending and
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Agents of Political Conflict in Afr
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Saudi Arabia Map 2 Horn of Africa S
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unacceptable humanitarian harm caus
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corruption, Somalia ranks last in t
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A few lessons learned can be mentio
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1. Sudan Once the continent’s lar
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iggest perpetrator of this type of
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documented, a few of which will be
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The relentless bombing and constant
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107mm mortars, as well as reportedl
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weapon systems are Russia, China, U
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small arms and light weapons (SALW)
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ocket launchers are also promoted.
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which they deemed ineffective. 124
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Spotlight: Children killed and maim
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© Enough / Amanda Hsiao South Suda
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!Abyei South Sudan Juba The Sudanes
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“Hundreds of extra-judicial killi
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embargo on South Sudan. 161 In earl
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implement” the remainder of the c
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thought to have been considerable,
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Equatorian leaders complained to th
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Spotlight: An Armed Newborn—Pre-i
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3. Uganda With a population slightl
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civil disobedience”—led to anot
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against the arrest and beating of a
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nonetheless killed 725 civilians in
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Concerning major weapons systems, t
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SU-30s do not appear to meet any ob
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the aim of offsetting the North’s
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Spotlight—Uganda and South Sudan:
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© Pete Lewis / UK DFID Refugee she
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Kenya Nairobi largest city), which
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end of 2014; the remaining cases ar
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them. 355 A few days later, 36 work
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2009, reaching USD 954 million in 2
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380 381 FN PRODUCTION Kenya has a s
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of USD 16,305 in small arms ammunit
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One fascinating investigative repor
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5. Ethiopia Among the largest and m
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the secession and autonomy efforts
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Ethiopian security forces have kill
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while providing limited hardware, t
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with the transformation of S-75 sur
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had been binding since March 1999.
Page 108: © David Stanley Military equipment
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Page 117 and 118: Arms Transfers The imposition of th
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Page 138 and 139: SMALL ARMS Because of the embargo,
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