The Metaphysical Foundation of Buddhism and Modern Science

in relation to their strict scientific purpose. Towards the end of its long
life, the doctrine lost its utility and turned into an obstructive agency.
The Platonic group of notions which have been considered have none of
the merits of the Aristotelian set. In fact, they are philosophic, and in
the narrow sense are not scientific. They suggest no detailed
observation. Indeed it has always been a reproach to Plato that he
diverted interest from observation of the particular facts. So far as
concerns political theory, and in particular jurisprudence, this accusation
is certainly untrue, and arises from the habit of concentrating interest
on his Dialogues in proportion to their literary brilliance. Nevertheless
the assertion is undoubtedly true in respect to physical science. But Plato
had another message. Where Aristotle said ‘observe’ and ‘classify’, the
moral of Plato’s teaching is the importance of the study of mathematics.
Of course, neither of them was so stupid as to dissuade from observation
or, on the other hand, to deny the utility of mathematics. Probably
Aristotle thought that the mathematical knowledge of his day was about
as much as was wanted for the purpose of physical science. Any further
progress could only minister to an unpractical curiosity about subtle
abstractions.
An intense belief that a knowledge of mathematical relations would
prove the key to unlock the mysteries of the relatedness within Nature
was ever at the back of Plato’s cosmological speculations. In one passage
he reprobates the swinish ignorance of those who have failed to study