The Metaphysical Foundation of Buddhism and Modern Science

passim] for expounding my point of view in some independence of Bradley,
with due acknowledgement. Surely the proper method of choosing
technical terms is to adopt terms from some outstanding exposition of an
analogous doctrine. It throws an interesting light on the belief in a wellunderstood
technical phraseology reigning in philosophy, that an
accomplished philosopher censured in print, my use of the word Feeling as
being in a sense never before employed in philosophy.
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I may add that William James also employs the word in much the same
sense in his Psychology. For example in the first chapter he writes,
"Sensation is the feeling of first things". And in the second chapter he
writes, "In general, this higher consciousness about things is called
Perception, the mere inarticulate feeling of their presence is Sensation,
so far as we have it at all. To some degree we seem able to lapse into this
inarticulate feeling at moments when our attention is entirely dispersed."
It is interesting to make a few citations from Bradley, illustrating my
general adherence to his doctrine of Feeling, as expressed in his Chapter,
"In my general feeling at any moment there is more than the objects
before me, and no perception of objects will exhaust the sense of a living
emotion"[Bradley, p. 159].
In accordance with this doctrine of Bradley's, I analyze a feeling [or
prehension] into the 'datum', which is Bradley's 'living emotion', and into
the 'subject' which is Bradley's 'me'. My reason for using the term
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