The Historiography of the Holocaust

Antisemitism and Holocaust Denial 445
According to Shafir, the radical post-communist east-central European political
landscape is to a great extent inhabited by what he terms parties of ‘radical
continuity’ and to a lesser extent by parties of ‘radical return’. The two concepts
were introduced by Shafir in 1992. 18 The former are ‘successor parties’, that is,
the products of national communism free to manifest themselves in a posttotalitarian
society without ideological constraints, but enjoying access to
present material resources (as partakers in the attempted ‘organizational continuity’).
The latter advocate a return to the values and creeds held by the interwar
far right. 19 The parties that reject continuity with communism have to look for
alternative resources such as ‘historic continuity’ or ‘return to history’. However,
in establishing and promoting their ideological and legitimizing framework,
most parties belonging to both categories are often involved in Holocaust
denial. 20 As for the size of this phenomenon, Randolph Braham’s observation on
Hungary can arguably be expanded to cover most former communist countries:
[Although] the number of populist champions of anti-Semitism is relatively
small, the camp of those distorting and denigrating the catastrophe of the
Jews is fairly large and . . . growing. [The] members of this camp represent a
potentially greater danger [both] to the integrity of the historical record of
the Holocaust [and]...to the newly established democratic system[s, because
these] history cleansers who denigrate and distort the Holocaust are often
‘respectable’ public figures – intellectuals, [popular politicians and members
of] government[s]...and high-ranking army officers. 21
The partisans of radical return whose ranks are usually swelled by the fiercest
negationists, despite opposing the legacy of the defunct political order, owe it
the popularity of their negationism. This process of historical distortion is among
the causes of the re-emergence of interwar fascist leaders such as Admiral Miklós
Horthy and Arrow Cross head Ferenc Szálasi in Hungary, Iron Guard founder
and leader Corneliu Zelea Codreanu and Marshal Ion Antonescu in Romania,
President Father Jozef Tiso in Slovakia, and Ustaša leader Ante Pavelic in Croatia,
as national heroes easily transformed, after the fall of communism, into anticommunist
symbols, exemplary patriots and martyrs. Their memory is being
increasingly cherished, the claims of their assiduous admirers going as far as
demanding their immediate canonization (in the cases of Tiso, Codreanu and
Antonescu)! 22
In their attempt to define their place within the political spectrum and
constellations of national values, mainstream political formations in this part
of Europe struggle to adjust themselves to their countries’ enthusiasm for
‘returning to Europe’ and the equally powerful affirmation of ‘national selfdetermination’.
This dilemma often forces them to resort to legitimization
through ‘historical continuity’, a consequence of the fact that their nations’