Avant-propos - Studia Moralia

Studia
Moralia
Biannual Review
published by the Alphonsian Academy
Revista semestral
publicada por la Academia Alfonsiana
VOL. 40 / 1
2002
EDITIONES ACADEMIAE ALFONSIANAE
Via Merulana 31 - 00185 Roma, Italia

Avant-propos: 40 years
of Studia Moralia
Introducing the first issue of Studia Moralia in 1962, Fr. J. Visser
C.Ss.R. explains, in Latin, that the purpose of this journal is not to
add to the already large number of periodicals in existence, but rather
to make available the fruit of current research on fundamental
and practical themes of moral theology.
There is no need to rehearse here how much has changed in the
world, and in moral theology, since 1962. The challenging task is to
try to respond to these changes while remaining faithful to the initial
project.
In biographical terms, 40 years is a land-mark at which the socalled
existential questions emerge: What has it all meant so far?
Where do we go from here? What if…? Perhaps these same questions
can help us all (authors, editorial board and readers) in the course of
this anniversary year in the on-going task of defining the role, shape
and goal of Studia Moralia, not least through a more adequate interpretation
of its history. The second issue of this year will include
more extensive considerations of this kind, in the preparation of
which we welcome comment, critique and suggestions.
————
The fact that Studia Moralia is still here to pose itself such interesting
questions is thanks to the generous collaboration of generations
of contributors, editors and collaborators. Particular recognition
is due at this juncture to the former editor Prof. Raphael
Gallagher, of the Alphonsian Academy. Prof. Gallagher has served,
along with his colleagues, diligently and creatively as Secretary of the
Commission for Studia Moralia since 1996. In these years the journal
has seen a number of significant developments. Through a period of
experimentation, a format for the layout has been found that is
agreeable to the eye and clear to the mind. The polyglottal nature of

4 AVANT-PROPOS
the publication and its genuinely global distribution have made it
possible to attend to an ever-broader range of pertinent themes. If
one were to single out a particular contribution of Prof. Gallagher it
would perhaps be his attention to the Alphonsian moral tradition,
culminating in the handsome volume produced to commemorate the
proclamation of Alphonsus as Patron of Confessors and Moralists.
Behind these various developments lie many hours of deliberation,
administration and sheer hard work. On behalf of our readership,
and on behalf of the Alphonsian Academy, I would like to
express our most fervent thanks to Raphael for this huge service, and
wish him success in his future work.
MARTIN MCKEEVER,
Secretary of the Editorial Board

AVANT-PROPOS 5
Avant-propos: 40 años
de Studia Moralia
Introduciendo el primer número de Studia Moralia en 1962, el P.
J. Visser C.Ss.R. explicaba, en latín, que el objetivo de la revista no
era aumentar las ya muy numerosas publicaciones existentes, sino
más bien poner a disposición el fruto de las actuales investigaciones
sobre temas fundamentales y prácticos de teología moral.
No es necesario repetir aquí cuánto ha cambiado en el mundo, y
en la teología moral, a partir de 1962. El verdadero desafío es intentar
responder a estos cambios permaneciendo fieles al proyecto inicial.
En términos biográficos, 40 años es un punto de referencia en el
que emergen las llamadas “preguntas existenciales”: ¿Qué ha significado
todo esto hasta el presente? ¿Qué dirección tomamos a partir
de aquí? ¿Qué si...? Quizás estas preguntas pueden ayudarnos a
todos (autores, equipo editorial y lectores) a lo largo de este año aniversario
a llevar adelante el desafío de definir el papel, la modalidad
y los objetivos de Studia Moralia, en particular también mediante
una interpretación más adecuada de su propia historia. El segundo
número de este año incluirá consideraciones más amplias de este
tipo; para preparar las mismas son bienvenidos sus comentarios, críticas
y sugerencias.
————
El hecho que Studia Moralia se siga planteando estas interesantes
preguntas lo debemos a la generosa participación de muchos sostenedores,
editores y colaboradores. Queremos expresar aquí un
reconocimiento del todo particular al anterior editor Prof. Raphael
Gallagher de la Academia Alfonsiana. El profesor Gallagher se
desempeñó con diligencia y creatividad como Secretario de la
Comisión de Studia Moralia desde 1996. Durante estos años la revista
fue objeto de numerosas e importantes modificaciones. Después

6 AVANT-PROPOS
de un período de experimentación, se llegó a una compaginación de
la revista agradable a los ojos y clara al pensamiento. El carácter
políglota de la publicación y su distribución realmente universal han
hecho posible tocar un expectro cada vez más amplio de temas pertinentes.
Si tuvieramos que subrayar una específica contribución del
Prof. Gallagher, ésta podría ser quizás su atención a la tradición
moral alfonsiana, que ha culminado con el hermoso volumen editado
para conmemorar la proclamación de Alfonso como Patrtono de
Confesores y Moralistas.
Detrás de estos variados desarrollos se ocultan muchas horas de
deliberación, de administración y de duro trabajo. En nombre de
nuestros lectores y en nombre de la Academia Alfonsiana quisiera
expresar nuestra más cálida gratitud a Raphael por este gran servicio,
y le deseamos mucho éxito en su trabajo futuro.
MARTIN MCKEEVER,
Secretario de Redacción

Studia Moralia – Vol. 40 / 1
June / Junio 2002
CONTENTS / ÍNDICE
Avant-propos: 40 years of Studia Moralia / 40 años de
Studia Moralia
Summaries / Resúmenes
Articles / Artículos
W. KASPER, Unità della Chiesa e comunione ecclesiale
nella prospettiva cattolica ...........................................
B. V. JOHNSTONE, The War on Terrorism: A Just War? ....
D. J. BILLY, The Healing Role of Friendship in Aelred of
Rievaulx’s De spiritali amicitia ....................................
M. P. FAGGIONI, Lavorare con le cellule staminali............
J. BERKMAN, The Morality of Adopting Frozen Embryos
in light of Donum Vitae ...............................................
E. KOWALSKI, L’uomo pastore dell’essere e l’etica dell’incontro.
Dall’esigenza ontologica all’imperativo etico
nella filosofia dell’uomo in cammino di Gabriel
Marcel...........................................................................
T. SALZMAN, The Basic Goods Theory and Revisionism: A
Methodological Comparison on the Use of Tradition
in Ethical Theory.........................................................
J. CHAPEL, Philosophy in the Ongoing Renewal of Moral
Theology: Dialogical Personalism Revisited ................
M. MCKEEVER, “Can anything good come out of postmodernism?”
A Reading of Zygmunt Bauman’s Postmodern
Ethics in the light of Fides et ratio ..................
3
9
17
39
63
85
115
143
171
205
237

Summaries / Resúmenes
WALTER KASPER
UNITÀ DELLA CHIESA E COMUNIONE ECCLESIALE
NELLA PROSPETTIVA CATTOLICA
Remembering at the outset the “scandal” of division between the
churches, the author takes up the “guiding idea” of ecclesial communion
as a possible way of promoting an authentic unity. Having made
a review of the fundamental principles enunciated in the documents of
Vatican II, the article focuses on the recent joint declaration on
Justification as an example of how diversity can be recognised without
necessarily constituting an obstacle to closer union.
Recordando al comienzo el “escándalo” de la división entre las
Iglesias, el autor retoma la “idea-guía” de la comunión eclesial como
una manera posible de promover una auténtica unidad. Después de
examinar los principios fundamentales enunciados en los documentos
del Vaticano IIº, el artículo estudia la reciente declaración conjunta
sobre la Justificación como un ejemplo de cómo la diversidad puede ser
reconocida sin necesariamente constituir un obstáculo para una unión
más estrecha.
BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
THE WAR ON TERRORISM: A JUST WAR?
Is it appropriate to invoke the just war doctrine to express Catholic
teaching in response to war, and in particular to the war on terrorism?
The article analyses two major criticisms: that the doctrine represents a
corruption of the genuine Christian tradition, and that it has served
merely to justify killing. It is demonstrated that the consideration of the
virtues, in particular of charity, which had been a central feature of the
classic version of the doctrine, disappeared. Thus, assessment of pro-
9

10 SUMMARIES / RESÚMENES
portionality, a key feature of the theory, was now judged in allegedly,
purely objective terms. Such objectivity turned out to be an illusion.
The difficulties which this presents are discussed in relation to the war
on terrorism, and in particular to its expansion beyond its original limits.
It is concluded that abandoning the doctrine would leave us worse
off. But, if it is to be coherent, the consideration of virtue needs to be
reintroduced.
¿Es correcto invocar la doctrina de la “guerra justa ”, como la
expresa la enseñanza católica, en respuesta a la guerra, y particularmente
a la guerra contra el terrorismo? El artículo analiza dos importantes
críticas a esta doctrina: ella representa una corrupción de la
auténtica tradición cristiana y ha servido simplemente para justificar
el asesinato. Se demuestra en particular que ha desaparecido la consideración
de las virtudes, especialmente de la caridad que ha jugado
un papel central en la versión clásica de la doctrina. Así la valoración
de proporcionalidad, una característica central de la teoría, se la juzga
ahora, como suele decirse, en términos puramente objetivos. Esta objetividad
resultó ser una ilusión. Se discuten las dificultades que todo
esto plantea en relación a la guerra contra el terrorismo, y en particular
a su extensión más allá de sus límites originarios. Se llega a la conclusión
que, abandonando esta doctrina, nos encontraríamos en una
situación peor. Pero si se quiere ser coherente con ella, debe reintroducirse
la consideración de la virtud.
DENNIS J. BILLY
THE HEALING ROLE OF FRIENDSHIP
IN AELRED OF RIEVAULX’S DE SPIRITALI AMICITIA
Aelred’s use of the dialogue form and of the Christian doctrines of
creation, fall, and redemption in his De spiritali amicitia give shape to
his teaching on spiritual friendship and cannot be separated from it
without drastically changing it. To do so would be to overlook some
of his most basic presuppositions about the present state of human
nature and the remedies given by God for facilitating a person’s growth
in holiness.
La utilización por parte de Aelred de la forma dialogal y de las doctrinas
de la creación, de la caída y de la redención, en su De spiritali

SUMMARIES / RESÚMENES 11
amicitia configura su enseñanza sobre la amistad espiritual y no puede
ser separada de ella sin modificarla drásticamente. Separarlas implicaría
desconocer algunas de sus proposiciones más fundamentales
referidas al estado actual de la naturaleza humana y a los remedios que
Dios ha dado para facilitar el crecimiento de la persona en la santidad.
MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI
LAVORARE CON LE CELLULE STAMINALI
Having noted some indispensable scientific considerations, the
article examines the ethical questions concerning the use of stem cells,
that is cells which are partially undifferentiated and hence susceptible
to being used to produce different kinds of cells. Particular attention is
paid to the problems which arise from the use of stem cells derived from
embryros, including the problem of therapeutic cloning. It is argued
that recourse to stem cells derived from the umbilical cord, or even to
those which survive in the adult organism, seems more reasonable
from the moral point of view, while being equally promising from the
therapeutic point of view.
El artículo, después de presentar algunos presupuestos científicos
indispensables, examina las cuestiones éticas relacionadas con el uso
de las “células madre”, células parcialmente indiferenciadas susceptibles
de ser orientadas a la formación de uno u otro tipo celular. Se estudian
en particular los problemas que suscita la utilización de las células
madre derivadas del embrión, incluído el problema de la denominada
“clonación terapéutica”, y se muestra cómo la utilización de las
células madre que provienen del cordón umbilical y aun de aquellas
que persisten en el organismo adulto parece más viable desde el punto
de vista moral e igualmente prometedora desde el punto de vista de las
aplicaciones terapéuticas.

12 SUMMARIES / RESÚMENES
JOHN BERKMAN
THE MORALITY OF ADOPTING FROZEN EMBRYOS
IN LIGHT OF DONUM VITAE
In the light of the moral principles and fundamental goods articulated
by Donum vitae, one may conclude that under some circumstances
it is appropriate and even morally praiseworthy for women to
allow themselves to be impregnated with abandoned frozen embryos,
gestating and raising them as their children. Under appropriate circumstances,
such a decision is legitimately seen, not as surrogacy, but
as a form of “adoption,” and as such can give witness to a profound
form of Christian hospitality.
A la luz de los principios de la moral y de los bienes fundamentales
expresados en la Donum vitae, se puede concluir que bajo ciertas circunstancias
es apropiado e incluso moralmente encomiable para las mujeres
permitir la implantación en su propio útero de embriones congelados
abandonados, gestándolos y criándolos como hijos suyos. Bajo determinadas
circunstancias, una decisión de este tipo es percibida como lícita, no
como “subrogación” (surrogacy), sino como una forma de “adopción”, y
como tal puede testimoniar una forma profunda de hospitalidad cristiana.
EDMUND KOWALSKI
L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE
E L’ETICA DELL’INCONTRO
The article highlights two dimensions of being human and being a
person in the philosophical and anthropological thought of G. Marcel:
the ontological and the ethical. These are studied with a view to
attempting to suggest some hermeneutical implications for contemporary
bioethical reflection. As regards bios, the French scholar suggests
the personalist-existentialist approach, with an ontological-ethical
(logos) and an ethico-relational (ethos) connotation, as the most suitable
ground for testing interpretative and argumentary capacities in
face of new problems in bioethics. Recognising all the transcendental
dimensions of being human and of being a person, in the existential
experience of bios-logos-ethos (that is to say in the dynamic unity of
one’s own “being more”, in relation to God, to others and to the world),
guarantees the dignity of the person in the full sense of the term.

SUMMARIES / RESÚMENES 13
El artículo pone en evidencia dos dimensiones del ser humanopersona
en el pensamiento filosófico-antropológico de G. Marcel, la
dimensión ontológica y la dimensión ética. A partir de allí el autor
intenta sugerir algunas implicaciones hermenéuticas para la reflexión
bioética contemporánea. Por lo que respecta al bios, el enfoque personalístico-existencial
de connotación ontológico-ética (logos) y éticorelacional
(ethos) del pensador francés aparece como la plataforma
más adecuada para verificar las capacidades interpretativas y argumentativas
frente a la gestión de los nuevos problemas bioéticos. El
reconocimiento de todas las dimensiones trascendentales del ser-hombre-persona,
en la experiencia existencial del bios-logos-ethos - es decir
en la unidad dinámica del propio ser-más, en relación creatural con
Dios y co-existencial hacia Dios, interpersonal con los otros y solidario
con el mundo - garantiza plenamente la dignidad de la persona.
TODD A. SALZMAN
THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM:
A METHODOLOGICAL COMPARISON ON THE USE
OF TRADITION AS A SOURCE OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE
The Catholic moral theological debate on the existence of absolute
moral norms and intrinsically evil acts reflects a more fundamental
debate on ethical method. In this article, the author argues that the two
predominant ethical theories in Catholic moral theology, the Basic
Goods Theory and Revisionism, differ fundamentally on their use of
Tradition and tradition in their respective methods. The three questions
the author investigates are: first, the nature of the relationship between
theologians and the magisterium; second, the criteria for determining
whether or not moral teachings belonging to the “secondary object of
infallibility” have been taught infallibly; and third, what types of norms
belong to the “secondary object of infallibility.”
El debate de la teología moral católica sobre la existencia de normas
morales absolutas y de actos intrínsecamente malos refleja un
debate más profundo sobre el método de la ética. En este artículo, el
autor sostiene que las dos teorías éticas predominantes en el campo de
la teología moral católica, “the Basic Goods Theory” [la teoría de los
bienes fundamentales] y el “Revisionism”, difieren basicamente en el
uso de ‘Tradición’ y ‘tradición’ en sus respectivos métodos. Estas son

14 SUMMARIES / RESÚMENES
las tres problemáticas que investiga el autor: en primer lugar la naturaleza
de las relaciones entre los teólogos y el Magisterio; en segundo
lugar los criterios para establecer si las enseñanzas morales, que pertenecen
al “objeto secundario de infalibilidad”, han sido expuestas realmente
como verdades infalibles; y, en tercer lugar, qué clases de normas
pertenecen al “objeto secundario de infalibilidad”.
JOSEPH CHAPEL
PHILOSOPHY IN THE ONGOING RENEWAL OF MORAL
THEOLOGY: DIALOGICAL PERSONALISM REVISITED
In Fides et ratio, John Paull II calls for a renewed dialogue between
philosophy and theology – a recovery of an autonomous philosophy
that can assist theology by confronting the major metaphysical
questions rather than confining itself to limited linguistic and
hermeneutical questions. The author proposes that the recovery of dialogical
personalist philosophy, and the work of Ferdinand Ebner in particular,
can assist in this project. Ebner identifies the foundation of human
existence in the “I-Thou” relation with God, mediated through
Jesus Christ, the Word made flesh, the source of language by which
human reason is manifest. The movement toward authentic relation
with God and others has implications for the moral life.
En Fides et ratio, Juan Pablo II propone una renovación del diálogo
entre la fe y la razón – la recuperación de una filosofía autónoma
que sin restringirse a limitados temas lingüísticos y hermeneúticos,
pueda asistir a la teología confrontando los grandes temas metafísicos.
El autor propone que la recuperación del personalismo dialogal, en particular
la obra de Ferdinand Ebner, puede contribuir a este proyecto.
Ebner identifica el origen de la existencia humana en la relación “Yo-
Tu” con Dios, mediada por Jesucristo, la Palabra hecha carne, que es el
origen del lenguaje en el cual la razón humana se manifiesta. El
movimiento hacia una auténtica relación con Dios y los demás tiene
implicaciones para la vida moral

SUMMARIES / RESÚMENES 15
MARTIN MCKEEVER
CAN ANYTHING GOOD COME OUT
OF POSTMODERNISM?: A READING OF ZYGMUNT BAUMAN’S
POSTMODERN ETHICS IN THE LIGHT OF FIDES ET RATIO
Taking up the invitation of Fides et ratio to attend seriously to
postmodernity as a cultural phenomenon, this article focuses on the
work of the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman as an example of this line of
thought. Bauman is one of the few who have attempted to tease out the
implications of postmodernity for ethics. The article compares his findings
with the official Catholic position as articulated in Fides et ratio.
While the clash between the positions is clear and sharp, it also proves
to be potentially informative and instructive.
Respondiendo a la invitación de la Fides et ratio a tomar en serio
la posmodernidad como fenómeno cultural, el artículo estudia la obra
del sociólogo Zygmunt Bauman como un ejemplo de esta línea de pensamiento.
Bauman es uno de los pocos autores que intentó extraer las
implicaciones de la posmodernidad en el ámbito de la ética. El artículo
relaciona sus conclusiones con la posición oficial católica expresada
en la Fides et ratio. El contraste entre las posiciones es claro y neto,
pero no deja de ser también potencialmente informativo e instructivo.

StMor 40 (2002) 17-37
W. KASPER
UNITÀ DELLA CHIESA E COMUNIONE
ECCLESIALE NELLA PROSPETTIVA CATTOLICA
Prolusione dell’anno accademico 2000-2001
dell’Accademia Alfonsiana
I. La problematica
Tutte le Chiese confessano, nei Simboli di fede della Chiesa
antica, la Chiesa una. “Credo unam sanctam... ecclesiam”. Secondo
la testimonianza della Sacra Scrittura l’unica Chiesa corrisponde
all’unico Dio e Padre di tutti, all’unico Signore Gesù
Cristo e all’unico Spirito Santo 1 . “Un solo corpo, un solo spirito...
Un solo Signore, una sola fede, un solo battesimo, un solo
Dio Padre di tutti” (Ef 4,4-6). Nessuna Chiesa e nessuna teologia
può perciò rassegnarsi a una situazione, in cui le Chiese si escludono
a vicenda e si condannano l’un l’altra nel nome del vangelo.
Tale situazione è e rimane uno scandalo. Il fatto che, nel nostro
tempo, tutte le Chiese si siano messe in cammino verso l’unità
va perciò considerato – come dice il Concilio Vaticano II –
un frutto dell’azione dello Spirito Santo 2 .
La Dichiarazione congiunta sulla dottrina della giustificazione
è – così ha sentenziato il papa – una pietra miliare su questa
strada. L’immagine della pietra miliare ci dice che è stata percorsa
una tappa decisiva, ma che non si è ancora raggiunta la
meta. Con tanta maggior urgenza si pone perciò adesso la domanda:
qual’è la meta che dobbiamo raggiungere? Quale la visione
ecumenica che inseguiamo? A quale modello di una futura
unità della Chiesa tendiamo? 3 .
1 E. STAUFFER, “eis”, in ThWNT II (1935) 436-439.
2 UR 1.
3 Così E. JUENGEL, “Amica Exegesis einer roemischen Note”, in ZThK
Beiheft 10, 1998, 275.
17

18 w. KASPER
Tale questione è stata ampiamente discussa in seno al movimento
ecumenico negli anni ‘70 e ‘80 4 . Harding Mayer ha descritto
con precisione questo dibattito, a cui anche lui aveva preso
autorevolmente parte, nel suo scritto Oekumenische Zielvorstellungen
(Idee ecumeniche circa il fine da raggiungere) 5 e ha in
esso individuato due diverse concezioni di fondo: unione delle
Chiese, da un lato, e comunione delle Chiese nel senso della comunione
del pulpito e della cena del Signore di Chiese rimanenti
indipendenti, così come tale comunione è realizzata in particolare
nella Concordia di Leuenberg, dall’altro lato.
Da parte cattolica i documenti del Concilio Vaticano II, il Direttorio
ecumenico (1993) e l’enciclica Ut unum sint (1995) non
lasciano dubbi circa la decisione irreversibile della Chiesa cattolica
in favore del movimento ecumenico. A questo scopo tali testi
danno molte indicazioni pratiche, indicano cioè delle vie da
percorrere, ma non precisano la meta nel senso di un modello
concreto. Tanto più meritevole è perciò il tentativo recentemente
fatto da Wolfgang Thoenissen di ricostruire, in base ai numerosi
dialoghi a cui la Chiesa cattolica ufficialmente partecipa, un
modello cattolico e di proporlo in questi termini: comunione per
mezzo della partecipazione a Gesù Cristo 6 .
Malgrado tutte le non ignorabili differenze, esiste in questa
discussione un punto di partenza comune. Tutte le Chiese partecipanti
al processo ecumenico concordano nel dire che l’unità
non può essere solo un’unità invisibile 7 . L’unità visibile corrisponde,
secondo la dottrina cattolica, alla struttura incarnatoria
di fondo della fede cristiana. Secondo la concezione cattolica la
Chiesa è una “realtà complessa risultante di un duplice elemen-
4 Cfr. la panoramica nel documento del dialogo evangelico-luterano/cattolico
romano intitolato Die Einheit vor uns, Paderborn-Frankfurt a. M.
1985.
5 H. MEYER, Oekumenische Zielvorstellungen (Bensheimer Hefte 78),
Goettingen 1996.
6 W. THOENISSEN, Gemeinschaft durch Teilhabe an Jesus Christus. Ein
katholisches Modell fuer die Einheit der Kirchen, Freiburg 1996.
7 Questa affermazione è ribadita nei documenti del Consiglio Ecumenico
delle Chiese e della Commissione Fede e Costituzione. Cfr. H. Meyer, o. c.,
20-22.

UNITÀ DELLA CHIESA E COMUNIONE ECCLESIALE ... 19
to, umano e divino” 8 . E da parte loro le professioni di fede luterane
non parlano della Chiesa invisibile, ma della Chiesa nascosta.
Neppure per esse la Chiesa è una “civitas platonica” 9 , ma è
riconoscibile nella predicazione del vangelo e nella corretta amministrazione
dei sacramenti 10 .
Le difficoltà ovviamente aumentano, se ci domandiamo che
cosa fa costitutivamente parte della visibilità della Chiesa. Secondo
la Confessione Augustana basta il consenso nella retta
dottrina e nell’amministrazione conforme al vangelo dei sacramenti;
invece in campo cattolico vige la dottrina dei tre vincoli
dell’unità: il consenso nella professione della stessa fede, nella
celebrazione degli stessi sacramenti e nell’unico ministero 11 . Tale
differenza non va però sopravvalutata. Infatti secondo la concezione
luterana la predicazione pubblica e l’amministrazione
conforme al vangelo dei sacramenti includono sostanzialmente
il ministero legato all’ordinazione 12 . A sua volta, secondo la concezione
cattolica, il ministero non sta semplicemente in posizione
paritetica accanto alla parola e al sacramento, ma è piuttosto
destinato al loro servizio.
Tuttavia la questione del ministero presenta un problema
più profondo: il problema della mediazione istituzionale della
salvezza, cioè il problema di sapere se e fino a che punto la Chiesa
non è solo comunione, luogo e spazio della salvezza, bensì in
nome di Gesù Cristo anche mediatrice della salvezza nel senso
di una causa strumentale. La risposta data a questo problema investe
la struttura sacramentale di fondo della Chiesa quale segno
e strumento della salvezza 13 . Secondo alcuni autori qui sta un
punto fondamentale, se non il punto fondamentale di dissenso 14 .
8 Cfr. LG 8.
9 Cfr. Aplogia, art. 7.
10 Confessio Augustana, art. 7.
11 LG 14; UR 2.
12 G. WENZ, “‘Est autem...’. Lumen gentium 8 und die Kirchenartikel der
Confessio Augustana”, in Catholica 1998, 24-43.
13 LG 1 e passim. In campo evangelico cfr. E. JUENGEL, “Die Kirche als
Sakrament?”, in ZThK 80 (1983) 423-457. Su questo dibattito cfr. P. LUENING
(cit. nella nota 19), nota 59s.
14 Cfr. W. KASPER, “Grundkonsens und Kirchengemeinschaft. Zum

20 w. KASPER
Il recentissimo documento prodotto dal dialogo evangelico-luterano/cattolico
romano, Chiesa e giustificazione, ha sì portato a
un avvicinamento in questa questione, ma non ancora a una reale
soluzione 15 .
Il problema diventa chiarissimo nella tesi di E. Herms, la
quale parla di una concezione fondamentalmente diversa, che
ha il carattere di una netta contraddizione 16 e di una contrapposizione
dottrinale 17 . Herms e altri autori non intendono con questo
mettere in discussione il processo ecumenico, ma cercano
una unità ecumenica che rinuncia all’unità della professione di
fede, interpreta le concezioni fondamentalmente diverse come
due modi dell’azione dello Spirito, le rispetta come provvidenziali
18 e le ratifica con la ripresa della comunione nella celebrazione
della cena del Signore 19 .
Lascio aperta la questione di sapere se questa tesi salvaguardi
il “consentire de doctrina evangelii”, essenziale per la tradizione
riformatoria, e mi limito alla visuale cattolica. Dovrebbe
essere diventato chiaro che la questione del modello di una futura
unità della Chiesa non è un gioco ozioso e utopico con soldatini
di piombo. La risposta presuppone un serio lavoro teologico
nel tentativo di arrivare a una concezione comune di quella
che, nel Credo, confessiamo come la Chiesa una, santa, cattolica
e apostolica.
Stand des oekumenischen Gespraechs zwischen katholischer und evangelisch-lutherischen
Kirche”, in ThQ 165 (1987) 161-181.
15 Kirche und Rechtfertigung. Das Verstaendnis der Kirche im Licht der
Rechtfertigungslehre, Paderborn-Frankfurt a. M. 1994 (ed. it. “Chiesa e giustificazione.
La comprensione della chiesa alla luce della dottrina della giustificazione”,
in EO 3/1223ss).
16 E. HERMS, Die oekumenische Bewegung der roemisch-katholischen Kirche
im Lichte der reformatorischen Theologie. Antwort auf den Rahner-Plan,
Goettingen 1984, 184, 186 e passim.
17 Ivi 200. Un confronto esauriente con E. Herms non dovrebbe occuparsi
solo della concezione della Chiesa, bensì anche della concezione della
rivelazione e della verità, cosa che in questo contesto non possiamo fare, per
cui nelle pagine che seguono ci limitiamo alla concezione della Chiesa.
18 Ivi 192.
19 Ivi 199s.

UNITÀ DELLA CHIESA E COMUNIONE ECCLESIALE ... 21
II. Il nuovo inizio del Concilio Vaticano II
Punto di partenza per comprendere la visuale cattolica sono
i nuovi accenti posti dal Concilio Vaticano II. La posizione preconciliare
è reperibile soprattutto nell’enciclica Satis cognitum
(1896) di Leone XIII e nell’enciclica Mortalium animos (1928) di
Pio XI. Quest’ultima è l’esposizione più chiara del punto di vista
cattolico romano circa il movimento ecumenico prima del Concilio
Vaticano II. Possiamo riassumerla brevemente così: Gesù
Cristo ha fondato una sola Chiesa e l’ha voluta come unica Chiesa.
Di qui l’invito rivolto ai cristiani, che vivono separati dalla
Chiesa cattolica romana, a tornare all’unica vera Chiesa di Cristo.
Ciò posto, una partecipazione della Chiesa cattolica o di singoli
cristiani cattolici al movimento ecumenico sembrava impossibile
e fu perciò espressamente interdetta.
Questo punto di vista fu ribadito ancora una volta da Pio XII
nell’enciclica Mystici corporis (1943), che insegnò la stretta identità
del corpo di Cristo con la Chiesa cattolica romana. La sua tesi
esplicita suonava così: il corpo di Cristo è la Chiesa cattolica
romana. Questo non significava che tutti i cristiani non appartenenti
alla Chiesa cattolica avrebbero perso la salvezza eterna.
L’enciclica riconosce che i cristiani non cattolici possono essere
uniti a Cristo e alla sua Chiesa mediante il “votum”, cioè mediante
il desiderio. Tuttavia questa affermazione si riferiva solo
allo stato salvifico di singoli cristiani, non alle Chiese, alle comunità
ecclesiali o a loro elementi esistenti al di fuori della Chiesa
cattolica romana. Per l’enciclica esistono cristiani separati
dalla Chiesa cattolica, ma non Chiese o comunità cristiane da essa
separate.
L’ingresso ufficiale della Chiesa cattolica nel movimento ecumenico
divenne possibile solo dopo che il Concilio Vaticano II ebbe
effettuato una svolta su questo punto decisivo. Il fondamento
fu posto nella Costituzione sulla Chiesa Lumen gentium. L’art. 8
di questa costituzione spezza la stretta identificazione del corpo
di Cristo con la Chiesa cattolica romana e sostituisce l’“est” identificante
i due con un “subsistit”. Adesso leggiamo: “Questa Chiesa...
sussiste (subsistit) nella Chiesa cattolica, governata dal successore
di Pietro e dai vescovi in comunione con lui”.
Come il teologo belga G. Philips, principale redattore della
Costituzione sulla Chiesa, aveva previsto, molto inchiostro è sta-

22 w. KASPER
to versato dalla fine del Concilio in poi circa il significato più
preciso di questo “subsistit”. Ci porterebbe troppo lontano ripercorrere
questo dibattito 20 . Preferisco lasciare da parte tutte le
teorie, che si sono formate attorno a questo verbo, e limitarmi al
suono letterale dei documenti conciliari. Stando a tali documenti
21 “subsistit” significa: l’unica Chiesa di Gesù Cristo ha il
suo luogo concreto, il suo modo di esistere nella Chiesa cattolica;
in lei essa è concretamente realizzata. “Questo non esclude”,
così continua il concilio, “che al di fuori del suo organismo si
trovino parecchi elementi di santificazione e di verità che, appartenendo...
alla Chiesa di Cristo, spingono verso l’unità cattolica”.
L’art. 15 della Costituzione sulla Chiesa e l’art. 3 del Decreto
sull’ecumenismo Unitatis redintegratio riprendono poi questo
discorso degli elementi esistenti al di fuori dell’organismo
della Chiesa cattolica romana e ne menzionano alcuni.
Tale enumerazione ci dice che, al di fuori dell’organismo della
Chiesa cattolica, non esistono solo singoli cristiani che sono
uniti mediante un “votum” interiore a Cristo e alla sua Chiesa,
bensì esistono anche elementi costitutivi della Chiesa, il più fon-
20 Possiamo perciò lasciare irrisolta la questione di sapere se il “subsistit”
è usato nel senso del concetto aristotelico-scolastico di “hypostasis”/”subsistentia”
oppure in un senso più generale e se serve semplicemente
a garantire, rispetto all’“est”, uno spazio alle Chiese e comunità ecclesiali
esistenti al di fuori della compagine della Chiesa cattolica. Cfr. il
commento di A. GRILLMEIER in LThK Vat. II, vol. 1, p. 174s e di G. PHILIPS, L’Eglise
et son mystère au II. Concile du Vatican, Paris 1976, 119 (tr. it. La chiesa
e il suo mistero, storia, testo e commento della Costituzione Lumen gentium,
Jaca Book, Milano 1982). Il dibattito più recente, che spesso si spinge molto
al di là dell’affermazione conciliare, in P. LUENING, “Das ekklesiologische Problem
des ‘subsistit in’ (LG 8) im heutigen oekumenischen Gespraech”, in
Catholica (1998) 1-23. Importanti le interpretazioni del cardinal J. WILLE-
BRANDS e del cardinal J. RATZINGER, Deus locutus est nobis in Filio. Some Reflections
on Subjectivity, Christology and the Church, 23-29.
21 Cfr. il commento di A. GRILLMEIER, o. c., 200-205 e di J. FEINER, ivi, vol.
II, 50-58. Il termine “elementi” non è certo il migliore, anche se non è facile
trovarne uno più adeguato. Esso risale in ultima analisi all’espressione “vestigia
ecclesiae” di Calvino; ma mentre in Calvino tale espressione indica
tracce residuali povere e misere, nella cornice del movimento ecumenico essa
indica realtà importanti, che spingono dinamicamente verso l’unità. Cfr.
J. FEINER, o. c., 53.

UNITÀ DELLA CHIESA E COMUNIONE ECCLESIALE ... 23
damentale dei quali è il battesimo. Attraverso il battesimo infatti
il battezzato diventa membro della Chiesa di Gesù Cristo 22 . Al
di fuori della compagine visibile della Chiesa cattolica esistono
perciò Chiese e comunità ecclesiali 23 che stanno in una comunione
reale, anche se non piena, con la Chiesa cattolica 24 . E lo
Spirito di Dio si serve di esse come di mezzi della salvezza 25 .
Il fine del movimento ecumenico nel senso del Concilio Vaticano
II non è perciò “il ritorno degli altri cristiani alla Chiesa
cattolica, bensì lo stabilimento della piena comunione di queste
Chiese e comunità ecclesiali con la Chiesa cattolica” 26 .
Il grande problema ecumenico consiste nell’armonizzare
queste due affermazioni: l’affermazione che la Chiesa di Gesù
Cristo sussiste nella Chiesa cattolica, e l’affermazione che esistono
Chiese al di fuori della Chiesa cattolica. Il concilio non dice
da parte sua nulla al riguardo. Non corrisponderebbe però al
senso delle sue affermazioni sostenere che la Chiesa può sussistere
anche in altre Chiese o che essa sussisterebbe solo in maniera
frammentaria anche nella Chiesa cattolica. Il concilio afferma
infatti in maniera inequivocabile che l’unità, che Cristo
fin dall’inizio donò alla sua Chiesa, “sussiste” secondo la nostra
fede, “senza possibilità di essere perduta, nella Chiesa cattolica”
27 . Il concilio afferma inoltre – “opportune-importune” sotto
il profilo ecumenico – che nella Chiesa cattolica esiste la pienezza
dei mezzi di salvezza, mentre le altre Chiese e comunità ecclesiali
soffrono di una certa carenza sotto questo aspetto.
Il fatto che elementi essenziali propri della Chiesa cattolica
sussistano al di fuori della sua compagine visibile non lascia naturalmente
illesa e incolume la Chiesa cattolica; in queste condizioni
essa non riesce a realizzare concretamente la sua piena
cattolicità 28 e deve perciò impegnarsi, per amore di se stessa, nel
dialogo e nello scambio con le altre Chiese e comunità ecclesia-
22 LG 7; UR 22 e passim.
23 UR 3; 14ss; 19ss.
24 UR 3 e passim.
25 UR 3.
26 J. FEINER, o. c., 52.
27 UR 4.
28 Ivi.

24 w. KASPER
li e crescere in tal modo nella concreta realizzazione della sua
unità, cattolicità e apostolicità. Cattolico e ecumenico non sono
perciò due aggettivi antitetici, né sono tra loro congiunti in maniera
puramente esteriore. L’impegno ecumenico non è un’aggiunta
esteriore e discrezionale alla nostra ecclesialità, ma scaturisce
dal dinamismo più intimo della stessa cattolicità.
III. Lo sviluppo postconciliare
Sulla base dei principi del Decreto sull’ecumenismo la Chiesa
cattolica ha avviato, dopo il concilio, dialoghi ufficiali con
quasi tutte le Chiese e comunità ecclesiali. Wolfgang Thoenissen
ha dimostrato in maniera convincente che tutti i risultati finora
raggiunti in seno a tali dialoghi – in quelli bilaterali con ortodossi,
anglicani, luterani e altri, così come in seno a dialoghi
multilaterali nell’ambito del Consiglio Ecumenico delle Chiese –
convergono in maniera sorprendente 29 . L’idea guida normativa
presente in tutti i documenti prodotti in tali sedi suona: “comunione
ecclesiale”. Egli pensa addirittura di poter constatare la
tendenza a sostituire il termine “unità” con quello di “comunione”
(communio) e a interpretare l’unità per mezzo della “communio”
30 .
Naturalmente in questi documenti il termine “communio” è
adoperato solo in maniera più o meno coerente e valida e con
accenti diversi non ignorabili. Abbiamo perciò a che fare più con
un movimento ecumenico di ricerca che con un preciso traguardo
da raggiungere. Tale movimento non è però un vagabondaggio
senza meta, perché cerca in continuazione di raccordare
il concetto di comunione ecclesiale con il concetto biblico e veteroecclesiale
di “koinonia/communio”, lasciando così intendere
di voler radicare la propria idea in una tradizione più antica, co-
29 Ivi 41-60. Molte testimonianze anche in H. SCHUETTE, Ziel: Kirchengemeinschaft.
Zur oekumenischen Orientierung, Paderborn 1985, 19-33; Id.,
Kirche im oekumenischen Verstaendnis, Paderborn-Frankfurt a. M. 1991,
45s, 171-174.
30 Ivi 77 e passim.

UNITÀ DELLA CHIESA E COMUNIONE ECCLESIALE ... 25
mune a tutte le Chiese, e di volerla interpretare e legittimare partendo
di là.
La concezione dell’unità della Chiesa come unità comunionale,
come “communio”, era molto diffusa nella Chiesa antica;
ma nel secondo millennio essa fu in larga misura soppiantata da
una ecclesiologia spesso unilaterale dell’unità 31 , pur riaffiorando
di nuovo sia in Tommaso d’Aquino 32 e sia nel primo Lutero 33 . In
tempi recenti furono anzitutto e soprattutto Ludwig Hertling 34 ,
da parte cattolica, e Werner Elert 35 , da parte evangelico-luterana,
a mettere in risalto il significato della “koinonia/communio”
e la concezione veteroecclesiale della Chiesa e dell’unità stante
alla base di questi termini. Nel frattempo molti studi furono
pubblicati al riguardo sia da parte ortodossa 36 che da parte cattolica
37 , studi che influirono sulle affermazioni del Concilio Vaticano
II 38 . Il Sinodo straordinario dei vescovi del 1985 ritenne
addirittura di poter affermare che “communio” sarebbe il con-
31 Cfr. al riguardo le pubblicazioni fondamentali di H. DE LUBAC E Y. CON-
GAR.
32 Cfr. W. KASPER, “Steuermann mitten im Sturm. Das Bischofsamt nach
Thomas von Aquin”, in Theologie und Kirche II, Mainz 1999, 103-127, spec.
119-122.
33 M. LUTHER, “Ein Sermon von dem hoschwuerdigsten Sakrament des
heiligen Leichnams Christi. Und von den Bruderschaften” (1519), in WA 2,
742s.
34 L. HERTLING. Communio und Primat. Kirche und Papstum in der Antike
(Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae 7), Roma 1943.
35 W. ELERT, Abendmahl und Kirchengemeinschaft in der alten Kirche
hauptsaechlich des Ostens, Berlin 1954.
36 Fondamentali sono i lavori di N. AFANASIEV, J. MEYENDORF, A. SCHME-
MANN, J. ZIZIOULAS e altri.
37 Per il periodo anteriore al concilio: H. de Lubac, Y. Congar, J. Hamer,
M. J. Le Guillou ecc. Dopo il concilio la bibliografia è sterminata: A. Grillmeier,
H. U. von Balthasar, O. Saier, J. Ratzinger, W. Kasper, J. M. R. Tillard,
M. Kehl, B. Forte ecc. Importanti sono le miscellanee in onore del vescovo P.
W. SCHEELE, Communio Sanctorum (1988), e dell’arcivescovo O. SAIER, Gemeinsame
Kirche sein. Theorie und Praxis der Communio (1992). Aggiunto va
anche il dibattito canonico su “communio” in W. Aymans, D. Pirson, E. Corecco,
I. Riedel-Spangenberger ecc.
38 Menzionati vanno soprattutto LG 3, 7, 13. Cfr. anche 14; UR 3, 13, 14,
19, 20.

26 w. KASPER
cetto ecclesiologico guida decisivo del Concilio Vaticano II 39 .
Sotto il profilo storico e filologico tale giudizio non è esatto.
Al centro dei testi del concilio stanno piuttosto le espressioni
“popolo di Dio”, “corpo di Cristo” e “Chiesa come sacramento
universale della salvezza”. Ma una analisi testuale più approfondita
evidenzia che il concetto di “communio” svolge un ruolo
centrale nell’interpretazione sia del concetto di “popolo di Dio”,
sia dell’immagine del “corpo di Cristo” e sia della denominazione
della Chiesa come “sacramento universale della salvezza” e
che, in questo senso, esso è radicato nel centro dei documenti
conciliari 40 .
Il dibattito postconciliare ha ripreso alcuni principi del concilio
e li ha nello stesso tempo sviluppati. Dopo l’assenso di fondo
espresso dal Sinodo straordinario dei vescovi del 1985, la Congregazione
romana per la dottrina della fede ha ripreso in maniera
fondamentalmente positiva questo dibattito in un suo documento
“su alcuni aspetti della Chiesa intesa come comunione”
(1992), anche se lo ha sviluppato e è intervenuta in esso in modo
critico 41 . Interessante è soprattutto il fatto che anche la dichiarazione
ufficiale congiunta della Federazione luterana mondiale e
della Chiesa cattolica, effettuata in occasione della firma della
Dichiarazione congiunta sulla dottrina della giustificazione riprende
questo dibattito e parla del cammino verso “la piena comunione
ecclesiale” e verso “una unità nella diversità, in cui diversità
permanenti sono tra loro ‘riconciliate’ e non più tali da dividere
le Chiese” 42 . In questo modo il concetto guida del dibattito
ecumenico ha conosciuto una prima ricezione ufficiale.
39 Sinodo straordinario dei vescovi 1985 C 1.
40 Cfr. l’approfondita analisi di W. THOENISSEN, o. c., 105s; 168-174.
41 Verlautbarungen des Apostolischen Stuhles, nr. 107 ed. it. in Enchiridion
Vaticanum 1991-1993, EDB, Bologna).
42 “Gemeinsame offizielle Festellung des Lutherischen Weltbundes und
der katholischeen Kirche”, cit. in Osservatore Romanum del 22.11.1999, Supplemento
A, VI (cfr. Il Regno doc, 1999, 476ss, 708ss).

UNITÀ DELLA CHIESA E COMUNIONE ECCLESIALE ... 27
IV. Prospettive nella cornice della ecclesiologia della “communio”
Se partiamo dal concetto biblico e veteroecclesiale di “koinonia/communio”
43 dobbiamo prendere in partenza atto di un
dato: “koinonia/communio” non significa originariamente “comunione”,
ma “partecipazione”, in concreto partecipazione ai
beni della salvezza o, meglio, partecipazione alla vita del Dio
unitrino per mezzo di Gesù Cristo nello Spirito Santo, cosa che
avviene attraverso la predicazione del vangelo e attraverso i sacramenti,
in particolare attraverso il battesimo e l’eucaristia.
La comune partecipazione a questi “beni” della salvezza fonda
poi, in secondo luogo, la comunione fra i cristiani. Importante
per la Chiesa antica, in specie per Agostino 44 , divenne a
questo scopo il passo di 1 Cor 10,16s: “Il pane che noi spezziamo,
non è forse comunione con il corpo di Cristo? Poiché c’è un
solo pane, noi, pur essendo molti, siamo un corpo solo”. Attraverso
la partecipazione all’unico corpo eucaristico di Cristo noi
diventiamo quindi l’unico corpo ecclesiale di Cristo. Questa ecclesiologia
eucaristica della “communio” è stata più volte ripresa
dall’ultimo concilio 45 .
Da questo principio seguono due cose:
1. L’unità della Chiesa è una realtà data in antecedenza alla
nostra azione. Essa si verifica primariamente non in senso “orizzontale”
attraverso la socializzazione, attraverso l’unione di uomini
o di Chiese. L’ecclesiologia della “communio” della Chiesa
antica differisce dall’ecclesiologia liberale risalente a Schleiermacher,
secondo la quale la Chiesa “nasce per mezzo di libere
azioni umane e solo così può continuare a sussistere” 46 . La co-
43 Sulla concezione biblica cfr. le ricerche di A. Seesemann, J. Hainz, P.
C. Bori, K. Kertelge ecc.
44 Cfr. F. HOFMANN, Der Kirchenbegriff des hl. Augustinus, Muenchen
1933, 390-413; J. RATZINGER, Volk Gottes und Haus Gottes in Augustins Lehre
von der Kirche, nuova ed. St. Ottilien 1922, 211-215.
45 SC 47; LG 7; UR 2.
46 F. SCHLEIERMACHER, Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsaetzen der
evangelischen Kirche im Zusammhang dargestellt, a cura di M. Redeker, Berlin
1960, § 2.2 (tr. it. La dottrina della fede, Paideia, Brescia 1985).

28 w. KASPER
munione ecclesiale è fondata “verticalmente” da Cristo; essa non
è qualcosa che noi possiamo “fare”, ma è grazia e dono. Nella
Chiesa vige il primato del ricevere rispetto al fare dell’uomo. Qui
sta il limite intrinseco di ogni ecumenismo negoziale e nello
stesso tempo la reale possibilità dell’ecumenismo; esso non è
mai completamente calcolabile e manipolabile, bensì deve lasciare
una possibilità all’azione sovrana dello Spirito di Dio. Qui
sta l’importanza dell’ecumenismo spirituale, che significa conversione,
ascolto della parola di Dio e preghiera per l’unità 47 .
2. La Chiesa è lì dove si predica la parola di Dio e la si accoglie
con fede e lì dove si celebra l’eucaristia. La Chiesa si invera
quindi sempre come Chiesa locale. Ma poiché in ogni Chiesa locale
è presente Gesù Cristo e poiché Gesù Cristo è soltanto uno,
ogni Chiesa locale è in Gesù Cristo una cosa sola con tutte le altre
Chiese locali. La Chiesa è sempre contemporaneamente
Chiesa locale e Chiesa universale. Nessuna Chiesa locale può esistere
da sola in maniera autosufficiente, bensì può esistere solo
e sempre in comunione con tutte le altre Chiese locali. Questa
“communio” non sopravviene successivamente al suo essere
Chiesa locale. Come la Chiesa locale non è semplicemente una
provincia della Chiesa universale, così la Chiesa universale non
è semplicemente l’unione successiva delle Chiese locali. La comunione
di una Chiesa locale con le altre Chiese locali, la sua
“communio” con tutte le altre Chiese locali è data con la sua essenza.
Dove manca questa “communio”, lì manca qualcosa al
suo essere Chiesa.
Per questo la Costituzione sulla Chiesa può dire che l’unica
Chiesa sussiste nelle Chiese locali ed è costituita dalle Chiese locali
48 . La Congregazione per la dottrina della fede ha aggiunto
che la Chiesa locale sussiste nella Chiesa universale e in virtù
della Chiesa universale 49 . La Chiesa locale e la Chiesa universale
47 Il Decreto sull’ecumenismo Unitatis redintegratio e l’enciclica Ut
unum sint annetteno giustamente grandissima importanza a questo tipo di
ecumenismo.
48 LG 23.
49 Schreiben ueber einige Aspekte der Kirche als communio, nr. 9 (ed. it.
“Alcuni aspetti della chiesa come comunione”, in Enchiridion Vaticanum
(1991-1993), EDB, Bologna).

UNITÀ DELLA CHIESA E COMUNIONE ECCLESIALE ... 29
si compenetrano intimamente; tra di loro esiste una reciproca
pericoresi 50 . Poiché ogni Chiesa locale attua necessariamente la
propria ecclesialità nella cultura del tempo e quindi in modi culturali
storici specifici, lo scambio con le altre Chiese locali significa
reciproco arricchimento e, eventualmente, anche critica
reciproca. L’unità della Chiesa e la comunione ecclesiale sono
pertanto una unità nella diversità delle Chiese locali.
V. Unità-communio e comunione ecclesiale
Il dibattito ecumenico, che parte dall’idea di “communio”, si
muove quindi in linea di principio su un solido fondamento. Ma
nel mentre esso concepisce l’unità-communio come comunione
ecclesiale, conferisce al concetto veteroecclesiale della “communio”
un significato che esso così non aveva né addirittura poteva
avere nella Chiesa antica. Là infatti si trattava della comunione
di Chiese locali, le quali avevano la stessa fede, gli stessi
sacramenti e gli stessi ministeri e che stavano, su questo fondamento,
in una comunione ecclesiale piena o – come nel caso delle
Chiese orientali – in una comunione ecclesiale ancora imperfetta.
Si trattava di Chiese sorelle, un concetto questo che oggi
svolge un ruolo decisivo nella relazione con le Chiese ortodosse
51 .
Invece la questione della comunione ecclesiale tra Chiese
confessionali, che sono tra loro diverse nella dottrina, nei sacramenti
e nei ministeri, è un problema che si pone solo dopo la
formazione di confessioni in seguito alla Riforma. In questo
nuovo senso il concetto di “comunione ecclesiale” affiora soprattutto
nei dibattiti relativi alla Chiesa Evangelica della Germania
e alla Federazione luterana mondiale, e specialmente nella
“Concordia di Leuenberg”. Esso fu formato inizialmente senza
alcun esplicito riferimento alla ecclesiologia della “commu-
50 Ivi nr. 17.
51 Cfr. soprattutto PAOLO VI nel Breve “Anno ineunte” (1967), in Tomos
agapes, Roma-Istanbul 1971, 386-392, che si rifà in proposito e UR 14 e lo
sviluppa; enc. Ut unum sint, 55-58.

30 w. KASPER
nio” della Chiesa antica 52 . Solo di recente nell’ecumenismo extracattolico
si tenta di approfondire l’idea della comunione ecclesiale
con l’idea della “communio”.
Viene perciò da domandarsi se e fino a che punto l’ecclesiologia
della “communio” può essere utilizzata come idea che rappresenta
il fine da raggiungere non solo per il dialogo cattolicoortodosso
e, in altro modo, per il dialogo intraevangelico, bensì
anche per il dialogo ecumenico cattolico-evangelico. Leuenberg
ebbe senza dubbio “metodicamente la funzione di una accensione
iniziale” per la ricerca intitolata “Lehrverurteilungen - kirchentrennend?”
(Le condanne dottrinali separano le Chiese?) 53 .
Così divenne però anche chiaro che la questione di sapere come
il modello di Leuenberg può essere cattolicamente adattato abbisogna
ancora di una discussione approfondita. Leuenberg infatti
si riferisce a una comunione ecclesiale tra Chiese uscite dalla
Riforma, che rappresentano un tipo di Chiese affini tra di loro.
Per sapere se questo tipo di unità possa essere trasposto alla
Chiesa cattolica, alla sua concezione della Chiesa e alla sua concezione
dell’ecclesiologia della “communio” ci vuole ancora una
accurata verifica. Questa questione è interessante e di scottante
attualità anche perché la richiesta spesso avanzata di una comunione
e ospitalità eucaristica scaturisce consciamente o inconsciamente
dal modello di Leuenberg, che concepisce la comunione
ecclesiale come comunione di pulpito e di cena del Signore
di Chiese rimanenti autonome e anche differenziantisi.
La risposta a questa questione dipende in modo decisivo
dalla possibilità di raggiungere un consenso circa la struttura sacramentale
e la forma istituzionale della Chiesa. Si tratta cioè
52 Cfr. E. SCHIEFFER, Von Schauenberg nach Leuenberg. Entstehung und
Bedeutung der Konkordie reformatorischer Kirchen in Europa, Paderborn
1983. Sulla storia dell’espressione cfr. H. MEYER, “‘’Kirchengemeinschaft’. Als
Konzept kirchlicher Einheit. Zur Entstehung und Bedeutung des Konzepts”,
in Versoehnte Verschiedenheit. Aufsaetze zur oekumenischen Theologie I,
Frankfurt a. M.-Paderborn 1998, 137-162.
53 Così i curatori K. LEHMANN e W. PANNENBERG in Lehrverurteilungen - kirchentrennend?
Freiburg i. Br.-Goettingen 1986, 14, sulla base di un suggerimento
comune del vescovo regionale E. LOHSE e del cardinal J. RATZINGER, ivi
178s.

UNITÀ DELLA CHIESA E COMUNIONE ECCLESIALE ... 31
della questione del ministero in generale e, in particolare, del
ministero episcopale nella sua successione storica e, in ultima
analisi, del ministero petrino.
Il documento Chiesa e giustificazione (1994), messo a punto
in seno al dialogo evangelico-luterano/cattolico romano, ha affrontato
questa questione e l’ha in buona parte chiarita 54 . Inoltre
il Porvoo-Statement (1982) siglato tra le Chiese anglicane britanniche
e irlandesi, da un lato, e le Chiese luterane nordiche e
baltiche, dall’altro lato, rappresenta similmente, dal punto di vista
cattolico, un passo in avanti, anche se esso, con la sua accentuazione
del ministero episcopale storico, contrasta in una
maniera finora irrisolta con la concezione di Leuenberg, che è
sostenuta dalle Chiese luterane continentali.
Dobbiamo perciò attendere e vedere se e fino a che punto in
questa questione si addiverrà a dei consensi e a delle convergenze
all’interno delle Chiese protestanti e tra queste e la Chiesa cattolica.
Realisticamente dobbiamo dire che le difficoltà ancora da
superare sono notevoli. Ma l’unificazione è senza prospettive?
La risposta dipende, oltre che dalle questioni oggettive implicite,
in cui in questo contesto non dobbiamo addentrarci, da quel
che si intende per consenso e dal tipo di consenso che è necessario
per l’unità della Chiesa.
VI. Quale consenso è necessario?
La domanda suona quindi: quanto consenso ci vuole per una
unità-communio? E che dobbiamo intendere per consenso? Si
tratta di una questione molto dibattuta sul piano ecumenico 55 .
Neppure all’interno della Chiesa cattolica il consenso è mai
totale. E ciò non solo oggi. Infatti anche prima è sempre esistito
all’interno di questa Chiesa uno spazio per un pluralismo di teo-
54 Cfr. nr. 174-242.
55 Sul concetto di consenso cfr. G. SAUTER, “Consensus”, in TRE 8 (1981)
182-189; “Konsens, Konsenstheorien”, in LThK 6, 3 ed. (1997) 288-292;
Grundkonsens - Grunddifferenz, a cura e con una introduzione di A. Bimelé
e H. Meyer, Frankfurt a. M.-Paderborn 1992; H. MEYER, “Die Struktur oekumenischer
Konsense”, ivi, 60-74. Cfr. sopra, nota 16s.

32 w. KASPER
logie e delle loro diverse scuole, di forme e tradizioni liturgiche,
di stili di pietà e di mentalità diverse culturalmente condizionate.
I concili – non da ultimo il Concilio di Trento – cercarono in
linea generale di tener conto di questa legittima multiformità.
Essi cercarono di porre dei paletti nei confronti dell’eresia, ma
anche di concedere spazio alla discussione intracattolica. Che
l’unità con il ministero petrino e sotto il ministero petrino ammetta
una multiformità è cosa che risulta chiara soprattutto dall’esistenza
delle Chiese orientali unite a Roma; esse sono Chiese
“sui juris”, che con la loro ogni volta specifica tradizione liturgica,
teologica, spirituale e canonica sono un patrimonio ereditario
essenziale e un arricchimento della cattolicità della Chiesa
universale 56 .
Il modello delle Chiese di rito orientale unite a Roma ha tenuto
a battesimo l’idea di una unificazione corporativa 57 e l’idea
del “typos” formulata dal cardinal J. Willebrands 58 . Secondo
questi progetti il riconoscimento dell’ufficio petrino non significherebbe
l’inserimento nell’attuale “sistema” della Chiesa latina.
Ne risulterebbe piuttosto quello che il cardinal Ratzinger ha così
definito: le Chiese devono rimanere Chiese e diventare sempre
più un’unica Chiesa 59 . In modo simile il cardinal J. Willebrands
ha definito la futura comunione ecclesiale come “communio ecclesiarum
in ecclesia Christi” 60 . Anche lo scritto L’unità attraverso
la diversità di O. Cullmann va in una direzione simile 61 .
Una tale unità nella diversità, se prendiamo seriamente la
struttura incarnatoria dell’ordine cristiano della salvezza, così
come esso è concepito sia dalla teologia cattolica che da quella
56 OE 7; Lettera Apostolica Orientale lumen (1995).
57 Vescovo H. TENHUMBERG, “Kirchliche Union bzw. korporative Wiedervereinigung”,
in W. DANIELSNEYER-C. H. RATSCHOW, Kirche und Gemeinde, Witten
1974, 25.
58 J. WILLEBRANDS, in Information Service.
59 J. RATZINGER, “Die Kirche und die Kirchen”, in Reformatio 13 (1964)
105.
60 J. WILLEBRANDS, in Proche Orient chrétien 25 (1975) 14s.
61 O. CULLMANN, Einheit durch Vielfalt. Grundlegung und Beitrag zur Diskussion
ueber die Moeglichkeiten ihrer Verwirchlichung, Tuebingen 1986 (tr.
it. L’unità attraverso la diversità. Il suo fondamento e il problema della sua realizzazione,
Queriniana, Brescia 1987).

UNITÀ DELLA CHIESA E COMUNIONE ECCLESIALE ... 33
luterana, non può essere semplicemente invisibile o sussistere
come una comunione accompagnata da contrasti. Il consenso
nella dottrina non è solo, per l’unità della Chiesa, un’esigenza
cattolica, bensì anche un’esigenza luterana. Perciò a me pare
che vadano esclusi una rinuncia radicale al consenso ecumenico
e un ecumenismo fermi restando i contrasti, come a volte si propone
62 . Ciò vale in misura ancora maggiore per un cambiamento
ecumenico di paradigmi in direzione della concezione di un
ecumenismo puramente secolare, per il quale l’unità della Chiesa
diventa una cosa marginale, quando non viene addirittura
persa completamente di vista 63 .
Con queste delimitazioni negative non abbiamo ancora naturalmente
detto di quale specie di consenso ci sia bisogno per
l’unità. Questa questione fu ampiamente discussa, da parte cattolica,
in occasione del piano proposto da Rahner-Fries. Secondo
questi teologi ogni unità della Chiesa presuppone un certo
numero di formulazioni fondamentali comuni nel campo della
fede. Essi pensano con ciò in primo luogo alle verità fondamentali,
così come esse sono espresse nella Sacra Scrittura, nel Simbolo
Apostolico e nel Simbolo Nicenocostantinopolitano. Al di là
di questo nucleo di fondo vincolante Rahner-Fries formulano il
seguente principio quale un principio realistico nel campo della
fede: nessuna Chiesa parziale può respingere con decisione e sul
piano della professione di fede una proposizione, che in un’altra
Chiesa parziale è un dogma vincolante. Questo principio non significa
per loro naturalmente che una Chiesa parziale abbia
l’obbligo di professare in maniera esplicita e positiva, al di là delle
professioni di fede menzionate, un dogma professato in un’altra
Chiesa parziale 64 . Essi vorrebbero che ci si accontentasse di
una tolleranza gnoseologica.
62 Cfr. al riguardo, oltre a E. HERMS (sopra, nota 12), le posizioni di E.
Geldbach e L. Klein nel “DOeSTA-Studie”, in OER 1988/2.
63 K. KAISER, Oekumene im Uebergang. Paradigmenwechsel in der oekumenischen
Bewegung, Muenchen 1989. Con ciò non contestiamo il fatto che
l’unità della Chiesa non è fine a se stessa, ma è a sua volta sacramento del
mondo. Cfr. LG 1; GS 42, 45 e passim.
64 H. FRIES-K. RAHNER, Einigung der Kirchen - reale Moeglichkeit (Quaestiones
disputatae 100), Freiburg i. Br. 1983, tesi 2, p. 23-24 (tr. it. Unione delle
chiese - possibilità reale, Morcelliana, Brescia 1986).

34 w. KASPER
Questa idea di una tolleranza gnoseologica fu in vari modi
criticata, e a mio giudizio giustamente criticata. Dobbiamo infatti
sì ammettere che, al di là del consenso nei Simboli fondamentali
della fede, basta che nessuna Chiesa dica a proposito
delle professioni di fede delle altre Chiese che esse non contraddicono
il vangelo, però dobbiamo aggiungere – e questo va al di
là della tolleranza gnoseologica di Rahner-Fries – che ogni Chiesa,
pur senza adottarle positivamente, deve riconoscere che le
formulazioni di fede di un’altra Chiesa possono essere una articolazione
storica possibile dell’unico vangelo comune.
Che questa non sia una semplice teoria o utopia risulta chiaro
dal fatto che oggi si riconosce generalmente che il “filioque”,
controverso tra Oriente e Occidente, è sì espressione di una teologia
trinitaria orientale e occidentale diversa, ma che esso non
indica alcuna oggettiva differenza nel campo della fede e che
perciò Oriente e Occidente non devono imporre le loro diverse
formulazioni 65 . La stessa cosa vale a proposito delle formulazioni
del Concilio di Calcedonia (451) circa la dottrina delle due nature,
che furono respinte già nel secolo V dalle Chiese veteroorientali
(precalcedonensi), per questo considerate fino ai nostri
giorni Chiese monofisite. Nel frattempo, nelle dichiarazioni ufficiali
comuni, si riconosce che si tratta qui di differenze terminologiche
che non mettono in discussione l’unica fede comune 66 .
Nella Dichiarazione congiunta sulla dottrina della giustificazione
abbiamo a che fare con un processo simile. In essa non abbiamo
infatti un consenso totale, ma un consenso differenziato.
Si è trovato un consenso circa le verità fondamentali della dottrina
della giustificazione, ma si è nello stesso tempo preso atto
che, in altre questioni, esistono impostazioni, accentuazioni e
terminologie differenti, che tuttavia non eliminano il consenso
raggiunto e sono piuttosto tollerabili all’interno della comunione
ecclesiale. Le differenze rimanenti non sono contraddittorie,
ma complementari. Esse non hanno un carattere capace di dividere
la Chiesa, bensì rappresentano un’unità in una diversità ri-
65 Y. CONGAR, Der Heilige Geist, Freiburg i. Br. 1986, 361-376 (ed. it. Credo
nello Spirito Santo, 3 voll., Queriniana, Brescia 1981-1983).
66 In Dokumente wachsender Uebereinstimmung 1931-1982, Paderborn-
Frankfurt a. M. 1983, I 541-542; II 1982-1990, 572.

UNITÀ DELLA CHIESA E COMUNIONE ECCLESIALE ... 35
conciliata 67 .
Questa teoria del consenso differenziato e dell’unità nella diversità
riconciliata risale sostanzialmente a Johann Adam Moehler,
l’importantissimo rappresentante della Scuola di Tubinga del
secolo XIX e uno dei grandi precursori dell’odierna teologia ecumenica.
Nella sua opera giovanile L’unità nella Chiesa egli distingue,
nello spirito del romanticismo del suo tempo, tra “Gegensatz”
(contrasto, diversità) e “Widerspruch” (contraddizione,
antitesi). I contrasti, le diversità fanno per Moehler parte della
vita; ogni vera vita, anche la vita della Chiesa, si svolge in seno a
una compenetrazione di cose tra loro diverse, che si muovono
pertanto nell’unità. L’eresia invece è una contraddizione e come
tale una diversità sbagliata, che si esclude e si assolutizza. Ma tali
contraddizioni possono, secondo Moehler, di nuovo trasformarsi
in diversità, allorché esse si riconciliano con l’unità 68 . Un
insigne ecumenista cattolico, il domenicano Yves Congar, riprese
queste idee e le utilizzò per il dibattito ecumenico 69 .
Il modello di una unità in una diversità riconciliata è molto
importante per la teologia ecumenica sia per quanto riguarda il
fine del lavoro ecumenico e sia per quanto riguarda il suo metodo.
Esso, poiché non mira a un consenso completo, è spesso detto
modello della convergenza, un modello il quale si contenta in
molti casi di stabilire delle analogie e delle equivalenze che
esprimono una intenzione comune, un modello che supera le
differenze senza poterle eliminare fino a raggiungere un pieno
consenso 70 . La Dichiarazione congiunta è sotto questo aspetto –
pur con tutti i suoi lati deboli – un modello tutto sommato riu-
67 Gemeinsame Erklaerung zur Rechtfertigunslehre (Dichiarazione congiunta
sulla giustificazione), in modo riassuntivo nel nr. 40s. Cfr. la riguardo
K. Lehmann. Cfr. anche A. DULLES, “Catholic and Protestant: Contrary or
Complementary?”, in The Catholicity of the Church, New York 1995, 147-166.
68 JOHANN ADAM MOEHLER, Die Einheit in der Kirche oder das Prinzip des
Katholizismus dargestellt im Geiste der Kirchenvaeter der drei ersten Jahrhunderte
(1825), a cura e con introduzione di J. R. Geiselmann, Darmstadt 1957,
§ 46, 152-157 (tr. it. L’unità nella Chiesa, cioè il principio del cattolicesimo nello
spirito dei Padri della Chiesa dei primi tre secoli, Città Nuova, Roma 1969).
69 Y. CONGAR, Diversités et commmunion, Paris 1982 (tr. it. Diversità e comunione,
Cittadella, Assisi 1984).
70 Cfr. W. THOENISSEN, o. c., 28-32.

36 w. KASPER
scito, che ci dice quale forma una simile unità nella multiformità
riconciliata può assumere.
VI. Visione trinitaria di una futura comunione ecclesiale
In ultima analisi la visione di una unità nella diversità è fondata
sul fatto che la Chiesa è formata ad immagine del Dio unitrino,
sul fatto che essa è come una icona della Trinità 71 . Come
nella Trinità l’unità dell’essenza e la distinzione delle tre persone
sono indissolubilmente unite, così avviene in modo analogo anche
nella Chiesa. In questa visuale trinitaria l’unità della Chiesa
non è un sistema uniformistico, così come non è una semplice
accumulazione o federazione di Chiese eterogenee, ma è comunione
attraverso la partecipazione, nell’unico Spirito Santo, all’unico
Signore Gesù Cristo. L’unità della Chiesa non può perciò
essere strutturata in base a qualche modello politico. Essa non
corrisponde né a uno Stato assolutistico, né a una costituzione
statale federativa, ma è una unità “sui generis” che affonda le
proprie radici nel mistero del Dio unitrino e ne è, nello stesso
tempo, una espressione.
Nel mondo moderno facciamo fatica a trovar ascolto con
questo nostro messaggio del mistero di Dio. Se non lavoriamo
ecumenicamente insieme, ben difficilmente ci riusciremo ancora.
Ma questo nostro mondo con i suoi molteplici conflitti potenziali,
che si unifica sempre di più ed è tuttavia profondamente
lacerato, di che cosa avrebbe più che mai bisogno se non della
testimonianza di una simile unità, che non solo tollera la diversità,
ma la sperimenta e la riconosce come un arricchimento?
La realizzazione della piena unità-communio quale unità nella
multiformità è perciò oggi diventata una questione esistenziale
non solo per la cristianità, bensì per tutto il mondo.
Proprio oggi c’è bisogno dell’unità dei discepoli di Gesù, affinché
il mondo creda (Gv 17,21). Solo nella fede in colui che è
71 LG 4; UR 3. Cfr, B. FORTE, La Chiesa, icona della Trinità, 1984; G. Greshake,
Der dreieine Gott. Eine trinitarische Theologie, Freiburg i. Br. 1997,
377-438 (tr. it. Il Dio unitrino. Teologia trinitaria, Queriniana, Brescia 2000).

UNITÀ DELLA CHIESA E COMUNIONE ECCLESIALE ... 37
la via, la verità e la vita (Gv 14,6) il nostro mondo può infatti finalmente
trovare la pace e l’unità.
Molti lamentano il fatto che il cammino dell’avvicinamento
ecumenico procede troppo lentamente. In realtà ci vuole un’infinita
pazienza lungo questo percorso. Ma ci sono anche segni
che inducono a sperare. La celebrazione ecumenica dell’apertura
della porta santa a San Paolo fuori le mura, svoltasi il 18 gennaio,
è stata per me un segno profetico del genere, nonché un
presagio e una anticipazione di una possibile unità nella molteplicità
malgrado tutte le difficoltà: il papa aprì la porta santa non
da solo, ma insieme al delegato di Costantinopoli e all’arcivescovo
di Canterbury, insieme essi si inginocchiarono davanti alla
porta che simboleggia Cristo. Alla fine delegazioni di ventidue
Chiese orientali e occidentali scambiarono con il papa il bacio
della pace.
Quella fu molto di più di una splendida celebrazione esteriore.
Fu un’ora della grazia. Tutti erano profondamente commossi
e intimamente felici. Noi, che avevamo lavorato duramente
per questo, fino a poco tempo prima quasi non l’avremmo
ancora ritenuto possibile in quella forma. Perciò sono convinto
che l’unità della Chiesa sia, malgrado tutte le difficoltà,
non un semplice sogno, ma come dono dello Spirito di Dio una
reale possibilità.
W. KASPER
—————
Cardinal Walter Kasper is Prefect of the Pontifical Council for
the Promotion of Unity among Christians.
El Cardenal Walter Kasper es Prefecto del Pontificio Consejo
para la promoción de la unidad entre los cristianos.
—————

StMor 40 (2002) 39-61
BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE, C.SS.R.
THE WAR ON TERRORISM: A JUST WAR?
In response to the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers and
the Pentagon, and the subsequent “war on terrorism,” a number
of Catholic spokespersons, including lay experts in military
affairs, and some Cardinals and Bishops appealed to the doctrine
of the “Just War” and argued that armed force in this case
could be accepted as a just response. 1 Pope John Paul II himself
has made a number of statements, affirming that religion should
never be used to justify war 2 , promoting tolerance and dialogue
between Christians and Muslims, and calling for aid for the victims
of violence. The Pope has not expressed a moral judgment
about this particular war as such, but has called for the rejection
of all war. 3 Indeed there seem to be two levels of discourse
involved here: a prophetic denunciation of war on the part of the
Pope, and a calculated, ethical acceptance of it, under certain
conditions, by a number of other Church leaders. The Pope’s
statements reflect the longing for peace and opposition to violence
which has been present in Christianity from its beginnings.
The others, using the language of the just war, continue
1
MICHAEL QUINLAN, “The Just War litmus test,” Tablet, 13 October, 2001,
1451; Editorial, America, Oct. 29, 2001, “The aerial attack by the United
States on terrorist and Taliban targets in Afghanistan has been declared a
just war by a number of Catholic leaders, including some bishops and cardinals,”
URL http://www.americapressorg/terror.htm; Cardinal Cormac
Murphy-O’Connor and Archbishop Patrick Kelly in their joint statement
published in Tablet, 29 September, 2001, 1390; “Living With Faith and Hope
After September 11,” Origins 31 (2001) 416.
2
JOHN PAUL II, “Do not use religion as a reason for conflict,” Origins 31
(2001) 285.
3 In his Angelus message for Sunday, 27 January 2002, the Pope said:
“Violence never again! War never again! Terrorism never again! In the name
of God, may every religion bring upon the earth justice and peace, forgiveness
and life, love!” URL http://www.vatican.va.
39

40 BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
the centuries old search for a responsible way to deal with
unavoidable violence. Is it still appropriate to present the “traditional”
doctrine of the just war, 4 in the public forum, as a moral
framework within which we may answer questions concerning
the legitimacy of a war and the morality of the conduct of that
war?
In its present form, the JWD is usually taken to mean an ethical
and/or legal doctrine which, while adopting a presumption
against war, holds that it may be justified, according to a set of
criteria. A first group of these criteria refers to the decision to go
to war, and requires legitimate authority, just cause, right intention,
while the second concerns the conduct of war, and requires
discrimination, proportionality, last resort, and reasonable hope
of success. The criteria of proportionality refer both to the decision
to go to war— the foreseen harms which inevitably accompany
war ought be proportionate to the good being sought—
and to the use of violence for particular objectives, which ought
to be proportionate to the importance of this objective for
achieving the purpose of the war.
Critics, have long seen the doctrine as a corruption of the
genuine Christian tradition. 5 It is further charged that it has not
fostered peace, but has simply opened the way to the justification
of violence, which has resulted in the murder of millions. 6
As a response to the first criticism, this article will offer an interpretation
of how the change in the tradition, from the early
Church’s rejection of violence, to the acceptance of just war,
came about. In respect to the second charge, historical studies
have claimed that the doctrine was invoked to legitimize wars,
or at least that authorities twisted the doctrine to provide pretexts
for their wars. 7 According to one author, even St. Francis of
4 Henceforth, the JWD.
5
ROLAND H. BAINTON, Christian Attitudes to War and Peace (Nashville:
Abingdon, 1960) 236.
6
JOHN DEAR, The God of Peace:Towards a Theology of Nonviolence
(Maryknoll N.Y: Orbis Books, 1994) 126.
7
JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, Ideology, Reason, and the Limitations of War
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975) 19.

THE WAR ON TERRORISM: A JUSTWAR? 41
Assisi invoked the doctrine to justify war. 8 Has the JWD been
effective in restraining war? In some circumstances, it does
seem to have acted as a restraint, at least during the era of
Christendom. 9 However, there is not sufficient published evidence
available to form a reasonable judgment on the historical
effectiveness, or lack of it, of the doctrine over a longer period.
In relation to the war against terrorism, up to the present, conducted
in Afghanistan, the JWD criteria may well have had a
restraining influence on military planning and conduct. But the
issue is complicated by tight restrictions on information; journalists
were kept away from the theatre of war so that people
have been deprived of the factual knowledge needed to form a
responsible judgment. To some extent at least this lack is now
being remedied. 10
Some of the criticism of the JWD can be answered by a clarifications
of its presuppositions. It does not maintain that war as
such is just, or that all wars are just; it holds that war is not, in
itself, always immoral, or, in other words, that it is not intrinsically
evil. Any particular war, to be justified, must satisfy all of
the criteria it proposes. It would thus be logically possible that,
after considering the purposes and conduct of historical wars,
the upholders of the doctrine would have to condemn all wars.
At present, both International Law and official Catholic teaching
accept defence only as just cause. The only form of war now
legally permissible for a state, is a war of individual or collective
self-defense. 11 Pius XII also taught that defense was the only just
8 CRISTOPH T. MAIER, Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant Friars and the
Cross in the Thirteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994) 15; JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic
Traditions, (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997) 57.
9 JOHNSON, Ideology, 13.
10 CARL CONETTA, “Strange Victory: A critical appraisal of Operation
Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan war.” Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth
Institute Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph, #6, 30 January
2002; URL http://www.comw.org/pda/O201strangevic.html; Idem., “Why a
Higher Rate of Civilian Bombing Casualties?” 18 January 2002, URL
http://www.comw.org/pda/0201oef.html.
11 Article 51 of Chapter 7 of the United Nations charter recognizes war
of defense as a right to be exercised pending action by the Security Council.

42 BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
cause for which war might be fought, 12 and this has become the
accepted official teaching of the Church. The Second Vatican
Council (1965) affirmed that: “As long as the danger of war
remains and there is no competent and sufficiently powerful
authority at the international level, governments cannot be
denied the right to legitimate defence once every means of
peaceful settlement has been exhausted.” 13
This teaching implies an acceptance of the JWD, in the form
of a doctrine of just defence. This statement has provided the
basis for a number of the comments made by some Church leaders,
on the war in Afghanistan. The attack of September 11 th and
the implied threat of similar attacks in the future, judged in
terms of the doctrine, clearly provides a just cause for defensive
war. The issue is relatively much clearer than was the case with
the Gulf War of 1990-91. 14 Indeed, the attack on the U.S.A. clearly
violated all the criteria of the JWD. However, while a war of
defence may be justified in principle, a definitive judgment on
the morality of initiating the war would still require the test of
proportionality: is war proportionate to the just end of selfdefence,
or should other methods be preferred, such as those
provided by international law or sanctions? 15
The proportionality requirement presents special difficulties
for the upholders of the JWD. Furthermore, many of those who
condemn war completely, do not do so simply on the basis of
abstract principle, but because they have concluded from historical
evidence that war can never, in reality, be a proportionate
means. Hence, in this article, particular attention will be given
to this criterion, both in reference to the decision to initiate war,
and to the conduct of particular operations during that war.
WILLIAM V. O’BRIEN, The Conduct of Just and Limited War (New York: Praeger,
1981) 23.
12 JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J. “War as a Moral Problem,” in Idem., We
Hold These Truths (London: Sheed and Ward, 1960) 258.
13 Gaudium et Spes, # 79.
14 Cf. JOHN LANGAN, S.J. “The Just-War Theory After the Gulf War,”
Theological Studies 53 (1992) 95-112.
15 Cf. “A Just War,” Editorial, America, Oct. 8, 2001, URL
http://www.americapress.org/terror.htm.

THE WAR ON TERRORISM: A JUSTWAR? 43
After the terrorist act of September 11 th 2001, journalists
asked some Catholic spokespersons, whether an armed response
was justifiable in terms of “traditional just war teaching.” As J.
Bryan Hehir has well pointed out, this is too narrow a question.
16 Nevertheless, it does call for an answer. To what does “tradition”
refer here? Does it mean the secular tradition which
emerged and separated from the Christian tradition, with a view
to providing a generally acceptable, rational code governing the
initiating and conduct of war, which is now, at least in part,
embodied in international law? Or does it mean, as Michael
Walzer proposed, that set of commonly accepted, but largely
unarticulated principles on which we base the arguments we
have about war 17 ? Or does it mean the just war doctrine as it
developed and is maintained within the Christian, or specifically
within the Catholic tradition? 18 The answer can make a considerable
difference to the way in which the doctrine is interpreted.
The criteria of the JWD, as stated above, are abstracted
from the tradition or traditions within which they were formed,
and if they are to be understood must be interpreted within
those traditions. Since the question to be answered in this article
is the appropriateness of the use of the doctrine by Catholic
spokespersons, the following explanation will be concerned
principally with the Catholic tradition, while taking others into
account.
Since there is no generally accepted notion of “tradition,”
and in particular of the kind of moral tradition we are dealing
with here, it will be necessary to make some stipulations about
the meaning of tradition. John Courtney Murray, in discussing
the morality of war, referred to the “tradition of reason,” but
without explaining in any depth what this might mean. 19 What I
16 J. BRYAN HEHIR, “What can be done? What should be done?” America
Oct. 8, 2001,URL http://www.americapress.org/terror.htm.
17 cf. MICHAEL WALZER, Just and Unjust War (New York: Basic Books,
1977).
18
JOSEPH JOBLIN, L’Église et la Guerre: Conscience, violence, pouvoir
(Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1988) 9.
19 John Courtney Murray, S.J. “The Problem of the Moral Vacuum,” in
Idem., We Hold These Truths (London: Sheed and Ward, 1960) 285.

44 BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
offer here may be taken as an endeavour to provide an account
of that notion. According to Alasdair McIntyre, a tradition may
be defined as “… an historically extended, socially embodied
argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods
which constitute that tradition.” 20 For the purposes of this
inquiry, I will adapt this definition somewhat so as to bring out
more clearly that the “goods” are not merely ideas about goods,
but lived realities, and that the form of discourse is wider than
formal “argument.” Thus, in this article, tradition means an
extended process of communication, by testimony and argument
over time, of what has proved itself to be a good way of
life. That which is communicated is not merely information,
beliefs and doctrines about that life, but the substance of that
good life, that is its actual embodiment in the way of life of a
community. Commitment to a tradition entails the acceptance of
a defining experience, which may take the form of accepting a
charismatic person or a group, who are seen as having inaugurated
the tradition to which its present inhabitants now adhere.
The latter see the tradition, entailing a continuity from the present
to the past, as bringing them into contact with the original
experience of the good life in which they now participate.
Accepting the tradition in this manner, and verifying it through
their own experience and critical reflection, opens the possibility
of continuing that good life in the future.
Coherence with the tradition will therefore entail coherence
with the particular experiences and insights of the founding figure
or group, insofar as they have been accepted by those committed
to the tradition, as defining what is a good life.
Commitment to the Christian tradition entails a commitment in
this sense to the person of Jesus, and to the experience and
insights of the apostolic church. These are expressed normatively
in the continuing tradition, embodied in the Scriptures.
Commitment to the tradition includes acceptance of the teachings
of authority which interpret these sources, namely what we
now call the “teachings of the Magisterium.” Living that tradi-
20 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, After Virtue, 2 nd ed. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1984) 222.

THE WAR ON TERRORISM: A JUSTWAR? 45
tion will, of course, entail modifications and adaptations as the
subsequent adherents to the tradition seek to live out the defining
form of the good life in their own historical circumstance.
Recalling the past may confirm the coherence of the present
notions of the good life with those of the past, or it may reveal
that some values have been forgotten and need to be recovered,
or may manifest elements in the previous stages that offer genuine
alternatives which can exercise a critique of the present; or
again, it may show that some positions, which have been accepted
from the past, were based on faulty arguments and need to be
revised. Being committed to a tradition thus includes both an
acceptance of and a critical engagement with that tradition. I
must accept the position which has been reached so far in the
process of argument, because it has behind it the tradition to
which I myself am committed and on which I depend for my
own arguments. But I may criticize that position, for example,
on the grounds that it is not fully coherent with the goods proposed
by the tradition itself. Tradition, for those who are committed
to it, sets the burden of proof in cases of dispute, so it is
those who challenge the tradition who must prove their case. In
this way the inner logic of tradition explains why certain
requirements, such as the criteria of the JWD, have “prima facie”
validity. 21 Commitment to the tradition implies faith in its transcendent
source, God. Faith in God, who created human reason,
sustains faith in that reason, while this subsumes a human faith
in that same reason, engendered by reason’s proven capacity to
discover and explain the basic elements of a good life.
The “tradition of reason” embodied in the JWD has been
elaborated within the Catholic tradition, “in the light of faith.”
How faith and reason combined in this process can best be
shown not by abstract formulae constructed a-priori, but by an
examination of how they collaborated in the historical process
by which the doctrine was formulated. An outline of this I will
now seek to provide. Since a full account of the tradition, is not
21 Cf. JAMES F. CHILDRESS, “Just War Criteria,” in Thomas A. Shannon, ed.,
War or Peace ? (Maryknoll, NY.: Orbis, 1980) 41. The basis for accepting
“prima facie” remains unaccounted for by this author. Hence, the suggestion
of tradition in this article.

46 BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
possible within the limits of an article, particular attention will
be directed to the point at which the alleged corruption in the
tradition is said to have taken place, namely in the work of St.
Augustine and in the consolidation of the doctrine by St.
Thomas Aquinas and his followers.
Although the negative influence of Augustine’s teaching has
been well documented, 22 it is not appropriate to read St.
Augustine merely as the father of the just war doctrine, or the
original justifier of religiously sanctioned violence. Indeed,
Augustine has been studied as the “doctor of peace.” 23 Augustine
held that war can be justified only if it is directed to peace. 24 But
to understand this position, we must place it in its context.
Augustine dealt with three options in regard to the political
order. He could adopt the strongly eschatological view of the
early Church, which saw the Church as alien to worldly affairs
and in particular to the State. It would be in keeping with such
a view to hold that Christians should have nothing to do with
war. A second model was that of Eusebius of Caesarea (d.340
A.D.) according to which the use of secular power had a sacral
significance, in that the use of such power for religious ends was
considered as an instrument of God in the working out of the
history of salvation. 25 It would be in keeping with such a position
to see war, in particular the wars of the Roman state as
instruments in the providential plan of God. It would seem that
Augustine accepted this second model for some years. Only later
(after the sack of Rome by Alaric in 410) did he move away from
seeing the coercive policies of the empire in favour of
Christianity as the instruments by which God was fulfilling his
plan. Especially in the City of God, he then developed a doctrine
of the political order, which insisted firmly on the fulfilment of
22 FREDERICK H. RUSSELL, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1975) 16-39.
23 STANISLAW BUDZIK, Doctor Pacis: Theologie des Friedens bei Augustinus
(Innsbruck: Tyrolia Verlag, 1988).
24 Letter 189.6 (CSEL 57.489)
25 EUSEBIUS, Preparation for the Gospel, 1.4.4, SC 206, 121. Cited in, Louis
J. Swift, The Early Fathers on War and Military Service (Wilmington,
Delaware: Michael Glazier, 1983) 83.

THE WAR ON TERRORISM: A JUSTWAR? 47
God’s plan only in the eschatological kingdom to be realized
beyond human history, but recognized a role for the state, and
for war in the present dispensation, as a lamentable necessity. 26
What were Augustine’s views on war as the instrument of
God? The question arose in a special way in connection with a
Gospel text, the interpretation of which has had an ominous and
fateful history: it was used for centuries to justify the use of violence
against the Jewish people. The prophecy of the divine punishment
which will fall on Jerusalem (Lk 19: 41-44; 21: 20-24; Mt
22:7) presents the destruction as punishment for not accepting
God’s call. Augustine believed that those Roman armies who
destroyed Jerusalem were wicked, but they were despite this, the
instruments of God in punishing the Jews. 27 Similarly, the invasions
by the Barbarians are interpreted by Augustine as a punishment
of the wicked for the corruption of morals, and a purifying
trial for the good. 28 However, even if God is using an invading
army to fulfil his purposes, it does not follow that the soldiers
of that army are, for that reason, morally justified in what
they do. God uses what they do, even if what they do is morally
evil. Man may act in a disordered way, but this does not escape
the counsel of God, who uses that disorder for his own purposes.
29 Augustine makes a clear distinction between the sinful soldier
bent on domination and the Christian soldier serving legitimate
authority: God may use the sin of the former for his own
purposes, but will eventually punish it. 30 What of the case of war
waged by legitimate authority for a just purpose? Could it be
26 R. A. MARCUS, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St.
Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 70, 98. De Civitate
Dei, XIX, 17. CCSL XLVIII, 685.
27 H. A. DEANE, Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine (New York and
London: Columbia University Press, 1963) 309, Notes to ch. 5, n.12. (En. in
P., LXXIII, 7-8; CCSL XXXIX, 1010-11).
28
DEANE, Political and Social Ideas, 310, n.12. (De Civitate Dei, I,1; CCSL
XLVII, 2).
29
HENRY PAOLUCCI, ed. The Political Writings of St. Augustine (Chicago:
Henry Regnery 1962) x. Augustine.
30 . JOHN HELGELAND, ROBERT J. DALY and J. PATOUT BURNS, Christians and
the Military: The Early Experience (Philadelphia: Fortress Press 1985) 80.

48 BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
said that God wills or commands such a war? It would seem
rather that for Augustine, waging a just war is something
imposed on the just man by those necessities which arise in a
sinful world. Good men may be required to undertake war “at
God’s command, or the command of a legitimate authority” but
such a divine command would come into play only in those situations
where maintaining order in a sinful world required violence.
This was his view at least when writing against Faustus
(397-398). 31 Divine authority does not descend arbitrarily from
the heavens; it applies to situations where war would be considered
just on other grounds than the divine fiat.
What of Augustine’s notorious support of state coercion
against heretics, in his case against the Donatists? This would be
a clear case of religion fostering coercion, if not violence or war.
The Edict of Unity (405) which branded the Donatists as heretics,
and so brought them under the general laws on heresy, was an
act of the imperial court. 32 However, Augustine accepted the
change of policy it embodied as an act of providence. In interpreting
its significance, Augustine fell back on some of the ideas
we have already discussed. The edict and the suppression which
followed, he viewed as an act of divine “disciplina” by which
God, the stern father, inflicts punishment on his delinquent children,
checking their evil tendencies, by a series of catastrophes
as he did in the Old Testament period and continues to do now. 33
As Peter Brown describes it, Augustine saw this necessary persecution
of the Donatists heretics as another form of such necessary
discipline or “controlled catastrophe.” 34
31 Contra Faustum, 22.74; Migne, PL t. XLII, 447; Swift, The Early
Fathers, 120.
32
PETER BROWN, Augustine of Hippo (Berkely: University of California
Press, 1969) 234. It needs to be remembered that the edict imposed “inconveniences”
(as Augustine called them) restricting the Donatists ability to dispose
of property and to hold office. It did not impose the death penalty.
Augustine was opposed in principle to the death penalty, ibid., 241 although
the means of disciplina included flogging, ibid., 239.
33 Letter, 93.2.6. The Fathers of the Church, St. Augustine, Letters, vol. 2
(Washington, D.C. The Catholic University of America Press, 1985) 61. Swift,
The Early Fathers, 148.
34
BROWN, Augustine, 237.

THE WAR ON TERRORISM: A JUSTWAR? 49
For Augustine, while no political community can claim to
embody true justice, this does not mean that all human political
communities are equally unjust and immoral. Political societies
are better or worse according to what they love. 35 Thus, the
earthly peace which such a political community sustains is a
genuine good, and gift of God. But it may not be identified with
the true peace of the Kingdom. It follows, therefore, that those
who work to preserve this limited, but necessary, peace do a
good work and should not shirk or withdraw from it, even
though they may feel pain in the exercise of their task. Living in
a sinful world, in the Kingdom of this world, we ought use what
is available to us to preserve the wretched kind of peace that we
can attain here. Provided it is directed to this end, namely peace,
the activity of war may be justified. According to St. Augustine,
a soldier may be justified in waging war, and in killing in war, if
he acts as the agent of the law. Since the law is necessary, given
the condition of sinful mankind, to prevent men from destroying
each other and to maintain a certain kind of peace, the activities
of a soldier who acts as an instrument of the law can be justified.
In later writings, however, St. Augustine seems to have moved
away from such a justification in favour of one looking to the
protection of others, and the common good. 36 Whatever may be
said of these differences, it is generally accepted that, “Augustine
of Hippo developed a theory of the complementarity of the
earthly and heavenly cities which legitimated the waging of war
by Christian rulers” 37 and the participation of Christian soldiers
in submission to authority.
What we find in St. Thomas’s treatment of war is a theological
context heavily dependent on St. Augustine, combined, however,
with a return to a Greek view, specifically that of Aristotle,
of political order. However, in the question on war itself, while
there are many citations from Augustine in St. Thomas’ princi-
35 De Civitate Dei, 19.24. CCSL XLVIII, 695.
36 GREGORY LEONARD COONEY, C.M. The Magisterium in Moral Matters of
Bishops’ Conferences in the Light of the Document The Challenge of Peace.
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Faculty of Theology, Gregorianum
University, Rome, 1989) 76.
37 HELGELAND, Christians, 73.

50 BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
pal text on the subject, there is only one from Aristotle. 38
According to Russell, St.Thomas makes an innovative move in
invoking the common good as a justification of war, and invoking
an Aristotelean doctrine of politics to justify the ruler’s
authority to wage war. 39 However, as the recent research on St.
Thomas’s teaching on peace and war by Gerhard Beestermöller
shows, his teaching on just war must be read as a systematic,
theological ethic of peace. 40 The more specific context, in the
Summa, 41 of the treatment of peace and force is the section on
the vices opposed to charity, and more particularly the vices
opposed to the effect of charity, which is peace. 42 St. Thomas
presents peace first of all as an interior effect of charity. But he
does not restrict it to interior morality, interior peace is meaningless
without its “opus” or work, which we might translate
“peace-making.” War is treated as a sin against peace in its opus
or work. Since St. Thomas drew on the thought of Aristotle, his
final views on the origin and status of political authority diverge
from those of Augustine. 43 However, he retains Augustine’s argument
that the use of the sword is justified, provided it is used in
due subjection to authority and law, in the case of a private person,
or from zeal for justice, in the case of a public official, who
acts quasi ex autoritate dei. 44
St. Thomas develops Aristotle’s thinking in two ways. First,
he draws on the biblical doctrine of God the creator so as to
widen his analysis of the good human life, from the limited polis,
to the quasi-political community of all human creatures under
the universal authority of the creator. Secondly, he adopts
Aristotle’s political notion of philia (amicitia) as his model for
the caritas which is the foundation of the community of the
38 S. Th. II-II, q. 40, a. 2; Politics, I, (1252b3).
39 S. Th. II-II, q. 40, a. 1. ad 2. FREDERICK H. RUSSELL, The Just War in the
Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) 261.
40
GERHARD BEESTERMÖLLER, Thomas von Aquin und der gerechte Krieg
(Cologne: J-P. Bachem, 1990) 31.
41 Other texts relevant to the question are: S. Th. II-II, q. 64, art 3; S. Th.
II-II, q. 83, art 8; Scriptum super Sententias, lib. 3, dist. 30.
42 S. Th. II-II, q. 39, intro. and q. 40.
43
MARCUS, Saeculum, 224.
44 S. Th. II-II, q. 40, a. 1, ad 1.

THE WAR ON TERRORISM: A JUSTWAR? 51
human family as not merely creatures but children of God. The
city state or polis, for Aristotle, had its basis in philia. This
means not so much friendship in our modern sense, but “companionship
with trust.” 45 For Aristotle, acts against this philia
are absolutely ruled out. Thus, St. Thomas distinguishes
between “... not living the life of the spirit well,” perhaps by not
cultivating the virtues through prayer, for such dispositions are
not merely something which we acquire by education and exercise,
but are gifts of the Holy Spirit, and “... those acts which are
simply incompatible with membership of the community sustained
and defined by caritas.” 46 War is such an act. By placing
his discussion of war in the context of charity, St. Thomas is saying
that it is the kind of sin which tears apart, not only the very
foundations of the universal human community, that community
which is the necessary support of the good life for all, but that
community which is the foundation of the family of all as the
children of God.
St. Thomas develops his treatment of war within a virtue
ethic, complimented by an ethic of office, and an ethic of law. 47
But all is contained within the wider teleological vision, such
that the ethic itself must be integrated into a life of peace and
friendship with God, and with one another, of which the causal
power is the divine energy, the Spirit of Jesus risen. 48 This peace
and friendship, as I have already noted, is to be embodied in the
community of the faithful, and extended to the whole human
community by the opus or work of peace. This theological teleology
is embodied in a political teleology, where community law
serves to foster the common good, whose principal feature is
peace. 49
The first question in the Summa’s treatment of war is: “Is
war always a sin?”. The presumption being that it is. Why it is
so, is explained in terms of the violation of order, now under-
45
HERBERT MCCABE, “Manuals and Rule Books,” in Understanding
Veritatis Splendor, ed. John Wilkins (London: SPCK, 1994) 64.
46
MCCABE., “Manuals,” 65.
47
RUSSELL, The Just War, 262-263.
48 S. Th. III, q. 56.
49
RUSSELL, The Just War, 261.

52 BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
stood as the order of creation and charity, which is the foundation
of the community of all humanity. The destruction of this
community is sinful, moreover, because it destroys that human
reality which is meant to be a participation of the divine idea of
peace. However, war may be justified under certain very restrictive
conditions: the argument in summary form is that, in certain
particular situations of violence arising from the sinfulness
of humankind, violence may be a means to peace, and the waging
of war may, indeed, be required of the prince. War, then, may
be justified, if it is directed to a just cause, ultimately peace; if it
is directed by right authority, and thus respects political order; if
it is guided by a right intention, that is not aimed at domination
or self-glorification, but at the restoration of peace. This is not
merely a justification of war in the name of natural law and a
theory of natural justice. This was to come later, particularly in
the work of Grotius. 50 The political element, for St. Thomas, has
its own proper moral orientation towards peace in this world,
and so can be the appropriate matter for human action directed
ultimately towards the definitive peace of the Kingdom of God.
How may we judge whether the complex argument presented
in outline here entailed a corruption of the tradition or not?
I suggest the way to proceed would be to ask whether we, as persons
committed to this tradition, and therefore also committed
to a critical reception of that tradition, can follow the process
through without detecting demonstrable incoherence between
the positions taken and the goals of the tradition, and between
the doctrine proposed and the goals present to our consciences,
which are formed by the tradition, and, in turn, form that tradition.
This does not require that we agree with everything that St.
Augustine or St. Thomas wrote on the subject; it is rather an
invitation to reason with the tradition which they have shaped,
so as to form a responsible judgment in our own circumstances.
It would take much further work to prove that this is the case
with regard to the JWD. However, I would argue that, at least in
50 DAVID LITTLE, “Hugo Grotius and Just War Theory,” in Suche nach Frieden:
Politische Ethik in der Frühen Neuzeit I., Norbert Brieskorn and Markus
Riedenauer eds. (Stuttgart Berlin Cologne: Kohlhammer, 2000) 259-273.

THE WAR ON TERRORISM: A JUSTWAR? 53
the light of the evidence which has been presented here, a definitive
rejection of the doctrine is not required of one who is committed
to the Catholic tradition. It is, as the moral theologians of
the past would have said, a “probable” position, that is to say,
there are reasonable grounds for accepting it as a norm for practice.
As was indicated previously, a particularly contentious element
of the JWD is the rule of proportionality; this can best be
dealt with in relation to the question of the immunity of the
innocent in war. St. Augustine does not deal with the question
explicitly. He urged the Roman general Boniface, “And so, even
in the act of waging war be careful to maintain a peaceful disposition
so that by defeating your foes you can bring them to the
benefits of peace… And so, let it be because of necessity rather
than your own desire that you kill the enemy fighting against
you.” 51 It was not sufficient that Augustine’s Christian warrior
preserve an interior disposition and then simply engage in whatever
degree of violence was judged to be necessary. The action
needed to be tempered by the aim of bringing the adversaries to
peace, which could, presumably, not be done by slaughtering the
innocent wholesale. There is, at least, an intimation that the
virtues, and in particular charity, would set limits to the employment
of justified force.
Nor does St. Thomas raise the matter, although an argument
for the immunity of the innocent can be constructed from his
texts. The clear assertion of the prohibition to kill the innocent,
specified as noncombatants, is now accepted as a constitutive
element of the tradition, but it came to be acknowledged as such
through a lengthy and complex process. 52 We must read St.
Thomas brief articles on war in the context of his theologicalmoral
vision; the people to whom he is providing moral guidance
are the same ones whom he has sought to make aware of
51 Letter 189.6 (CSEL 57.135). Translation from Swift, Early Fathers,
114. Cf. JOHN LANGAN, S.J. “The Elements of St. Augustine’s Just War Theory,”
The Journal of Religious Ethics 12 (1984) 30.
52 B. JOHNSTONE, “Noncombatant Immunity: The Origins of the Principle
in Theology and Law,” Studia Moralia 24/1 (1986) 120.

54 BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
the nature of God, the way of return to God through acts which
are intended to be manifestations of the divinity in action,
moved by charity and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and of salvation
through Jesus Christ. Such persons may be presumed to be
unlikely to engage in the indiscriminate slaughter of innocents
in the course of pursuing earthly, military purposes.
Furthermore, the theological-eschatological context would prevent
any cause of war from being considered as absolute, and
thus affect the judgment as to which means are proportionate to
that cause. If one loves God, even the deepest love for community
and nation must be recognized as finite and of a different
order of value. The same love, in its human expression, must
include both friends and enemies, so that even the use of force
against the latter must be contained within an effective will to
bring them peace. Thus, love or charity would limit the use of
force, even when this becomes necessary as the last resort in
defense of self and others.
A detailed examination of the important subsequent development
of the tradition, the detailed exposition of the doctrine
and the further development of its specific criteria by Vitoria 53
and Suarez 54 would be beyond the limits of one article. Some
remarks on particular points must be sufficient. Suarez (d.
1617) made explicit the link between self-defense and defense of
the state, (a link not found in St.Thomas). Charity in his
account, still has a fundamental place, indeed, he places his
analysis of the morality of war in the tract on charity, as did St.
Thomas. 55 Timothy M. Renick has argued that, for Suarez, the
requirements of charity, require a limit on the losses of innocents,
to what is “absolutely unavoidable.” 56 Thus the applica-
53
HEINZ-GERHARD JUSTENHOVEN, Franciscus de Vitoria zu Krieg und
Frieden (Cologne: J. P. Bachem, 1991).
54
RAINER SPECHT, “Francisco Suárez über den Kreig,” in Suche nach
Frieden: Politische Ethik in der Frühen Neuzeit I., Norbert Brieskorn and
Markus Riedenauer eds. (Stuttgart Berlin Cologne: Kohlhammer, 2000) 191-
222.
55
FRANCISCO SUAREZ, S.J. Omnia Opera, t.12, (Paris: Vivès, 1858) tr. III De
Charitate, Disputatio XIII, Sect. I, disp. XIII, p. 737.
56
TIMOTHY M. RENICK, “Charity Lost: The Secularization of the Principle
of Double Effect in the Just-War Tradition,” The Thomist 58 (1994) 452.

THE WAR ON TERRORISM: A JUSTWAR? 55
tion of the JWD is not only a matter of justice, and the assessment
of proportionality is not to be made by a mere quantitative
calculation of numbers of losses. The just war tradition, within
the Catholic tradition, did not manifest any substantial development
after this period, until the Second Vatican Council, with its
requirement to “to undertake an evaluation of war with an
entirely new attitude.” 57 The process of re-evaluation is now taking
place.
As the secular version of the JWD divided from the Catholic
tradition, the theological-eschatological context was set aside in
favour of “reason.” The link with the ethic of charity, although
retained by Grotius, soon disappeared, 58 and with it any consideration
of the virtues of the subject, while the assessment of the
acceptable losses of non-combatants was calculated in purely
“objective” terms.
What would be the role and significance of the consideration
of the charity in ethical decisions regarding war and the
acceptable range of losses of non-combatants? Renick argues
that charity would require the protagonists to do more “… than
merely create a greater sum of good than evil. We must minimize
the evil done, and we must be willing to sacrifice to do so,
if we are meaningfully to call our actions moral.” 59 But one
might ask, what is the criterion by which the minimum ought to
be set? Would we want to say that, in a military action, only that
number of losses may be accepted, which is strictly necessary
for the success of this particular attack, and, overall, only that
number of losses is acceptable which is strictly necessary for victory?
But what does “necessary” mean? Does it mean what is
necessary for the fitting punishment of the aggressor? Or does it
mean what is required to re-establish peace, or to make the
world a better place? Or does it simply mean that which is strictly
necessary only to repel the aggression?
The argument put forward here will be that, for Catholics, at
least, and perhaps also for other Christians, the JWD has mean-
57 Gaudium et Spes # 80.
58 RENICK, “Charity Lost,” 455.
59 RENICK, “Charity Lost,” 460-461.

56 BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
ing within the tradition of their community, and these particular
questions must be addressed in reference to that tradition. Thus,
accepting (or rejecting) the doctrine must be understood as one
element in a moral life, within a community which has committed
itself to an historical purpose, of preventing war, checking
violence, and fostering peace for all. Because it is this kind of
life, it requires certain virtues and the elaboration of specific
norms, for example those norms governing the decision to go to
war and the conduct of war. Conversely, because those who
inhabit the tradition live by certain virtues, they will seek to
develop such norms, and engage in a continual process of
review, to assure themselves that the norms express what the
virtues require. General moral terms are the product of this constant
interaction, engaging the intellect and the will. Sometimes,
within the tradition, the intensity of the concern to protect people
threatened with harms has led some exponents of the tradition
to reinforce certain prohibitions with language originally
proper to timeless, ontological essences. 60 I would suggest that
they are not so much essences as the fruit of a long history of
experience, and of a refinement of virtue, together with moral
insight, which are carried forward from generation to generation
through the testimony of those committed to the tradition.
We relearn what murder means, by reading the narratives of the
tradition. The stories evoke something of the revulsion which
the past members of the tradition felt for this crime, and with
that also something of the intensity of their concern for life.
Thus, the present members of the tradition, accepting their testimony,
absorb a similar motivation. Norms express in propositional
form the historical requirements of that concern for life.
In the Christian tradition, for example, the prohibition to kill the
innocent in war, or more specifically non-combatants, is such a
norm. If such norms are detached from their tradition and presented
in isolation, as if they were they were simply items in a
general, “secular” ethic, they are deprived both of their sub-
60 An example is Augustine’s notion of order, see Budzik, Doctor Pacis,
386.

THE WAR ON TERRORISM: A JUSTWAR? 57
stance and of their motivating power. Separated from the context
of virtue, within which they were formed, they do not have
within themselves the capacity to move people towards those
goals which give them meaning, namely the limitation of war,
the overcoming of violence and the fostering of peace. This is
not to say that those who follow the generally accepted war convention
do not possess virtue, or do not allow virtue to guide
their concrete decisions. The contrary is evident from experience.
61 The problem is that the necessary virtue ethic has been
omitted from the standard presentations of the J.W.D.: there is
no mention of charity, and justice is often treated as if it consisted
in purely objective rules. 62 Hence, if the JWD is to be presented
in its “traditional” form, by which is meant that form
which it assumed within the Catholic tradition, then it must
include an ethics of virtue.
It can be argued further, that without such an ethic of virtue,
attempts to assess proportionality cannot succeed. Consider the
following version of the JWD norms and their application to the
war against terrorism.
(In reference to)… the in bello field. There, the two Just War criteria
call for action that does not seek to work through the deaths of
non-combatants - the principle of discrimination; and that does
not foreseeably and avoidably entail such deaths, even collaterally,
on a scale disproportionate to the military effect properly sought -
the principle of proportionality. The initial strikes do indeed seem
to be so designed and their outcome so far appears to fit the aim. 63
Thus, the action was not planned to bring pressure to bear on
the government to surrender, or modify its policies, by directly
61 See the story of Frank Richards, WALZER, Just and Unjust Wars, 152.
62 For an otherwise excellent argument, which, however omits considerations
of virtue, and specifically of charity, see JOHN LANGAN, S.J. “From
Ends to Means: Devising a Response to Terrorism,” America (October 8,
2001), URL http://www.americapress.org/terror.htm.
63 MICHAEL QUINLAN, The Tablet, 23 October, 2001, 1451. This was written
at the start of the operation. As can be seen, the author leaves room for a
revision in view of later evidence.

58 BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
killing the inhabitants of the country (as was the case with
Hamburg, Dresden, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and, perhaps most
recently, Washington in 2001) which would clearly make it
morally wrong. It is claimed that the action does not “foreseeably”
entail the deaths of non-combatants. But we could now
add that such deaths of non-combatants could have been foreseeable
in the light of recent experience of the use of similar tactics
in recent wars, and in view of the type of attacks that were
planned. 64
Did the action “avoidably” include the loss of non-combatants?
Could the losses incurred not have been avoided, at least
to a greater degree than they were, by other tactics than a broad
campaign of high level aerial bombardment? 65 It is estimated
that the non-combatant losses were “… 1000-1300 civilian
deaths due to aerial bombardment; a minimum of 3000 civilian
deaths attributable to the impact of the bombing campaign and
war on the nation’s refugee and famine crises.” 66 How does one
calculate whether some 4000 deaths are proportionate or disproportionate
to “the military effect properly sought”? No one
has suggested that the due proportion should be calculated in
relation to the number of civilians killed on September 11 th . As
stated in the text cited, the proportion must be assessed in terms
of the “military” effect proposed. Suppose we accept that this
effect was the removal of those forces and persons likely to make
another, similar attack on the U.S.A., or another country. But
how is it possible to determine who these people are, and how
would the determination be carried out? Perhaps some intelligible
form of calculation might be possible. But we are told that
the war is to involve a “long hall” aimed at eliminating “terrorism.”
Does this involve the removal from power of every national
leader who is deemed to pose a threat to national security?
How many leaders does this involve? How many countries will
be attacked as Afghanistan was? How can any such assessment
reasonably be made, when the end itself is so ill defined? Even
64 CONETTA, “Why a Higher Rate of Civilian Bombing Casualties?” p. 2.
65 CONETTA, “Strange Victory,” p. 5.
66 CONETTA, “Strange Victory,” p. 4.

THE WAR ON TERRORISM: A JUSTWAR? 59
where the object of a particular action can be precisely defined,
such as the destruction of a truck depot, deemed to be “necessary”
to complete the campaign, how many “collateral” deaths
are proportionate to this? Would the figure be one, twenty or
fifty?
The apparent objectivity of such assessments of proportionality
is an illusion; other factors are operating in such judgments.
In a recent article on the accomplishments of President
Bush, an author writing under the pseudonym “Lexington”,
noted, among the many genuinely praiseworthy achievements of
President Truman, that: “He had the grit to use the atomic
bomb.” 67 In the judgment of the author, it apparently takes “grit”
to accept as proportionate the loss of some 200,000 people.
According to Michael Walzer, Truman, and most of his advisers
accepted the “war is hell” doctrine, and believed that “… the
Americans could do almost anything to win (and shorten the
agony of war).” 68 The combination of the repudiation of the JWD
doctrine, according to which war is not simply an amoral “hell”
but subject to moral restraint, and the alleged “grit” that provided
the inner direction and motivation of the judgment, produced
the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
How then might virtue and reasonable estimation according
to JWD norms yield a more responsible judgment of proportionality.
This provides a crucial test for the doctrine; if no such
judgment can be shown to be “reasonable” in the appropriate
sense, then the doctrine is indeed both incoherent and useless.
First of all, what is to count as reason? In terms of the argument
developed here, this must mean, for Catholics, the tradition of
reason as that has been developed within the actual historical
tradition to which the Catholic community is committed.
Reason therefore, must include the requirements of virtue,
specifically of charity and justice. Thus reason calls for attention
both to the inner requirements of the virtues, together with the
danger of moral corruption their neglect will bring, and to the
67 “A Leader is Born,” The Economist September 20, 2001, 3, URL
http://www.Economist.com.
68
WALZER, Just and Unjust Wars, 264-265.

60 BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
objective requirements, that is the promotion of peace, and,
where necessary, the protection of those to whom one has commitments
in love and responsibilities in justice. Where one cannot
protect these persons by any other means except armed
force, armed force may be justifiable. In assessing the proportionality
of the war itself, proportionality must be assessed not
only in regard to the immediate needs of a particular nation, but
also with respect to the wider interest in the peace of the whole
human family. Charity would require the limitation of the use of
violence to what is necessary to defend those persons under
threat or attack. Vague metaphysical notions of condign punishment
are not admissible, since they are not reasonably calculable.
The range of action must be limited to what is needed to
repel this particular aggression, and to prevent these perpetrators
from further aggression. War may not be engaged in for
quasi religious ends, such as making the world a better place, or
making the world safe for democracy, or conquering “evil”, since
such notions are simply indefinable and can never be used in
assessing proportionality.
Concerning the assessment of proportionality in relation to
particular operations, a first requirement is to learn from experience.
When it is evident that certain forms of attack simply
cannot adequately be controlled, then they may not be used. The
criteria must be what is strictly necessary to defend those persons
who have claims in charity and justice to be protected.
The tradition of reason, as explained here, means that which
has been developed in the Catholic tradition. Would this mean
that it applies only within that tradition? Those who hold to the
Catholic tradition do not claim that they necessarily have a better
grasp of the requirements of reason than do others. But they
do believe that, in the light of their understanding of reason,
they can responsibly offer to others what they themselves have
discovered to be a way of leading a good life, even in the circumstances
of what seems to be the intractable violence of our
world. Accordingly, they believe they have grounds to argue their
case in public, and to critique policies and tactics, which while
claiming to be “reasonable, ” can sometimes by shown not to be
so, using by the very criteria of reason that their proponents
themselves presuppose. The major focus of critique will be the
inner coherence of such proposals. It may be added here, that

THE WAR ON TERRORISM: A JUSTWAR? 61
the four nations now engaged most directly in the “war against
terrorism” were themselves engaged in nuclear terrorism for
decades, targeting cities with their innocent inhabitants, so as to
threaten other governments,
The conclusion of this article is that the JWD, with all its
defects, provides us with moral resources without which we
would be worse off. But it is only when the objective criteria of
the doctrine are combined with the subjective virtue of charity,
and justice, that the assessments required by the doctrine can be
made in a genuinely moral way.
—————
B.V. JOHNSTONE, C.SS.R
The author is Ordinary Professor of Systematic Moral Theology
at the Alphonsian Academy.
El autor es profesor ordinario de Teología Sistemática en la
Academia Alfonsiana.
—————

StMor 40 (2002) 63-84
DENNIS J. BILLY, C.SS.R
THE HEALING ROLE OF FRIENDSHIP
IN AELRED OF RIEVAULX’S DE SPIRITALI AMICITIA
Cistercian abbot Aelred of Rievaulx’s De spiritali amicitia 1
numbers among the great works of Christian literature on
friendship. Composed in a monastic setting over a number of
years and completed sometime before Aelred’s death in 1167, it
offers a comprehensive vision of the nature of Christian friendship
and some very practical advice about how such friendships
should be developed and maintained over time. Using Cicero’s
famous dialogue, De amicitia, 2 for his inspiration and point of
departure and incorporating insights from Scripture, the fathers
of the Church (especially Augustine), and his own experience,
Aelred provides his readers with some very profound insights in-
1 The critical Latin edition Aelred’s De spiritali amicitia [hereafter referred
to as DSA] appears in CCCM 1:279-350. The English translation [hereafter
referred to as SF] comes from AELRED OF RIEVAULX, Spiritual Friendship,
Cistercian Fathers Series, no. 5, trans. Mary Eugenia Laker, with an Introduction
by Douglass Roby (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications,
1977). The treatise has been described as “…probably the most popular of all
the early Cistercian texts.” See BERNARD MCGINN, JOHN MEYENDORFF, and JEAN
LECLERCQ, eds., Christian Spirituality I: Origins to the Twelfth Century (New
York: Crossroad, 1985), 214. For the life of Aelred, see AELRED SQUIRE, Aelred
of Rievaulx: A Study, Cistercian Studies, no. 50 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian
Publications, 1981). For critical studies of DSA, see CCCM 1: xii. For a concise
summary of his spirituality and the major theological influences on his
life, see JEAN LECLERCQ, FRANÇOIS VANDENBROUCKE, and LOUIS BOUYER, A History
of Christian Spirituality, vol. 2, trans. The Benedictines of Holme Eden
Abbey (New York: The Seabury Press, 1968), 205-8. See also MARCEL VILLER
et al., eds., Dictionnaire de spiritualité, ascétique et mystique, doctrine et histoire
(Paris, Beauchesne, 1934-), s. v. “Aelred,” by A. Le Bail.
2 CICERO, De senectute, De amicitia, De divinatione, The Loeb Classical
Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1923; reprint ed. 1979),
100-211.
63

64 DENNIS J. BILLY
to the healing role of friendship in a person’s journey through
life. 3
Literary Context: The Uses of ‘Dialogue’
Aelred’s choice of the dialogue form has great significance
for the content of his teaching. Deeply rooted in the Western
philosophical tradition, the dialogue was a widely accepted
means of learned discourse in classical civilization, one that was
eventually taken up by a wide spectrum of interested Christian
authors. 4 In selecting the dialogue form, Aelred embraces this
3 For the sources of the De spiritali amicitia, see DOUGLASS ROBY,
“Sources of the Spiritual Friendship,” in SF, 29-35. For the centrality of Scripture
in Aelred’s spirituality, see ANDRÉ VAUCHEZ, The Spirituality of the Medieval
West: The Eighth to the Twelfth Century, trans. Colette Friedlander, Cistercian
Studies, 145(Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1993), 157-58.
In addition to Church fathers such as Ambrose, Augustine, and Jerome, later
monastic authors such as Bernard of Clairvaux, sometimes called “the last of
the fathers,” must also be taken into account. According to ÉTIENNE GILSON:
“Aelred of Rievaulx, although belonging to a later generation, still directly depends
upon St. Bernard. Living wholly within the twelfth century, he is not
divided from the latter by any considerable interval; and although various
doctrinal influences interposed between them, accentuated, no doubt, by
their individual differences, he remains nevertheless a qualified interpreter of
the master whose presence in his writings may be constantly felt.” See The
Mystical Theology of St. Bernard, trans. A. H. C. Downes (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian
Publications, 1990), 6. Aelred, in fact, was often referred to as “the
English Bernard.” See GUERRINO PELLICCIA and GIANCARLO ROCCA, eds.
Dizionario degli istituti di perfezione (Rome: Edizioni Paolini, 1962-), s. v.
“Aelredo,” by H. TRIBOUT DE MOREMBERT According to BERNARD MCGINN,
“[t]he appeal to experience that formed the leitmotif of all Christian mysticism
seems somehow more accessible in Aelred’s personal and at times
painful expressions of how he actually “felt” his friendships as a part of the
quest for God than it may be in Bernard’s lush evocations of male-female
erotic symbolism of the encounter with God.” See The Presence of God: A History
of Western Christian Mysticism, vol. 2, The Growth of Mysticism: From
Gregory the Great to the Twelfth Century (London: SCM Press, 1994), 323.
4 “The monks prefer to cultivate genres like the letter, the dialogue, and
history in all its short forms from short chronicles and accounts of individual
events to long annals.” See JEAN LECLERCQ, The Love of Learning and the

THE HEALING ROLE OF FRIENDSHIP 65
venerable tradition of philosophical and theological expression.
He casts his teaching in this literary genre because he desires a
flexible way of expressing his very particular concerns about the
nature of human relationships. Those concerns are closely connected
with what Jean Leclercq terms “monastic theology,” a
broad, descriptive phrase used to distinguish the practical, experiential,
and symbolic interests of the cloister setting from the
more theoretical, abstract, and dialectical interests of the
scholastic aula. 5 The two approaches differ in fundamental
ways. Monastic theology values the epistemological role of love
and looks upon learning as a means to holiness. Scholastic theology,
in turn, while having nothing against the pursuit of holiness,
sees it as only ancillary to the specific goal of theology itself,
which is to clarify the objective content of the faith through
a critical use of dialectical reasoning. 6 In the twelfth century, the
dialogue form was used very creatively and to great benefit by
monastic and scholastic authors alike. 7
Aelred’s interests in using the dialogue form coincide closely
with his practical interest as a monastic author in showing his
readers how friendship can heal them and draw them closer to
Christ. A close examination of his treatise shows that he departs
from the general characteristics of monastic theology only in his
general hesitancy to incorporate allegorical interpretations into
his text. Since he employs such interpretations in many of his
Desire for God, trans. Catharine Misrahi (New York: Fordham University
Press, 1982), 153-54. For the dialogue as a literary form, see IRWIN EDMAN,
ed., “Introduction” in The Works of Plato (New York: Tudor Publishing Company,
1931), xxiii-xxvi.
5 LECLERCQ, The Love of Learning, 191-235.
6 For a comparison of monastic and scholastic theology, see B. P. GAYBBA,
Aspects of the History of Theology: 12 th -14 th Centuries (Pretoria: University of
South Africa, 1988), 52-57. See also JEAN LECLERCQ, “Monastic and Scholastic
Theology in the Reformers of the Fourteenth to Sixteenth Century,” in
From Cloister to Classroom: Monastic and Scholastic Approaches to Truth, ed.
E. Rozanne Elder, The Spirituality of Western Christendom III (Kalamazoo,
MI: Cistercian Publications, 1986), 178-201, esp. 194.
7 Compare, for example, DSA with PETER ABELARD’S Dialogus inter
philosophum, iudaeum et christianum, ed. R. Thomas (Stuttgart-Bad-
Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann, 1970).

66 DENNIS J. BILLY
other works, he restrains himself probably because of the philosophical
nature of the work by Cicero used for his point of departure.
8 Contrary to what some might claim, his reliance on a
secular source like Cicero is not out of step with general monastic
sensitivities of his day. In most monastic circles, secular
knowledge had little value in itself and was considered useful
only to the extent that it helped the monk in his spiritual journey.
9 Aelred borrows so heavily from Cicero precisely because he
finds the pagan orator and philosopher genuinely useful for his
theological goals. Rather than merely imitating Cicero, however,
Aelred “baptizes” him by immersing him in the life-giving waters
of Scripture and the Fathers. 10
Through the dialogue form, Aelred is able to give his readers
a glimpse of a conversation among close friends in a monastic
setting. The physical location of the conversations – the monastic
cloister – should not be downplayed. Aelred writes with a
monastic (and specifically Cistercian) audience in mind, but
seems to be aware that it might eventually have a wider circulation.
11 Although the dialogue provides little by way of description,
one understands immediately when reading it that those
engaged in the dialogue are thoroughly immersed in such an environment.
Aelred conveys this sense through carefully placed
references to monastic practice and community life that, in his
day, would make sense only if the conversations were taking
place within the cloister. 12 In the dialogue, simplicity of speech,
8 In DSA, Aelred employs the allegorical interpretation of Scripture
only in his treatment of Sg 1:1 [DSA 2:21-27; CCCM 1:306-8 (155-203); SF
75-77]. He uses it extensively, however, in De Jesu puero duodenni (CCCM
1:245-78). See ROBY, “Sources of the Spiritual Friendship,” 33.
9 For the legitimate uses of reason and secular knowledge in monastic
theology, see GAYBBA, Aspects of the Medieval History of Theology, 47-52.
10 DSA “…gives the impression of a thoroughly Augustinian structure,
built on the foundation provided by Cicero. The doctrine is expressed in
scriptural and patristic terms but is no more a florilegium of the Fathers
than it is a simple copy of Cicero.” See ROBY, “Sources of the Spiritual
Friendship,” 31.
11 DSA 2:7 [CCCM 1:303(50-53); SF 71].
12 For the place of DSA in the tradition of monastic friendship, see
DOUGLASS, “Aelred in the Tradition of Monastic Friendship,” in SF 36-41.

THE HEALING ROLE OF FRIENDSHIP 67
good humor, purity of heart, and a genuine desire to draw closer
to Christ give the reader a sense that the monastic ideal has
been enfleshed in the lives of real people.
The dialogue’s erratic chronological framework, moreover,
conveys the strong impression that time itself is of only relative
importance to the characters. Aelred and his friends are keenly
aware of the small amount of time they have at their disposal for
talking about friendship, but do not seem particularly concerned
about it. Shaped by a Rule that seeks to sanctify the day through
a strict regimen of prayer, spiritual reading, and manual labor,
they recognize time itself as a gift from God to be used primarily
for giving glory to him. This attitude frees them from pressures
of an exclusively utilitarian view of time based on output
and production. As a result, they are not overly concerned if
their conversation is broken off in mid-course by the demands
of the Rule or community duties. What has been dropped can be
taken up again as the need arises. In their eyes, the span of years
between books one and two and of a single day between books
two and three are of little consequence. What matters is not if
they finish what they are doing, but if they are using their time
in a way that give honor and glory to God. 13
Finally, Aelred uses the dialogue form to introduce the reader
to a variety of relationships both in and out of time. He makes
this clear in the very first sentence of Book One when he says to
Ivo, “Here we are, you and I, and I hope a third, Christ, is in our
midst.” 14 Whether consciously averted to or not, Christ is the in-
13 Breaks in time within the DSA occur between Books One and Two (a
number of years) and between Books Two and Three (a single day). A break
for an unspecified amount of time also occurs between DSA 2:7 and 2:8 (CC-
CM 1:303(53-54); SF 71). Although annoyance may be expressed at the need
of having to postpone their conversation for a time (e.g, DSA 1:71, 2:72; CCM
1:301(413-15), 2:315-16(470-73); SF 66, 87, Aelred and his dialogue partners
never openly complain about the Rule and what it requires of them. The
monastic attitude toward time is closely linked to the “devotion to heaven,”
which manifested itself in a life of “busy leisure” (negotiosissimum otium)
that steered clear of the dual perils of idleness (otiositas) and business
(negotium). The business of the monk, one might say, was to live a life of holy
leisure. See LECLERCQ, The Love of Learning, 53-70, esp. 67.
14 DSA 1:1 [CCCM 1:289(4-5); SF 51].

68 DENNIS J. BILLY
visible partner in all genuine Christian friendships. All such relationships
flow from, rest in, and tend toward Christ, who provides
the model of genuine spiritual friendship and helps one to
attain it. Aelred also gently reminds his readers that true friendships
do not end but are merely changed by death. Such is what
happens to Aelred and Ivo, the interlocutors of the Book One.
Years later, when Ivo has long been dead, Aelred resumes his discussion
of spiritual friendship and reveals the depth of their
bond:
Indeed, the fond memory of my beloved Ivo, yes, his constant love
and affection are, in fact, always so fresh to my mind, that, though
he has gone from this life in body, yet to my spirit he seems never
to have died at all. For there he is ever with me, there his pious
countenance inspires me, there his charming eyes smile upon me,
there his happy words have such relish for me, that either I seem
to have gone to a better land with him or he seems still to be
dwelling with me here on earth. 15
Aelred’s friendship with Ivo deepens rather than weakens with
death. The reason for this is that the latter’s drawing closer to
Christ through death has had some residual effects on the former.
Aelred, in turn, carries his deep friendship with Ivo into his
daily activities, and especially into the discussion on spiritual
friendship that he takes up again with Walter and Gratian in
Books Two and Three.
This sense of the extended reach of friendship has important
ramifications for Aelred’s readers; they too are silent, invisible
partners in the discussion that is taking place. As mentioned earlier,
Aelred uses the dialogue form to give his readers a glimpse
of a conversation between close friends in a monastic setting. By
allowing them to become quiet observers in this conversation,
he tries to awaken in them the hope that this invisible bond will
one day reap visible fruit. This reader/text dynamic is already
hinted at near the beginning of Book Two when, before setting
out to discuss related concerns on the topic of spiritual friend-
15 DSA 2:5 [CCCM 1:303(30-37); SF 70].

THE HEALING ROLE OF FRIENDSHIP 69
ship, Aelred asks Walter to read the paper containing Aelred’s
and Ivo’s earlier discussion on its nature and origins. 16 Just as
Walter befriends Ivo through the act of reading, so too the readers
of De spiritali amicitia get to know those conversing throughout
its pages. This bond with the characters of the text should
awaken in readers a desire to taste the sweet fruit of spiritual
friendship in their own lives and to be more keenly attuned to
the invisible presence of Christ in their midst.
Theological Context: Creation, Fall, Redemption
In addition to the above literary context, Aelred provides
some important theological parameters for understanding his
teaching on the healing role of friendship. These parameters
concern the Christian doctrines of creation, humanity’s fall, and
redemption in Christ.
1. Creation. In his discussion with Ivo in Book One about the
nature and origin of friendship, Aelred states that God “…has
willed that peace encompass all his creatures and society unite
them.” 17 Every level of creation reveals some trace or vestige of
that unity. A look at inanimate creation, for example, reveals
that the earth produces not a single stone, but many, while
forests contain not a single tree of a single kind, but a great number
of different species. For Aelred, such variety reveals that a
certain love of companionship has been imprinted into the very
nature of the inanimate world. 18 Much the same can be said for
animate life. Although they are irrational, by nature, a look at
the way animals run, play, and enjoy each other’s company almost
makes one want to believe that they are acting with reason.
Their enjoyment of one another’s company is another sign that
the love for companionship has been implanted in their natures.
19 Even immaterial beings such as angels delight in each
16 DSA 2:7-8 [CCCM 1:303(50-59); SF 71].
17 DSA 1:53 [CCCM 1:298(300-2); SF 62].
18 DSA 1:54 [CCCM 1:298(305-10); SF 62].
19 DSA 1:54-55 [CCCM 1:298(310-18); SF 62-63].

70 DENNIS J. BILLY
other’s company. God created not one but many of them, thus
giving them the opportunity to live together in charity through a
union of will and desire. 20 Finally, within this hierarchical ordering
of creation, God united the animal and spiritual realms
in the figure of Adam. Because God deemed that it was not good
for man to be alone, however, a helper was made for him, one
like unto himself. In Aelred’s mind, “It was from no similar, nor
even from the same, material that divine Might formed this help
mate, but as a clearer inspiration to charity and friendship he
produced the woman from the very substance of the man.” 21
Aelred goes on with a beautiful description of the equality of the
sexes and the need for friendship as the basis of their existence
and mutual relationship: “How beautiful it is that the second human
being was taken from the side of the first, so that nature
might teach that human beings are equal and, as it were, collateral,
and that there is in human affairs neither a superior nor an
inferior, a characteristic of true friendship.” 22 Aelred’s point in all
of this is that nature was created in such a way that, from the
very beginning, the desire for friendship and charity was implanted
in the human heart.
2. The Fall. Up until this point, Aelred’s description of the
orientation towards companionship and society implanted in
creation by the divine will and the eternal reason does not take
into full account the reality of sin. When the fall of Adam occurs,
however, the original harmony within nature and in the human
heart is radically disrupted. Since Aelred is primarily interested
in spiritual friendship, he focuses on the repercussions of this
fall for humanity. The main effect, for Aelred, has to do with a
fundamental dissonance that enters into the relationship between
charity and friendship. Prior to the sin of Adam, charity
and friendship are coextensive; after it, however, they grow
apart:
…after the fall of the first man, when with the cooling of charity
concupiscence made secret inroads and caused private good to
20 DSA 1:56 [CCCM 1:298(318-24); SF 63].
21 DSA 1:57 [CCCM 1:298(327-30); SF 63].
22 DSA 1:57 [CCCM 1:298-99(330-33); SF 63].

THE HEALING ROLE OF FRIENDSHIP 71
take precedence over the common weal, it corrupted the splendor
of friendship and charity through avarice and envy, introducing
contentions, emulations, hates and suspicions because the morals
of men had been corrupted. From that time the good distinguished
between charity and friendship, observing that love ought to be extended
even to the hostile and perverse, while no union of will and
ideas can exist between the good and wicked. And so friendship
which, like charity, was first preserved among all by all, remained
according to the natural law among the few good. 23
This passage identifies the fall of Adam as the primary cause for
disruption between charity and friendship. Prior to the fall, the
intimate union between nature and grace allowed friendship
and charity to exist in close relationship with one another and to
share a certain “splendor.” After the fall, however, this “splendor”
was corrupted: friendship contracted in its extension and
was limited to a very few; charity, in turn, remained limited in
scope, but was possible only under the influence of grace. Elsewhere
in the treatise, Aelred describes the relationship between
charity and friendship in this manner: “…divine authority approves
that more are to be received into the bosom of charity
than into the embrace of friendship. For we are compelled by
the law of charity to receive in the embrace of love not only our
friends but also our enemies. But only those do we call friends
to whom we can fearlessly entrust our heart and all its secrets;
those, too, who, in turn, are bound to us by the same law of faith
and security.” 24 For Aelred, the fall is also responsible for the different
types of friendship in the world today. Since reason was
not completely corrupted through the fall, the wicked experience
an inclination toward companionship and society that of-
23 DSA 1:58-59 [CCCM 1.299(336-47); SF 63-64].
24 DSA 1.32 [CCCM 1:294(183-89); SF 58]. Aelred develops his general
theory of love in De speculo caritatis (CCCM 1:3-161. For an analysis of this
work, see AMÉDÉE HALLIER, The Theology of Aelred of Rievaulx: An Experiential
Theology, Cistercian Studies, no. 2 (Spencer, MA: Cistercian Publications,
1969). For a general treatment of Aelred’s position on friendship, see
DOUGLASS, “The Doctrine of Spiritual Friendship,” in SF, 15-35. See also
SQUIRE, Aelred of Rievaulx: A Study, 98-111. `

72 DENNIS J. BILLY
ten resembles friendship. After the fall, therefore, it is important
to distinguish between true friendship and other relationships
“of some slight resemblance.” 25 Aelred’s discussion of the differences
between “carnal” and “spiritual” friendship presupposes
and springs from this underlying theological premise. 26
3. Redemption. Aelred’s doctrine of the fall helps one to understand
how the disharmony between charity and friendship
crept into human affairs. Aelred recognizes its importance in
this regard, but refuses to dwell on it. His theology of friendship
is eminently positive, one that flows from the love of God who,
through the death of Christ, enables a person once again to enjoy
the friendship of God. In Aelred’s mind, “Christ himself set
up a definite goal for friendship when he said: ‘Greater love than
this no man hath, than a man lay down his life for his friends.’” 27
Through his redemptive suffering, a healing process begins that
will eventually make them co-extensive. In Jesus, charity and
friendship once again exist in close harmony. Through him,
original sin is overcome and its effects will eventually be completely
wiped out:
And so in friendship are joined honor and charm, truth and joy,
sweetness and good-will, affection and action. And all these take
their beginning from Christ, advance through Christ, and are perfected
in Christ. Therefore, not too steep or unnatural does the ascent
appear from Christ, as the inspiration of the love by which we
love our friend, to Christ giving himself to us as our Friend for us
to love, so that charm may follow upon charm, sweetness upon
sweetness and affection upon affection. And thus, friend cleaving
to friend in the spirit of Christ, is made with Christ but one heart
and one soul, and so mounting aloft through degrees of love to
friendship with Christ, he is made one spirit with him in one kiss.
Aspiring to this kiss the saintly soul cries out: ‘Let him kiss me with
the kiss of his mouth.’ 28
25 DSA 1:60 [CCCM 1:299(358-59); SF 64].
26 See DSA 1:39-49 [CCCM 1:295-97(220-79); SF 59-61].
27 DSA 2:33 [CCCM 1:309(238-39); SF 78].
28 DSA 2:20-21 [CCCM 1:306(143-55); SF 74-75].

Friendship, for Aelred, is the “medicine of life,” because it ultimately
brings a person into relationship with Christ, who is the
Way, the Truth, and the Life” (Jn 14:6). 29 It plays a healing, even
elevating role in the human sojourn. By entering into a true
“spiritual” (as opposed to “carnal”) friendship with another human
being, a person begins a process that will eventually enable
him or her to share in the friendship of Christ. For Aelred,
“…friendship is a stage bordering upon that perfection which
consists in the love and knowledge of God, so that man from being
a friend of his fellowman becomes the friend of God, according
to the words of the Savior in the Gospel: ‘I will not now
call you servants, but my friends.’” 30
Applications
THE HEALING ROLE OF FRIENDSHIP 73
This general theological framework of creation, fall, and redemption
helps one to interpret some of Aelred’s better-known
statements on spiritual friendship. Aelred himself insists that
“…friendship bears fruit in this life and in the next.” 31 The
phrase, “in this life,” implies that friends receive concrete benefits
in the present even though they are still weighed down by the
effects of original sin. The phrase, “in the next,” points to the
time when, on account of Christ’s redemption, they are completely
free from the shackles of concupiscence and live in close
intimate union with God and the communion of saints. By keeping
the distinction between the fruits of friendship clear in one’s
mind, the reader is better able to understand the significance of
Aelred’s teaching on the meaning of the goodness, the three kisses,
and the formation of spiritual friendships.
29 The phrase “A faithful friend is the medicine of life” (Amicus fidelis
medicamentum vitae est) comes from Sir 6:16. See Biblica sacra iuxta vulgatam
versionem ed. Robertus Weber, vol. 2 (Stutgart: Wüettenbergische
Bibelanstalt, 1969), 1036. Aelred refers to it in DSA 2:12; 3: 74, 97[CCCM
1:304(82-83), 332(532), 339(750); SF 72,109,117].
30 DSA 2:14 [CCCM 1:305(104-8);; SF 73].
31 DSA 2:9 [CCCM 1:304(64-65); SF 71].

74 DENNIS J. BILLY
Application One: The Meaning of ‘Goodness’
It may be surprising to learn that, for Aelred, friendship
“…can begin among the good, progress among the better, and be
consummated among the perfect.” 32 If this is so, one may wonder
if anyone can be good in a world where the effects of original
sin influence human activity so strongly. Aelred, however,
draws a strong distinction between goodness as it exists in God
and in one who is journeying to God. God, in Aelred’s mind, is
“…supremely powerful and supremely good, is sufficient good
unto himself, since his good, his joy, his glory, his happiness, is
himself.” 33 In God, there is no distinction between good, better,
and best. His goodness is his perfection – and vice versa. Man,
by way of contrast, is on a journey that hopefully involves a
movement along a distinct series of grades of spiritual and
moral perfection.
When Aelred says that spiritual friendship begins with the
good, he does not mean that two people must be good in the
same way that God is good. Nor does he mean that they are good
in the same sense as those who have already passed through
death and experience God in an immediate way in the beatific
vision. Nor does he mean that they have no experience of concupiscence
in their lives as a result of the effects of original sin.
He merely intends to say that spiritual friendships in this life are
forged by those who struggle to move further along (as opposed
to away from) the journey of eventual intimacy with God. In answer
to a question by Gratian about friendship among those
who are not good, Aelred says:
I am not cutting “good” so finely as do some who call no one
“good” unless he is lacking no whit in perfection. We call a man
“good” who, according to the limits of our mortality, “living soberly
and justly and godly in this world,” is resolved neither to ask others
to do wrong nor to do wrong himself at another’s request.
32 DSA 2:38 [CCCM 1:309(252-53); SF 78-79].
33 DSA 1:51 [CCCM 1:297(290-91); SF 62].

THE HEALING ROLE OF FRIENDSHIP 75
Among such, indeed, we have no doubt that friendship can spring
up and that by such it can be perfected. 34
As far as human beings are concerned, “goodness,” for Aelred,
resides in the firm resolution not to participate in wrongdoing of
any kind. It does not mean that a person is perfect or that he or
she has never committed sin or will not do so in the future. A
“good person,” for Aelred, is someone who intends not to sin and
who takes appropriate measures to keep himself or herself from
being overcome by unruly passions.
Friendships among “good persons” of this type are not rare
in this life. As Aelred reminds his readers:
… the Christian ought not to despair of acquiring any virtue since
daily the divine voice from the Gospel re-echoes: “Ask and you
shall receive….” It is no wonder, then, that pursuers of true virtue
were rare among the pagans since they did not know the Lord, the
Dispenser of virtue, of whom it is written: “The Lord of hosts, he
is the King of glory.” Indeed, through faith in him they were prepared
to die for one another – I do not say three or four, but I offer
you thousands of pairs of friends – although the ancients declared
or imagined the devotion of Pylades and Orestes a great
marvel. Were they not, according to the definition of Tullius,
strong in the virtue of true friendship, of whom it is written: “And
the multitude of believers had but one heart and one soul; neither
did anyone say that aught was his own, but all things were common
unto them?” 35
The highest expression of Christian love is to lay down one’s life
for one’s friend. Those who did so, the thousands of pairs mentioned
by Aelred in the above passage, were weak human beings
who, like everyone else in this fallen world, were hounded by
doubts and temptations of various kinds. To enter into a spiritual
friendship, one needs to be good – not perfect. It is the
34 DSA 2:43 [CCCM 1:310(283-89); SF 80].
35 DSA 1:27-28 [CCCM 1:293-94(154-66); SF 56-57]. For the theology of
the kiss in monastic theology, see LECLERCQ, The Love of Learning, 226-28.

76 DENNIS J. BILLY
friendship itself which, rooted in Christ’s grace, leads a person
along the way of purgation, illumination, and ultimate union
with God.
Application Two: The Three Kisses
Aelred uses the metaphor of a kiss to point out what the
process of growth in friendship precisely entails: “…in a kiss two
breaths meet, and are mingled, and are united. As a result, a certain
sweetness of mind is born, which rouses and binds together
the affection of those who embrace.” 36 He extends the
metaphor to demonstrate the different types of friendship that
can be forged: “There is, then, a corporeal kiss, a spiritual kiss,
and an intellectual kiss. The corporeal kiss is made by the impression
of the lips; the spiritual kiss by the union of spirits; the
intellectual kiss through the Spirit of God, by the infusion of
grace.” 37
Although the carnal kiss is supposed to be offered or received
for definite and worthy reasons (e.g., as a sign of reconciliation
or a mark of peace), Aelred points out that it can be
misused for perverse and lustful ends. 38 The spiritual kiss, by
way of contrast, is “…the kiss of friends who are bound by one
law of friendship; for it is not made by contact with the mouth
but by the affection of the heart.” 39 According to Aelred, Christ
is already present in this friendship. His presence is not directly
experienced, however, but mediated through another person: “I
would call this the kiss of Christ, yet he himself does not offer it
from his own mouth, but from the mouth of another, breathing
upon his lovers that most sacred affection so that there seems to
them to be, as it were, one spirit in many bodies.” 40 As the soul
becomes accustomed to this kind of friendship, it tastes the
sweetness that comes from Christ and eventually yearns for
36 DSA 2:23 [CCCM 1:307(162-65); SF 75].
37 DSA 2:24 [CCCM 1:307(165-68); SF 76].
38 DSA 2:25 [CCCM 1:307(177-85); SF 76].
39 DSA 2:26 [CCCM 1:307(185-87); SF 76].
40 DSA 2:26 [CCCM 1:307-8(190-94); SF 76].

something more than a mediated encounter and sighs for direct
contact with Christ through intellectual “kiss of grace.” 41 When
this happens, “…all earthly affections have been tempered, and
all thoughts and desires which savor of the world have been quieted,
the soul takes delight in the kiss of Christ alone and rests
in his embrace, exulting and exclaiming: ‘His left hand is under
my head and his right hand shall embrace me.’” 42
Friendship, for Aelred, is the “medicine of life” because it
moves two people along this wide spectrum of relationships and
enables them eventually to meet Christ face to face. It calms
their disordered passions, enables their spirits to mingle, and
eventually brings them to an intimate relationship with the Spirit
of Christ. All of this is possible because of Christ’s redemptive
suffering. By laying down his life for his friends, Jesus gives human
beings the chance once again to become the friends of God.
Because of Christ, charity and friendship are slowly coming
back into harmony with one another. If they presently appear to
still be in dissonance with each other, it is simply because the
full effects of Christ’s redemption are not yet manifest. When
they become so, “… this friendship, to which here we admit but
few, will be outpoured upon all and by all outpoured upon God,
and God shall be all in all.” 43
Application Three: Practical Advice
THE HEALING ROLE OF FRIENDSHIP 77
Aelred’s interest in providing concrete measures to help others
establish and develop strong friendships in Christ stems
from his consciousness of the great caution and care that needs
to be taken in an imperfect world still under the sway of the effects
of Adam’s fall. Even though he firmly believes in the victory
won for humanity by Christ suffering and death, he is still
very conscious of the struggle with temptation and the tendency
to sin that even good people must deal with in their daily lives.
41 DSA 2:27 [CCCM 1:308(198); SF 77].
42 DSA 2:27 [CCCM 1:308(199-203); SF 77].
43 DSA 3:134 [CCCM 1:350(1116-18); SF 132].

78 DENNIS J. BILLY
Indeed, there would be no need for him to give such advice if the
rages of concupiscence no longer had any hold over the human
heart.
It is for this reason that Aelred offers some very concrete and
practical advice to his readers about forming spiritual friendships.
In his mind, there are “…four stages by which one climbs
to the perfection of friendship: the first is selection, the second
probation, the third admission, and the fourth perfect harmony
in matters human and divine with charity and benevolence.” 44 In
the selection process, Aelred instructs his readers of the types of
person who should (and should not) be chosen for friendship.
He advises them to avoid strong ties with those who have a difficult
time restraining the passions that lead a person to quarreling,
anger, fickleness, suspicion, and talkativeness. 45 Friendships
with those who can give love and affection, security and
happiness, by way of contrast, should be actively pursued. 46 If
one has already begun a friendship with someone who cannot
withstand these tendencies, he reminds his readers that they are
still bound by the law of charity and should unstitch the bond
“little by little” rather than breaking it off immediately. 47 As far
as the period of probation is concerned, Aelred says that a potential
friend should be given a trial period where the qualities
of loyalty, right intention, discretion, and patience are tested. 48
Once these qualities have been carefully examined in a potential
friend, that person can be admitted to be one’s closest confident,
where a union of spirits will eventually take place and where one
will discover “…how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to
dwell together in unity.” 49 Aelred himself provides his reader
with an example from his own experience of the gradual process
whereby a person is admitted into the intimacy of spiritual
friendship: “All this in a most wondrous way had bound him to
me by the most intimate bounds, and so had brought him into
44 DSA 3:8 [CCCM 1:319(64-68); SF 93].
45 DSA 3:55 [CCCM 1:328(379-82); SF 104].
46 DSA 3:51 [CCCM 1:327(346-47); SF 103].
47 DSA 3:41 [CCCM 1:325(281-85); SF 101].
48 DSA 3:61 [CCCM 1:329(418-19); SF 105].
49 DSA 3:131[CCCM 1:349(1090-91); SF 131].

my affection, that from an inferior I made him my companion,
from a companion a friend, from a friend my most cherished of
friends.” 50
The need for all of this practical advice arises out of Aelred’s
keen awareness of the various pitfalls before anyone who seeks
to enter into a friendship with another person that is rooted in
Christ. It is also why Book Three (where this practical advice occurs)
is the longest part of the treatise and generally the most
widely read.
Observations
THE HEALING ROLE OF FRIENDSHIP 79
Given the above literary and theological contexts, as well as
accompanying applications to Aelred’s understanding of goodness,
the kiss of friendship, and the need for practical advice
about entering into and sustaining such a bond, a number of observations
are in order.
1. To begin with, Aelred’s teaching on friendship and his lively
conversation with Ivo, Walter, and Gratian encourage the
reader to examine the quality of his or her own personal relationships.
Aelred adapts the dialogue form to suit his practical,
experiential concerns for entering into the friendship of Christ.
He does so by presenting his readers with a number of possibilities
regarding the range of spiritual friendships available to
them and by urging them, at least implicitly, to be aware of their
own potential for entering into and maintaining such relationships.
By engaging his own active imagination and helping the
other characters of dialogue to do the same, Aelred raises questions,
makes suggestions, and opens possibilities that may inspire
the reader to embark on a similar process of reflection.
2. When going through the treatise, one gets the strong sense
that the written conversation reflects a conversation going on in
Aelred’s mind which, in turn, has its roots in actual conversations
with his friends. Aelred’s dialogue, in other words, is the
fruit not only of his real-life friendships with Ivo, Walter, and
50 DSA 3:122 [CCCM 1:346(1001-4); SF 127].

80 DENNIS J. BILLY
Gratian, but also of his reflection on the meaning of spiritual
friendship with them in his mind. As such, it reminds readers
that their thought processes are influenced by their relationships
with others – and greatly depend on them. When going
through the treatise, they should try to be aware as much as possible
of the various influences on their own thought processes.
The origin of the various questions and concerns that help to
shape one’s convictions should be very helpful in this respect.
3. Aelred is not only the author of the treatise, but also the
principal character in the dialogue. Although it would be nice to
imagine that the two are one and the same, careful reflection
should lead the reader to conclude that they are not. In all probability,
the “Aelred of the dialogue” is a “persona” projected onto
the page by “Aelred the writer.” That is not to say that there
are no continuities between the two; more continuities probably
exist than discontinuities. Still, “Aelred the writer” is making
only a selective representation of himself when he portrays himself
in words for others to see. However small the gap between the
“author” and his “persona,” it is important for readers to keep
the discrepancy in mind as they go through the text. Reading the
dialogue should encourage them to be aware of discrepancies in
their own lives between the people they are and the “personae”
they project for others to see.
4. The dialogue form brings to the fore the dialogical dimension
of spiritual friendship: the closer the friendship, the
more intimate the dialogue. This holds true for one’s relationship
with other human beings – both living and dead – and especially
with Christ. Aelred’s dialogue encourages his readers to
be conscious of the quality of the dialogue that they have with
their friends and also of the quality of their prayer. The depth of
these conversations provides them with a good gauge for determining
the strength of the bonds that tie them. In his dialogue,
Aelred feels free not only to discuss a serious subject with his
friends, but also to root that discussion in his own experience.
By presenting this dialogue to a wider audience, he is inviting
those who read his words to do the same.
5. For Aelred, the doctrine of creation provides his teaching
with a focal point of paradisal innocence. He uses it to show that
all creatures – inanimate, animate, human, and angelic – have
an innate orientation to some kind of companionship and life in

THE HEALING ROLE OF FRIENDSHIP 81
society. His beautiful description of the collateral relationship
between man and woman, moreover, contrasts sharply with the
predominant hierarchical view of the day. Aelred considers
friendship before the fall to be coextensive with the life if charity.
In this state, it is the “medicine of life” not in the sense of
healing (since there is no need of it), but in the sense of bringing
ongoing strength and sustenance to one’s life. Aelred uses the
doctrine of creation to point to an original compatibility of the
dual love of friendship (amicitia) and charity (caritas). Even today,
this usage causes its readers to reflect upon the origins of
these loves, the reasons for their present dissonance, and the
orientation they have toward the future.
6. Although Aelred does not devote a great deal of space to it
in his treatise, the doctrine of the fall plays a significant role in
his understanding of friendship as the “medicine of life.” The fall
of Adam disrupts the original relationship of harmony between
charity and friendship within humanity. This fall from grace results
in a corresponding disruption in the relationship between
God and humanity and unleashes the powerful force of concupiscence
in the heart of every human being. The doctrine of the
fall provides an important part of the theological rationale for
Aelred’s teaching on friendship. Deeply wounded by Adam’s fall,
human nature is in desperate need of healing. Even after Christ’s
redemptive action, humanity still suffers from the horrible effects
of original sin. Spiritual friendship helps people to experience
in their lives the concrete fruits of Christ’s redemption. Its
curative powers tame the unruly emotions of the heart and enable
people to live in one another – and with God.
7. The healing of humanity’s wound, of course, comes primarily
through the redemptive suffering of Christ, which
reestablishes a basis for friendship between the human and the
divine. Spiritual friendship is again made possible only because
Jesus, out of loving obedience to the Father, has laid down his
life for his friends (cf. Jn 15:13). Without this gratuitous act of
self-offering, the harmony between charity and friendship would
never be able to be brought back into harmony. For Aelred, the
doctrine of the redemption creates the possibility for a renewed
relationship of friendship between God and humanity. It is this
renewed relationship with Jesus that heals humanity of its deadly
wounds and gives it a new lease on life. In this respect, a per-

82 DENNIS J. BILLY
son’s friendship with Christ is the true “medicine of life.” All other
spiritual friendships are of a participatory nature. Their curative
powers flow from Christ and ultimately lead back to him.
8. This participatory nature of spiritual friendships in Christ
provides an important context for Aelred’s understanding of
goodness. In God, goodness is a transcendental perfection (e.g.,
the One, the True, the Good, the Beautiful) and possesses all the
characteristics typically associated with it. In humanity, however,
goodness is merely participatory and can never achieve the
transcendental status reserved only to the divine. The distinction
between the divine and the human, between the Creator and the
created must always be strictly maintained. For Aelred, moreover,
the participatory nature of human goodness differs greatly
depending on which particular mode of human nature one is
talking about at the time. Humanity’s participated goodness before
the fall, for example, differs from what it is like after the fall
and also after the Christ’s redemption has reached its full effect.
Aelred’s practical concerns about the formation of spiritual
friendship reflect this qualified understanding of the participatory
nature of human goodness.
9. The qualified participatory nature of human goodness allows
Aelred to treat the healing of human nature as an ongoing
process. Rooted in an allegorical interpretation of The Song of
Songs 1:1 (the only such interpretation in the entire treatise) his
metaphor of the three kisses – carnal, spiritual, and intellectual
– allows him to describe spiritual friendship as a mingling of
spirits that mediates one’s relationship with Christ and eventually
leads to a direct mingling of one’s spirit with the Spirit of
Christ. Spiritual friendship is likened to the exchange of breath
that takes place in a kiss. Just as breathing is necessary for life,
so too is friendship necessary for spiritual life. This necessity,
however, comes not from the bond of friendship itself, but from
the grace of Christ, who makes it possible and to whom the spiritual
friendship ultimately leads. The medicinal powers of spiritual
friendship, in other words, derive from their “graced capacity”
to mediate Christ’s presence and to lead a person into an intimate
relationship with Christ himself.
10. All of the practical advice on spiritual friendship given in
Book Three, the longest in the treatise, stems from Aelred’s sensitivity
to the precarious nature of humanity’s present earthly ex-

istence. Even though Christ’s redemptive suffering has made it
possible for human beings to enter once again into fellowship
with God, the effects of original sin still influence the human
heart and can easily get in the way. Concerned more with experience
than with abstract doctrines, Aelred provides his readers
with concrete suggestions about the precautions they should
take when entering into spiritual friendships. It is for this reason
that Aelred goes to great lengths to describe the various steps involved
in the fourfold process of selection, probation, admission,
and union. This practical advice helps to insure that genuine
spiritual friendships can actually be established and bear
fruit. Without it, the reader would be at a loss concerning the
concrete ways of developing these important bonds.
Conclusion
THE HEALING ROLE OF FRIENDSHIP 83
Spiritual friendship, for Aelred, has an important role to
play in a person’s journey to God. The various literary and theological
contexts of his treatise highlight this firm conviction.
One might go so far as to say that Aelred’s use of the dialogue
form and of the Christian doctrines of creation, fall, and redemption
give shape to his teaching and cannot be separated
from it without drastically changing it. To do so would be to
overlook some of his most basic presuppositions about the present
state of human nature and the remedies given by God for
facilitating a person’s growth in holiness.
In describing spiritual friendship as the “medicine of life,”
Aelred highlights humanity’s present need for healing and
strengthening. The literary form in which he casts his teachings
reminds the reader of the various types of spiritual friendships
possible and that dialogue itself is an essential element for the
establishment and ongoing development of such relationships.
The theological background of his teaching offers some helpful
insights into his qualified understanding of participated goodness,
his presentation of spiritual friendship as a process of
growth reaching its perfection in intimate union with Christ,
and his penchant for giving very concrete, practical advice about
their care and maintenance.
Aelred’s primary interest in his De spiritali amicitia is to help

84 DENNIS J. BILLY
his readers to foster intimate friendships among themselves and
with Christ. One does not journey long into the treatise, however,
before discovering that the two kinds of relationships are intimately
related – and in a circular way. Spiritual friendships
lead those involved into an intimate relationship with Christ.
Christ, in turn, makes such relationships possible and orients
them from the very beginning toward himself. Spiritual friendships,
in other words, “…begin in Christ, continue in Christ, and
are perfected in Christ.” 51 They lie at the heart of Aelred’s spiritual
doctrine and have much to offer those who enter into a critical
yet constructive dialogue with their underlying literary and
theological premises. Only by examining these contexts, will the
reader discover the influence that Aelred’s own monastic background
had on the shaping of his teaching. Only then will he or
she be ready to begin to make appropriate adaptations of this
teaching to the present day.
—————
DENNIS J. BILLY, C.SS.R
The author is an Ordinary Professor at the Alphonsian Academy.
El Autor es profesor ordinario de en la Academia Alfonsiana.
—————
51 DSA 1:10 [CCCM 1:29171-73); SF 53].

StMor 40 (2002) 85-114
MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI
LAVORARE CON LE CELLULE STAMINALI
Uno dei campi più affascinanti della ricerca biomedica
odierna e uno fra gli ambiti più promettenti delle biotecnologie
è quello legato alle ricerche sulle cellule staminali.
Gli studi in corso per penetrarne le dinamiche differenziative
e per poterle impiegare in ambito terapeutico hanno ormai
raggiunto la ribalta dei mezzi di comunicazione di massa e sono
destinati ad accendere un nuovo e appassionante dibattito pubblico.
Accanto alle urgenti e delicate questioni etiche e legali
connesse con la produzione e la manipolazione delle cellule staminali,
si profilano infatti orizzonti inediti e forse rivoluzionari
per la stessa comprensione del fenomeno della vita.
Il presente articolo si propone di compiere una puntualizzazione
dei più rilevanti problemi in gioco, avvisando che ci muoviamo
in un terreno ancora magmatico e tumultuoso sia dal
punto di vista scientifico sia, di conseguenza, almeno in qualche
misura, dal punto di vista etico.
1. La biologia delle cellule staminali
Le cellule staminali (stem cells) sono cellule che hanno già
compiuto alcuni passi sulla via della trasformazione da cellule
embrionali del tutto indifferenti e ancora totipotenti in cellule
specializzate. Le cellule staminali sono ovviamente tipiche degli
embrioni, ma una quota di esse continua ad essere presente anche
nei tessuti adulti.
Le cellule staminali embrionali – studiate dapprima nel topo
e da qualche anno nell’uomo 1 – provengono dalla blastocisti,
1 Le prime esperienze nel topo all’inizio degli anni ’80 del xx secolo:
EVANS M., KAUFMAN M., Establishment in culture of pluripotent cells from
mouse embryos, “Nature” 292 (1981), 154-156.
85

86 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI
un embrione in fase immediatamente preimpiantatoria, prelevando
con tecniche di immunochirurgia i singoli blastomeri della
massa cellulare interna, quella – per intenderci – che darà origine
al corpo del nuovo essere, o dalle cellule germinali primordiali,
cellule fetali da cui in una fase successiva si formeranno
spermatozoi ed ovociti 2 .
Le cellule staminali embrionali sono cellule pluripotenti: esse
mantengono, infatti, una grande flessibilità potendo dare origine
praticamente a qualsiasi tipo cellulare e tessuto, esclusi solo
quelli degli annessi. Una volte poste in coltura, anche se sono
isolate dall’embrione di provenienza, mostrano una spontanea
tendenza a differenziarsi e a formare strutture organizzate multicellulari
note come corpi embrioidi (embryoid bodies) che contengono
elementi riferibili ai tre foglietti embrionali, ectoderna,
mesoderma ed endoderma: si possono riconoscere in essi una
varietà di tipi cellulari e tissutali, talvolta presentando masse disorganizzate
di tessuto nervoso o cartilagineo, talvolta evolvendo
in miociti o anche in miocardiociti, cellule cardiache che ben
presto mostrano la proprietà fisiologica di pulsare sincronicamente
3 . Mentre, dunque, isolare cellule staminali da embrioni è
relativamente agevole, mantenerle in coltura allo stato pluripotenziale
impedendo la loro spontanea progressione verso la specializzazione
è invece arduo, in accordo con la visione tradizionale
e quasi intuitiva che afferma l’intrinseca tensione delle forme
viventi a muoversi verso stadi evolutivi e maturativi sempre
più definiti. Solo da pochi anni, dopo lunghe esperienze con gli
animali, il 5 novembre 1998 la Geron Corporation ha annunciato
che un gruppo di scienziati che lavoravano per la Geron stes-
2 Nel topo: MATSUI Y., ZSEBO K., HOGAN B. L., Derivation of pluripotent
embryonic stem cells from murine primordial germ cells in culture, “Cell” 70
(1992), 81-87; SHAMBLOTT M. J., AXELMAN J., WANG S. et al., Derivation of pluripotent
stem cells from cultured human primordial germ cells, “Proceedings
of the National Academy of Science USA” 95 (1998), 13, 726-731.
3 ITSKOVITZ-ELDOR J., SCHULDINER M., KARSENTI D. et al., Differentiation of
human embryonic stem cells into embryoid bodies comprising the three embryonic
germ layers, “Mol Med” 6 (2000), 88-95; KELLER G., In vitro differentiation
of embryonic stem cells, “Current Opinions in Cell Biology” 7 (1995),
862-869.

LAVORARE CON LE CELLULE STAMINALI 87
sa era riuscito a stabilire linee di coltura di cellule staminali embrionali
umane dando origine a cellule virtualmente immortali,
capaci cioè di riprodursi indefinitamente 4 .
Le cellule necessarie per queste manipolazioni sono prelevate
da embrioni precoci provenienti da tecniche di procreazione
artificiale, sia soprannumerari sia prodotti ad hoc (dove le
leggi, come nel Regno Unito, lo permettono) o da embrioni e feti
provenienti da aborti spontanei o indotti. Dal momento poi
che le cellule staminali potrebbero meglio dispiegare il loro potenziale
terapeutico, soprattutto in vista dei trapianti, se si potranno
avere linee cellulari istocompatibili o addirittura identiche
a quelle del ricevente, si sta prospettando di ottenere cellule
staminali da embrioni umani prodotti per clonazione con questo
scopo preciso (clonazione terapeutica) 5 .
L’uso di embrioni non è l’unica via per ottenere queste cellule.
Un’alternativa consiste nell’isolamento, dal contesto dei tessuti
differenziati, di speciali cellule staminali adulte: si tratta di
cellule non specializzate e non ancora idonee a svolgere le funzioni
specifiche tipiche delle cellule dei diversi organi e tessuti,
ma che – al bisogno – possono andare incontro a mitosi e dare
origine a una progenie di cellule figlie, parte delle quali progredisce
nel cammino differenziativo sino a uno specifico tipo cellulare,
mentre un’altra parte permane indifferenziata e funge come
da serbatoio.
L’istologia tradizionale ben conosceva la presenza negli organismi
adulti di cellule progenitrici o cellule stipite, cellule immature
e solo parzialmente differenziate, la cui funzione era giustamente
riportata al mantenimento dell’omeostasi tissutale 6 .
4 THOMSON J. A., ITSKOVITZ-ELDOR J., SHAPIRO S. S., WAKNITZ M. A., SWIER-
GIEL J. J. et al., Embryonic stem cell lines derived from human blastocysts,
“Science” 282 (1998), 1145-1147.
5 GEARHART J., New potential for human embryonic stem cells, “Science”
282 (1998), 1061-1062; ODORICO J.S., KAUFMAN D. S., THOMON J. A., Multilineage
differentiation from human embryonic stem cell lines, “Stem Cells” 19
(2001), 193-204.
6 HOLTZER H., Cell lineages, stem cells and the ‘quantal’ cell cycle concept,
in LORD B. I., POTTEN C. S., COLE R. J. eds., Stem cells and tissue homeostasis,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (N. Y.) 1978, 1-28.

88 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI
Classicamente si ammetteva che le cellule progenitrici fossero
presenti in quei tessuti adulti che vanno incontro a insulti e a rapida
e fisiologica sostituzione (turn-over), come l’epidermide, la
mucosa intestinale e il midollo osseo, detti per ciò tessuti labili
o rinnovabili 7 . Le cellule progenitrici intestinali rigenerano di
continuo il rivestimento interno dell’intestino, le progenitrici
dell’epidermide producono incessantemente nuove progenie cellulari
cutanee, le progenitrici emopoietiche del midollo osseo
danno origine ad una vasta serie di cellule che si trovano nel sangue.
Si avevano inoltre indizi per ritenere che le piccole cellule
individuate fin dagli anni ’20 nel connettivo, spesso lungo il decorso
dei piccoli vasi e dei capillari 8 , fossero cellule indifferenziate,
dette cellule mesenchimali perché capaci di originare diversi
tipi di derivazione mesenchimale 9 . In effetti, oltre alle cellule
progenitrici, sono state ritrovate nei tessuti adulti vere e proprie
cellule staminali, cellule non specializzate capaci di perpetuarsi
indefinitamente e di dare origine a tipi cellulari maturi,
passando attraverso lo stadio intermedio di cellule progenitrici.
Le novità più interessanti sulle cellule staminali adulte riguardano
la loro presenza in tessuti finora ritenuti non rinnovabili
e la loro flessibilità differenziativa.
Era convinzione generale che il tessuto nervoso dell’adulto
fornisse un tipico esempio di tessuto non rinnovabile, “un tessuto
ad elementi perpetui” come si esprimeva Bizzozero, in cui le
7 LOEFFLER M., POTTEN C. S., Stem cells and cellular pedigrees – a conceptual
introduction, in POTTEN C. S. ed., Stem Cells, Academic Press, Cambridge
(MA) 1997, 1-27; SLACK J. M., Stem cells in epithelial tissues, “Science” 287
(2000), 1431-1433.
8 MARCHAND F., Der örtlichen reaktiven Vorgänge (Lehre von der Entzündung),
in KREHL, MARCHAND F., Handbuch der allgemeinen Pathologie, Leipzig
1924, vol. 4, part. 1, 78.
9 Un noto manuale, negli anni ’60, si esprimeva così: “La convinzione
che questi elementi non sono comuni fibroblasti, ma cellule indifferenziate
è derivata da numerose osservazioni attestanti che sotto l’influenza di certi
stimoli, come il mantenimento in coltura in vitro, l’infiammazione e l’iniezione
di tossine, essi possono dar origine a nuovi tipi di cellule; probabilmente
hanno proprietà molto simili alle cellule reticolari primitive dei tessuti
emopoietici” (BLOOM W., FAWCETT D. W., Trattato di istologia, Piccin, Padova
1970, 150).

LAVORARE CON LE CELLULE STAMINALI 89
possibilità di moltiplicazione dell’elemento nobile del tessuto, il
neurone, e quindi le possibilità di riparazione di eventuali danni
fossero praticamente nulle. Queste caratteristiche del tessuto
nervoso spiegavano a sufficienza perché, dopo la distruzione di
aree più o meno vaste del sistema nervoso centrale per ictus o
trauma, il recupero anatomico e funzionale è alquanto ridotto.
Ora sappiamo, invece, che anche nel sistema nervoso centrale
sono presenti cellule staminali le quali possono dare origine ai
principali tipi cellulari del tessuto nervoso, le cellule gliali
(astrociti e oligodendrociti) e i neuroni 10 . Esse sono state isolate
dapprima dalla zona subventricolare nella parete del ventricolo
laterale del cervello, dove costituirebbero una popolazione cellulare
molto piccola (0.1-1% del totale) e relativamente quiescente,
ma che, in particolari situazioni, possono dividersi e differenziarsi
11 . Johansson ha dimostrato che nel ratto la sede delle
cellule staminali neurali non è la zona sottoventricolare, ma
l’ependima, il sottile rivestimento epiteliale monostratificato che
ricopre la superficie ventricolare stessa. Frammiste fra le cellule
ependimali mature, sono state infatti evidenziate cellule staminali
che presentano i tipici marcatori delle cellule neurali immature
e che, sebbene molto raramente, entrano in mitosi, come
è dimostrato dall’incorporazione di un particolare vettore retrovirale
iniettato nel ventricolo laterale che può essere incorporato
solo dalle cellule che si dividono. Si pensa che le cellule staminali
dell’ependima si dividano asimmetricamente per dare
origine a due cellule figlie, una che rimane come cellula indifferenziata
nell’ependima e una che si trasferisce nella sottostante
zona sottoventricolare dove forma un pool di cellule progenitrici
della glia e dei neuroni pronte a migrare dove sia necessario.
La seconda novità è costituita – come si diceva – dalla sco-
10 MCKAY R. D. G., Stem cells in the central nervous system, “Science” 276
(1997), 66-71; MOMMA S., CHANDROSS K. J., HARTA G., et al., Get to know your
stem cells, “Current Opinions in Neurobiology” 10 (2000), 45-49; STEINDLER
D.A., PINCUS D.W. Stem cells and neuropoiesis in the adult human brain, “Lancet”,
359 (2002), 1047-1054; TEMPLE S., ALVAREZ-BUYLLA A., Stem cells in the
adult mammalian central nervous system, “Current Opinions in Neurobiology”
9 (1999), 135-141.
11 WEISS S., VAN DER KOOY D., J., CNS stem cells: Where’s the biology
(a.k.a. beef)?, “Journal of Neurobiology” 36 (1998), 307-314.

90 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI
perta di una flessibilità maggiore di quella che si era classicamente
supposta. A differenza infatti delle cellule staminali embrionali,
che sono pluripotenti, si è a lungo ritenuto che le cellule
staminali dell’adulto fossero meno versatili e potessero differenziarsi
entro un ambito alquanto più ristretto. Questa persuasione,
che era in linea con la comprensione tradizionale della
biologia sulla unidirezionalità del processo differenziativo
normale, deve ora essere rivista 12 .
Si è visto che le cellule progenitrici contenute nello stroma
del midollo osseo, che sono di origine mesenchimale, possono
differenziarsi non solo negli elementi del sangue e in altre cellule
di analoga derivazione embriologica, come miociti, osteociti e
condrociti, incluse le cellule della microglia del sistema nervoso
centrale, ma perfino, sia pure in percentuale minore, in cellule
di derivazione neuroepiteliale, quali gli astrociti 13 . La capacità
delle cellule staminali di generare cellule differenziate di natura
embriologica diversa da quella della staminale di origine è detta
plasticità 14 o transdifferenziazione 15 .
12 Non possiamo affrontare qui, per motivi di spazio, il tema delle ripercussioni
culturali delle scoperte sulle cellule staminali, ma probabilmente esse
ci porteranno a ripensare la nostra comprensione dello svolgersi unidirezionale
dei processi vitali sia a livello del singolo organismo, sia a livello dei
processi evolutivi generali.
13 BIANCO P., RIMINUCCI P., GRONTHOS M., ROBEY P. G., Bone marrow stromal
stem cells: Nature, biology, and potential applications, “Stem Cells” 19
(2001), 180-192; DEANS R. J., MOSELEY A. B., Mesenchymal stem cells: biology
and potential clinical uses, “Experimental Hematology” 28 (2000) 875-884;
PITTENGER M. F., MACKAY A. M., BECK S. C. et al., Multilineage potential of
adult human mesenchymal stem cells, “Science” 284 (1999), 143-147; WOOD-
BURY D., SCHWARZ E. J., PROCKOP D. J., BLACK I. B., Adult rat and human bone
marrow stromal cells differentiate into neurons, “Journal of Neuroscience Research”
61 (2000), 364-370.
Ricordiamo che fra le cellule deputate a funzioni trofiche e di sostegno
nel sistema nervoso centrale, gli astrociti derivano, come i neuroni e le cellule
ependimali, dal neuroepitelio ectodermico, mentre le cellule microgliali
derivano dal mesenchima mesodermico circostante il tubo neurale.
14 Cfr. KRAUSE D. S., THEISE N. D., COLLECTOR M. I. et al., Multi-organ,
multi-lineage engraftment by a single bone narrow-derived stem cell, “Cell” 105
(2001), 369-377.
15 Cfr. ANDERSON D. J., GAGE F. H., WEISSMAN I. L., Can stem cells cross li-

LAVORARE CON LE CELLULE STAMINALI 91
Ancora più sorprendente, sempre tenendo conto della tradizionale
stabilità del tessuto nervoso, è l’osservazione che le cellule
staminali del sistema nervoso centrale sono capaci di differenziarsi
in tipi cellulari che non condividono la stessa origine
ectodermica 16 . Nel gennaio del 1999 Cristopher Bjornson e Angelo
Vescovi con il loro gruppo hanno riferito di aver osservato
che alcune cellule staminali nervose prelevate dal cervello di topo,
una volta trasferite in topi il cui midollo osseo emopoietico
era stato distrutto per irradiazione, potevano evolvere in cellule
ematiche 17 . La possibilità di poter avere colture di cellule staminali
neurali per lunghi periodi di tempo e l’osservazione che tali
cellule possono naturalmente evolvere – in determinate circostanze
– sia in senso neurogliale sia in senso ematico, fa sperare
con fondamento che “le cellule staminali nervose umane possano
fornire una fonte rinnovabile e caratterizzata di cellule che
potrebbero essere usate in approcci tesi alla ricostituzione ematopoietica
in varie malattie e disordini del sangue” 18 . L’anno seguente
lo stesso gruppo ha mostrato come le cellule staminali
cerebrali umane, al pari di quelle murine, sono in grado di dare
origine a cellule di muscolo scheletrico 19 .
neage boundaries?, “Nature Medicine” 7 (2001), 393-395; SNYDER E. Y., VE-
SCOVI A. L., The possibilities/perplexities of stem cells, “Nature Biotechnology”
18 (2000), 827-828. Il gruppo di E. Lagasse, dopo aver descritto la transdifferenziazione
di cellule staminali del tessuto emopoietico midollare in epatociti,
si chiede se il fenomeno non sia da attribuirsi alla presenza nell’adulto
di cellule pluripotenti più primitive (e quindi più simili alle staminali embrionali):
LAGASSE E., CONNORS H., AL-DHALIMY M. et al., Purified hematopoietic
stem cells differentiate into hepatocytes in vivo, “Nature Medicine” 6
(2000), 1229-1234.
16 VESCOVI A. L., GALLI R., GRITTI A., The neural stem cells and their trans
differentiation capacity, “Biomedical Pharmacotherapy” 55 (2001), 201-205.
17 BJORNSON C. R. R., RIETZE R. L., REYNOLDS B. A., MAGLI M. C., VESCO-
VI A. L., Turning brain into blood: A hematopoietic fate adopted by adult neural
stem cell in vivo, “Science” 283 (1999), 534-537.
18 Ibidem, 537.
19 GALLI R., BORELLO U., GRITTI A., MINASI M. G. et al., Skeletal myogenic
potential of human and mouse neural stem cells, “Nature Neuroscience” 3
(2000), 986-991.

92 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI
2. Uso terapeutico e fonti delle cellule staminali
Le potenziali applicazioni terapeutiche delle cellule staminali
sono entusiasmanti 20 .
Le speranze più forti riguardano l’impiego delle cellule staminali
per la sostituzione di cellule e tessuti danneggiati. Sulla
base di esperimenti compiuti su animali, si possono prevedere
molteplici applicazioni in una vasta gamma di affezioni umane
per esempio nell’infarto miocardico, o in processi degenerativi,
come nel diabete insulinodipendente, in cui si ha esaurimento
delle beta cellule pacreatiche, o nel Parkinson, in cui sono implicate
particolari vie neuronali dopaminergiche 21 .
Nel morbo di Parkinson sono già stati sperimentati trapianti
di cellule dopaminoproduttrici prelevate da feti umani e si va
studiando la possibilità di trapianti a partire da cellule staminali
neuronali prelevate dal cervello fetale o addirittura dall’embrione,
messe in coltura e fatte sviluppare, con gli opportuni fattori
di crescita e di differenziazione, verso il tipo neuronale desiderato
22 . In base alle nuove acquisizioni sulle cellule staminali
dell’adulto, si pensa però che “in futuro si potrebbero utilizzare
cellule staminali provenienti dallo stesso individuo maturo (che
ancora ne possiede) per un autotrapianto. Questo risolverà tutta
20 KELLER G., SNODGRASS R. H., Human embryonic stem cells: The future
is now, “Nature Medicine” 5 (1999), 151-152; SNODGRASS H. R., GRAHAM D. K.,
STANFORD W. L., LICATO L. L., Embryonic stem cells: Research and clinical potential,
in SMITH M. D., SACHER R. A. (eds), Peripheral blood stem cell transplantation,
Bethesda, Maryland 1993, 65-82.
21 MCDONALD J. W., LIU X. Z., QU Y., LIU S., et al., Transplanted embryonic
stem cells survive, differentiate and promote recovery in injured rat spinal
cord, “Nature Medicine” 5 (1999), 1410-1412; KLUG M. G., SOONPAA M. H.,
KOH G. Y., FIELD L. J., Genetically selected cardiomyocites from differentiating
embryonic stem cells from stable intracardiac grafts, “Journal of Clinical Investigations”
98 (1996), 216-224; POTOCNIK A. J., KOHLER H., EICHMANN K.,
Hematolymphoid in vitro reconstitution potential of subpopulations derived
from in viro differentiated embryonic stem cells, “Proceedings of the Academy
of Science U.S.A.” 94 (1997), 10295-10300.
22 FREED C. R., GREENE P. E., BREEZE R. E. et al., Transplantation of embryonic
dopamine neurons for severe Parkinson’s disease, “New England Journal
of Medicine” 344 (2001), 710-719.

LAVORARE CON LE CELLULE STAMINALI 93
la problematica etica connessa con l’uso di materiale fetale” 23 .
Una forma singolare di combinazione di terapia genica e autotrapianto
potrebbe essere realizzata in soggetti affetti da gravi
malattie genetiche: le cellule stipite di un certo tipo cellulare o
anche cellule staminali diverse, un volta estratte dal soggetto ed
opportunamente manipolate, potrebbero essere corrette dall’anomalia
genica e poi reintrodotte nel soggetto di provenienza
per costituire una nuova popolazione sana 24 .
Un campo nel quale si ha una esperienza clinica ormai consolidata
è quello del trapianto di cellule staminali ematopoietiche,
indicata in soggetti incapaci di normale emopoiesi o di normale
produzione di cellule immunocompetenti, come nell’aplasia
midollare, in diverse sindromi di immunodeficienza, nella
Thalassemia maior, e in soggetti con neoplasie a carico del sistema
emopoietico e in alcuni tumori solidi. Nell’ambito della terapia
di malattie ematologiche congenite meritano di essere segnalati
i tentativi di trapianto in utero di cellule staminali che offrono,
rispetto ai tradizionali trapianti post-natali, almeno tre
vantaggi: essendo il sistema immunitario del ricevente ancora
immaturo, sono meglio tollerate; la rapida espansione del compartimento
emopoietico fetale permette alle cellule trasferite di
trovare più facilmente spazio per attecchire; la correzione precoce
della disfunzione permette uno sviluppo più soddisfacente
del feto 25 . Le cellule staminali necessarie per questi interventi
provengono da donatori e vengono ottenute generalmente dal
midollo delle ossa del bacino, ma si sta perfezionando il prelievo
dal sangue periferico con la centrifugazione e la staminoaferesi,
previa stimolazione con opportuni fattori di crescita 26 .
23 FARIELLO R. G., Argomenti di discussione per un consenso allargato, in
DULBECCO R. et al., Clonazione: problemi etici e prospettive scientifiche, Le
Scienze, Milano 1997, 45.
24 HALENE S., KOHN D. B., Gene therapy using hematopoietic stem cells:
Sisyphus approaches the crest, “Human Gene Therapy” 11 (2000), 1259-1267.
25 FLAKE A. W. et al., Treatment of X-linked severe combined immunodeciciency
by in utero transplantation of paternal bone marrow, “New England
Journal of Medicine” 335 (1996), 1806-1810; FLAKE A. W., ZANJANI E. D., In
utero hematopoietic stem cell transplantation. A status report, “Journal of the
American Medical Association” 278 (1997), 932-937.
26 La premedicazione del donatore desta alcune perplessità etiche, non

94 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI
Una ulteriore fonte, ancora da valorizzare adeguatamente, è
costituita dal sangue del cordone ombelicale: le cellule fetali hanno
mostrato di essere meglio tollerate immunologicamente dai
riceventi rispetto a quelle dei donatori adulti e, anche se in scarsa
quantità rispetto alle necessità di un organismo adulto, hanno
il vantaggio di essere facilmente e largamente disponibili,
senza danneggiare né le madri né i neonati da cui proviene la
placenta 27 . E. Gluckman ha sottolineato sul New England Journal
of Medicine la necessità di non disperdere un capitale biologico
così ingente ed è stata perciò proposta la creazione di vere
e proprie banche di sangue ombelicale 28 . Per il trapianto in utero
– stante la piccola quantità di cellule necessaria – si sono impiegate
anche cellule fetali ematopoietiche estratte dal fegato o
dal timo di feti abortiti, per lo più aborti procurati, con tutte le
intuibili implicazioni etiche e legali.
Un altro settore dei trapianti in cui si può prevedere in futuro
un utile impiego del potenziale biologico delle cellule staminali
è quello della produzione di tessuti ed organi bioartificiali.
La produzione di organi bioartificiali che fino a poco tempo fa
pareva un miraggio, negli ultimi anni ha conosciuto un notevole
progresso e la possibilità di poter disporre di una fonte sicura
di cellule umane ha dischiuso orizzonti nuovi per questa branca
della bioingegneria 29 . Analogamente alle cellule staminali embrionali
di topo, oggi sappiamo che anche le cellule staminali
embrionali umane possono formare vari tipi cellulari e tessuti
semplici, ma la loro capacità di costruire organi complessi in
coltura è pressoché inesplorata. Un saggio impiego di interazio-
essendo ancora del tutto accertata la assenza di conseguenze a lungo termine:
d’altra parte un margine di rischio, purché conosciuto e liberamente accettato,
fa parte della logica della donazione (criterio della lesività ragionevole).
27
ERICES A., CONGET P., MINGUELL J. J., Mesenchymal progenitor cells in
human umbilical cord, “British Journal of Hematology” 109 (2000), 235-242;
LAUGHLIN M. J., Umbilical cord blood for allogeneic transplantation in children
and adults, “Transplantation” 27 (2001), 1-6.
28
GLUCKMAN E., The therapeutic potential of fetal and hematopoietic stem
cells, “New England Journal of Medicine” 335 ( 1996), 1839-1840.
29
LANGER R., VACANTI J. P., Tissue Engineering, “Science” 260 (1993),
920-926.

LAVORARE CON LE CELLULE STAMINALI 95
ni cellulari e tissutali e l’uso di matrici extracellulari potrebbe
permetterci in futuro di produrre organi complessi come rene o
polmone, per esempio ricorrendo a organi preesistenti, umani o
no, come base, e rimpiazzando le cellule originali con quelle derivate
dalle cellule staminali.
Ovviamente, ogniqualvolta si parla di trasferimento di materiale
istologico fra individui diversi, si profilano il grande ostacolo
della medicina dei trapianti, il rigetto.
Una prima possibilità per superare il rigetto è quella di produrre
embrioni per clonazione con trasferimento di materiale
nucleare prelevato dalle cellule somatiche degli stessi individui
che hanno bisogno di cellule staminali e dei loro derivati: si potrebbero
prelevare dagli embrioni così clonati tutti i materiali
biologici necessari 30 . Oltre al trasferimento nucleare in ovociti
umani denucleati, si è sperimentato anche il trasferimento in
ovociti di altri mammiferi: il 12 novembre 1998 J. Cibelli e J. Robl
hanno annunciato alla stampa di aver ottenuto con questa tecnica
un embrione chimerico, incrocio fra uomo e vacca 31 . Una
terza possibilità allo studio, consiste nella riprogrammazione
del nucleo cellulare (carioplasma) di un certo soggetto fondendolo
con il citoplasma di una cellula staminale embrionale di
specie diversa e ottenendo così un cybrid (ibrido nucleo-citoplasma).
Senza considerare i gravi ostacoli morali presentati da
queste metodiche qualora portassero a ibridi uomo-animale, dal
punto di vista pratico il passaggio obbligato attraverso la clonazione
costituisce una tappa limitante per tutta la procedura e aggiunge
a una tecnica già delicata ulteriori difficoltà.
Altre possibilità per ovviare al problema del rigetto e, nello
stesso tempo, per avere fonti facilmente accessibili di cellule staminali
è quella di produrre e conservare in apposite banche una
larga quantità di stipiti cellulari da cui scegliere quelli maggiormente
compatibili con i riceventi, magari intervenendo sugli antigeni
di istocompatibilità per via genetica o rimuovendo dalla
30
SOLTER D., GEARHART J., Putting stem cells to work, “Science” 283
(1999), 1468-1470.
31
MARSHALL E., Claim of human-cow embryo greeted with skepticism,
“Science” 282 (1998), 1390-1391. Cfr. MARINELLI M., Etica delle biotecnologie.
Clonando & clonando, “Anime e corpi” 36 (1999), 89-90.

96 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI
superficie cellulare le sostanze proteiche che causano il riconoscimento
da parte dell’organismo ricevente ovvero mascherando
gli antigeni di istocompatibilità sulla superficie delle cellule staminali
così da creare linee cellulari donatrici universali anche di
provenienza animale 32 .
Oltre alle diverse applicazioni nella medicina dei trapianti,
le cellule staminali potranno essere utilmente impiegate per lo
studio della biologia dello sviluppo e chiarire lati oscuri dell’embriologia
umana ed animale, in riferimeno al funzionamento dei
geni, alla regolazione dei rapporti fra i tessuti, all’azione dei fattori
di crescita, con benefiche ricadute in campo clinico e terapeutico.
Si può prevedere anche l’utilità pratica delle cellule staminali
come sistemi di riferimento per valutare la tossicità e l’efficacia
di nuovi farmaci e sostanze chimiche 33 .
Per conseguire questi e altri risultati c’è ancora molto lavoro
da fare per l’isolamento e la moltiplicazione in vitro di linee
pure di cellule staminali e per usare a nostro piacere il loro enorme
potenziale. Sarà necessario, in particolare, imparare a spingere
le cellule staminali di una cultura a differenziarsi lungo un
percorso prestabilito per diventare, ad esempio neuroni adrenergici
o beta-cellule pacreatiche, e insegnar loro a farlo in modo
simultaneo, armonioso e controllato. Le nostre conoscenze
sulle cellule staminali sono ancora largamente frammentarie,
anche se – come si è visto – non mancano promettenti esperienze
nel topo e perfino nell’uomo: conosciamo ancora in modo insufficiente
i segnali biochimici che determinano differenziazione
dei blastomeri embrionali totipotenti in cellule pluripotenti e
infine nei vari tipi di cellule specializzate, né sappiamo ancora
abbastanza sui markers biologici che le contraddistinguono e le
fanno riconoscere, né sappiamo molto sui meccanismi fisiologici
che presiedono al funzionamento e al ciclo vitale delle cellule
32 La tecnica del mascheramento è quella che per ora sembra più avanzata,
essendo già stata sperimentata dalla società Diacrin di Charlestown, nel
Massachussets, per ottenere cellule di fegato di maiale da impiegare in xenotrapianti
nell’uomo e, sempre negli Stati Uniti, essendo stato permesso
l’impiego sperimentale sull’uomo di cellule mascherate di fegato umano nel
trattamento di alcune forme di insufficienza epatica.
33 KELLER G., SNODGRASS R. H., Human embryonic stem cells, 152.

staminali nell’organismo adulto 34 .
Non possiamo infine sottacere i pericoli e i rischi che può
comportare l’uso terapeutico di cellule staminali, in particolare
quelle di derivazione embrionale. Le cellule staminali embrionali
murine si sono dimostrate tumorigeniche, sviluppandosi in
teratomi o teratocarcinomi, quando sono state inoculate in topi
adulti e non c’è motivo per ritenere che le cellule staminali embrionali
umane non si rivelino tumorigeniche negli esseri umani,
anche tenendo conto del fatto che la maggior lunghezza della
vita umana può costituire un fattore facilitante l’insorgere di
patologie neoplastiche 35 . Qualunque mezzo si usasse per separare
le cellule staminali indifferenziate dalla progenie cellulare desiderata
differenziata per essere inoculate, dovremo essere assolutamente
sicuri che la separazione sia completa. Finora noi non
sappiamo il numero minimo di cellule staminali embrionali necessario
per causare un tumore o il tempo necessario per lo sviluppo
tumorale stesso. Le risposte definitive a queste domande
non potranno venire dai topi perché, a parte le diverse caratteristiche
immunologiche, la durata della loro vita è troppo esigua
per poter costituire un modello adeguato
3. Questioni morali e legali
LAVORARE CON LE CELLULE STAMINALI 97
Sono da ritenersi in generale eticamente corretti i prelievi di
cellule e tessuti staminali provenienti da organismi umani viventi
che, rispettata la dignità e la libertà della persona, non comportano
danni per la loro integrità e per la loro sussistenza. Né
sarebbe sostanzialmente diverso il discorso se, per migliorarne le
prestazioni o per meglio aggirare il problema del rigetto, si dovesse
ricorrere a interventi manipolativi (come la trasduzione di
particolari geni) sulle cellule stesse. In particolare, il prelievo e
l’uso terapeutico o sperimentale di staminali provenienti da un
34
VOGEL G., Harnessing the power of stem cells, “Science” 283 (1999),
1432-1434.
35
ANDREWS P. W., Teratocarcinomas and human embryology: Pluripotent
human EC cell lines, “Acta Pathologica, Microbiologica et Immunologica
Scandinavica” 10 (1998), 158-17.

98 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI
adulto, a parte i consueti problemi clinici legati alla incompatibilità
genetica e al rigetto, non pone questioni morali sostanzialmente
diverse da quelle poste da qualsiasi prelievo di materiale
biologico a fini di trapianto o di sperimentazione.
Quando il donatore è un bambino (situazione non infrequente
nel caso di cellule da midollo osseo) si propone invece la
questione – non facile – della eticità della decisione o del consenso
da parte dei genitori nei confronti di un prelievo da figli
minorenni che non sia motivato dal bene del minore stesso, ma
dal bene di un consanguineo del donatore, di solito un fratellino
con grave patologia di natura linfoematica. Ancora più incresciosa
la situazione del concepimento in vitro e della selezione
di un potenziale donatore per il fratellino o la sorellina bisognosi
di un trapianto di cellule staminali: il caso è accaduto in California
e la piccola Molly di otto anni, affetta dall’anemia di Fanconi,
grave malattia genetica, si è salvata grazie al sangue del
cordone ombelicale del fratellino Adam, concepito in vitro e selezionato
in base alla compatibilità tissutale con Molly 36 .
Riguardo all’uso di cellule staminali ricavate dal sangue del
cordone ombelicale non esistono problemi morali insuperabili,
ma sono stati evidenziati alcuni aspetti etico-deontologici peculiari
che hanno condotto alla compilazione di apposite linee-guida
37 . Prima di tutto c’è da considerare il consenso all’uso di un
organo, il cordone, appunto, che alla nascita viene tagliato e poi
distrutto insieme alla placenta, ma sul quale la madre del bambino
può rivendicare diritti di possesso, in quanto pertinente all’unità
materno-fetale: l’uso terapeutico o scientifico delle cellule
staminali del cordone in favore di terze persone richiede perciò
l’esplicitazione di un consenso libero ed informato. Non è
36
EZZELL C., Ma è etico?, in Medicina per il futuro, “Le Scienze quaderni”
122, ottobre 2001, 26-27.
37
DAME L., SUGARMAN J., Blood money: Ethical and legal implications of
treating cord blood as property, “American Journal of Pediatric Oncology”, 23
(20001), 409-410; SUGARMAN J., KAALUND V., KODISH E., MARSHALL M. F. et al.,
Ethical issues in umbilical cord blood banking, “Journal of the American Medical
Association” 278 (1997), 938-943. Cfr. SPAGNOLO A. G., Trapianto in utero
di cellule ematopoietiche staminali e “banca” del sangue ombelicale, “Medicina
e Morale” 48 (1998), 1073-1077.

LAVORARE CON LE CELLULE STAMINALI 99
corretto – a nostro avviso – presumere il consenso, accampando
la ragione che il cordone è destinato all’incenerimento, né sarebbe
rispondente alla logica della libertà, chiedere il consenso
mentre il travaglio è in corso e la donna non è normalmente nelle
condizioni psico-fisiche più adatte per ricevere un’informazione
ed esprimere un consenso, ma si dovrà provvedere ad
informare e raccogliere l’eventuale consenso in antecedenza. In
secondo luogo possono emergere situazioni conflittuali fra la tutela
della privacy del donatore e del ricevente e la tutela della salute
del ricevente stesso: nel caso, per esempio, che una malattia
infettiva o genetica comparisse nel donatore, sarebbe necessario
risalire al ricevente per prendere le precauzioni necessarie. L’impossibilità
di garantire il completo anonimato fra donatore e ricevente,
così come i modi e i motivi dell’impiego delle notizie,
devono essere ben precisati all’atto di richiesta del consenso.
Il dibattito etico si concentra sul ricorso a embrioni o feti come
fonte di cellule staminali e questo aspetto particolare si inscrive
nel più vasto problema del prelievo di organi e tessuti fetali
a scopo di trapianto. Senza entrare nello specifico della questione,
è chiaro che, nella prospettiva del personalismo cattolico,
la soppressione diretta di una vita umana in fase iniziale, sia
embrionale sia fetale, per ridonare la salute ad un’altra o per far
progredire le conoscenze a vantaggio dell’umanità, è una prassi
palesemente irragionevole perché contraddittoria e moralmente
inaccettabile 38 .
Nel caso del ricorso a embrioni e feti uccisi con aborto procurato,
anche se l’aborto non è stato praticato da chi poi preleverà
o trapianterà i tessuti, il ricorso a cellule staminali di siffatta
provenienza configurerebbe o potrebbe facilmente configurare
– a nostro avviso – una forma di complicità lato sensu inaccettabile,
anche se non si può parlare stricto sensu di cooperazione
all’atto abortivo. Diverso è ovviamente il discorso se l’aborto
è avvenuto spontaneamente, ma sarebbe ipocrita giustificare
l’impiego di tessuti di dubbia origine – come potrebbe esse-
38 Vedere, per esempio: SPAGNOLO A. G., SGRECCIA E., Prelievi di organi e
tessuti fetali a scopo di trapianto. Aspetti conoscitivi ed istanze etiche, in BOM-
PIANI A., SGRECCIA E. curr., Trapianti d’organo, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1989,
47-84 (soprattutto 69-81).

100 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI
re per i tessuti fetali di una banca – con l’impossibilità morale di
venire a conoscere con certezza le circostanze dell’interruzione
di gravidanza, essendo a tutti noto che la fonte principale di tali
tessuti sono gli aborti procurati. Il sospetto di una possibile relazione
fra induzione dell’aborto e uso dei tessuti embrionali o
fetali non è certo infondato dal momento che in un documento
ufficiale del Comité Consultatif National d’Èthique francese, per
esempio, si raccomanda di realizzare gli aborti in modo da evitare
il più possibile la lacerazione dei tessuti da avviare a scopi
terapeutici o scientifici 39 . Non sembra davvero troppo lungo il
passo fra la semplice accortezza nello scegliere il metodo abortivo
così da non rendere inutilizzabili i tessuti degli embrioni e
dei feti, alla raccolta sistematica e commercializzazione dei prodotti
abortivi.
Ancora più acceso è il dibattito a livello scientifico, etico e
giuridico sulle cellule staminali provenienti da embrioni precoci,
ottenuti tramite tecniche di fecondazione in vitro o tramite clonazione.
A questo proposito, è significativo è il fatto che, prima
ancora di dare l’annuncio ufficiale dei successi ottenuti nel campo
delle cellule staminali embrionali, nel novembre del 1998, la
Geron aveva creato un gruppo di lavoro per elaborare linee guida
che fornissero il necessario supporto o – se si preferisce – la
necessaria copertura bioetica alle ricerche sulle cellule staminali
umane di derivazione embrionale. Questo Comitato Consultivo
di Etica (Ethics Advisory Board), lavorando su una bozza preparata
da Karen Lebacqz nel settembre 1998, è giunto ben presto
al documento definitivo, intitolato A Statement on Human
Embryonic Stem Cells ovvero Dichiarazione sulle cellule staminali
embrionali umane il 20 ottobre dello stesso anno. Il testo del
documento e le spiegazioni che lo accompagnano si possono
trovare in Hastings Center Report 40 , insieme con alcuni interes-
39 COMITÉ CONSULTATIF NATIONAL D’ÈTHIQUE, Opinion on the establishment
of collections of human embryo cells and their use for therapeutic or scientific
purposes, 11-3-1997 (http://www.ccne-ethique.org). Cfr. DI PIETRO M. L., MI-
NACORI R., Cellule staminali: una questione aperta, “Vita e Pensiero” 84 (2001),
65-66.
40 GERON ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD, Research with human embryonic stem
cells: Ethical considerations, “Hastings Center Report” 29 (1999), 2, 31-36.

LAVORARE CON LE CELLULE STAMINALI 101
santi commenti. Può essere utile, prima di procedere nella discussione,
offrire qui una nostra traduzione del Documento.
“Il Comitato Consultivo di etica della Geron è unanime nel
suo giudizio che la ricerca sulle cellule staminali embrionali
umane può essere condotta in modo etico. Perché tale ricerca
sia condotta eticamente nell’attuale contesto, devono soddisfarsi
alcune condizioni. Inoltre, sarà necessario un ulteriore dibattito
pubblico su una gamma di questioni eticamente complesse
generate da questa ricerca. Le condizioni sono:
1. La blastocisti deve essere trattata con il rispetto dovuto
(“appropriate”) a tessuto embrionale umano precoce.
2. Le donne o le coppie che donano blastocisti prodotte nel
processo di fecondazione in vitro devono dare un consenso pieno
ed informato per l’uso delle blastocisti nella ricerca e nello
sviluppo di linee cellulari da quel tessuto.
3. La ricerca non includerà nessuna clonazione finalizzata a
riproduzione umana, nessun trasferimento in utero e nessuna
creazione di chimere.
4. L’acquisizione e lo sviluppo del terreno di coltura (“feeder
layer”) necessario per la crescita in vitro delle linee cellulari di
cellule staminali embrionali umane non deve violare le norme
accettate per la ricerca umana o animale.
5. Ogni ricerca di questo tipo deve essere svolta in un contesto
di attenzione per la giustizia globale.
6. Ogni ricerca dovrebbe essere approvata da un Comitato
Consultivo di Etica in aggiunta al Comitato Istituzionale di Revisione”
41 .
Il Documento rileva correttamente che il problema cardine
sta nello status ontologico e assiologico conferito alla blastocisti
umana e, più in generale, all’embrione precoce o pre-embrione
umano e quindi nella considerazione etico-giuridica dell’embrione
ottenuto per clonazione. Dal momento infatti che il prelievo
di cellule staminali dall’embrione ne prevede la distruzione,
la questione di fondo ci riporta al valore della vita embrionale
soprattutto quando sono in gioco gli interessi e i progetti
degli esseri umani, intendendo l’aggettivo umano in senso forte.
41 Ibidem, 36.

102 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI
In un impianto utilitarista – per esempio – sarà piuttosto
agevole ammettere che, qualunque sia la risposta alla domanda
sullo statuto ontologico dell’embrione, possano darsi situazioni
nelle quali sia socialmente vantaggioso permettere la sua manipolazione
e che, di contro, sia irrazionale proibire la destinazione
di embrioni a studi e applicazioni che potrebbero migliorare
la vita e la salute di molte persone. La distinzione, cara ai neocontrattualisti,
fra le persone e le non persone umane fornisce
ulteriori eleganti, per quanto speciose legittimazioni a queste
pratiche e insinua all’interno dell’unità del genere umano pericolose
e arbitrarie discriminazioni in base alle quali gli agenti
morali in senso proprio possono accordarsi per disporre secondo
i loro progetti gli esseri umani incapaci di essere membri attivi
dell’impresa morale, come gli embrioni e i feti. La posizione
della bioetica personalista sul valore della vita dell’embrione e
quindi sulla distruzione diretta di embrioni per qualsiasi scopo
è notoriamente negativa e le ragioni sono state più volte esposte
con dovizia di argomentazioni, né qui pare necessario entrare
nel merito della discussione 42 .
Mentre a livello legislativo, esclusa le legge inglese, esiste
una certa convergenza sul divieto di produrre embrioni per scopi
diversi da quello riproduttivo, aumentano le incertezze e i cedimenti
per l’uso sperimentale e terapeutico degli embrioni soprannumerari,
provenienti cioè dalla fecondazione in vitro e rimasti
inutilizzati in situazione di crioconservazione 43 . Il Parlamento
europeo si è dichiarato contrario all’uso strumentale degli
embrioni soprannumerari 44 , ma organismi altrettanto presti-
42 Una raccolta di studi di grande interesse in: PONTIFICIA ACADEMIA PRO
VITA, Identità e statuto dell’embrione umano, Città del Vaticano 1998. Nel volume
segnaliamo l’articolo: SERRA A., COLOMBO R., Identità e statuto dell’embrione
umano: il contributo della biologia, 106-158.
43 Per tutta la questione degli embrioni soprannumerari e della loro
crioconservazione rimandiamo ad un nostro status quaestionis: FAGGIONI M.
P., Embrioni congelati. Situazione e problemi emergenti, “Studia Moralia” 34
(1996), 351-387.
44
PARLAMENTO EUROPEO, Risoluzione sulla clonazione umana, 7-9-2000
(http://www.col.fr./oviedo/).

LAVORARE CON LE CELLULE STAMINALI 103
giosi si sono mostrati alquanto più aperti a soluzioni di questo
genere, come la National Bioethics Advisory Commission degli
Stati Uniti e questa opinione sta guadagnando favori anche in
Francia ed in Germania 45 .
In Italia il Comitato Nazionale per la Bioetica, benché in modo
non unanime, e la Commissione Ministeriale istituita ad hoc
dal ministro U. Veronesi nel 2000 si sono pronunciati a favore
del ricorso agli embrioni soprannumerari altrimenti destinati alla
distruzione 46 . Sorvolando sul presupposto ideologico implicito
che la vita dell’embrione precoce non abbia valore o ne abbia
comunque meno di quella dell’essere umano nato, la ragione più
spesso addotta per usare gli embrioni soprannumerari è che essi
sono certamente destinati alla morte e che, quindi, impiegarli
per fini utili alle persone non muta il loro destino, mentre procura
benefici ad altri. Si dimentica che la vita dell’essere umano
non può mai essere strumentalizzata e diventare un mezzo per
il conseguimento di fini anche buoni e che, dal punto di vista etico,
esiste una grande differenza tra il lasciar morire, quando non
è possibile impedire la morte, e causare la morte, quando il decesso
dipende direttamente da un atto volontario non inevitabile.
L’ineluttabile destino di morte verso cui sono avviati gli embrioni
soprannumerari non toglie gravità a una loro soppressione
diretta, ma anzi dovrebbe portare ad impedire – come di fatto
è previsto in diverse legislazioni – la loro stessa formazione.
45 NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, Ethical Issues in Human
Stem Cell Research, “National Bioethics Advisory Commission”, Rockville
(Maryland), September 1999, vol. I, 85-86 (http://bioethics.gov/pubs.html). Il
9 agosto 2001 il presidente Bush ha annunciato che potranno essere finanziate
con fondi federali ricerche con cellule staminali provenienti da embrioni
formati per motivi riproduttivi e non richiesti dai genitori.
46 I lavori della Commissione in: BOMPIANI A., I. I lavori della commissione
ministeriale per lo studio della utilizzazione delle cellule staminali, “Medicina
e Morale” 51 (2001), 101-125 (sugli embrioni soprannumerari 113-114);
ID., II. I lavori della commissione ministeriale per lo studio della utilizzazione
delle cellule staminali. La relazione di minoranza e le proposte emendative finali,
“Medicina e Morale”, 51 (2001), 299-340 (sugli embrioni soprannumerari
325-326). Il testo ufficiale, diffuso il 28-12-2000, in: http: //www.sanità.it/
sanità/bacheca/cellstami/relazione-conclusiva. pdf.

104 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI
Quanto si è detto circa la produzione di embrioni come fonte
di cellule staminali non cambia sostanzialmente quando si
parla di embrioni umani ottenuto per clonazione: le modalità attraverso
le quali viene chiamato alla vita un nuovo essere umano
non cambiano la qualità ontologica ed etica di questa esistenza.
Come abbiamo visto nel primo paragrafo, è stata tentata sia
la clonazione con trasferimento di nucleo da cellula umana in
ovocita umano denucleato sia quella con trasferimento in ovocita
di altro mammifero sia riprogrammando il nucleo di una cellula
attraverso la fusione con il citoplasma di una cellula staminale
embrionale. In ogni caso si tratta della produzione di nuove
unità biologiche, nel secondo caso addirittura di un individuo
chimerico, attraverso la clonazione di un intero individuo.
È stata introdotta una distinzione fra clonazione terapeutica e
clonazione procreativa e si è anzi proposto di riservare il termine
clonazione alla sola clonazione riproduttiva per evitare le difficoltà
morali e l’istintiva ripulsa connessa con la clonazione umana, indicando
la clonazione terapeutica come cell nuclear replacement o
sostituzione del nucleo della cellula 47 . Ovviamente dal punto di vista
etico, le finalità perseguite nel dare la vita ad un essere umano
siano esse finalità procreative o strumentali, non mutano il
giudizio sulle tecniche di clonazione applicate all’uomo.
Le perplessità intorno alla clonazione umana sono molteplici
e non possiamo qui addentrarci nell’intricata discussione 48 .
47 SOLTER D., GEARHART J., Putting stem cells to work, 1470: “To avoid these
difficulties, it would be much better to reserve the term cloning to describe
reproductive cloning”. La terminologia alternativa si riferisce all’evento
cruciale della clonazione, cioè il trasferimento del nucleo di una cellula somatica
in una cellula uovo denucleata e la successiva attivazione dello zigote
o embrione unicellulare così ottenuto.
48 Per un esame dei termini del dibattito: RUSSO G., La clonazione di soggetti
umani. Uno studio bioetico per sperimentatori e animatori della società.
Parte I, “Itinerarium” 4 (1996), 153-180; ID., La clonazione di soggetti umani.
Riflessioni bioetiche, norme sociali e giuridiche. Parte II, “Itinerarium” 5
(1997), 125-151; SCHOCKENHOFF E., L’uomo come la pecora? Riflessioni teologico-etiche
sull’utilizzo della tecnologia genetica, “Concilium” 34 (1998), 2,
129-139; SERRA A., Verso la clonazione dell’uomo? Una nuova frontiera della
scienza, “Civiltà Cattolica” 149/1 (1998), 224-234; ID., La clonazione umana

LAVORARE CON LE CELLULE STAMINALI 105
Pur dichiarandoci contrari a qualsiasi forma di clonazione umana
per qualsivoglia scopo, non abbiamo dubbi ad affermare che,
se una forma di clonazione può vantare ancora qualche giustificazione
razionale, si tratterebbe della clonazione procreativa.
Nella riproduzione per clonazione si nega il legame antropologico
fra la trasmissione della vita e la relazionalità umana, singolarmente
espressa dal legame matrimoniale, e si occulta, a livello
intenzionale, anche se non a quello ontologico, l’unicità irripetibile
o – se si vuole – la libertà esistenziale della persona: il
figlio non si configura più come l’incarnarsi di una relazione interpersonale
intima e totalizzante e quindi come il raggiungimento
della propria perpetuazione attraverso un superamento
dell’onnipotenza narcisistica nella comunione coniugale, ma diventa
proiezione grandiosa del sé in un infinito gioco di specchi
e di autoreferenze. Nonostante questa radicale stortura, la clonazione
procreativa mantiene una qualche connessione con l’atto
umano del generare perché tende a porre in essere un creatura
affinchè esista e quindi ne ammette, sia pure in modo oscuro
e contraddittorio, la autonomia e ne riconosce, pur nella innaturalità
antropologica del processo tecnologico impiegato, la dignità
personale.
La clonazione terapeutica, invece – come si legge nel Documento
del Centro di Bioetica dell’Università Cattolica – “stravolge
il significato umano della generazione, non più pensata ed attuata
per scopi riproduttivi, ma programmata per finalità medico-sperimentali
(e perciò anche commerciali)”. In essa la negazione
del senso umano della generazione è radicale: nella generazione,
comunque avvenga, si vuole porre in atto un’esistenza
umana, nella clonazione terapeutica e in ogni forma di procreazione
finalizzata ad analoghi scopi strumentali si vuole distruggere
un’esistenza dopo averle conferito una vita effimera. Perciò
“a fronte di questo atto clonatorio – si legge in un recente Documento
della Pontificia Academia Pro Vita – e delle sue conseguenze
sull’embrione umano, il giudizio morale è di assoluta
inaccettabilità… La generazione per clonazione di un individuo
in prospettiva “sapienziale”, “Civiltà Cattolica” 149/1 (1998), 329-339. Vedere,
inoltre: PONTIFICIA ACADEMIA PRO VITA, Riflessioni sulla clonazione, 25-6-1997,
“Medicina e Morale” 47 (1997), 978-983.

106 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI
umano al fine di utilizzarlo come fonte di cellule staminali… è
un’azione indegna della persona umana perché si oppone al suo
bene e nessuna intenzione buona o circostanza particolare è capace
di cancellarne la malizia” 49 .
Anche potendosi escludere la soppressione del clono, il discendente
per clonazione di un soggetto “sarà un individuo
umano a pieno titolo, e non è lecito farlo venire al mondo con il
fine primario di essere un donatore d’organi. Pertanto – conclude
il Comitato Nazionale per la Bioetica italiano – anche volendo
ipotizzare una clonazione di individui umani a fini terapeutici,
questa non appare in generale moralmente ammissibile” 50 .
L’universale contrarietà alla clonazione umana, sancita in documenti
pubblici di notevole rilievo e autorità 51 , mostra segni di cedimento
quando si passa a considerare separatamente il caso della
clonazione terapeutica. Nel sopra citato Documento della Consulta
della Geron, per esempio, si esclude con forza la clonazione riproduttiva,
ovviamente per poter introdurre l’idea della legittimità di
quella terapeutica 52 . Nel Regno Unito, dove già è permessa la produzione
di embrioni al solo scopo di ricerca, il Rapporto della
Commissione Donaldson ha aperto la strada alla clonazione terapeutica
di esseri umani per ricavarne cellule staminali 53 .
49 PONTIFICIA ACADEMIA PRO VITA, Cellule staminali umane autologhe e trasferimento
di nucleo, Osservatore Romano 5-1-2001, 6 (anche “Medicina e
Morale”, 2001,1, 141-142). Cfr. GIOVANNI PAOLO II, Discorso al XVIII International
Congress of the Transplantation Society, Roma 29-8-2000, “Osservatore
Romano”, 30-8-2000, 1); CONGR. DOTTR. FEDE, Istruzione Donum Vitae, 22-2-
1987, I, 6, AAS 1988, 80, 84-85.
50 COMITATO NAZIONALE PER LA BIOETICA, La clonazione, Roma 1998, 35.
51 OMS, Déclaration sur le clonage, 18-3-1997, “Medicina e Morale” 47
(1997), 323-325; PARLAMENTO EUROPEO, Risoluzione sulla clonazione, 15-1-
1998, “Medicina e Morale” 48 (1998), 167-168; UNESCO, Déclaration universelle
sur le génome humain et les droits de l’homme, 11-11-1997, “Medicina
e Morale” 48 (1998), 158-166.
52 GERON ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD, Research with Human Embryonic Stem
Cells, 36: “3. La ricerca non includerà nessuna clonazione finalizzata a riproduzione
umana”.
53 CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICIER’S EXPERT GROUP, Stem Cell Research: Medical
Progress with Responsibility, Department of Health, London June 2000, 10:
“Recommendation 1. Research using embryos (whether created by in vitro
fertilisation or cell nuclear replacement) to increase understanding about

LAVORARE CON LE CELLULE STAMINALI 107
È prevedibile che l’opinione pubblica, sotto la spinta dei
mass media espressione degli enormi interessi economici che girano
intorno all’affare delle cellule staminali 54 , si orienti a una
maggiore condiscendenza verso la clonazione terapeutica e questo
porti ad agggiustamenti legislativi in senso possibilista. La
categoria di terapeuticità rappresenta l’usuale grimaldello retorico
per sfondare sul versante emotivo le barriere etiche che risultano
inespugnabili sul versante razionale e sottolineando la motivazione
del progresso scientifico e delle applicazioni terapeutiche
non sarà impossibile ammorbidire il divieto di clonazione
umana, soprattutto se contenuta entro i limiti temporali dei fatidici
quattordici giorni del pre-embrione. In secondo luogo si
cerca di sviare la sensibilità del pubblico evitando semplicemente
il termine clonazione e ricorrendo – come fa lo stesso Rapporto
Donaldson – al criptico equivalente sostituzione di nucleo
della cellula. A ciò si aggiunga che molti di coloro che sostengono
la legittimità della produzione di cloni da tenersi in serbo come
possibile banca tissutale per eventuali necessità future, sembrano
implicare una persuasione alquanto discutibile che cioè il
clono di un individuo ottenuto mediante trasferimento nucleare
altro non sia che una espansione o una copia biologica dell’individuo
stesso e che perciò la copia sia in qualche modo disponibile
per l’originale. Sarebbe l’individuo di partenza che si continua
nel suo clono e quindi usare il clono per curare una malattia
del soggetto di partenza sarebbe del tutto legittimo, trattandosi,
a ben guardare, di una forma sofisticata di autotrapianto.
Purtroppo la realtà è ben diversa: anche restando su un piano
puramente biologico, la condivisione di un comune patrimonio
genetico non comporta l’indistinzione fra due oggetti biologici
autonomamente viventi, così come la condivisione del patrimonio
genetico non fa di due gemelli monozigoti un solo individuo.
Il clono è un essere umano distinto dal suo originale genetico,
pur condividendone il patrimonio genetico, e questo si realizza
human disease and disorders and their cell-base treatments should be permitted”.
Il testo del documento in: http:// www.doh.gov.uk./cegc.
54 Gli interessi economici in gioco sono enormi e lo sfruttamento delle
scoperte pone importanti questioni di giustizia. Cfr. CAHILL L., The New Biotech
World Order, “Hastings Center Report” 29 (1999), 2, 45-48.

108 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI
dal momento in cui il clono funziona come unità biologica autofunzionante,
all’attivazione (con ioni Sr 2+ o con impulsi elettrici)
dello zigote che è stato ottenuto con il transfer nucleare.
In conclusione, il prelievo di cellule staminali da pre-embrioni,
embrioni e feti, in quanto comporta la soppressione di
una vita umana innocente, non è moralmente accettabile. La
produzione di embrioni mediante clonazione per trarne cellule
e tessuti (clonazione terapeutica) è moralmente illecita, aggiungendo
al disordine della riproduzione per clonazione, la distruzione
dell’esistenza così prodotta. Nel caso della clonazione attaverso
la formazione di embrioni chimerici si ha l’aggravante
della lesione dell’intregrità onto-biologica e della dignità propria
dell’essere umano e della sua generazione. Non è neppure lecito
per un ricercatore o un medico usare cellule staminali embrionali
o cellule staminali adulte, ma derivate da queste, eventualmente
fornite da altri ricercatori o reperibili in commercio perché
“al di là della condivisione, formale o meno, dell’intenzione
moralmente illecita dell’agente principale, nel caso in esame c’è
una cooperazione materiale prossima da parte del produttore o
fornitore” 55 .
4. Lo statuto delle cellule staminali e la questione del
TNSA
Potrebbe stupire il netto confine che, implicitamente, abbiamo
posto fra l’embrione precoce a partire dallo stadio monocellulare
e la cellula staminale totipotente. Il fatto è che – secondo
noi – l’embrione precoce sin dal concepimento deve essere rispettato
come una persona, mentre una cellula staminale è e resta
una cellula che non ha senso in sé, ma soltanto se riferita al
tutto e che perciò non ha maggiore significato ontologico ed etico
di una cellula, per esempio, dell’epidermide.
Negli estenuanti dibattiti sullo status dell’embrione gli op-
55 PONTIFICIA ACADEMIA PRO VITA, Dichiarazione sulla produzione e sull’uso
scientifico e terapeutico delle cellule staminali embrionali umane, Libreria
Editrice Vaticana, Città del Vaticano 2000, 17 (originale in “Osservatore Romano”,
25-8-2000, 6).

LAVORARE CON LE CELLULE STAMINALI 109
positori della tesi dell’individuazione biologica al concepimento
– come il salesiano australiano N. Ford – sottolineano che, essendo
tutte le cellule dell’embrione precoce totipotenti, esse possono
subire l’embryo splitting e dare origine ad un altro embrione
distinto dal primo e geneticamente identico e da questo deducono
la indistinzione o mancata individualità del pre-embrione
56 . I sostenitori dell’individualità al concepimento fanno notare
che l’embrione precoce funziona come una unità vitale autorganizzata
sin dal concepimento ed è quindi un individuo biologico,
anche se conserva la possibilità di dare origine, per una
forma di generazione asessuata che ricorda la gemmazione, un
nuovo embrione inclusi gli annessi embrionali a partire da un
blastomero totipotente che si rende autonomo dall’insieme ed
inizia un proprio percorso esistenziale 57 . Ogni cellula embrionale
totipotente, nel momento in cui si rende, per natura o per artificio,
funzionalmente autonoma rappresenta l’inizio di una
nuova individualità biologica.
Una situazione strettamente affine è quella della cellula staminale
embrionale ricavata dall’embrioblasto che però è totipotente
solo nel senso che può dare origine virtualmente a tutti i
tessuti embrionali, ma non a quelli degli annessi e che perciò
meglio si direbbe pluripotente. Derivando dalle cellule dell’embrioblasto,
che sono già orientate ad evolversi nel soma embrionario,
esse da sole, infatti, non riescono a dare origine a un embrione
completo dei suoi annessi. Gli studi più approfonditi in
questo campo sono stati compiuti sulle cellule murine. È stato
dimostrato che le cellule staminali embrionali di topo possono
formare tutti i tipi cellulari dell’organismo, ma non sembra che,
56 FORD N. M., When did I begin? Conception of the human individual in
history, philosophy and science, Cambridge 1988 (trad. it. Quando comincio
io? Il concepimento nella storia, nella filosofia e nella scienza, Milano 1997).
Una analisi molto critica del volume in: SERRA A., “Quando è iniziata la mia
vita?”, “Civiltà Cattolica” 140/4 (1989), 575-585.
57 Sul problema della gemellarità: BATTISTON F., Lo statuto dell’embrione
e il principio di potenzialità in bioetica, “Studia Patavina” 40 (1993), 603-604;
CASPAR P., Individualisation génétique et gémellité: l’objection des jumeaux monozygotes,
“Ethique” 4 (1992), 81-90; ZATTI M., Quando un pre-embrione esiste,
si tratta di un altro embrione, “Medicina e Morale” 41 (1991), 781-788.

110 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI
in condizioni normali, possano formare anche tutti i tessuti extraembrionari.
Se però noi trasferiamo in una blastocisti tetraploide,
che non può evolvere in un embrione maturo, cellule staminali
embrionali normali di topo, queste danno origine a un
embrione normale 58 . In altre parole, le cellule staminali embrionali
derivate da blastocisti se sono lasciate a se stesse non hanno
la capacità di evolvere verso un organismo completo, ma possono
farlo se vengono poste in un ambiente che può fornire i necessari
supporti biometabolici e influire sui regolatori intrinseci
della pluripotenzialità 59 .
La qualifica di totipotente viene dunque usata con due sfumature
diverse: si applica sia alla cellula embrionale precoce
che, staccata per fissione naturale o artificiale dalla massa embrionaria,
può dare origine a un embrione completo (gemellazione
o clonazione per embryo splitting); sia alla cellula embrionaria
che, staccata dalla massa embrionaria, può dare origine a
tutti i tessuti embrionari, ma non quelli extraembrionari, a meno
di non essere inserita in una blastocisti funzionante. In attesa
di nuovi e più precisi dati, le cellule embrionali totipotenti comunque
ottenute, sia da clonazione per trasferimento nucleare
in ovocita, sia dalla massa embrionaria di una blastocisti, sembrano
presentare sufficienti caratteri di autonomia biologica e
di potenzialità evolutiva da far pensare a nuovi esseri in atto e
come tali devono essere trattate, sino a evidenza contraria 60 .
Ben diverso il caso di cellule staminali sia embrionali sia derivate
da organismi post-natali che hanno le caratteristiche di
essere pluripotenti, ma senza la capacità di dare spontaneamente
origine – in condizioni normali - ad un nuovo essere autonomo.
Nonostante la grande versatilità, si tratta di cellule ricondu-
58
NAGY A., ROSSANT J., NAGY R. et al., Derivation of completely cell culture-derived
mice from early-passage embryonic stem cells, “Proceedings of the
National Academy of Science U.S.A” 90 (1993), 8424-8428.
59
ROSSANT J., Stem cells from the Mammalian blastocyst, “Stem Cells” 19
(2001), 477-482.
60 Ci sembra interessante l’ipotesi interpretativa che potrebbe trattarsi
viventi umani in condizioni di non viabilità. Cfr. SPAGNOLO A. G., SGRECCIA E.,
Prelievi di organi e tessuti fetali a scopo di trapianto. Aspetti conoscitivi ed
istanze etiche, 53.

LAVORARE CON LE CELLULE STAMINALI 111
cibili ad un organismo pluricellulare e non di entità biologiche
autonome e autoorganizzate.
Per comprendere il nostro pensiero su questo punto, a scopo
esemplificativo si potrebbe fare un esperimento mentale. Immaginiamo
che si riescano a dominare completamente le dinamiche
differenziative delle cellule e che sia possibile far regredire
una cellula somatica verso lo stadio di cellula staminale e poi,
indietro, allo stadio di cellula embrionale pluripotente e quindi
allo stadio di cellula zigotica e da qui ricominciare l’avventura di
una nuova vita individuale. Ci si domanda: se è lecito manipolare
un cellula somatica sino a renderla pluripotente, perché dovrebbe
essere illecito spingere il processo di sdifferenziazione sino
a una cellula massimamente totipotente dalle potenzialità zigotiche?
Dove collocare lo spartiacque etico della manipolazione
sdifferenziativa delle cellule staminali?
Lo spartiacque etico fra manipolazione lecita e illecita di cellule
staminali umane si trova – teoricamente parlando – nella produzione
di una unità biologica svincolata e autonomizzata rispetto
all’organismo di provenienza. Sarà quindi lecito procedere a
manipolazioni sdifferenziative che aumentino la plasmabilità
delle cellule staminali, ma senza giungere ad originare uno zigote
caratterizzato da intrinseche qualità autopoietiche, cioè
senza giungere a porre in atto una nuova esistenza. A questo
proposito esiste un’illuminante analogia fra le cellule staminali
e i gameti: il fatto che, attraverso interventi particolari una cellula
staminale possa dare origine a uno zigote, non significa che
quella cellula debba essere identificata biologicamente ed ontologicamente
con uno zigote, così come i gameti che sono destinati
a dare origine a una nuova vita, ma che, in quanto cellule
isolate, non hanno la potenzialità di originare un nuovo individuo;
analogamente alle cellule staminali, i gameti non sono infatti
unità biologiche autoorganizzate e, come ogni cellula in un
organismo pluricellulare, non hanno senso biologico se non in
riferimento al tutto organico. Queste qualità biologiche sono invece
possedute dallo zigote e, via via, dalla morula e poi blastocisti
e così avanti.
Sullo sfondo di queste riflessioni si colloca l’ipotesi di una
via alternativa alla clonazione terapeutica che non comporti in
nessun momento la formazione di embrioni, sia pure di embrioni
monocellulari, ma che permetta di avere cellule stamina-

112 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI
li autologhe, cioè con lo stesso patrimonio genetico del ricevente
e quindi perfettamente istocompatibili. Si è parlato a questo
proposito di clonazione incompleta, in cui si ha la produzione di
cellule staminali geneticamente identiche alle cellule somatiche
di un soggetto adulto, ma senza passare attraverso la produzione
di embrioni clonati 61 . Tale clonazione incompleta potrebbe
essere ottenuta o prelevando da un tessuto del soggetto cellule
idonee, staminali o somatiche, che verrebbero sottoposte in coltura
a un processo di sdifferenziamento e che poi sarebbero
orientate a differenziarsi nella direzione voluta con l’impiego di
opportuni fattori di differenziamento 62 o trasferendo il nucleo di
una cellula somatica in una cellula staminale denucleata, per ottenere
una cellula staminale con i caratteri genetici del donatore
del nucleo 63 .
Potrebbe non essere immediatamente perspicua la differenza
fra il trasferimento di un nucleo da una cellula somatica in un
ovocita denucleato, come si ha nella clonazione, e il trasferimento
del medesimo nucleo in una cellula staminale denucleata.
Nel primo caso – come la clonazione ha ormai ampiamente
dimostrato – si dà inizio ad una nuova esistenza biologica autonoma,
si pone in essere una nuova unità biologica autopoietica
del tutto indistinguibile, per quanto ci è dato di sapere, da uno
zigote frutto della fertilizzazione di un ovocita da parte di uno
spermatozoo. Ogni volta che ci troviamo di fronte ad una vita riferibile
alla sottospecie Homo sapiens sapiens, biologicamente
autoorganizzata e autofinalizzata, comunque essa sia stata originata,
essa esige la nostra attenzione etica e il nostro rispetto.
Nel secondo caso abbiamo invece la produzione di una cellula
staminale modificata, con i caratteri genetici della cellula da cui
61 Traggo l’espressione clonazione incompleta da R. Dulbecco che la usa
in riferimento ai protocolli di sdifferenziamento cellulare: DULBECCO R., Fermare
o regolare il processo?, in DULBECCO R. et al., Clonazione: problemi etici
e prospettive scientifiche, 41
62 All’inizio del 2001 è stata data notizia dalle Agenzie di stampa della
scoperta, fatta a Cambridge, di una procedura che permette la retrodifferenziazione
di globuli bianchi adulti nelle corrispondenti cellule staminali.
63 In questo senso: COLMAN A., KIND A., Therapeutic cloning: Concepts
and practicalities, “Trends in Biotechnology” 18 ( 2000), 192-196.

LAVORARE CON LE CELLULE STAMINALI 113
proviene il nucleo, ma con le caratteristiche biologiche delle cellule
staminali che, per quanto versatili, si è visto che non hanno
la capacità di dare origine ad un embrione e che non gode del
medesimo statuto ontologico ed etico.
Rimane invece oscuro in che modo il trasferimento nucleare
per la produzione di cellule staminali autologhe (TNSA) possa differire
da una comune clonazione. Secondo la Commissione Ministeriale
Italiana – che ha proposto questa “via italiana alla clonazione”
– è possibile riprogrammare il nucleo di cellule somatiche
prelevate dal paziente tramite il contatto con un oocita enucleato
ed il risultato dell’operazione non sarebbe uno zigote capace
di maturare in embrione, ma un oocita ricostituito capace di
evolvere, sotto stimoli opportuni, in sfere embrioidi ricche in cellule
staminali. Non è chiaro in base a quali evidenze empiriche
un oocita ricostituito non sia del tutto analogo a un embrione
monocellulare o zigote prodotto artificialmente, né come si possano
formare sfere embrioidi senza passare per embrioni più
semplici, dato che, fino ad oggi, per ottenere in vitro corpi embrioidi
e isolare da essi specifiche linee cellulari si è sempre dovuti
passare attraverso cellule staminali derivate dall’embrione.
Allo stato attuale delle conoscenze la TNSA resta pertanto
una ipotesi seducente non rafforzata da certezze sperimentali e
non ben inquadrabile nelle attuali conoscenze sulle cellule staminali.
Nel dubbio di trovarsi di fronte a una forma di vera clonazione
umana, è doveroso astenersi da applicarla all’uomo, nell’attesa
che nuovi dati e acquisizioni possano fornire la necessaria
sicurezza pratica.
Per ora, la vera alternativa all’uso di cellule embrionali sta
nel ricorso alle cellule del cordone ombelicale e soprattutto alle
cellule staminali da soggetto adulto. Secondo una letteratura
scientifica che si fa ogni giorno più imponente, le speranze offerte
dalle cellule staminali adulte sono ormai paragonabili a
quelle offerte dalle cellule staminali embrionali, se non forse superiori
64 e ci sono notizie di varie ditte farmaceutiche che hanno
64 Cfr. CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICIER’S EXPERT GROUP, Stem Cell Research: Medical
Progress with Responsibility, 19: “Par. 2.14. In may be that the long term
promise of stem cells derived from adult tissue will equal or even surpass
that of embryonic stem cells”.

114 MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI
in corso importanti sperimentazioni cliniche con esse 65 . La Pontificia
Accademia per la Vita indica tale via come “la più ragionevole
e umana da percorrere per un corretto e valido progresso in
questo campo che si apre alla ricerca e a promettenti applicazioni
terapeutiche” 66 .
Commentando questo testo la dottoressa Di Pietro saggiamente
conclude:
La via più ragionevole e umana: questo non significa, come
qualcuno si ostina a scrivere, chiudere la porta di fronte alla sofferenza
di chi, essendo malato, aspetta una risposta dalla scienza,
ma far sì che la speranza diventi realtà senza il sacrificio di
altre vite umane 67 .
PROF. MAURIZIO PIETRO FAGGIONI, OFM
—————
The author is associate Professor of Bioethics at the Alphonsian
Academy.
El autor es profesor asociado de Bioética en la Academia
Alfonsiana.
—————
65
MARSHALL E., The business of stem cells, “Science” 287 (2000), 1419-
1421.
66
PONTIFICIA ACADEMIA PRO VITA, Dichiarazione sulla produzione e sull’uso
scientifico e terapeutico delle cellule staminali embrionali umane, 17.
67
DI PIETRO M. L., MINACORI R., Cellule staminali: una questione aperta,
67.

StMor 40 (2002) 115-141
JOHN BERKMAN
THE MORALITY OF ADOPTING FROZEN EMBRYOS
IN LIGHT OF DONUM VITAE
In at least some instances, the choice by Catholic women to
adopt cryopreserved human embryos who have been abandoned
by their biological parents is compatible with current Catholic
teaching on assisted reproduction, on surrogate motherhood,
and on the family. While a variety of potential circumstances
may rule out this practice in some situations, the view that it is
morally acceptable in some circumstances and morally praiseworthy
in others is consonant with current Catholic teaching on
the appropriate reverence and respect for human life from conception
until natural death.
The most extensive and authoritative evaluation of the status
of and protection to be accorded to early embryos from the
teaching office of the Catholic church is to be found in the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s (CDF) Instruction
on Respect for Human Life in its origin and on the Dignity of
Procreation, more widely referred to as Donum vitae (DV). 1 Near
the beginning of DV, the CDF notes that it makes free use of a
variety of biological terms (e.g. “zygote”, “pre-embryo”,
“embryo” and “foetus”) to refer to the embryo in its various
stages of development. However, it sees no relevant moral distinction
between these stages, as all “designate the result
(whether visible or not) of human generation, from the first
1 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for
Human Life in its origin and on the Dignity of Procreation, February 22, 1987:
Acta Apostolicae Sedis 80 (1988), 70-102. Henceforth cited as DV with section
numbers. English translations of DV are taken from Origins, vol. 16, no. 40
(March 19, 1987), 697-711, unless otherwise noted.

116 JOHN BERKMAN
moment of its existence until birth.” 2 At all stages of life from
conception on, human life is deserving of absolute protection.
As DV puts it:
From the moment of conception, the life of every human
being is to be respected in an absolute way … Human life is sacred
because from its beginning it involves “the creative action of God”
and it remains forever in a special relationship with the Creator,
who is its sole end. God alone is the Lord of life from its beginning
until its end: no one can, in any circumstance, claim for himself the
right to destroy directly an innocent human being. 3
Since the publication of DV, there has been a vigorous
debate in Catholic theology on the status of the embryo in the
earliest stages after conception, and the further implications of
the alternative viewpoints. 4 While an important debate, an
extended discussion of the various viewpoints is beyond the
scope of this paper. At present, the embryological and theological
arguments articulated in DV find numerous credible defenders.
Since this paper is an evaluation of embryo adoption in the
2 DV, Foreword, footnote #1. The full footnote reads as follows: “Voces
‘zygotum’, ‘prae-embryon’, ‘embryon’, ‘fetus’, iuxta usum in disciplina biologica
receptum, indicare possunt succedentia tempora in viventis humani processu
ad suam maturitatem assequendam. Haec Instructio libere his vocibus utitur,
eis tribuens eandem ethicam aestimationem ad significandum fructum,
vitae autonomae capacem vel non, generationis humanae, a primo eius vitae
momento usque ad nativitatem. Ratio huius ex ipso textu patebit.”
3 DV, Introduction, 5. “Inde a conceptionis momento, vita cuiusvis
humanae creaturae omnino est observanda … Humana vita pro re sacra
habenda est, quippe quae inde a suo exordio ‘Creatoris actionem postulet’ ac
semper peculiari necessitudine cum Creatore, unico fine suo, perstet conexa.
Solus Deus vitae Dominus est ab exordio usque ad exitum: nemo, in nullus
rerum adiunctis, sibi vindicare potest ius mortem humanae creaturae innocenti
directe afferendi.”
4 Questions have been raised about the ontological and moral status of
the embryo in its earliest stages in e.g. Shannon and Wolter (1990). Their
embryological arguments are analyzed in Johnson (1995). Johnson’s views
are evaluated in Porter (1995). The embryological views of DV are defended
by e.g. Doerflinger (1999) and Ashley and Moraczewski (2001).

THE MORALITY OF ADOPTING FROZEN EMBRYOS 117
light of DV, DV’s embryological views will be presumed without
further argumentation.
1. Does Donum Vitae directly prohibit embryo adoption?
In the last seven years, there have been a number of analyses
regarding whether married couples (and in some cases
unmarried women) can licitly “adopt” a frozen embryo. Prior to
the widespread publicity generated by the destruction of
embryos in the U.K. in 1996, one Catholic theologian had
already examined the morality of embryo adoption in relation to
his understanding of DV. In a question-and-answer section of
his monthly column of the October 1995 issue of the Homiletic
and Pastoral Review, William Smith responded to a question
from a Catholic couple who wished to consider the possibility of
adopting a frozen embryo who had been abandoned. 5 Smith
argued, albeit tentatively, that it was not licit for a couple to “rescue”
a frozen embryo, and his response was drawn for the most
part from his interpretation of the teaching of DV. 6 More specifically,
Smith’s response hinged on his interpretation of what I
will refer to as the “cannot be licitly pursued” sentence from DV.
That sentence from DV reads as follows:
In consequence of the fact that they have been produced in
vitro, those embryos which are not transferred into the body of the
mother and are called “spare” are exposed to an absurd fate [sorti
absurdae obnoxii permanent], with no possibility of their being
offered safe means of survival which can be licitly pursued.” 7
5 In this case, it is clear that the embryo is not of the couple’s own making
and that the couple oppose in vitro fertilization (IVF). It is also fairly
clear that the couple were not in any other way party to the creation and
abandonment of the embryo, but enter the situation as people trying to
respond in a morally appropriate way to what they see to be an ongoing
morally problematic situation.
6 See also Smith’s comments in Caulfield (1998), pp. 1, 15.
7 DV, I, 5. “Eo quod in vitro producti sunt, hi embryones, qui in matris
corpus non translati ‘supranumerarii’ vocantur, sorti absurdae obnoxii per-

118 JOHN BERKMAN
Smith concluded from the final phrase of this sentence –
“can[not] be licitly pursued” – that Donum vitae ruled out the
possibility of embryo adoption.
In order to evaluate whether one can reasonably conclude
that the “cannot be licitly pursued” sentence in DV is referring
to the adoption of embryos, it is necessary to note the sentence’s
context, especially its intended audience. The sentence occurs in
Part I of DV, the goal of which is to articulate the respect due to
human embryos in general. More specifically, the section in
which it occurs (i.e. the fifth section of Part I) is discussing a
rather specific sub-group of embryos. This particular section is
addressed to researchers who experiment on human embryos
that have been created through in vitro fertilization (IVF). 8 In
the sentences immediately prior to the “cannot be licitly pursued”
sentence, DV condemns two specific kinds of acts: first,
the production in vitro of embryos that have been created specifically
for the purpose of experimentation; second, the destruction
of these embryos.
It is immoral to produce human embryos destined to be exploited
as disposable “biological material.”
In the usual practice of in vitro fertilization, not all of the
embryos are transferred to the woman’s body; some are destroyed.
Just as the Church condemns induced abortion, so she also forbids
acts against the life of these human beings. It is a duty to condemn
the particular gravity of the voluntary destruction of human embryos
obtained ‘in vitro’ for the sole purpose of research … By acting in this
way the researcher usurps the place of God; and, even though he
may be unaware of this, he sets himself up as the master of the destiny
of others inasmuch as he arbitrarily chooses whom he will
allow to live and whom he will send to death and kills defenceless
manent, quippe quibus securae viae non pateant ad superstitem vitam, quas
ingredi liceat.”
8 After the introductory section, Part I of DV is entitled “Respect for
Human Embryos.” Section 5 of Part I, a section of about ten sentences and
the one from which Smith quotes, is entitled “ How is one to evaluate morally
the use for research purposes of embryos obtained by fertilization ‘in
vitro’?”

THE MORALITY OF ADOPTING FROZEN EMBRYOS 119
human beings …. It is therefore not in conformity with the moral law
deliberately to expose to death human embryos obtained ‘in vitro’. 9
Through an evaluation of this section of DV, one thing
becomes clear. The actions and intentions being condemned in
this section are those of researchers who create, experiment on,
and destroy human embryos. There is no evidence that this section
is referring to the actions and intentions of persons who
wish to protect or aid already existing cryopreserved human
embryos.
Misunderstanding as to what DV claims “cannot be licitly
pursued” arises from confusion with regards to the meaning of
“spare” in the key sentence. Whereas Smith seems to assume
that “spare” refers to cryopreserved embryos that could be
implanted in a mother’s womb, this is not the meaning of
“spare” in DV. Although the first live birth from a cryopreserved
human embryo had occurred in Australia in 1984, thus three
years previously, DV is silent on the subject of the implantation
and gestation of cryopreserved embryos. In fact, DV gives no
indication that it recognizes that previously frozen embryos can
– in a technical sense – be successfully implanted and gestated. 10
By “spare” embryo DV is rather referring to embryos destined
not to be implanted into the womb of a woman. Since the
9 DV I, 5. Italics in original.
“Morum igitur honestati contraium est embryones humanos gignere ad
abutendum, scilicet ut efficiantur ‘materia biologica’, quae praesto sit ad
usum.
Modus, quo communiter fecundatio in vitro obtinetur, non sinit ut
omnes embryones in corpus mulieris transferantur; eorum nonnulli interficiuntur.
Quare Ecclesia, sicut abortum procuratum damnat, ita etiam prohibet,
ne vita harum humanarum creaturarum attentetur. Conscientiae officium
postulat, ut palam denuntietur peculiaris gravitas voluntariae interfectionis
embryonum humanorum, qui in vitro obenti sunt ad solum investigationis
finem… Hac agendi ratione investigator se in locum Dei substituit atque,
licet inconscius, se efficit dominum aliorum sortis, quippe qui arbitratu suo
decernat quis vivat et quis morte afficiatur, idemque creaturas humanas
interficiat, quae defensione carent…
Moralibus igitur normis contradicitur, si data opera embryones humani
in vitro producti morti exponuntur.”

120 JOHN BERKMAN
embryos are not being given an opportunity to be gestated by a
human mother, they are being exposed to an “absurd fate.” For
such embryos are destined to destruction, either immediately, or
after being used for experimental purposes.
That is the broad context of Donum vitae I, 5. But what of
the reference to the embryos “not transferred into the body of
the mother”? Here the difficulty arises from confusion between
a descriptive declaration and a prescriptive claim. Whereas
some interpret the passage as having a prescriptive intent (i.e.
prohibiting the transfer of embryos), the sentence in fact presumes
that the embryos being discussed are not being (as
opposed to “should not be”) transferred into the body of a
woman. 11 In other words, the point of this section is to assert
that if there is not a human womb to gestate the embryo, there
is no morally licit means by which the embryo can be gestated.
What alternatives to implanting embryos in the wombs of
human mothers does the document have in mind? In the sentence
immediately following the “cannot be licitly pursued” sentence,
DV rejects “attempts or plans for fertilization between
human and animal gametes and the gestation of human
embryos in the uterus[es] of animals, or the hypothesis or project
of constructing artificial uteruses for the human embryo.” 12
10 DV does refer explicitly at two points to issues surrounding the cryopreservation
of human embryos. In the context of a discussion of experimental
manipulations of the embryo, DV condemns the act of freezing
embryos (DV I, 6). DV’s only explicit reference to frozen embryos refers to
those which are not transferred into the genital tracts of the woman and
which are “utiliz[ed] for different purposes to the detriment of their integrity
and life,” i.e. frozen for non-therapeutic experimental purposes (DV, II).
Also, when DV calls for legislation prohibiting “embryo banks” (DV, III), the
embryos being kept in such banks are presumably cryopreserved, and presumably
kept in such banks to be made available for experimental purposes.
11 DV uses the term “mother,” but it is unclear what that term signifies,
for once ET takes place, the woman is a mother or mother-to-be, whether or
not she is also the biological mother, a surrogate mother, a gestational mother,
and/or an adoptive mother.
12 A few sentences later, DV articulates its objection to the cryopreservation
of human embryos. Situated as it is in this particular context, this
objection should not be taken to be a general objection to the cryopreserva-

THE MORALITY OF ADOPTING FROZEN EMBRYOS 121
DV is ruling out the crossing of human gametes with those of
other mammals – “genetic bestiality” so to speak – and attempts
to gestate human embryos outside of a human womb.
Thus, we may conclude that the fifth section of Part I of DV
analyzes and morally evaluates the proposed actions of
researchers who see human embryos as mere means for attaining
knowledge, and not as human beings who deserve unconditional
respect for their lives and their physical integrity. This section
is not addressing the morality of embryo transfer (ET) with
regard to already-existing and abandoned cryopreserved
embryos. As such, it cannot be legitimately interpreted as directly
prohibiting the possibility of adopting a cryopreserved
embryo. Furthermore, the question of what can be done with
already created and cryopreserved embryos is nowhere else
addressed in DV. 13
tion of human embryos in all situations. Once one acknowledges that
embryo cryopreservation could, in some circumstances, be undertaken for
therapeutic benefit of the embryo itself, it is clear that there can be no principled
rejection of this technique.
13 The possibility of cryopreserving embryos is only mentioned in two
places in DV (i.e. I,6 and II, 1). In I, 6, DV says that cryopreservation of
embryos “even when carried out in order to preserve the life of an embryo …
constitutes an offence against the respect due to human beings” because of
(at least what was in 1987 likely to be) grave harm or death to them through
this procedure. However, this passage should not be interpreted as ruling out
the possibility of such cryopreservation in circumstances where it would
likely be of therapeutic benefit and enhance the possibility of the embryo
being gestated to term. For DV also says “In the case of experimentation that
is clearly therapeutic, namely, when it is a mattter of experimental forms of
therapy used for the benefit of the embryo itself in a final attempt to save its
life, and in the absence of other reliable forms of therapy, recourse to … procedures
not yet fully tested can be licit.” (I,4) Furthermore, I take it that the
sentence from DV I, 6 quoted above presumes that the cryopreserved
embryos of which it is speaking are not going to be gestated, and such cryopreservation
only extends their dying and subjects them to “further
offences and manipulation.”

122 JOHN BERKMAN
2. Is Embryo Adoption wrong in principle?
If Donum vitae neither prohibits nor even addresses the
morality of adopting frozen embryos, one can still ask whether
the adoption of previously frozen embryos would be ruled out by
the principles articulated in DV. To begin with, it is worth noting
that DV does not rule out ET of already created embryos into
the body of a woman – even when they are created with donor
ova and/or sperm. This at least provides prima facie evidence
that embryo adoption cannot be ruled out in advance as wrong
in principle. 14 For while DV clearly prohibits the technological
procedure known as IVF-ET as morally wrong in principle, its
chief objection is not to the transfer of the already-created
embryo into the body of the woman (i.e. the ET), but to the very
creation of these embryos (i.e. the IVF). 15
One can certainly imagine a variety of scenarios where ET
would be morally unproblematic. For example, it would certain-
14 For instance, a close reading of the critique of heterologous IVF (i.e.
conception using gametes of at least one person other than the spouses) in
DV (see II.A.2) reveals that the critique is always directed at the means of
conception of the child. At no place does the critique rule out ET once
embryos have been created. Presumably, some individuals might come to see
the wrongfulness of seeking to bring a child into the world through the
process of IVF after the embryos have been conceived, but prior to implantation
of them into a woman’s womb. Nowhere is it stated that the embryos
created at the request of a woman or a couple should be abandoned after
they have been conceived. Furthermore, the various statements in DV which
might be interpreted as prohibiting embryo transfer would seem to require
one to draw the additional (reductio ad absurdum) conclusion that all adoptions
must be rejected, whether ordinary (post-natal) or pre-natal.
15 In its evaluation of homologous ‘in vitro’ fertilization, DV typically
groups homologous IVF and ET together, typically referring to the process
as “IVF and ET” (DV, II, B, 5 passim). However, at the end of this section, DV
states its objection only to IVF as “in itself illicit.” Thus, “… the Church
remains opposed from the moral point of view to homologous ‘in vitro’ fertilization.
Such fertilization is in itself illicit and in opposition to the dignity of
procreation and of the conjugal union, even when everything is done to avoid
the death of the human embryo” (DV, II, B, 5. Italics in original). This is not
to say that ET is always morally appropriate or acceptable, but that it is not
ruled out as “in itself illicit,” as is IVF.

THE MORALITY OF ADOPTING FROZEN EMBRYOS 123
ly be appropriate to seek to transfer an embryo lodged in the fallopian
tube (i.e. in an ectopic pregnancy) to the lining of the
uterus. Furthermore, it would seem morally unproblematic if it
were technically possible to temporarily remove an embryo
from the uterine lining while a woman received, e.g., radiation
therapy for cervical cancer, and then transfer it back to the
uterus to continue its gestation. 16 Such interventions in the normal
process of gestation when done for the unambiguous good
of the embryo are not called into question in the tradition.
Such a conclusion regarding interventions on behalf of the
embryo are not at all surprising, for DV’s fundamental principle
for reflection upon the treatment of embryos, invoked repeatedly
at key points, is: “Human life must be absolutely respected
and protected from the moment of conception.” 17 Although DV
argues that it is wrong in principle to create embryos in vitro,
once created an embryo “must be treated as a person” and thus
“tended and cared for, to the extent possible, in the same way as
any other human being.” 18 On the basis of this principle, one fol-
16 These are largely imaginary scenarios. However, there is at least one
recorded case where it has been claimed that an embryo has been successfully
transferred from the fallopian tube to the lining of the uterus. It is certainly
possible that such transfers will become increasingly common as medical
techniques continue to develop.
17 DV, I, 1. DV quotes this sentence from the Holy See, Charter of the
Rights of the Family, 4: L’Osservatore Romano, 25 November 1983.
18 DV I, 1. The fifth section is to be read in the context of the first section,
which articulates more generally the respect due to human embryos.
The first section begins by stating “The human being must be respected – as a
person – from the very first instant of his existence.” It then goes on to note
that it is aware “of the current debates concerning the beginning of human
life … and concerning the identity of the human person,” and that while “no
experimental datum can be in itself sufficient to bring us to the recognition
of a spiritual soul … how could a human individual not be a human person?”
The section concludes by claiming that “[t]he human being is to be respected
and treated as a person from the moment of conception; and therefore
from that same moment his rights as a person must be recognized, among
which in the first place is the inviolable right of every innocent human being
to life. This doctrinal reminder provides the fundamental criterion for the
solution of the various problems posed by the development of the biomedical
sciences in this field: since the embryo must be treated as a person, it

124 JOHN BERKMAN
lowing DV would have at least a prima facie basis for providing
these cryopreserved embryos with an opportunity to be gestated
and given birth to by morally acceptable means.
But there have also been a number of arguments put forward
claiming that embryo adoption is wrong in principle.
Interestingly, all of those who raise these objections acknowledge
that the embryos are in fact worthy of protection. The
objections are that, for one reason or another, a woman cannot
agree to gestate an (abandoned) embryo without consenting to
an action that is morally wrong in principle. We will consider
three arguments as to the nature of this wrong, namely, that it
requires the woman (or the couple) to a) become a surrogate
mother, b) sin against the virtue of chastity, or c) continue participation
in the wrongfulness of IVF.
(i) Is Embryo Adoption a Form of Surrogacy?
While surrogacy is as old as Abraham, Sarah and Hagar, and
has undoubtedly been a part of many cultures, it is at least today
perceived as an affront both to the dignity of the surrogate, and
to the best interests of the child. In order to evaluate whether
embryo adoption is a form of surrogacy, we must understand
what, morally speaking, constitutes surrogate motherhood.
Donum vitae provides a precise definition, claiming that either
of the following two scenarios constitutes surrogate motherhood:
a) the woman who carries in pregnancy an embryo implanted
in her uterus and who is genetically a stranger to the embryo
because it has been obtained through the union of the gametes of
“donors.” She carries the pregnancy with a pledge to surrender the
baby once it is born to the party who commissioned or made the
agreement for the pregnancy.
b) the woman who carries in pregnancy an embryo to whose
procreation she has contributed the donation of her own ovum,
must also be defended in its integrity, tended and cared for, to the extent possible,
in the same way as any other human being as far as medical assistance
is concerned.”

THE MORALITY OF ADOPTING FROZEN EMBRYOS 125
fertilized through insemination with the sperm of a man other
than her husband. She carries the pregnancy with a pledge to surrender
the child once it is born to the party who commissioned or
made the agreement for the pregnancy. 19
In both of these scenarios, an essential element of an action
that can be said to constitute surrogacy is the making of “a
pledge to surrender the child once it is born to the party who
commissioned or made the agreement for the pregnancy.”
Whether or not the woman is genetically related to the embryo
does not determine whether the act is surrogacy. Nor, according
to this definition, does the woman’s intent or lack thereof to
raise the child. 20 Rather, the defining characteristic of becoming
a surrogate mother is entering into a prior agreement or contract
with another person or couple to gestate a baby for them
and to give it to them upon birth. Thus, surrogate motherhood
can be defined as the willingness to be impregnated (through
e.g. sexual intercourse, artificial insemination, or embryo transfer)
after having pledged in advance to give up that child to a
particular person or persons.
Though at present we tend to associate surrogacy with an
agreement to gestate a baby in return for a sizable payment,
such a payment merely signals a particularly problematic kind
of surrogacy, rather than defining what constitutes surrogacy in
itself. It is equally a case of surrogacy when a woman’s sister or
mother or daughter or friend offers to gestate an embryo on her
behalf without a fee. The woman who functions as a surrogate
for a fee simply exacerbates the wrong that is done. 21
19 DV, II, A, 3.
20 It would seem that this allows for the possibility of “embryo fostering,”
which is arguably not suttogacy, though it has certain similarities. An example of
this is provided by and defended by Germain Grisez (1997). In the example he
gives, a young single woman proposes to gestate an embryo to “rescue it” but
does not intend to permanently raise the child, planning rather to give the child
up for adoption. See Grisez (1997), 239-244. For a critique of Grisez’s “rescue”
view, see JOHN BERKMAN, “Surrogacy? Rescue? Adoption? Gestating the Embryos
of Others and Catholic Morality,” unpublished paper.
21 That the exchange of a fee may make a wrong action worse, is of
course not unique to surrogacy. For example, with prior agreement for a payment,
what was fornication or adultery becomes prostitution.

126 JOHN BERKMAN
In line with the definition of surrogacy offered in DV, the
essence of surrogacy lies in the woman’s willingness to gestate a
child on behalf of others. 22 Thus, in the situation in which a
woman arranges to have an embryo implanted in her womb, and
does so without a prior arrangement to give up the child to a specific
couple upon delivery, she is not acting as a surrogate mother,
strictly speaking. Whatever other criticisms may or may not
be directed at what is being done, the woman is not, according to
the definition offered by Donum vitae, a surrogate mother. 23
When evaluated in a broader context, surrogacy can also be
seen to contribute to the denigration of the moral significance of
gestation, including that of the good and natural bond that
develops between mother and child in the gestational period.
While the contemporary discussion of IVF-ET, surrogacy, and
embryo adoption seems to see little or no moral significance in
the unique act of human gestation, it is what – in a profound
sense – makes a woman a mother. In the next section on embryo
adoption and the virtue of chastity, more will be said about the
moral significance of gestation.
(ii) Is Embryo Adoption Contrary to the Virtue of Chastity?
If embryo adoption is not a case of surrogacy strictly speaking,
some see it as analogous to surrogacy in that it involves a
woman in actions that are incompatible with the nature of the
marital commitment among Catholics. For example, Mary
Geach has described embryo adoption as a “technological
impregnation,” and concluded that it is wrong because all forms
22 A religious form of surrogacy is illustrated in Margaret Atwood’s The
Handmaid’s Tale.
23 It may be argued that DV has an inadequate definition of surrogacy.
It is certainly debatable as to whether a woman’s decision to “rescue” and
“foster” a child to birth, with a general intention to give the child up for
adoption, is a form of surrogacy. If this appeared to be done with a goal of
financial gain, this would seem to reveal something about the nature of the
woman’s intentions that would make the action closer to, if not in fact, a
form of surrogacy.

THE MORALITY OF ADOPTING FROZEN EMBRYOS 127
of technological impregnation are wrong. 24 According to Geach,
any kind of technological impregnation is wrong because like
adultery (for a married woman) or fornication (for an unmarried
woman), it is against the virtue of chastity. That is, it is
unchaste for a woman to allow herself to become impregnated
with a baby who has come to be in any way other than through
the act she performs in sexual intercourse with her spouse. 25
At first glance, this last claim seems obviously wrong. For
what could have less to do with a woman’s exercise of the virtue
of chastity – the temperate exercise of her sexual desire – than a
technological impregnation, the act of allowing a technician to
implant an embryo in her womb? Furthermore, it does not even
appear to have anything to do with the generative good (or telos)
of an act of sexual intercourse, that of the conception of a
human being. For in her act of allowing an embryo to be
implanted in her womb, there is no goal of conception, since the
embryo already exists. For these two reasons, this action
appears to have nothing to do either with chastity understood as
a form of temperance, or with the act that potentially conceives
a human being.
In response to the view that a technological impregnation
has nothing to do with chastity traditionally understood (i.e. as
a form of the virtue of temperance), Geach responds that the
traditional understanding of chastity, while correct as far as it
goes, is inadequate. Sexual temperance is only part (and not the
most important part!) of the virtue of chastity that a woman
exercises. Fundamentally, chastity for a woman lies in her maintaining
her “reproductive integrity.” 26 According to Geach, a part
of a woman’s reproductive integrity consists in her commitment
24 See Geach (1999).
25 Geach uses the term “marriage act” rather than sexual intercourse to
indicate the kind of act through which a child is to come to be. This term has
the consequence of collapsing different kinds of acts into the category of
“marriage acts.”
26 “So,” according to Geach, “the question about the woman who allows
herself to be made pregnant by technology is whether she is doing this: is
dis-integrating the marriage act by using a part of it out of context.” Geach
(1999), p. 344.

128 JOHN BERKMAN
to becoming pregnant only through acts of sexual intercourse
between herself and her husband.
If reproductive integrity is properly understood as being
concerned with the means by which a woman “allows herself to
be made pregnant,” then Geach is correct to insist that a woman
engages in acts that impact upon her reproductive integrity both
in her action in sexual intercourse and in her action when she
allows a medical technician to implant an embryo into her
uterus. Under this description, both acts are of the kind that
leads to impregnation, and both are thus properly understood as
marriage acts. The former – conjugal acts between a husband
and wife – are appropriate marriage acts. The latter – acts by
which a woman becomes pregnant which are not the result of a
conjugal act between a husband and wife – are perversions of
the marriage act, and as such are intrinsically immoral. 27
However, Geach’s argument gains some of its force from an
equivocation as to the nature of an act that leads to pregnancy.
For to say that a woman’s reproductive integrity lies in her
allowing the conception of a child only through marriage acts
with her husband is not the same as to say that a woman’s reproductive
integrity lies in her allowing herself to become pregnant
only through marriage acts with her husband. 28 The former is
27 “Now if these [orgasmic] sensations are ones which it is wrong to
excite by acts of solitary vice, how much worse must it be to isolate the spiritual
component of the marriage act, the giving up of the body to the
impregnator, dissociating oneself from the parents of the child, and substituting
for the relation to the father a mere arrangement with a technician.
What is being asked of women is that they take a vital part of the marriage
act, and perform it without the father. If solitary vice is objectionable as part
of the marriage act taken out of context, much more so is this giving up of
one’s body to an impregnating intromission.
…To lay one’s womb open to an impregnating intromission which is not
performed by the father, and is not generative, and is not expressive of a preexisting,
sexually exclusive personal relationship, would be seriously to damage
one’s ability to give oneself in marriage, and one’s sense of oneself as a
psychophysical unity, and one’s understanding of the human animal as an
image of the creator.” Geach (1999), p. 345. For Geach’s claim that having an
orphan embryo implanted in one’s womb is intrinsically immoral, see Geach
(1999), p. 341.
28 On the question of the appropriate context for conception, DV says

THE MORALITY OF ADOPTING FROZEN EMBRYOS 129
concerned specifically with conception (the proper way in which
one may bring into being a new human life) along with the nurture
necessary to bring the child to birth. The latter is not concerned
with conception, but only with a particular form of nurturing
an existing life up until birth. Thus, some argue that the
latter kind of act – i.e. the act by which a woman accepts an
existing embryo into her womb – is not a kind of marriage act
(which requires it to be like the kind of act which normally leads
to a conception of a new human life), but a particular, and a particularly
significant, kind of maternal nurturing. 29
Formulating an accurate description of a decision by a
woman to have an orphaned embryo implanted in her womb is
thus of utmost importance. The most adequate description is not
that she is participating in a perversion of the marriage act (i.e.
not that she is participating in an act which is per se open to the
conception of new life in the wrong kind of way). Rather, the
most adequate description of what she is doing (in having an
orphaned embryo implanted in her womb with the commitment
to raise the child if it survives to birth) is consenting to become
a mother through adoption. In adopting the orphan embryo she
is offering a uniquely important, intimate, and necessary form of
nurturing. Furthermore, it can be argued that the consent
involved in the woman’s choosing to adopt a frozen embryo and
gestating it up to birth makes her the mother of the child in a
more profound way than she would be if she adopted the child at
“The moral relevance of the link between the meanings of the conjugal act
and between the goods of marriage, as well as the unity of the human being
and the dignity of his origin, demand that the procreation of a human person
be brought about as the fruit of the conjugal act specific to the love
between spouses.” (DV, II, B, 4)
29 This view is argued by Watt (1999). While a conjugal act is the kind
of act by which, under certain circumstances, a woman may become pregnant,
it is not, per se, an impregnating act. Granted, as Geach notes, it is the
kind of act that requires no additional human acts for pregnancy to occur.
But it is not the kind of act that necessarily leads to pregnancy. Impregnation
is an event that follows in some cases from a conjugal act. On the other hand,
embryo transfer is an act by which a woman is made pregnant simpliciter
(at the very least for a short period of time).

130 JOHN BERKMAN
birth. On this view, the appropriate (albeit limited) analogy for
the woman’s decision to gestate an embryo is to be drawn, not
with the decision to participate in an act of sexual intercourse,
but rather with the decision to nurture a child by nursing.
Of course, this possibility of separating genetic motherhood
from gestational motherhood is fundamentally new. This paper
can only gesture towards a few of the many implications that
can be drawn about either the good or bad implications of this
new possibility. However, it can at least be noted that at present,
greater significance, morally speaking, is typically given to
genetic parenthood, but the opportunity is presented at this
point in time to reevaluate this prevalent assumption.
In the current debate regarding the adoption of frozen
embryos, it is typical to equate (or almost equate) genetic parenthood
with parenthood per se. Of course, in the normal and
ideal course of events the genetic, gestational, and “raising” elements
of parenthood all go together. But since it is now clear
that genetic and gestational “motherhood” can be separated,
why is it so readily assumed that providing an ovum qualifies
one as the mother of a child, even after the created embryo has
been implanted in the womb of another woman? On the contrary,
a woman’s consenting to gestate a child, to give a child life
that it otherwise could not have, can certainly be argued to be at
least as biologically significant in terms of what is necessary for
the child to actually be born. And if one does separate the act of
consent to the creation of an embryo and the act of consent to
gestate a child, it can certainly be argued that the latter is more
morally significant in terms of a choice to become a human
mother. While this is a subject that will require much more evaluation,
it is certainly possible to make a case that, by the very act
of gestation, the woman becomes the child’s mother in the most
important and profound sense. The unquestioned priority that is
typically given to the genetic element of parenthood must begin
to be questioned. 30
30 On the one hand, it is no doubt a very good thing to recognize the natural
bond between children and their biological parents, so that e.g. nationstates
or other governmental institutions cannot wrest control of children

THE MORALITY OF ADOPTING FROZEN EMBRYOS 131
(iii) May a Couple Who Have Commissioned Embryos
Through IVF Freeze them for the Purpose of Later Implantation?
Having argued that the decision of a couple to adopt an
embryo neither constitutes surrogacy (they are not contracted to
give the child up at birth), nor constitutes an act incompatible
with the virtue of chastity, we now examine the objection that in
some instances the decision to implant an embryo in one particular
kind of situation would constitute wrongful participation
in IVF-ET. One recent proponent of embryo adoption in some
instances has concluded that, according to DV, a couple in the
middle of the IVF-ET process, who have already created and
perhaps cryopreserved numerous embryos, have no morally
acceptable course of action with regard to their frozen embryos.
They continue to do wrong even if they seek eventually to gestate
the rest of their embryos. Geoffrey Surtees writes:
In other words, for those who choose the methods of in vitro
fertilization, it is in fact true that there are no licit means of handling
the “spares” begotten from the IVF procedure: this is because
any action the parties choose to adopt with respect to the “spares”
would be to deny the fundamental rights of the embryo(s) to enjoy
gestation and birth in his natural mother; and, after birth, to be
raised and educated by the same. Even if the couple were to envision
giving up their spares for adoption, this too would be wrong,
and for the same reason: it would deny the children the parental
love they are by natural justice entitled to from their original parents.
It is never licit to reject one’s own child; and it is a further
injustice to give [the embryo] over to the “absurd fate” of spending
the rest of his existence confined in deep freeze, all the while susceptible
to experimentations and further inhumane treatment. 31
from their parents without very strong reason (e.g. child abuse, serious
neglect, and so forth). On the other hand, in a world where children have
been orphaned through a variety of tragic circumstances (including abandonment),
those who commit themselves to the raising of a child through
adoption are in the most important sense the true parents of that child.
31 Surtees (1996), 8.

132 JOHN BERKMAN
Thus, according to Surtees, those who choose to undergo
the IVF-ET treatment are enmeshed in an irresolvable moral difficulty.
Once a couple commissions the embryos, there is no
moral choice they can make with regard to the leftover embryos.
While I will challenge shortly the conclusions drawn in the
above quoted passage, Surtees does draw out some seemingly
logical conclusions in a very puzzling situation. On the logic of
the Catholic tradition discussed thus far, it has been noted that
it is wrong in principle for a couple to commission the creation
of embryos (using either their own gametes or donor gametes)
through IVF. Thus, according to Catholic teaching, there would
seem to be no situation in which a couple could intend a process
by which they would have embryos which are their genetic children
implanted in the womb of the woman. On the other hand,
the adoption of embryos that are unrelated to the couple has not
been ruled out as wrong in principle. If this is indeed the case, it
produces the rather odd consequence that Catholic teaching
seems to allow ET which separates genetic parenthood from
gestational and “raising” parenthood, but prohibits ET that
would maintain the bond between genetic, gestational, and
“raising” parenthood.
Now it can be argued that the situation about which Surtees
is arguing is not in fact a case of embryo adoption, as a couple
cannot “adopt” their own biological children. Rather, it is about
the morality of implanting too many embryos, or relinquishing
one’s embryos for adoption, or freezing one’s embryos. While
this is true, Surtees’ example sheds light on issues relevant to the
question of the morality of embryo adoption that is at the heart
of this essay.
Central to Surtees’ response to this question is his interpretation
of the “cannot be licitly pursued” sentence in Donum vitae
which has been extensively discussed in section one of this
paper. According to Surtees, this sentence is directed towards
“persons who have freely adopted by choice the intelligible,
though illicit, proposal of artificial reproduction.” 32 Unfor-
32 See Surtees (1996), 8. He completes that sentence by adding “and,
hence, not at those who would wish to “rescue” these embryos through adoption.”

THE MORALITY OF ADOPTING FROZEN EMBRYOS 133
tunately, Surtees also fails to note adequately the context of that
sentence in DV and mistakenly takes it to be directed towards
couples who seek a pregnancy through “artificial procreation.”
However, this section is in fact directed to researchers, and the
issue of the morality of artificial procreation will not be raised
until the following section of DV. 33
As can be seen from the quote above, Surtees believes that a
couple who have commissioned the creation of more embryos
than can be implanted in the uterus of the woman at the time of
their creation are in a position where there is no morally acceptable
solution. This is because neither of the two alternatives to
their immediate implantation is, according to Surtees, morally
acceptable. It is not permissible either to give them up for adoption
or to cryopreserve them for future implantation.
Let us first examine Surtees’s claim regarding the impermissibility
of cryopreservation. He claims that the couple cannot
choose to cryopreserve an excess embryo because an embryo
has a right to be gestated, and freezing the spare embryo consigns
it to “the ‘absurd fate’ of spending all the rest of his existence
confined in deep freeze, all the while susceptible to experimentation
and further inhumane treatment.” 34 However, while
33 The first mention of artificial procreation comes in the opening lines
of Part 2 of DV, which is entitled “Interventions upon Human Procreation.”
The term “artificial procreation” is the term used by DV to refer to the
combination of the fertilization of an ovum in a test-tube (i.e. in vitro) along
with the transfer of the fertilized ovum (i.e. the embryo) in utero, all of which
is done for the purpose of human procreation other than via the sexual
union of man and woman. Surtees uses a different term – “artificial reproduction”
– and while that term is ambiguous in that it could be a reference
merely to artificial conception, Surtees clearly has in mind what DV calls
artificial procreation, as is evident from the sentences that follow.
Furthermore, Surtees also seems to overlook the descriptive thrust of
DV I, 5, and is thus, like Smith, confused as to what DV means by “spare”
embryos. Whereas DV is referring to those embryos which are destined
never to find a human womb for a home, Surtees thinks “spare” simply
refers to those embryos which are not implanted in what is typically referred
to as the “first” cycle or round of IVF treatment
34 Surtees (1996), 8. Note the oddity of this claim by Surtees, which he
derives from DV I, 6. One could simply say that the cryopreservation will

134 JOHN BERKMAN
the claim here involves the assumption that cryopreserving the
embryo is permanent or alternatively leads to experimentation
by a researcher, that is clearly not necessarily the case. If there
is something inherently wrong with cryopreservation of an
embryo, it cannot be because it is always permanent.
Furthermore, if, for example, the couple had a kind of moral
conversion right after they had created ten embryos through IVF
and wanted to do the best thing in that situation, what should
they do? The thing that would be most respectful of those
nascent lives would be to implant two or three, and freeze the
rest with the plan of gestating the rest in small groups as well. 35
Alternatively, one can imagine a scenario of a woman simultaneously
diagnosed with an ectopic pregnancy and with a form of
cancer requiring radiation. She might seek to preserve the life of
her embryo by having it removed from the fallopian tube and
cryopreserved, with the hope that following the radiation treatment
she would be able to have the embryo reimplanted in her
uterus and gestate it to term. While a variety of circumstances
only be temporary, the embryo will be implanted later, and that there is no
intention of allowing the embryo to be experimented on. This uncited appeal
to DV I, 5 only makes sense if one understands that by “spares” DV I, 5 is
referring to those embryos which are definitely not destined for future
implantation (as argued in section one of this paper). Thus DV’s objection
to cryopreservation in DV I, 6 reads as follows: “The freezing of embryos,
even when carried out in order to preserve the life of an embryo - cryopreservation
- constitutes an offence against the respect due to human beings
by exposing them to grave risks of death or harm to their physical integrity
and depriving them, at least temporarily, of maternal shelter and gestation,
thus placing them in a situation in which further offences and manipulation
are possible.”
35 For a similar kind of argument, see Watt (1999), p. 352. “I can even
imagine cases in which it might be morally obligatory [to adopt particular
frozen embryos], because one was morally responsible for the embryo’s (sic)
being conceived. The woman who commissions the production of embryos
from her husband’s sperm and another woman’s ova bears considerable
responsibility for the fate of any embryos left on ice. If the ovum donor is
unwilling or unable to gestate, a woman who regrets the commission might
rightly consider she herself has a duty to gestate, in groups of two or three,
all remaining frozen embryos.”

THE MORALITY OF ADOPTING FROZEN EMBRYOS 135
might make these decisions imprudent or even morally wrong,
they are not wrong in principle.
Let us next examine Surtees’s objection to giving up the
embryo for adoption, namely, that such an action denies “the
children the parental love they are by natural justice entitled to
from their original parents. It is never licit to reject one’s own
child…” 36 From this Surtees draws a principle that it is never
permissible to create a child with the intent to give it up for
adoption. This claim finds support in DV, which in the context
of a critique of surrogate motherhood speaks of the “right of the
child to be conceived, carried in the womb, brought into the
world and brought up by his own parents.” 37 However, interpreted
in one way, the claims made by Surtees and DV regarding
what biological parents owe their children could be interpreted
as ruling out not only giving up an embryo for adoption, but also
giving up a child for adoption. For both actions would seem to
contravene the rights due to a child on one understanding of
these rights. On this view, it would thus seem to be wrong for
any Catholic agency to ever counsel a woman in crisis pregnancy
to consider giving up a baby for adoption and then find an
adoptive home for him or her. Again, perhaps both DV and
Surtees should be understood to be making the more modest
claim stated above, that one should not bring into existence children
whom one does not intend to gestate and raise. In other
words, perhaps the principle is something like the following: one
should not seek to conceive and/or gestate a child one does not
intend to raise. This would seem to be a reasonable moral principle,
indicating the wrongfulness of bringing children into existence
while planning in advance to abandon those children.
However, couples who have embryos created in vitro do not
typically set out to give up some of their embryos for adoption.
Typically, it is only after a successful pregnancy that they consider
offering some of their embryos for adoption. For those
who plan in advance to leave this option open, this is a kind of
36 Surtees (1996), 8. Surtees later elaborates and further specifies what
he means by “reject” (p. 14, n. 4). However, that qualification, if taken seriously,
vitiates the force of the argument he is making at this point in the
paper.

136 JOHN BERKMAN
conditional abandonment. However, many others simply fail to
consider the implications of what they are doing in commissioning
the creation of embryos in vitro. Finally, others may fully
intend to implant all of their embryos, but through illness,
death, or other misfortune simply become unable to fulfill the
responsibilities they undertook.
One can imagine untimely circumstances leading to a decision
to give up one’s embryo for adoption similar to those that
could be expected to lead to a regular adoption. In certain circumstances
the decision by a biological parent to offer embryos
up for adoption would not necessarily be any more an act of illicit
abandonment than that of a birth mother who for a variety of
reasons decides to give up her child for adoption. While in certain
instances one would act in a gravely wrong manner to hand
over one’s frozen embryos (or one’s birth child) to another couple
for adoption, the wrongfulness does not lie in an “in-principle”
requirement upon all those who procreate children to raise
them.
Finally, there is also the question of the woman who finds
out after conception that her endometrium is unfit for implantation.
If she flushed out her pre-implanted embryo, froze it, and
looked for someone to gestate it, would that be acceptable?
Mary Geach presents this case as something which would be
wrong to do. 38 However, she assumes that the woman who
would gestate the baby would pledge to return the child to the
genetic mother at birth. Of course, that would be surrogacy.
However, this is not the last word with this case. For
instance, what if the woman engages in embryo flushing and
freezes the embryo, not so that someone can gestate the embryo
for her, but so that she can give it up for adoption? What if, like
the mother of Moses, she will go to extraordinary means to give
37 DV, II, A, 3. This line is repeated almost verbatim at DV III.
38 This case can be found in Geach (1999), 341. Another analogous case
is that of the rape victim, who, while recognizing the humanity of the
embryo inside her, does not want to gestate and raise the child. Is it morally
wrong for her, not wanting to abort the embryo, to have an embryo flush and
cryopreservation done, and seek a person willing to adopt the child? Issues
of self-defense complicate this example.

THE MORALITY OF ADOPTING FROZEN EMBRYOS 137
her embryo a chance at life that she cannot provide, and is eager
to give the child up to another woman who can both gestate and
raise the child? Does she do wrong? This possibility, though
fraught with moral, emotional and technical difficulties, does
not seem to be ruled out in principle.
3. Further Moral Concerns and Considerations
In the previous section, we examined a number of arguments
that have led some commentators to conclude that the
adoption of human embryos is morally wrong in itself. Those
arguments are not in the end convincing; the adoption of abandoned
human embryos cannot be ruled out in principle.
However, it would be a mistake to conclude from this that the
choice to adopt an abandoned embryo is always a good thing. In
fact, there are a number of further moral considerations that
must be taken into account when a couple is considering such
an adoption. Issues of cooperation with wrongdoing and scandal
must be taken into account in evaluating the permissibility
of embryo adoption in any particular situation. Furthermore, it
is also important to acknowledge the limitations of the conceptual
paradigm of adoption that has been central in this essay.
For while a woman’s decision to have an embryo implanted in
her uterus is certainly analogous to the ordinary notion of what
it means to adopt a child, it is by no means identical, and the
limits of this analogy must be noted. 39
However, while moral difficulties involved in specific cases
must be taken into account, one must not lose sight of the centrality
of the good of adoption, whether it be of an embryo or a
child. From the beginning of the Christian tradition, the Church
has always been involved in the rescue and placement of
foundlings. 40 The good of finding loving and stable homes for
39 I have taken up a number of these issues in my article “The Morality
of Adopting Frozen Embryos: Contemporary Context and Debate,” unpublished
paper.
40 On this question, see Amundsen (1996) and Boswell (1988).

138 JOHN BERKMAN
infants and children whose parents are for whatever reason
unable to raise them is not questioned. 41 Furthermore, the willingness
of couples (or in some cases single persons) to open
their hearts and homes through adoption to needy children is a
great gift of Christian charity. While all persons of good will are
able to see the great good in adopting needy children, the call to
care for orphans will be particularly compelling to Christians, as
part of their response to Christ’s call to care “for the least of
these.”
Likewise, reflection on the morality of adopting orphaned
embryos must begin with the duty to care for “the least of these.”
Abandoned frozen embryos do indeed qualify as being some of
the most vulnerable and needy of human beings: “It is therefore
not in conformity with the moral law deliberately to expose to
death human embryos obtained ‘in vitro’.” 42 If the embryo is a
human being as worthy of care and protection as any other
human being, then the good involved in the rescue and adoption
of such orphaned embryos make such adoption at least a prima
facie good thing to do.
However frozen embryos have come to be, the fundamental
principle for evaluating the appropriateness of adopting them is
that of the dignity of and protection to be given to innocent
human life. Furthermore, Christians witness to this dignity most
powerfully by promoting the dignity of the most marginalized
and vulnerable in our society. Orphans, whether post-natal or
41 Of course, this is not to deny those particular instances of adoption or
certain kinds of adoption (e.g. some international or inter-racial adoptions)
which have been questioned morally. These questions are usually raised
because of concerns of perceived and/or actual injustices done to the birth
parent(s) and/or child. That such concerns should arise is not at all surprising
considering that the very necessity of adoption arises from a pre-existing
evil (i.e. that the child cannot be raised by its birth parents, either because
of some tragedy (i.e. death, disability, etc.), or because of irresponsibility, or
by due consideration of the best interests of the child).
42 DV, I, 5. While this sentence from DV is also directed specifically
towards embryos created for research purposes, it is merely an elaboration
of the principles outlined in DV I, 1 on the respect due to the human life,
namely, that “Human life must be absolutely respected and protected from
the moment of conception.”

pre-natal, have always had a particular claim on the charity of
Christians. With regard to these most helpless and abandoned of
human beings in our day, who are given no status whatsoever by
much of our society, one cannot but be reminded of a similar situation
in another age and the response of Christians at that
time. The early Christians were both famous and infamous for
their giving shelter to Roman infants who were left exposed.
This odd behavior marked them as different in that society.
While Christians should not seek to be “different” for its own
sake, the commitment to rescue and raise the children “exposed”
in our society is, as it was then, an odd behavior that will worthily
mark those who offer such hospitality. 43
Bibliography
THE MORALITY OF ADOPTING FROZEN EMBRYOS 139
JOHN BERKMAN
Amundsen, Darrel (1996), Medicine, Society, and Faith in the
Ancient and Medieval Worlds. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1996, pp. 50-69.
Ashley, Benedict, O.P., and Albert Moraczewski, O.P. (2001),
“Cloning, Aquinas, and the Embryonic Person,” National
Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, Summer 2001, pp. 189-201.
Boswell, John (1988), The Kindness of Strangers: The
Abandonment of Children in Western Europe From Late
Antiquity to the Renaissance. New York: Pantheon Books,
1988.
Caulfield, Brian (1998), “‘Souls on Ice’: With Frozen Embryo
Technology, Life’s Sanctity is Lost,” The National Catholic
Register, January 4 - 10, 1998, pp. 1, 15.
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (1987), Instruction on
Respect for Human Life in its origin and on the Dignity of
Procreation, February 22, 1987: Acta Apostolicae Sedis 80
(1988), 70-102.
43 I am grateful for the comments of W Barbieri, C Crysdale, D Ferris, N
Ford, J Grabowski, J Komonchak, F Moloney, J Utz, and H Watt on previous
drafts of this paper. Thanks also to the CUA Grant-in-Aid program for financial
support of my research.

140 JOHN BERKMAN
[N.B. This document is typically referred to by its Latin title
Donum vitae (DV), and cited according to its outline divisions.
An English translation is available under Respect for
Human Life (Boston: St Paul Editions, n.d.); See also
Origins, vol. 16, no. 40 (March 19, 1987), 697-711. It is also
to be found at www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations.]
Doerflinger, Richard (1999), “The Ethics of Funding Embryonic
Stem Cell Research: A Catholic Viewpoint,” Kennedy
Institute of Ethics Journal (9:2) June 1999, pp. 137-150.
Geach, Mary (1999), “Are there any circumstances in which it
would be morally admirable for a woman to seek to have an
orphan embryo implanted in her womb? – 1,” Issues for a
Catholic Bioethic, ed. Luke Gormally, London: The Linacre
Centre, 1999, pp. 341 - 346.
Grisez, Germain (1997), “Should a woman try to bear her dead
sister’s embryo?” The Way of the Lord Jesus volume 3:
Difficult Moral Questions. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1997, pp. 239 - 244.
Johnson, Mark, “Reflections on Some Recent Catholic Claims
for Delayed Hominization,” Theological Studies 56 (1995),
pp. 743-763.
Porter, Jean, “Individuality, Personal Identity, and the Moral
Status of the Preembryo,” Theological Studies 56 (1995), pp.
763-770.
Shannon, Thomas A. and Alan B. Wolter, “Reflections on the
Moral Status of the Pre-Embryo,” Theological Studies 51
(1990), pp. 603-626.
Smith, William B. (1995), “Rescue the Frozen?” Homiletic and
Pastoral Review. 96:1, October 1995, pp. 72-74.
Smith, William B. (1996), “Response,” Homiletic and Pastoral
Review. 96:11-12, August-September 1996, pp. 16 - 17.
Surtees, Geoffrey (1996), “Adoption of a frozen embryo,”
Homiletic and Pastoral Review. 96:11-12, August-September
1996, pp. 7 - 16.
Watt, Helen (1999), “Are there any circumstances in which it
would be morally admirable for a woman to seek to have an
orphan embryo implanted in her womb? - 2.” Issues for a
Catholic Bioethic, ed. Luke Gormally, London: The Linacre
Centre, 1999, pp. 347 - 352.

THE MORALITY OF ADOPTING FROZEN EMBRYOS 141
—————
The autor is a visiting professor at Duke Divinity School and currently
a visiting scholar at the Duke Institute on Care at the End of
Life.
El autor es professor invitado en Duke Divinity School y actualmente
estudioso invitado en el Duke Institute on Care at the End of
Life.
—————

StMor 40 (2002) 143-169
EDMUND KOWALSKI C.SS.R
L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE
E L’ETICA DELL’INCONTRO
Dall’esigenza ontologica all’imperativo etico nella filosofia
dell’uomo in cammino di Gabriel Marcel
“Ricoeur è consapevole come sia inutile cercare in Marcel
un sistema morale – afferma giustamente Franco Riva – o una
collocazione esatta rispetto alle prospettive di un Heidegger –
l’ontologia senza l’etica – o di Lévinas – l’etica senza ontologia.
Ciò non toglie che, secondo Ricoeur, Marcel non ponga di fronte
a delle esperienze forti che danno a pensare, a uno stile filosofico
che si configura in una approssimazione crescente, e al
valore di universalità concreta dato a certe esperienze, trascurate
in filosofia morale” 1 . Per comprendere a pieno il rapporto tra
etica e ontologia in Marcel, la direzione indicata da Ricoeur per
tracciare a grandi linee un’etica marceliana, occorre collocare
infatti l’implicazione di G. Marcel sia ad un livello ontologico di
partecipazione d’essere, sia ad un livello etico di decisione per
l’interrelazione (Etre et Avoir, L’Homme problematique, Homo
Viator, Le Mystère de l’Etre). Il rapporto tra etica e ontologia in
Marcel acquista in Entre éthique et ontologie: la disponibilité un
rilievo più marcato 2 . L’analisi etica di Marcel si nutre della dialettica
tra l’essere e l’avere che apre all’orizzonte ontologico. Il
rapporto tra l’etica e l’ontologia tocca in particolare i temi del-
1 P. RICOEUR, G. MARCEL, Per un’etica dell’alterità. Sei colloqui (a cura di
Franco Riva), Edizioni Lavoro, Roma 1998, 133. (Je n’ai jamais pensé à écrire
une éthique – dice G. Marcel in un’intervista con Pierre Boutang – pour cette
simple raison que je me suis toujours senti éloigné du formalisme, in: P. BOU-
TANG, Gabriel Marcel, J. M. Place, Paris 1977, 93).
2 G. MARCEL, Entre éthique et ontologie: la disponibilité, in: Aa. Vv., Gabriel
Marcel (Colloque organisé par la Bibliothèque National et l’association
“ Présence de Gabriel Marcel ”, 28-30 settembre 1988), Bibliothèque National,
Paris 1989, 157-165.

144 EDMUND KOWALSKI C.SS.R.
l’esistenza, della soggettività e dell’interpersonalità 3 . “In una visione
itinerante della vita umana, per cui l’essere è dinamismo
operante e l’agire è attestazione ontologica, ontologia ed etica –
afferma Mauro Cozzoli – sono in intima e solidale compenetrazione:
l’indicativo ontologico è imperativo etico” 4 .
Perché ho scelto questo tema? Prima di tutto vorrei continuare
la ricerca relativa alla bioetica nell’ottica del personalismo
francese 5 . Poi, due considerazioni di Sandro Spinsanti, fatte durante
il II Convegno nazionale sul personalismo comunitario di
E. Mounier a Teramo nel 1990 hanno determinato la scelta del
tema e del contenuto di questo articolo: la prima, che “all’area
dei problemi di bioetica il personalismo deve la sua seconda giovinezza”,
la seconda riguarda “l’uso improprio e strumentale del
personalismo come etichetta, da utilizzare per condurre vecchie
battaglie e da contrapporre ad altre concezioni” 6 . In questo articolo,
tuttavia, non vorrei utilizzare il personalismo di G. Marcel
per condurre vecchie battaglie oppure per la sua contrapposizione
ad altre concezioni, ma, al contrario, per mettere in rilievo:
in primo luogo, la dimensione ontologica dell’essere umano,
in secondo luogo, la dimensione etica della persona in quanto
norma normativa, in terzo luogo, le implicazioni ontologiche,
antropologiche ed etiche nel campo della bioetica.
1. Il mistero dell’essere – una dimensione ontologica
dell’essere umano
L’opera di G. Marcel nasce da una reazione critica e polemica
al razionalismo oggettivistico che caratterizza gran parte del-
3 P. RICOEUR, G. MARCEL, Per un’etica dell’alterità. Sei colloqui, op. cit.,
139-148.
4 M. COZZOLI, L’uomo in cammino verso… L’attesa e la speranza in Gabriel
Marcel, Abete, Roma 1979, 267.
5 Cfr E. KOWALSKI, CSsR, Quale uomo e quale etica per la bioetica. Una
proposta di umanizzazione della riflessione bioetica, StM, 39/2001/1, 175-195.
6 S. SPINSANTI, Quale personalismo per la bioetica, in: A. DANESE (a cura
di), Persona e sviluppo. Un dibattito interdisciplinare, Edizioni Dehoniane,
Roma 1991, 265-268.

L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 145
le istanze antimetafisiche del pensiero moderno, in particolare
al razionalismo di tipo cartesiano, kantiano e positivista 7 . Inoltre,
Marcel non volle mai costruire una metafisica sistematica
(si pensi a Kant, Schelling o Hegel); perciò accettò che la sua filosofia
si chiamasse neo-socratismo 8 ; egli stesso, invece, si riconosce
un pensatore esistenziale 9 mentre rifiuta l’etichetta di esistenzialista
10 . Marcel come filosofo esistentivo – secondo Dario
Composta – “non dipende né da Kierkegaard né da Jaspers, né
da Heidegger; tanto meno da J. P. Sartre o da Maurice Merleau
Ponty ai quali non volle assimilarsi nemmeno attraverso una polemica
camuffata, ma da cui anzi volle tenersi distante coraggiosamente
per il loro pensiero ateo” 11 . “La mia situazione filosofica
– dice Marcel in Il mistero dell’essere – mi si presenta come
se io avessi seguito finora molte piste in un paese in gran
parte inesplorato e voi mi chiedeste ora di indicarvi una strada
al posto di quelle piste o mi invitaste a tracciare un itinerario, il
che, sostanzialmente, è la stessa cosa. Questa metafora può sollevare
almeno due tipi di obiezioni: innanzi tutto potreste osservare
che il concetto di strada implica quello spazio, da cui una
ricerca metafisica, come vuole essere la nostra, deve astrarre…
Mi potreste allora presentare l’obiezione in un’altra forma, assai
più imbarazzante: ricostruire un cammino là ove non c’erano
che alcune piste, equivale a prestabilire una meta, già precisata
7 G. MARCEL, Etre et Avoir, Aubier, Paris 1935, 319 [EA]; En Chemin, vers
quel Eveil?, Gallimard, Paris 1971, 81 [ECE].
8 G. MARCEL, L’uomo problematico, Borla, Torino 1964, 58 [UP]; Présence
et immortalité, Flammarion, Paris 1959, 184; La dignité humaine et ses assises
existentielles, Aubier, Paris 1964, 217 [DH]; R. DAVIGNON, Le mal chez Gabriel
Marcel. Comment affronter la souffrance et la mort?, Cerf-Bellarmin, Paris-Montréal
1985, 161-164; D. COMPOSTA, Intersoggettività e morale, Edizioni
Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli 1999, 65.
9 ECE, 97.
10 G. MARCEL, Le Mystère de l’Etre, vol. I Réflexion et Mystère, vol. II Foi et
réalité, Aubier, Paris 1951, 5 [MEI][MEII]; L’Homme Problématique, Aubier,
Paris 1955, 72 [HP]; [DH], 10; ECE, 228, 230; da: M. COZZOLI, L’uomo in cammino
verso, op. cit., 17; UP, 58.
11 D. COMPOSTA, Intersoggettività e morale, op. cit., 67; cfr G. MARCEL, Remarques
sur l’irreligion contemporaine, in: EA, 259-297.

146 EDMUND KOWALSKI C.SS.R.
e determinata, alla quale s’intende giungere” 12 . Nell’ambito della
ricerca filosofica – secondo Marcel – non si possiede un pre-concetto
in forma schematica, l’equivalente della pre-nozione del
tecnico. Nella ricerca filosofica marceliana, infatti, non esistono
né pregiudizi sociali, politici, etici o religiosi, né “risultati” del
genere e “il filosofo spesso va alla ventura” 13 . La sua ricerca filosofica
è il passaggio da una “situazione di disagio ad una situazione
di distensione”, da una situazione-domanda ad una situazione-risposta.
Questa prospettiva deve essere considerata come
“ciò in cui io mi trovo implicato” (io-sono-in-situazione, io-vivola-situazione)
e in qualsiasi modo si debba interpretare questo
“io”, questo “me stesso”. La situazione non tocca l’io solo dal di
fuori, ma lo qualifica interiormente, o meglio, l’opposizione tra
interno ed esterno perde a questo proposito il suo significato.
L’io non può mai essere considerato un qualcosa in quanto io.
Se l’io esisto è una certezza esistenziale, lo è soltanto a condizione
che sia preso nella sua inscindibile unità 14 .L’io esisto, l’io
vivo è il puro immediato nell’ambito d’intelligibilità. L’io esistovivo
fonda, precede e supera io penso (cogito cartesiano). In oltre
parole, l’io esisto compie ed esaurisce totalmente l’essere
umano in quanto io, cioè io è sempre io esistente, vivente e personale
anche se non è ancora, già o non evidentemente io pensante
(si pensi allo stato embrionale oppure allo stato vegetativo
persistente). L’io esisto ha di mira - per Marcel – l’altro fatto “che
io non sono solo per me, ma che mi manifesto, sarebbe anzi meglio
dire che ‘sono manifesto’; il prefisso ‘e’ nella parola ‘esistere’
è infatti della massima importanza perché esistere vuol dire: farmi
conoscere, o riconoscere, sia dagli altri, sia da me stesso, in
tanto che ostento un’alterità presa a prestito” 15 . In altre parole
Marcel vorrebbe rispondere alla domanda fondamentale: “Chi
sono io?” Questa problematica indirizza la sua indagine filosofi-
12 G. MARCEL, Il mistero dell’essere, Borla, Roma 1987, 9-10 [ME].
13 ME, 12, 18-20; G. Marcel, Essai de philosophie concrète, Gallimard,
Paris 1940, 21-61, 92-126 (Quest’opera è stata pubblicata originariamente
con il titolo Du refus à l’invocation da Editions Gallimard, nel 1940); M. M.
DAVY, Un philosophe itinérant. Gabriel Marcel, Flammarion, Paris 1959.
14 ME, 89-90.
15 ME, 90-91.

L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 147
ca e allo stesso tempo costituisce l’inizio della sua ontologia esistenziale.
Parlando del senso e della natura della ricerca intrapresa, si
tratta – spiega Marcel – “di esigenza del trascendente” 16 . Trascendere,
in questo caso, non significa semplicemente superare
un limite, spaziale oppure temporale, come si vede nel caso del
“progetto” sartriano. Facendo riferimento all’antitesi tradizionale
fra immanente e trascendente, Marcel propone la sua distinzione
fra “superamento orizzontale e superamento verticale” in
quanto il suo metodo fenomenologico “salire-scendere-risalire”:
dalla vita al pensiero e ridiscendere dal pensiero alla vita, per
tentare di chiarire le relazioni precise fra esperienza e vita 17 .
“L’esigenza della trascendenza si presenta essenzialmente, ed è
essenzialmente sperimentata, come insoddisfazione” 18 . L’insoddisfazione
possiede un duplice dinamismo, da una parte, essa è
determinata dalla mancanza di un qualcosa (il valore) che in
realtà è esteriore all’io (“un’esperienza del trascendente”), dall’altra
parte, l’io può assimilarlo e per conseguenza farlo mio
(“un’esperienza dell’immanente”, l’autocreazione della libera decisione).
La dinamica dell’insoddisfazione assicura all’io la libertà
di movimento di cui ha bisogno: “il trascendente è immanente
all’esperienza”. L’esperienza del trascendente è fondamentalmente
il riferimento intimamente vissuto all’io nell’intimo
della sua coscienza 19 . Si può far notare a questo proposito che
Marcel ha voluto aggiungere – seguendo la via tracciata dalla fenomenologia
husserliana – che “la coscienza è essenzialmente
coscienza di qualcos’altro da sé” 20 . Allora, l’esigenza di trascendenza,
presa nel suo significato metafisico come esperienza del
trascendente, indica essenzialmente un’alterità: la relazione-comunicazione
fra me e gli altri (tu, Dio come il Tu supremo) ed
anche fra me e me. L’alterità, infatti, suppone l’apertura, in vista
di una teoria della verità: adaequatio rei et intellectus. La definizione
della verità di Tommaso d’Aquino prende in considerazio-
16 ME, 41.
17 ME, 41-43.
18 ME, 43.
19 ME, 47-49.
20 ME, 53.

148 EDMUND KOWALSKI C.SS.R.
ne – secondo Marcel – un processo conoscitivo che si svolge partendo
da me stesso e fa ritorno a me stesso per constatare ciò
che semplicemente “è” (la realtà, il fatto), e non ciò che “è vero”
(la verità), sulla base della tradizionale opposizione fra attività
(intellectus) e passività (res). Il ragionamento (intellectus) instaura
nei confronti dell’oggetto (res) la particolare relazione
dell’esattezza (adaequatio). L’essenza di questa relazione è chiamata
da Heidegger – in Dall’essere alla verità – “appresentazione”
e “appresentare” significa: “Lasciar sorgere davanti a noi la cosa
in quanto è quell’oggetto, ma in modo che il ragionamento si lasci
guidare dalla cosa e la renda tale e quale essa si presenta. La
condizione di ogni appresentazione è che l’essente che appresenta
sia illuminato da una luce in modo che la cosa possa apparirgli,
rendersi manifesta. Questa cosa deve presentarsi e rivelarsi
in un campo aperto al nostro incontro” 21 . Marcel non soltanto cita
queste parole di Heidegger, ma soprattutto le prende come
sue. Nell’ambito dell’incontro la tradizionale opposizione fra attività
e passività perde la sua ragion d’essere. Secondo Marcel
non si tratta soltanto di una certa “zona” d’incontro, ma essenzialmente
di “comunicazione e di volontà di comunicare” 22 .
Questa affermazione investe la prima comunicazione tra “corpo”
e “mio”. Per Marcel non esiste la distinzione fra “il mio corpo”,
considerato un corpo qualunque, ed il mio “io”. Sia la riflessione
primaria-diretta-comune (il piano dell’esistenza immediata)
che la riflessione di secondo grado (la relazione oggettiva
ed ontologica: partecipazione, comunione) confermano che
“questo corpo” è e non può essere che “il mio corpo”. Ambedue
le riflessioni prendono come punto d’appoggio l’inseparabilità
esistenziale tra il mio “io” e “il mio corpo”. La questione essenziale
riguarda la nozione di avere: io non ho “corpo” come ho il
mio cane, ma io sono corporeo. L’io del possesso non può mai
essere ridotto – secondo Marcel – “ad un io del tutto smaterializzato”
23 . L’unità sui generis che costituisce “il mio corpo” in
quanto mio è l’unità perfetta ed esistenziale. Dire “il mio corpo”
21 ME, 71-72.
22 ME, 78; cfr E. SOTTIAUX, Gabriel Marcel. Philosophe et dramaturge,
Nauwelaerts, Louvain 1956, 29-82 (La communion ontologique).
23 ME, 96-97.

L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 149
significa negare il dualismo cartesiano e l’interpretazione del parallelismo
di tipo spinoziano. Neppure posso concepire “il mio
corpo” come un mio strumento o come il mezzo con cui agisco
nel mondo, inserendomi così in esso, come ha voluto per esempio
H. Bergson. Io non mi servo del mio corpo, ma invece “io sono
il mio corpo” 24 . Inoltre, è legittimo dire “io sono il mio corpo”
solo in quanto io riconosco che questo corpo non è oggettivabile,
non è “qualcosa”, ma “corpo-soggetto” (“l’io in carne ed ossa”)
perché io ho con lui un certo tipo di relazione-comunicazione-legame
che non si può oggettivare. Io posso, infatti, identificarmi
con il mio corpo. A questo proposito Marcel preferisce
parlare dell’incarnazione perché questo termine “indica la situazione
di un essere legato fondamentalmente e non accidentalmente
al ‘suo corpo’” 25 .
Per stabilire ciò che ha di specifico “il mio corpo” in quanto
“mio”, si deve affrontare il problema della sensazione. “La sensibilità
è indissolubilmente legata al fatto che questo corpo è il
mio corpo e non un corpo fra altri” 26 . Per comprendere la natura
essenziale della sensibilità si deve parlare di una specie di comunicazione
tra due poli: uno che emette un messaggio e un altro
che registra, traduce ed interpreta questo messaggio, chiamato
da Marcel la “sensazione”. La sensibilità è immediata e
non disgiungibile dal mio corpo. Il suo contenuto “qui” ed “adesso”
sentito è l’immediato esistenziale, cioè una realtà che io sono
veramente. Non si tratta affatto di un contenuto del pensiero
deduttivo e ricostruttivo, ma della “partecipazione immersa”
sulla base dell’esistenza stessa della sensibilità, significa ricevere
in sé con l’atto dinamico ed attivo di accogliere – chiamato da
Marcel “responsività”, che si oppone radicalmente all’inerzia interiore
che è l’insensibilità o l’apatia – significa partecipare all’esistenza
stessa 27 . Per ben esporre il dualismo irriducibile tra ciò
24 ME, 99.
25 ME, 100; cfr G. MARCEL, Homo Viator, Aubier, Paris 1945, 97 [HV];
DH, 70.
26 ME, 103; cfr G. MARCEL, Giornale metafisico (1915-1923), Abete, Roma
1966, 219-226 [GM]; Esistenza ed oggettività, in: Giornale metafisico. Esistenza
e oggettività, Abete, Roma 1980, 213-219.
27 ME, 115-116.

150 EDMUND KOWALSKI C.SS.R.
che è insensibile, non-responsivo e ciò che invece è sensibile, responsivo
e partecipa all’esistenza stessa, Marcel usa un esempio
fornito dall’embriologia. Due persone, lo scienziato e l’artista,
osservano un processo embrionale che si effettua nel tempo come
un film – che ci permette solo di sintetizzare in modo intuitivo
una evoluzione di una certa struttura che si complica progressivamente
– perché “non esistono ancora mezzi di osservazione
capaci di cogliere l’essenza del dinamismo interno, di cui
ciò che noi vediamo è solo la manifestazione”. Lo scienziato ha
l’ambizione di riprodurre quella realtà, di fabbricare cioè la vita.
L’artista, lungi dall’essere affascinato dal processo di formazione
che assorbe l’attenzione del biologo, guarda alla forma realizzata
e trova in se stesso le capacità di farla rivivere, di ricrearla
col pennello o con lo scalpello. “Questi due richiami –
conclude Marcel – non possono comporsi in unità, anzi sono inversi:
quello dell’artista, lo si può captare ed attuare solo nell’ambito
di una partecipazione, l’altro invece implica proprio la
negazione della partecipazione, in quanto presuppone un atteggiamento
che, in una visuale religiosa, o meglio sacrale, del
mondo potrebbe essere considerato sacrilego… Per una strana e
singolare contraddizione, egli riesce a convincersi, e cerca di
convincere gli altri, di essere riuscito a riprodurre l’origine autentica
del processo, e vuole dimostrare in tal modo che la vita
si crea da sé senza l’intervento di una potenza creatrice” 28 .
La partecipazione supera considerevolmente i limiti della
sensibilità nella contemplazione da parte dell’io. La contemplazione
in quanto atto intelligibile non si esaurisce nello sguardo
o nel guardare, ma come la ricerca tende a conoscere l’oggetto
nella sua unicità per raccoglierlo. Contemplare – afferma Marcel
– significa “raccogliersi in presenza di” al punto che la realtà alla
cui presenza ci si raccoglie entra a far parte del raccoglimento
stesso 29 . Raccogliersi non significa isolarsi, abbandonare. “Il
raccoglimento è invece innanzi tutto un atto con cui ci si rivolge
‘verso’ senza abbandonare nulla” 30 . Rivolgersi “verso” signifi-
28 ME, 116-117.
29 ME, 122.
30 ME, 124.

L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 151
ca “rientrare in sé” per esaminare la situazione da un altro angolo
di visuale (un atto creativo) e poi “uscire da sé” trasformato
interiormente. Il raccoglimento a livello metafisico comporta
immediatamente la chiarificazione dei rapporti fra me e la mia
vita: accogliere la verità del reale e ricomporre l’unità personale
dell’io (ricevere se-stesso, accogliere in se stesso). In altre parole
si tratta di “essere in una situazione” 31 . L’essere in una situazione
e l’essere in cammino (essere-viaggiante) sono – secondo Marcel
– i modi inseparabili, i due aspetti complementari della nostra
condizione umana 32 . Nel primo caso si tratta del rapporto
tra l’io e il dato circostanziale (la mia vita vissuta, la mia situazione,
la mia esperienza concreta) 33 . Secondo Marcel quest’ultimo
interviene solo in rapporto ad una attività libera da parte
dell’io, perché il dato non possiede nessuna autorità (“la noncontingenza
del dato circostanziale”) 34 . Ma Marcel non si ferma
al livello della riflessione primaria del dato, cioè alla riflessione
di primo grado dell’esistenza immediata alla luce delle categorie
del vedere e dell’avere, dove c’è un mondo neutro, asettico e
spersonalizzato. Nella riflessione seconda, quella del sapere metafisico
(ontologico), egli ricupera l’immediatezza dell’esistenza
per ristabilire l’unità del dato con il resto del reale (la totalità
dell’essere) e dell’io pensante con la realtà pensata, per realizzare
in questo modo il rapporto di partecipazione ontologica: la
comunione con me stesso, con gli altri e con la realtà 35 . L’articolazione
stessa di “riflessione prima” e “riflessione seconda” riflette
non tanto un diverso modo di conoscere-comprendere la
realtà, ma una diversità di partecipazione a questa realtà: dalla
partecipazione pre-cosciente alla partecipazione oggettiva (“partecipazioni
immerse”) e poi alla partecipazione ontologica, chia-
31 ME, 126.
32 ME, 128; cfr S. PLOURDE, Gabriel Marcel. Philosophe et témoin de l’espérance,
Les Presses de l’Université du Québec, Montréal 1975, 129-223
(L’Etre en marche).
33 G. MARCEL, Les Hommes contre l’Humain, Fayard, Paris 1968, 7
[HCH].
34 ME, 128-130.
35 EA, 166, 171, MEI, 97-98, 108, 130-131; HCH, 198.

152 EDMUND KOWALSKI C.SS.R.
mata la “partecipazione emersa” o la “comunione ontologica” 36 .
I tre livelli di partecipazione: pre-cosciente dell’esistere (io esisto),
oggettiva dell’avere (io ho) ed ontologica dell’essere (io sono),
corrispondono ai tre piani di intelligibilità che sono quelli
dell’esistenza immediata (io sento), dell’astrazione (io penso) e
della “fede” (io credo) 37 .
Quando il dato presenta un valore positivo, contribuisce
cioè ad uno sviluppo creativo dell’io nell’intimità del raccoglimento
al livello ontologico dell’essere, la creazione dell’interiorità,
dell’io passa attraverso le posizioni prese da parte dell’io di
fronte alla sua vita. L’io dovrebbe dunque vivere la sua vita, che
porta in sé, per essere veramente se stesso in nome della sua vocazione.
Essa s’impone all’io non come necessità da parte dei
fatti, oppure come una fatalità, ma come una chiamata 38 . L’io
sono nell’io so ciò che sono e ciò che posso-devo diventare è chiamato
ad autorealizzare, autocreare essenzialmente l’io in cammino
verso la pienezza di verità 39 . “Una persona viva si rivela
sempre come essenzialmente creatrice. Da questo punto di vista
si può capire meglio come la creatività sia legata originariamente
all’esistenza, benché quest’ultima abbia sempre in sé la possibilità
di decadere, di diventare torpore, malinconica ripetizione,
routine mortale. Forse queste semplici osservazioni hanno in sé
un autentico significato etico che permette di conferire ad una
persona una dignità, senza ricorrere ad un formalismo spesso
sterile, portato a misconoscere ciò che vi è di irriducibile nelle
situazioni e nelle azioni umane” 40 . La constatazione marceliana
è chiara: la libertà e la creatività sono alla base dell’etica. “L’essere
è l’attesa che si compie e questa opera di compimento è l’esperienza
dell’essere” 41 . La scoperta dell’indicativo ontologico di
36 ME, 78-101, 102-120; J. DELHOMME, Témoignage et dialectique, in: AA.
VV., Existentialisme chrétien: Gabriel Marcel, Plon, Paris 1947, 117-201.
37 R. TROISFONTAINES, De l’Existence à l’Etre. La philosophie de Gabriel
Marcel, I-II vol., Nauwelaerts, Louvain-Paris 1968, 206; M. COZZOLI, L’uomo
in cammino verso, op. cit., 32-35.
38 ME, 128-131.
39 ME, 234.
40 ME, 132.
41 ME, 235.

L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 153
essere-in-cammino e di essere-sempre-più, come cammino dall’esistere
all’essere e come intensificazione progressiva nell’essere,
diventa – attraverso gli atti liberi-creativi - la conoscenza personale,
eticamente orientata e impegnata 42 . L’esigenza ontologica
dell’essere uomo è sempre in Marcel la dimensione etica dell’essere
più uomo-persona. La dimensione etica dell’essere fondata
sull’intensificazione ontologica nell’essere, come cammino
di crescita, di maturazione e di realizzazione 43 , non può svolgersi
– secondo Marcel – “se non nella direzione di una comunità
aperta”. L’io si crea attraverso gli altri e con gli altri. L’intersoggettività,
allora, sta alla base dell’ontologia marceliana 44 ed anche,
secondo me, essa fonda l’etica dell’incontro di G. Marcel.
2. L’etica dell’incontro – una dimensione etica della persona
Prima di esporre il tema della intersoggettività e dell’etica,
occorre ancora chiarire e qualificare la categoria della soggettività,
da cui si stacca la stessa intersoggettività. La soggettività si
polarizza intorno all’essere-uomo-persona come risulta dall’interrogativo
metafisico marceliano: “Chi sono io?”. Nella sua metafisica
esistenziale G. Marcel non cerca oggetti e la loro intelligibilità,
ma si accosta a ciò che cade direttamente sotto la nostra
personale esistenza storica, cioè la realtà-presenza delle cose che
ad essa appartengono: la sensazione, il corpo e l’esistere. La sensazione
è una partecipazione esistenziale immediata, nella quale
l’oggetto è accolto in me, esso entra in mio possesso e perde la
sua oggettività: l’avere è il mio essere. L’oggetto, prendendo contatto
con il mio corpo, vi si assimila: l’esistenza perde l’avere e
diviene essere. L’essere è un riconoscere attraverso il mio corpo
ciò che è dato nella sensazione. L’esistenza immediata del mio
42 EA, 26; M. COZZOLI, L’uomo in cammino verso, op. cit., 268-271.
43 EA, 123.
44 ME, 209, 248; UP, 57; cfr D. COMPOSTA, Intersoggettività e morale, op.
cit., 76-83; M. COZZOLI, L’uomo in cammino verso, op. cit., 280-282; D. A. JO-
SEPH, Self Realization and Intersubjectivity in Gabriel Marcel (A Doctoral Dissertation),
Pontifical Urban University, Roma 1988, 128-158, 159-199.

154 EDMUND KOWALSKI C.SS.R.
essere è legata alla sensazione e mediante la sensazione, al mondo.
La mia partecipazione al mondo – chiamata da Marcel l’engagement
– invoca una “fede” e una riflessione. Il credere è l’impegno
nell’esistenza e aderenza alla concretezza del vivere in
una situazione come fatto interiore alla volontà (libertà). Al contrario,
il pensare è oggettivazione formalista, astratta e indeterminata.
Inoltre, credere è libertà personale creativa 45 . Non basta
affermare che la persona è soggetto – secondo Marcel – essa è libera.
La libertà, infatti, individua e differenzia la persona dalle
altre persone, essa è personale e coinvolge la decisione. Questa
decisione non è che un atto con cui la persona si sceglie, si impegna,
si progetta e infine si crea. L’essere uomo presuppone il
dinamismo dell’agire umano come autotrascendenza, autorealizzazione
ed autocreazione. L’autocreazione non è che il ricupero
e la riconquista di ciò che già è nell’essere-più. La mia libertà
– in quanto processo di liberazione 46 e mai come produzione
47 , perché è creata per la coscienza 48 – è chiamata a compiersi
nelle molteplici situazioni-scelte (l’engagement), da cui è
segnato il mio cammino di homo viator. L’agire a sua volta si dinamizza
come attuazione coerente e libera della verità dell’essere.
Essere e agire, allora, non sono due espressioni autonome e
neppure contigue di una stessa esistenza incarnata, ma due
realtà dinamiche che si implicano e si compenetrano fra loro. In
Marcel, infatti, non si può parlare di ontologia eticamente neutra,
come non si trova in lui l’etica ontologicamente autonoma:
ontologia ed etica sono in intima e solidale compenetrazione.
L’ontologia marceliana è nel contempo etica e viceversa l’etica è
ontologica 49 .
L’ontologia etica esistenziale – più significativa in Marcel –
non soltanto si svolge nella sua etica ontologica, ma traccia anche
le dimensioni etiche della sua antropologia: la crescita tota-
45 MEI, 137-140; ME, 102-120, 216-226; D. COMPOSTA, Intersoggettività e
morale, op. cit., 68-74.
46 G. MARCEL, Du Refus à l’invocation, Gallimard 1940, 73.
47 MEII, 140.
48 MEII, 117; cfr J. P. BAGOT, Connaissance et Amour. Essai sur la philosophie
de Gabriel Marcel, Beauchesne, Paris 1958, 190-199.
49 M. COZZOLI, L’uomo in cammino verso, op. cit., 267-271.

L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 155
le dell’uomo al suo essere è la realizzazione etica della persona.
L’intensificazione ontologica nell’essere si trasfigura nel processo
di personalizzazione: un processo che è progredire, trascendersi
e compiersi. L’io diventa persona umana nella misura stessa
in cui impegna la sua libertà nel cammino dall’esistenza all’essere:
dall’io esisto all’io sono 50 . La conoscenza filosofica incarnata
dell’essere-in-situazione è sempre in Marcel la conoscenza-coscienza
eticamente orientata e impegnata. “Il logos –
secondo Pietro Prini – è un ethos profondo” 51 . Affermare questo
non significa che il conoscere si svuoti dei suoi aspetti intellettivi,
ma si determina in esso – afferma Cozzoli – “una coincidenza
dialettica di intelletto e di volontà, di verità e di libertà, di logos
e di ethos” 52 . Riconoscere il suo carattere ontologico intensivo
come essere-più è nello stesso tempo l’affermazione etica dell’essere
più persona che coinvolge e dispone la sua libertà-volontà.
Così la coscienza morale è simultanea alla coscienza ontologica
53 . La coscienza morale di Marcel è fondata sulla morale
della persona che tiene conto del cammino esistenziale dell’individuo,
dell’apporto ontologicamente determinate della sua
coscienza, della conoscenza come sensazione e partecipazione,
incontro e comunione 54 .
Per Marcel non esiste la libertà in quanto facoltà assoluta,
demotivata oppure come la semplice capacità di scelta (Sartre).
Neppure esiste la morale autonoma, distaccata dall’ontologia
fondata solo sul razionalismo puro ed astratto (si pensi alla critica
di Marcel dell’autonomia della morale kantiana 55 ). La vera
libertà si erige a offerta assoluta a Dio-Essere-Amore. L’Essere-
Amore fonda, suscita e indirizza eticamente la libertà dell’uomo,
perché l’essere io si riconosce come essere-partecipante nell’Essere
in quanto Fonte-Fine del suo essere verso-per-con. La co-
50 Ibidem, 198-201, 268-270; P. RICOEUR e G. MARCEL, Per un’etica dell’alterità.
Sei colloqui, op. cit., 127; HV, 30-33.
51 P. PRINI, Gabriel Marcel e la metodologia dell’inverificabile, Studium,
Roma 1968, 81.
52 M. COZZOLI, L’uomo in cammino verso, op. cit., 270.
53 Ibidem, 271.
54 Ibidem, 272; J. P. BARGOT, Connaissance et Amour, op. cit., 213-229.
55 GM, 101-107.

156 EDMUND KOWALSKI C.SS.R.
munione tra Dio-Tu e l’io pone la libertà autentica (“la verità della
libertà”). Non esiste allora opposizione tra libertà e grazia perché
l’io riconosce in Dio l’Autore e la Guida del suo essere, nonché
il Fine-Bene-Valore supremo del suo essere-da-compiere nell’Amore
56 . “Camminare nell’essere verso l’Essere è costituirsi e
maturarsi come persona” 57 . Riconoscere il suo essere nell’Essere-Verità-Vita
e camminare nell’essere verso l’Essere-Fine-Pienezza
implica il suo agire verso l’Essere-Bene-Valore. La verità
dell’essere (logos) nell’esperienza del co-essere si rivela nella verità
come valore-bene che impegna l’uomo nel momento stesso
in cui la riconosce (ethos). E viceversa, attraverso il suo impegno
etico l’uomo riconosce il suo essere 58 . L’esigenza ontologica dell’essere-più
è l’imperativo morale dell’essere come valore-bene
da “realizzare”, cioè da vivere-compiere. In seguito non si può rivendicare
l’autonomia dell’agire dall’essere. Il fondamento universale
ontologico-morale dell’essere-uomo-valore-bene si fonda
nel co-Essere, nel riconoscersi e nel conformarsi al Valore-Bene.
La morale esistenziale e personale, orientata essenzialmente verso
la Trascendenza, si realizza come compresenza di universalità
(l’Essere-Bene-Valore) e incarnazione (l’io esistenzialmente situato-agente).
Come io non creo l’Essere, ma solo lo riconosco,
entro in partecipazione e da Lui mi lascio illuminare e guidare,
lo stesso si passa con i valori: io non creo i valori, ma io mi apro
ai valori, li incarno nella mia vita e mi lascio illuminare nel mio
agire 59 . “Il valore è come l’orizzonte sul quale risalta il progetto,
cioè l’azione. Possiamo anche affermare che esso è l’interpretazione
schematica che la coscienza dà a se stessa dell’impresa,
nella quale si impegna tuffandosi nell’azione” 60 . L’appello ontologico
dell’essere-più è l’appello etico dei valori per intensificare
56 ME, 254-266, 267-284, 285-297; EA, 329-331; cfr E. SOTTIAUX, Gabriel
Marcel, op. cit., 83-133 (La communion au trascendant); R. DAVIGNON, Le mal
chez Gabriel Marcel, op. cit., 81-91, 111-139.
57 M. COZZOLI, L’uomo in cammino verso, op.cit., 269; HV, 30-33; GM, 40-
49.
58 M. COZZOLI, L’uomo in cammino verso, op. cit., 276.
59 Ibidem, 277; J. P. BARGOT, Connaissance et Amour, op. cit., 207-211;
HCH, 87, 128; UP, 40-41, 49; HV, 34-35.
60 UP, 40-41.

L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 157
il suo essere nel suo agire: essere-più significa essere-più-uomo
in quanto persona. I valori sono dunque punti d’incontro del logos
e dell’ethos. Tradurre l’essere nel termine persona fa emergere
il suo significato etico come valore-bene. L’uomo deve custodire,
promuovere, sviluppare e compiere il suo essere per essere
più uomo. Inoltre, l’essere più uomo significa intraprendere il
processo della personalizzazione: la realizzazione etica dell’uomo
in quanto persona.
“L’essere – afferma Marcel – non si può separare da una certa
pienezza di verità” 61 . “Pienezza”, in quanto portata ontologica,
non è interpretata da Marcel in senso quantitativo come totalità,
ma come quid non rappresentabile, non proiettabile in
una raffigurazione. L’esigenza o meglio il bisogno di pienezza
dell’uomo fa parte dell’esperienza del suo essere come esserepiù,
essere in cammino ed essere-da-compiere. L’essere uomo significa
appunto essere “pastore dell’essere”. Questa molto significativa
definizione dell’uomo di M. Heidegger è stata ripresa e
sviluppata da Marcel in L’uomo problematico 62 . “Affermare che
l’uomo è il pastore dell’essere significa attribuirgli una responsabilità
ontologica. La qual cosa non avrebbe senso, a dire il vero,
se l’essere fosse concepito come dotato di una esistenza in sé,
alla maniera della natura, quale almeno siamo abituati a concepirla.
D’altronde – sempre perché la formula abbia senso – non
si tratterebbe di ridurre l’essere alla modalità del soggetto pensante,
conformemente a certo idealismo” 63 . Il concetto antropologico-ontologico
dell’uomo di Marcel mette in luce il carattere
crescente e relazionale della persona. Il suo profondo carattere
ontologico in quanto intensificazione dell’essere, articolato con
la sua libertà, è nello stesso tempo affermazione etica che coinvolge
e dispone la sua volontà. L’identità uomo-pastore non può
essere veramente compresa in senso funzionale (essere-custodire)
se non come atto d’amore 64 . L’amore suppone sempre la libertà
umana e l’apertura verso un altro diverso da sé come l’altro
essere-io-uomo e soprattutto verso Uno più grande di lui:
61 ME, 234.
62 UP, 41-62.
63 UP, 41-42.
64 UP, 44.

158 EDMUND KOWALSKI C.SS.R.
l’Essere-Tu. Il compimento dell’essere uomo nell’amore è “un
modo di partecipare a” e si svolge nell’ambito dell’attività creatrice
dell’essere verso, dell’essere per e dell’essere con. L’essere verso-per-con
si attua in rapporto con l’Altro, che risolve in dualità
l’unità d’esperienza a livello della “coscienza esclamativa di esistere”:
sensazione, corpo, esistenza (la riflessione primaria). La
riflessione secondaria nella forma del riconoscimento e della
partecipazione ontologica, invece, riconquista questa unità tra
l’Io e il Tu e si trasfigura in una comunione esistenziale: noi due
viviamo nella comunicazione delle proprie esperienze di significati
e valori personali. L’incontro dell’Io con il Tu e il riconoscimento
del Tu fonda l’intersoggettività dal quale spunta la partecipazione
ontologica dell’uno nell’altro: Noi 65 .
Il fondamento dell’etica di G. Marcel è dunque l’incontro esistenziale
dell’Io con il Tu, che si attua nella comunione reciproca
mediante il dialogo e l’amore tra l’Io e il Tu per creare la nuova
realtà: Noi. Il dialogo e l’amore non sono correlati, ma ambedue
tracciano la dimensione etica dell’intersoggettività: l’incontro
dialogico con l’amore o l’amore reciproco ove l’incontro e il
dialogo non sono essenziali 66 . L’incontro l’io-Tu come partecipazione
dell’essere nell’Essere fa riconoscere l’Essere-Amore. L’Amore
è il Valore nel quale tutti i valori si riconoscono e a cui tutti
si riconducono 67 . I valori sono sempre i punti dell’incontro del
logos (Essere) e dell’ethos (Amore). In essi l’Essere, per cui tutti
gli esseri umani sono, si rivela a loro come Amore: l’Essere è
Amore. Ed esseri umani in quanto persone, invece, scoprono
l’imperativo etico e il senso morale del loro essere attraverso il
riconoscersi e vivere per l’Amore, e nell’Amore 68 . “Vivere nell’Amore”
non solo suppone ed attesta una libertà della persona, ma
anche impegna ed indirizza la persona-libertà a prendere la responsabilità
dell’attestazione di sé come persona in una comunità
di persone. Solo l’amore mi permette di conoscere piena-
65 ME, 78-101, 102-120; GM, 61-64, 95-100; J. P. BAGOT, Connaissance et
Amour, op. cit., 215; D. COMPOSTA, Intersoggettività e morale, op. cit., 76-78.
66 Ibidem, 78-83.
67 HCH, 140-141; M. COZZOLI, L’uomo in cammino verso, op. cit., 181,
278.
68 Ibidem, 278.

L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 159
mente me stesso e l’altro in quanto Tu. La logica della libertà si
traduce infatti nella profonda esigenza morale – come istanza
primaria dell’esistenzialità – della promozione e dello sviluppo,
della partecipazione e della comunione. Le capacità di partecipazione
e di comunione danno alle persone la misura della maturazione
nell’essere, della realizzazione e della pienezza della
vita umana. L’incontro interpersonale in Marcel è impensabile e
irrealizzabile al di fuori dell’impegno etico dell’amore-carità
mentre l’amore-carità non è un valore se non è l’indicativo-imperativo
dell’intersoggettività 69 . L’amore-carità non solo rende
possibile e intensifica la comunione delle persone, ma come appello
alla libertà della persona a disporsi eticamente rende possibile
e intensifica la persona stessa in quanto essere verso-percon.
L’esigenza ontologica dell’intersoggettività per essere l’iouomo-persona
è dunque l’imperativo etico dell’amore-caritàagapé:
io sono perché io amo, io sono perché noi siamo, io sono
l’amore che mi fa essere 70 . Dall’imperativo etico dell’amore per essere-uomo-persona
nasce la fedeltà all’essere-amore come responsabilità
morale. Questa fedeltà all’essere-amore e responsabilità
dell’essere-amore è il criterio normativo dell’agire morale
e della coscienza morale. Siccome l’essere-amore è co-Essere
nell’Amore allora il criterio normativo universale, assoluto e unificante
dell’agire morale umano è l’Essere-Amore che costituisce
ontologicamente l’essere-uomo-persona e lo dinamizza eticamente.
L’etica dell’incontro è l’etica dell’amore-carità-agàpe 71 .
Concludendo possiamo dire che l’uomo come pastore dell’essere
(aspetto ontologico) diventa “buon pastore” quando
ama, unisce e fa comunione (aspetto etico). La verità dell’essere
come esigenza ontologica e la verità dell’amore in quanto imperativo
etico si incontrano nell’interiorità di ogni coscienza morale
e fanno appello alla libertà che implica e rivela per se stessa
un profondo senso morale: fedeltà alla verità dell’essere e responsabilità
della verità dell’amore per essere-uomo-persona. Allora,
ogni atto di libertà – che è insieme un riconoscimento e una
scelta: accogliere l’essere (verità, bene, amore) e rifiutare il non-
69 Ibidem, 281.
70 Ibidem, 175-198, 281, 186.
71 Ibidem, 280-296.

160 EDMUND KOWALSKI C.SS.R.
essere (menzogna, male, egoismo) – orienta tutta la vita umana
personale: l’opzione fondamentale verso la verità dell’essereamore
in quanto co-Essere nell’Amore-Verità-Bene. Di conseguenza,
ogni atto della libertà umana ha, allo stesso tempo, valore
ontologico ed etico, cioè conferma, crea e realizza l’uomo in
quanto persona. In questo contesto, l’uomo come pastore dell’essere
e “buon pastore” che ama l’essere, diventa pastore-creatore
dell’essere. L’ambito della creazione graduale e intensificante
dell’essere è sempre la vita morale: optare per l’Essere-
Amore ed operare nell’amore-carità-agàpe-philìa 72 . La realizzazione
personale passa attraverso gli atti della libertà: ragionevoli
(riconoscimento dell’io sono e dell’io sono più) e responsabili
(scelta di ciò che decido di essere) per crearsi come persona. Logos
come conoscenza-intensificazione-partecipazione ontologica
ed ethos in quanto realizzazione ontologico-etica nell’amore
si incontrano nell’unico atto creatore. La libertà creatrice è condizione
fondamentale di ogni responsabilità nell’ordine morale
dell’unificazione di sé ed al tempo stesso il limite morale della
creazione integrale di sé e non della degradazione-destruzione
di sé come persona. La condizione fondamentale ed allo stesso
tempo il limite morale della libertà creatrice personale si verifica
sempre su un duplice livello: la verità dell’essere-amore in
quanto co-Essere nell’Amore e la libertà dell’altro come Tu-Noi.
3. Implicazioni ontologiche, antropologiche ed etiche
nel campo della bioetica
Le due dimensioni dell’essere uomo-persona nel pensiero filosofico-antropologico
di G. Marcel – enucleate nei punti precedenti:
quella ontologica e quella etica – serviranno adesso per intraprendere
un tentativo di ampliare con implicazioni ermeneutiche
la riflessione bioetica contemporanea. L’etimologia stessa
del termine bio-etica conferma del resto le tendenze bilaterali del
nostro obiettivo: una proposta-dimensione ontologico-antropo-
72 ME, 209.

L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 161
logica per bios inteso come vita umana e una proposta-dimensione
ontologico-antropologico-etica per ethos.
Che spazio potrebbe acquisire – possiamo dire – G. Marcel
in merito al bios umano nella riflessione bioetica contemporanea?
Prima di tutto, contro ogni forma di idealismo, di soggettivismo
e di dualismo nella visione antropologica dell’uomo, Marcel
propone l’approccio personalistico-esistenziale a connotazione
ontologico-etico ed etico-relazionale come il terreno più adatto
per verificare le capacità interpretative e argomentative di
fronte alla gestione dei nuovi problemi biomedici. Per rispondere
a questi problemi è necessario fornire innanzitutto una chiara
definizione dei punti di riferimento: l’essere uomo in quanto
persona, il corpo umano, la vita umana. Nell’affermare l’essere
uomo in quanto persona, il personalismo marceliano, sulla base
della concezione dinamica dell’ontologia, si pone apertamente
contro l’ontologia per sé, astratta ed universalistica come espressione
di un’antropologia statica ed, allo stesso tempo, contro
un’antropologia senza ontologia. Simili antropologie sono personalmente
anonime, esistenzialmente disincarnate ed eticamente
infeconde 73 . Il riconoscimento fenomenologico dell’essere
uomo come “essere in cammino” conduce Marcel ad un’ontologia
più esistenziale, cioè più attenta alla vita umana concreta come
cammino da percorrere, processo di crescita e come intensificazione
progressiva nell’essere in sé, che si snoda nella maturazione
personale dell’essere per sé della persona. L’essere personale,
preso nella sua inscindibile unità come l’essere incarnatoincorporato
e nella sua dinamica continuità ontologico-transcendente
dell’essere-più e l’essere-da-compiere in quanto co-Essere
fonda, precede e supera l’essere cosciente. Sostenendo la
precedenza dell’io esisto-sono dinanzi all’io penso, da parte di
Marcel, significa ritrovare – utilizzando il linguaggio di P. Ricoeur
– “l’ego dell’ego cogito” 74 , fondamento dei fondamenti,
principio dei principi e norma delle norme. Tanto più che i rappresentanti
dell’utilitarismo, “vitalismo” oppure “funzionali-
73 M. COZZOLI, L’uomo in cammino verso, op.cit., 268-269.
74 P. RICOEUR, Demitizzare l’accusa, in: P. RICOEUR, Il conflitto delle interpretazioni,
Jaca Book, Milano 1977, 349-366.

162 EDMUND KOWALSKI C.SS.R.
smo”, considerando l’essere cosciente come unico criterio dell’essere
uomo-persona, aprono ed entrano nella discussione meta-bioetica
odierna sulla strada della “diluizione” – di cui parla
Filippo Boscia 75 – per stabilire confini variabili ed artificiali tra
vita umana e non-umana, individuo biologico e individuo in senso
personale (ad esempio Engelhardt), la vita degna di vivere o
quella da sopprimere (la cosiddetta “qualità della vita”) per suggerire
l’idea di una “ontologia intermedia” da cercare attraverso
l’abbandono della polarità cose-persone. Di conseguenza la persona
in questa visione è ridotta al temporale soggetto parlante,
oppure ad un soggetto che diventa oggetto da manipolare, ed
inoltre la coscienza morale personale si riduce alla conoscenza e
dunque alla scienza, l’atto umano all’applicazione implicita della
norma positiva stabilita da parte della società o dei tecnocrati
e la libertà alla ragione “pratica”, tecnicamente orientata. In
Marcel, invece, l’io esistente-incarnato – in quanto unica unità
personale – non è riducibile ai meccanismi dell’oggettività scientifico-tecnica,
perché egli ha il suo cammino ontologico verso la
Pienezza del suo essere nell’Essere-Fine e la vita umana storica
da compiere come persona. La dimensione del superamento è
collegata al recupero del mondo della vita umana personale,
soggiacente e antecedente l’attività scientifica e la prassi tecnica.
Da questa esigenza ontologica, in quanto recupero del “fondamento”,
secondo la filosofia esistenziale dell’essere, smarrito nel
mondo dell’oggettualità e della funzionalità, dove la persona è
destinata a cadere nell’area della manipolazione, della frammentazione
e della riduzione, nasce l’imperativo etico d’essere e
di diventare persona. L’io esistente in quanto persona non soltanto
indica l’abisso ontologico tra persone e cose, ma anche tra
il mondo umano e non-umano (biologico, animale). L’io sono
persona vuol dire io sono unico e farmi conoscere in quanto l’io
unico o riconoscere dagli altri, anche in quanto persone uniche.
L’io unico rivela dunque la verità del suo essere e l’autenticità
del vivere il suo essere come unica possibilità della unicità del
75 F. BOSCIA, Sul piano delle biotecnologie, in: M. COZZOLI (a cura di), La
soggettività tra individualismo e personalismo, Edizioni VIVERE IN, Roma
1996, 101-119.

L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 163
proprio essere in quanto persona. La persona come unica possibilità
del suo essere uomo e del vivere come uomo, in forza dell’atto
dell’essere o meglio del co-Essere, possiede una dignità intrinseca
invariabile, teleologicamente fondata, orientata e quindi
non da stabilire al di fuori ad essa. L’invariabilità della dignità
intrinseca dell’essere riguarda il tutto essere uomo dall’inizio alla
fine del suo cammino ontologico-personale.
Dalla dimensione ontologica della dignità della persona in
quanto realtà inseparabile dall’essere uomo nasce la dimensione
etica: la persona come norma normativa per sé e per gli altri. La
persona in quanto norma normativa a se stessa è l’imperativo
etico d’essere e diventare persona. L’intensificazione ontologica
nell’essere – come abbiamo visto in Marcel – passa attraverso
l’atto della conoscenza-libertà: accedere all’essere (io sono) e
camminare nell’essere (io sono ciò che desidero essere) per costituirsi
come persona (processo di personalizzazione). La conoscenza
di se stesso dell’essere in cammino (essere-da-compiere,
essere-storia, essere-nel-mondo) e dell’essere incarnato (io sono
corporeo) diventa conoscenza-coscienza concreata, eticamente
orientata e impegnata. Da questa constatazione risulta che la coscienza
morale personale focalizza la concentrazione dell’io verso
il proprio essere e la sua espansione nel mondo. La coscienza
e l’agire morali sono la creazione-realizzazione in atto della persona
e nello stesso tempo l’affermazione-effusione del suo essere-persona.
La persona come norma normativa ad altri è anche
l’imperativo etico che esige di rispettare la dignità della persona
in quanto persona, cioè gli altri (si pensi in questo conteso ai
medici, ai biologici o agli scienziati) debbono garantire, promuovere
e custodire il processo di sviluppo dell’essere-uomopersona.
Questo processo non può passare che attraverso il suo
corpo umano-personale e nella sua storia umana e personale come
unica possibilità d’essere-diventare persona e d’essere al
mondo. Allora, la riflessione meta-bioetica deve non soltanto riconoscere
questo principio dei principi per essere fedele alla verità
dell’essere e alla verità cognitivo-ermenutica (logos), ma soprattutto
deve cominciare la sua riflessione da questo principio
per difendere la persona dalle minacce da parte della prassi biomedicale
e il mondo dalla minaccia di una globale e totale catastrofe
ecologica (ethos). La bioetica come scienza non può dunque
rappresentare una minaccia costante all’uomo e al suo am-

164 EDMUND KOWALSKI C.SS.R.
bito naturale, ma al contrario deve proteggere l’integrità e l’autonomia
dell’uomo in quanto persona collaborando strettamente
con l’antropologia e l’etica. La persona deve essere l’inizio, il
centro, la direzione e il fine della riflessione e della prassi della
bioetica e non sempre l’oggetto da indagare per essere poi l’oggetto
da stabilire, da manipolare. Tanto più che la dimensione
umana è prioritaria e soggiacente, la bioetica in quanto scienza
non può maturare in conflitto con l’antropologia e l’etica, né respingerne
il ruolo di guida, pur nel rispetto di ambiti e di logiche
diversi. La bioetica in quanto scienza non può maturare perché:
in primo luogo, non vuole dentro di sé ricostruire o recuperare
il soggetto-persona dal suo “oggetto-persona” e neanche si
rende conto che lo stesso soggetto-persona che fa teoria-prassi
biomedica, fra poco tempo, può diventare anche “oggetto” della
sua teoria-prassi, ma al contrario tende ad una totale oggettivabilità
delle realtà umane-personali, in seconda istanza, vuole invece
sostituire l’antropologia e l’etica per stabilire criteri dell’uomo-persona
e norme morali al di là di esse e per questo uscire illegittimamente
dal suo campo metodologicamente organizzato
ed epistemologicamente determinato. Tale conflittualità minaccia
la perdita del suo rigore e della sua praticabilità in quanto
scienza.
Inoltre, la verità e fedeltà all’essere, in modo particolare all’essere-uomo-persona,
significa prendere la responsabilità morale
individuale e collettiva di ogni forma di bios. Creare un nuovo
ethos in quanto lo scopo principale della riflessione bioetica
contemporanea si traduce dunque in un duplice impegno, in
realtà dialettico e complementare: in primo luogo, la formazione
della coscienza e dell’agire morale individuale pro life, poi,
svegliare, attivare e formare la “coscienza morale collettiva” nella
forma della cultura etica, della cultura della vita e della responsabilità
sociale e politica di ogni forma di vita (l’etica dell’ecologia),
e di vita umana personale in particolare, da parte degli
organismi nazionali ed internazionali 76 .
76 Donum vitae, nn. 1-2; Parte III Morale e legge civile; Evangelium vitae,
nn. 78-101; Veritatis splendor, nn. 64, 97-99; G. PIANA, Persona e società: per
una rifondazione etica della politica, in: AA. VV., Persona e personalismo, Fondazione
LANZA, Padova 1992, 187-203; L. SANTORI, La persona nella storia

L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 165
Forse più pertinente può apparire il richiamo al principio
dell’amore per l’attivazione e l’intensificazione di un’autentica dinamica
di unità e di universalità degli uomini in relazione persona-persona
e persona-comunità delle persone come propostadimensione
ontologico-antropologico-etica per ethos in quanto
l’etica dell’incontro nell’amore di G. Marcel. Il pensatore francese,
abbandonando il principio della ratio come affermazione di
uno stile di “introversione egocentrica” (tutto e tutti per il soggetto
oppure secondo soggetto) e fornitore fondamentale della
morale autonoma (creazione arbitraria dell’etica da parte del
soggetto), propone al contrario il principio dell’amore-caritàagàpe
che muove il soggetto – che in Marcel è sempre l’essere-uomo-persona
– verso il soggetto e l’oggetto. La ratio obbliga a dividere
e a distinguere tra soggetto pensante-riconoscente e soggetto-oggetto
da riconoscere, l’amore, invece, conduce all’unione
interpersonale fino alla contemplazione-participazione-comunione,
cioè all’uscire da sé come l’essere-verso-per-con e al ricevere-accogliere
l’altro-essere-verso-per-con in sé. L’uscire da sé e
l’accogliere in sé, come la fecondità ontologica dell’essere nell’amore,
crea l’essere-uomo-persona in quanto persona ed al tempo
stesso crea la comunità delle persone, “la città degli uomini”
(“mondo delle persone”, personne des personnes di E. Mounier)
e anche la comunione con il mondo non-umano (“la casa dell’essere”
direbbe Heidegger). L’ontologia etica esistenziale di
Marcel non soltanto si svolge nell’etica ontologica, ma anche
traccia le dimensioni etiche dell’antropologia: la partecipazione
intensiva dell’uomo al suo essere è la creazione-realizzazione etica
della persona. Questa realizzazione passa attraverso l’incontro-dialogo-comunione-amore
con gli altri e con il mondo, perché
la conoscenza filosofica è sempre in Marcel la conoscenzacoscienza
personale, eticamente orientata e impegnata. Riconoscere
il suo carattere ontologico intensivo come essere-più, che
è nello stesso tempo l’affermazione etica dell’essere più uomopersona,
significa riconoscere anche il suo carattere trascenden-
della teologia, ivi, 173-183; J. Bouëssée, A. Marcel (a cura di), Gabriel Marcel
et les injustices de ce temps. La responsabilité du philosophe, Cahier 4, Présence
de Gabriel Marcel, Paris 1983, 9-137.

166 EDMUND KOWALSKI C.SS.R.
tale in quanto co-Essere nell’Amore. Approfondendo quest’ottica
possiamo constatare che logos ed ethos fanno riconoscere bios
come dono reciproco, co-essenziale, co-esistente e mai come cosa
da possedere. Allora bios è: il valore fondamentale, l’ambito
esistenziale e la condizione sine qua non d’essere e diventare
persona; l’affermazione dell’unità di tutti gli esseri umani e dell’universalità
dei diritti e della dignità della persona umana in
ogni forma e tappa del suo sviluppo e della sua maturazione, di
cui nessuno può privarla. “L’atto con cui io sopprimo la vita, per
quanto motivato, implica la pretesa sacrilega di interrompere un
ciclo o addirittura la volontà di porre ad esso un termine assoluto.
Uccidere significa prima di tutto sopprimere, considerare
suscettibile di distruzione ciò che forse è indistruttibile: è un atto
oggettivamente sacrilego e sostanzialmente assurdo. In questo
senso è facile accorgersi di quanto la speranza s’innesti nella
vita, considerata non tanto nelle sue manifestazioni, quanto
nella sua essenziale perennità” 77 . Infine, bios, riconosciuto e
contemplato da logos, partecipato e confermato da ethos, fa riconoscere
l’Essere-Dio-Creatore in quanto Principio-Fine della
creazione. Il riconoscere tutte queste dimensioni trascendentali
dell’essere-uomo-persona, nell’esperienza esistenziale di bios-logos-ethos,
cioè nella unicità dinamica del proprio essere-più, in
relazione creaturale con Dio e co-esistenziale verso Dio, interpersonale
con gli altri e solidale con il mondo, garantisce la dignità
della persona nel senso pieno.
Conclusioni
Chi sono io? Che senso ha la mia vita? Queste domande, in
quanto questioni iniziali dell’indagine filosofica di Gabriel Marcel
che sono state poste a se stesso ed all’uomo d’oggi, sono sempre
gli stessi interrogativi concernenti le sue origini, la sua natura
e il suo destino che l’uomo si è posto da molti secoli, fin dall’antichità
greca 78 . Il suo problema esistenziale, che l’uomo pone
77 ME, 328.
78 UP, 9.

L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 167
da sempre a se stesso ed ad altri, implicato costantemente nella
situazione storica concreta e complessa, non si può risolvere rispondendo:
“Tu sei un animale ragionevole” oppure “Tu sei rationalis
naturae individua substantia”. Senza dubbio questo problema
instaura una relazione tra l’uomo-in-situazione e l’uomo
concreto che vorrebbe avere una risposta ad hoc per comprendere
se stesso hic et nunc e dare un senso alla sua esistenza vissuta
in prima persona. Dopo la sua analisi ontologico-antropologica
ed ontologico-etica, Marcel – “un uomo autentico, un vero
cristiano, un testimone della verità” 79 e filosofo della speranza
80 – può rispondere a quest’uomo: “Tu sei l’unico nel mondo
perché tu sei voluto-creato da Dio e tu hai la vita unica da percorrere
e da compiere come persona, e, di più, tu non morrai
quando tu ami qualcuno”. Ma il pensatore francese non si ferma
nella sua indagine filosofica soltanto a questo livello individuale-esistenziale
dell’uomo-quesito a se stesso, perché vorrebbe
smascherare le radici di questo problema, formulando la sua
questione così: “a quali condizioni l’uomo, nella sua pienezza, è
diventato un quesito per l’uomo?” 81 In altre parole, Marcel vorrebbe
approfondire il problema dell’alienazione dell’uomo contemporaneo,
che sembra essere diventato sempre più estraneo a
se stesso, fino a mettere in dubbio la sua esistenza e la sua essenza:
“l’uomo della baracca”, l’uomo senza faccia e “l’immagine
deformata e quasi irriconoscibile riflessa dallo specchio interiore”
come la rende manifesta l’arte contemporanea 82 . Parlando
d’alienazione dell’uomo, ci troviamo – secondo Marcel – di fronte
alle “modalità esistenziali operanti al di qua della soglia della
79 B. HÄRING, CSsR, Prefazione, in: M. Cozzoli, L’uomo in cammino verso,
op. cit., 9.
80 G. MARCEL, Structure de l’Espérance, Dieu vivant, 1951/19, 73-80; Dialogo
sulla speranza (a cura di Enrico Piscione), Edizioni Logos, Roma 1984;
ME, 314-329; M. BECQUÉ, CSsR, J. PRIEUR, R. TROISFONTAINES, SJ, (avec la collaboration
de: Jean Guitton, L. Becqué, CSsR), Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973).
Philosophe de l’Espérance, Editions Jules Hovine, Marquain (Belgique) 1990;
S. PLOURDE, Gabriel Marcel. Philosophe et témoin de l’Espérance, op. cit., 129-
226.
81 UP, 9.
82 UP, 10-11.

168 EDMUND KOWALSKI C.SS.R.
coscienza quotidiana”: lo stato o la società, il nazionalismo nelle
sue forme estreme del razzismo e del nazismo che fanno sparire
l’uomo-persona nella massa della super-nazione, della classe
inferiore oppure della collettività anonima; il capitalismo con
il suo liberalismo industriale e il comunismo come sistema totalitario
che lo riducono a robot, a numero e a strumento delle sue
ideologie applicate. Paradossalmente, in fondo a queste modalità
esistenziali che provocano e conducono il processo della riduzione-deformazione
dell’uomo in quanto persona sta l’ansioso
interrogativo di origine metafisica: ”l’uomo pare aver perduto
ogni riferimento al divino: egli non si pone più davanti a un
Dio del quale sarebbe creatura e immagine. La morte di Dio, nel
preciso significato che Nietzsche ha dato a queste parole, non
sarebbe all’origine del fatto che l’uomo è diventato per se stesso
un quesito senza risposta?” 83 Ma, e questo sarebbe il secondo paradosso,
Dio è stato ucciso dagli uomini – come del resto afferma
Nietzsche stesso in Così parlò Zarathustra e in La gaia scienza
– per il fatto di distaccare radicalmente l’uomo dall’atto del
creare e riducendolo all’atto del produrre 84 . Per non cadere nello
stesso errore dell’ardua ed acuta questione: uomo o Dio, dal
quale il pensiero filosofico ha tentato per secoli di liberarsi, Marcel
propone “la particolare modalità di relazione che mi unisce
a Dio al quale mi riferisco in quanto uomo” 85 , l’incontro tra la libertà
e la grazia, tra la conoscenza filosofica e la coscienza etica
per possedere “il segreto di ciò che io sono e di ciò che sono atto
a diventare” 86 . Di conseguenza, né il superuomo del passato
né la società-scienza-tecnica d’oggi che si è sostituita all’io onnipotente
ed onnipresente possono dar morte a Dio e poi all’uomo
in quanto persona perché, dal momento in cui decidono di porre
se stesso come assoluto, non possono che distruggersi, e, la
“potenza” della verità e della libertà del suo co-Essere nell’Amore,
confermata ed attualizzata nella coscienza morale personale
non è nelle mani del potere di nessuno. L’uomo, in quanto pastore-creatore
dell’essere e come “testimone di una realtà tra-
83 UP, 22.
84 UP, 54; cfr anche 22-32.
85 UP, 50.
86 UP, 61.

L’UOMO PASTORE DELL’ESSERE 169
scendente”, nella comunione-agàpe con gli altri e con il mondo
prolunga l’atto della creazione e della redenzione. “Ma ciò che
dobbiamo ricordare – afferma Marcel in L’inquietudine nel mondo
d’oggi – in nome di una più alta esigenza, è che qualsiasi progresso
tecnico non può bastare a se stesso: esso degenera in un
gioco ridicolo se si sgancia dalla proclamazione del regno della
carità, garante – in condizioni del resto imperfettamente rappresentabili
– dell’unità di tutti in tutti e della quale il concetto
di ‘corpo mistico’, proprio della teologia cristiana, ci dà l’unica
nozione suscettibile di colmarci, direi perfino di dissetarci” 87 . La
vera risposta all’uomo che è problema a se stesso non sarebbe
infatti la ratio-techné, ma innanzitutto la carità-agàpe vissuta nel
quotidiano dalla persona che rivela: il senso del suo essere-piùuomo
come essere-amore-persona, il senso della sua vita come
dono da ricevere e da donare, ed, attraverso se stessa, la presenza
di Dio nel mondo come l’Essere-Creatore-Amore. “C’è un atteggiamento
singolare e proprio di Dio – afferma Ignazio Sanna
in Dalla parte dell’uomo: la Chiesa e i valori umani – nei confronti
dell’uomo: quello di perdonare, cioè di donarsi-per, di darsi, concedersi.
E c’è un atteggiamento singolare e proprio dell’uomo
nei confronti di Dio: quello di credere, cioè cor-dare, dare il cuore,
donare qualcosa di se stessi, donare il proprio intimo, nella
lode, nel ringraziamento, nell’accoglienza. L’uomo è un dono
per essenza, e si realizza donandosi” 88 .
—————
EDMUND KOWALSKI CSSR
The author is an invited professor at the Alphonsian Academy.
El autor es profesor invitado en la Academia Alfonsiana.
—————
87 UP, 156-157.
88 I. SANNA, Dalla parte dell’uomo: la Chiesa e i valori umani, Edizioni
Paoline, Milano 1992, 271.

StMor 40 (2002) 171-204
TODD A. SALZMAN
THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM:
A METHODOLOGICAL COMPARISON
ON THE USE OF TRADITION AS A SOURCE
OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE
Catholic ethical method continues to be a central topic of
debate in fundamental moral theology in the post-Veritatis splendor
era. This article is the third in a series of three articles comparing
the two predominant ethical methods in Catholic moral
theology: Revisionism and the Basic Goods Theory (BGT). 1
Here, I will focus on tradition as a source of moral knowledge.
There are two relevant senses in which tradition is used in this
paper. Tradition with a capitol “T” depicts the infrastructure and
process or system for handing over lived faith and tradition with
a small “t” is the content of that lived faith that is handed over. 2
1 See my “The Basic Goods Theory and Revisionism: A Methodological
Comparison on the Use of Reason and Experience as Sources of Moral
Knowledge,” Heythrop Journal 42 (2001) 423-50; and “The Basic Goods Theory
and Revisionism: A Methodological Comparison on the Use of Scripture
as a Source of Moral Knowledge,” Louvain Studies 26 (2001) 117-46.
2 See P.C. RODGER and L. VISCHER, eds., The Fourth World Conference on
Faith and Order: Montreal, 1963, Faith and Order Papers, No. 42 (London:
SCM, 1964) nn. 38-63, 50-57 (cited in CHARLES E. CURRAN, The Catholic Moral
Tradition Today: A Synthesis [Washington, DC: Georgtown University Press,
1999] 59), 66-106. It should be noted that the distinction made in this document
differs fundamentally from that posited within Catholic theological
discourse. In that discourse, Tradition refers not simply to the process and
structure but also to the content, whereas traditions refer to particular determinations
of the tradition, which may be permanent in certain contexts,
but are not necessarily enduringly normative. (See YVES CONGAR, Tradition
and Traditions, MICHAEL NASEBY and THOMAS RAINBOROUGH [trans.] [New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1967]). Even within this discourse, however, there
is fluidity in interpreting these two terms. For instance, while the INTERNA-
TIONAL THEOLOGICAL COMMISSION published a document entitled “The Interpretation
of Dogmas,” and uses the terms Tradition and tradition throughout

172 TODD A. SALZMAN
A fundamental difference between revisionism and the BGT is
on the role, function, and authority of Tradition and tradition in
either ethical theory. For Tradition, the question of authority
within the Church and the ecclesiologies that the view of authority
reflects is central. For tradition, “the hermeneutic problem
is to discern the difference between continuing a content
that expresses divine revelation and a teaching that merely reflects
the sociological and cultural circumstances of a particular
time and place.” 3 Since the impact of Tradition and tradition on
moral theology are extensive and warrant far greater treatment
than I can do them justice in this paper, I must narrow my investigation
of them as methodological sources to three central
issues. First, I will investigate the nature of the relationship between
theologians and the magisterium; second, the criteria for
determining whether or not moral teachings belonging to the
“secondary object of infallibility” have been taught infallibly;
and third, intrinsically linked to this second issue, is which, if
any, norms belong to the “secondary object of infallibility.” The
first issue pertains to Tradition whereas the latter two issues pertain
to tradition. The differences in ecclesiological models between
the BGT and revisionism are key for understanding and
responding to these issues. Consequently, before addressing
them I will explore the ecclesiologies of both theories.
Ecclesiology and Tradition
The late RICHARD MCCORMICK, S.J., frequently pointed out
that one’s understanding of the teaching authority on morality
within the church is intimately linked with one’s ecclesiology, or
understanding of the church. 4 The BGT recognizes the funda-
the text, it provides no explanation of the terms (see “De interpretatione dogmatum,”
Gregorianum 72 [1991] 5-37).
3 CURRAN, The Catholic Moral Tradition Today, 53.
4 See, for example, The Critical Calling: Reflections on Moral Dilemmas
Since Vatican II (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1989) 19-
21, 34-45, 54-55, 163-69; and, “Some Early Reactions to Veritatis Splendor,”
in CURRAN and MCCORMICK, eds., Readings in Moral Theology No. 10: John
Paul II and Moral Theology (New York: Paulist Press, 1998) 5-34, at 28-30.

THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM 173
mental importance of this relationship as well. 5 Ecclesiology is
central to how one comprehends Tradition and the role and
function of the magisterium in relation to the theologian and the
faithful.
Since Vatican II, theologians have generally adhered to two
fundamentally different ecclesiological models. The model that
originated in the Middle Ages and predominated up until Vatican
II is the hierarchical model. According to this ecclesiological
model, knowledge flows downward from the magisterium to
theologians to the faithful. The role and function of theologians
in this model is to explain and clarify to the faithful what the
magisterium has taught authoritatively, but not to question or
challenge those teachings. 6 While the sensus fidelium and their
experiences are a source for informing the magisterium in its
formulation of moral teachings, it is the magisterium’s responsibility
to determine how that experience is to be interpreted and
incorporated into its teaching. In cases where there is a disparity
between human experience and magisterial teaching (e.g., artificial
birth control), the magisterium holds the trump card. According
to this model, then, the magisterium is the final authority
for interpreting, formulating, and dispensing moral teachings.
Theologians help to explain and disseminate those teachings
to the faithful. They should not question or challenge authoritative,
non-infallible teachings where the magisterium has
deliberately stated an opinion about a controverted matter, even
if their scholarship challenges it, but should defend and explain
such teachings. If we think of this ecclesiological model as a
pyramid, the magisterium is at the pinnacle of the pyramid and
is the hermeneutical key for all other sources of moral knowledge.
With Vatican II came a profound transition in ecclesiology
and, by implication, moral epistemology. The proposed concentric
model is referred to as the people of God or communio
(communion) model. 7 Within this model, knowledge is dis-
5
GRISEZ, Christian Moral Principles 831.
6 This model is clearly reflected in PIUS XII’s Humani Generis (see, for
example, DENZINGER, 2313-14).
7
MCCORMICK, Critical Calling 40. For a helpful study on communio as an
ecclesiological model, see JEAN-MARIE ROGER TILLARD, O.P., Church of Church-

174 TODD A. SALZMAN
cerned through the people of God in its entirety – the magisterium,
theologians, and the faithful alike. There is a “trialogue,” if
you will, among the three groups guided by the Holy Spirit with
Scripture and human experience at the very center of this conversation.
It is this ongoing conversation that moves the pilgrim
Church through history towards a fuller recognition, knowledge,
understanding, and appreciation of God’s self-communication
to humanity. While the magisterium still maintains authority in
this model, and there is a presumption of truth regarding its
teaching, this authority is qualified by its role as learner-teacher.
The faithful and theologians facilitate, contribute to, and sometimes
may even challenge noninfallible magisterial teachings in
this learning-teaching process.
The BGT espouses a hierarchical ecclesiology. GRISEZ and
SHAW note, “God prescribes that there be a visible human community
which is ‘the Church’ and that it be organized hierarchically
rather than democratically or in some other way.” 8 Within
such a model, hierarchical authority, and obedience and conformity
to that authority, are key. While the BGT recognizes the importance
of the contributions of both theologians and the faithful
in this model, how does it explain their respective roles in relation
to the magisterium? It is the task of theologians to aid the
magisterium by eliciting “the testimony of witnesses of faith on
matters about which the magisterium must judge” and to propose
“the material or conceptual content for possible judgments
by which the faith will be freshly articulated and developed, or
challenges to it answered.” In addition, “the faithful at large can
propose material from their experience.” 9 What happens if the
experiences of the faithful conflict with the authoritative judgments
of the magisterium? “A sound method in moral theology
will not allow the moral experiences and judgments of some of
es: The Ecclesiology of Communion, R.C. DE PEAUX (trans.) (Collegeville, MN:
The Liturgical Press, 1992).
8 GRISEZ and SHAW, Fulfillment in Christ: A Summary of Christian Moral
Principles (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991) 130.
9 GRISEZ, “How to Deal with Theological Dissent,” in CURRAN and MC-
CORMICK, eds., Readings in Moral Theology No. 6: Dissent in the Church (New
York: Paulist Press, 1988) 442-72, at 460-61.

THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM 175
the contemporary faithful to override the constant and very firm
moral teaching of the Church.” 10 In this case, it is the role of the
theologian to consult moral principles and the fundamental
truths of faith “to find resources for explaining modern experience
and criticizing dissenting opinions.” 11 What if theologians
find grounds for legitimate dissent from noninfallible magisterial
teachings based on the experiences of the faithful and/or their
own research and scholarship? While rational argumentation
can sometimes be convincing, it is susceptible to distorting the
truth, according to the BGT. “No moral theory can settle any issue
with complete certainty by experience and purely rational
analysis.” 12 The only possibility for legitimate dissent from noninfallible
moral norms is if a stronger authority is drawn from
faith itself. Since it is the ultimate authority of the magisterium
to interpret articles of faith, the hierarchical epistemological circle
is complete. That is, the magisterium issues teachings on
faith and morals, and theologians defend those teachings. If theologians
are to have a legitimate basis to question noninfallible
teachings, they must invoke a higher source drawn from faith itself
“such as Scripture, a defined doctrine, or a teaching proposed
infallibly by the ordinary magisterium.” 13 The magisterium
is responsible for interpreting and defining sources of faith.
Given the constraints for legitimate dissent from noninfallible
magisterial teaching, such dissent is very limited in this ecclesiological
model.
Contrarily, revisionism espouses a people of God or communion
ecclesiological model. This model is based on Trinitarian
theology in that, just as the Trinity is a relational entity, no
10
GRISEZ, Christian Moral Principles 10. We must note that the phrase
“constant and very firm” implies infallible statements. If a moral teaching
is infallibly taught, it is understood that neither theologians nor the experiences
of the faithful could challenge such a teaching. A moral teaching’s
infallibility, however, is precisely what is being debated between the two
theories.
11 Ibid. 10-11.
12 Ibid. 853.
13 Ibid. 854 (while this assertion is made in the context of the faithful’s
response to noninfallible teachings, the point is reiterated in the context of
Grisez’s discussion of radical theological dissent (871).

176 TODD A. SALZMAN
member superior to the other, so too, the three bodies which
constitute the Church. 14 While this model does not deny the importance
and authority of the magisterium as an authoritative
witness to truth, it stands in relation to, not above, the other two
bodies. The relationship between the magisterium, theologians
and the people of God are communal and dialectical. It is communal
in the sense that all the faithful share a common baptism
that unites them in faith. On the basis of this faith, the faithful
“cannot err in matters of belief.” 15 Given this communal unity,
however, there remain different gifts and roles in discovering,
articulating, and defining “matters of belief.” For the faithful, experience
in their faith journey as this is lived out and manifested
in community is key to determining what constitutes matters
of belief. For moral theologians, it is reflection on that experience
as well as upon revelation and reason that help to formulate
and articulate matters of belief in a comprehensive ethical
system. For the magisterium, it is discernment that both listens
to the experiences of the faithful and is in thoughtful, honest,
and respectful dialogue with theologians in the process of formulating
matters of belief and to teach authoritatively. In all of
these processes, the Holy Spirit is present to guide the entire
church. Whenever there is a disagreement over noninfallible
magisterial teachings, whether it be the faithful in relation to the
magisterium, theologians in relation to the magisterium, or the
magisterium in relation to the faithful and theologians, such disagreements
must be thoroughly investigated to discern their
source, their validity, and if and how it challenges those teachings.
Mere disagreement does not constitute an argument
against noninfallible teachings. What it does warrant is a serious
investigation that can seek to clarify, correct, or in extreme cases
change those teachings on the basis of responsible dialogue.
The only teachings that are beyond correction and change are
infallible teachings.
Both of these ecclesiological models are evident in the early
14 See RICHARD R. GAILLARDETZ, Teaching with Authority: A Theology of the
Magisterium of the Church (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1997) 241-52.
15 Lumen Gentium par. 12.

THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM 177
history of the Church and can be defended through recourse to
the documents of Vatican II. Historically, FRANCIS SULLIVAN notes
that whereas the roots of the infallibility of ecumenical councils
and pope date back to the ninth and thirteenth centuries respectively,
“the conviction that the consensus of the universal
church in its faith is an infallible norm of truth goes back to the
second century, with Irenaeus, and is a consistent element of
Christian belief.” 16 GRISEZ challenges this revisionist perspective
on history and authority within the Church. Instead, he defends
the kind of teaching authority the hierarchy claims for itself in
Lumen Gentium 25 and Dei Verbum 10 as stemming back to Jesus’
authorizing the apostles to teach with authority. He writes,
“the fact that supreme teaching authority, however exercised and
articulated, is vested in the pope and bishops as successors of the
apostles goes back to the origin of the Church herself.” 17 Furthermore,
support for both models can be deduced from Vatican
II’s documents, especially Lumen Gentium, depending on one’s
interpretive lens. In fact, there is a dialectic between the ecclesiological
model one espouses, the documents of Vatican II, and
the hermeneutical lens one develops in order to interpret those
documents. Revisionism interprets those documents as expressing
ecclesiological innovations that departed significantly from
the ecclesiology developed in the Middle Ages, and that continued
up until Vatican II. AVERY DULLES refers to this perspective as
a “hermeneutics of discontinuity.” 18 The BGT would opt for a
hermeneutics of continuity whereby Vatican II merely reaffirmed
the traditional hierarchical ecclesiology. 19
16
SULLIVAN, Creative Fidelity 97; and, Magisterium: Teaching Authority in
the Catholic Church (New York: Paulist Press, 1983) 84-99.
17
GRISEZ, Christian Moral Principles 882-83 (emphasis added).
18
AVERY DULLES, S.J., “A Half Century of Ecclesiology,” TS 50 (1989) 419-
42, at 430-31.
19
GRISEZ critiques DULLES’revisionist ecclesiology (Christian Moral Principles
894-97). In so doing, he posits that this ecclesiology is untenable because
it posits a view of revelation and faith that are inconsistent with
Church teaching (481-85). His critique, however, is both an oversimplification
of DULLES’ position and utilizes the very tools of a hierarchical ecclesiology
that are being debated.

178 TODD A. SALZMAN
As I understand the debate over the hierarchy and its teaching
authority, the important question is not if the bishops and
pope have this teaching authority, but how the teaching authority
is to be exercised. That is the very point of debate on the historical
investigation of ecclesiological models. Whereas the BGT
has a very limited role for the faithful and theologians in their
hierarchical model, revisionism’s people of God model allows
for much greater input from both groups in developing, formulating,
and reformulating noninfallible teachings. This model is
particularly relevant for the contemporary Church, given that
many of the faithful are educated and have a very active ministry
within Church institutions (e.g., universities and parishes). Furthermore,
with the radical decline of vocations to the priesthood
and religious life in the contemporary church, the Church herself
is moving more towards a “Church of the Laity” whereby the
laity have a much greater role to play in every aspect of Church
life. For revisionism, the re-positioning of authority based on a
revised, yet traditional, ecclesiology reflects not only a Trinitarian
theology and the documents of Vatican II but also Catholic
social teaching and the principle of subsidiarity or participation
that applies to social and ecclesial structures. 20 The implications
of these sources for the authority of the magisterium and its relationship
to theologians and the faithful supports a communion
ecclesiological model which is more reflective of the “signs of
the times” than is the antiquated exclusively hierarchical model.
In light of these two different ecclesiological models, we can
now address three central issues concerning the teaching authority
of the magisterium on morality and its role and function within
ethical theory that divide the BGT and revisionism. The first issue
is the proper relationship between theologians and the magisterium
when the magisterium exercises its teaching function.
20 PIUS XI, Quadragesimo anno par. 79. See JOSEPH A. KOMONCHAK, “Subsidiarity
in the Church: The State of the Question,” The Jurist 48 (1988) 298-
349; and JOHN R. QUINN, “The Exercise of the Primacy and the Costly Call to
Unity,” in PHYLLIS ZAGANO and TERRENCE W. TILLEY, eds., The Exercise of the
Primacy: Continuing the Dialogue (New York: Crossroad Publishing Co.,
1998) 1-28, at 21-24.

THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM 179
Relationship between Theologians and the Magisterium
The BGT and the Juridical Model
At the heart of the current “crisis of faith in the Church” 21 according
to GRISEZ, is the “cancer” of dissenting theologians. 22
This state of affairs is due, in large part, to an improper relationship
between the magisterium (pope and bishops) and theologians
in the magisterial process. To heal this cancer, GRISEZ
proposes a juridical or high court model for this relationship
that follows from a hierarchical ecclesiological model. 23 There
are three features to this “high court” model. “The pope and other
bishops should first listen together to theological debate, then
dismiss the theologians and engage in their own reflection.” 24 In
this way, the role and function of theologians in relation to the
magisterium becomes clear. Just as the arguments of the advocates
representing each side of a case settle nothing, so too, this
model “would make clear to everyone the quite limited and relative
value of all theological arguments.” 25 The act of evaluating
and judging those arguments is reserved for the magisterium ‘in
chambers.’ Second, “theologians and others invited to make
their appropriate contributions to the theological debate should
be instructed clearly regarding what is expected of them.” 26 In
the case of disputed theological viewpoints, “both sides should
be given equal and adequate opportunities to present their cases.”
27 Finally, “to assure collegial solidarity in magisterial judgments,
those which concern disputed questions ordinarily
should be made in a collegial manner as the outcome of such a
process.” 28
21 GRISEZ, “How to Deal with Theological Dissent” 443.
22 Ibid. 456.
23 Ibid. 465.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.

180 TODD A. SALZMAN
GRISEZ’S “high court” analogy does not end with the magisterial
process of judgment but reflects what may be considered
a punitive component for dissenting theologians as well. GRISEZ
belittles the 1985 assembly of the SYNOD OF BISHOPS’ call for “reciprocal
dialogue between the bishops and theologians…for the
building up of the faith and its deeper comprehension” 29 given
the current state of “radical dissent” within the Catholic Church.
Instead, he proposes the remedies of the first assembly of the
SYNOD in 1967. “Those who are rash or imprudent should be
warned in all charity; those who are pertinacious should be removed
from office.” 30
This juridical model is based on certain premises. First, the
magisterium “should respect” the scholarly authority of theologians.
31 Second, rational arguments do not carry doctrinal
weight. 32 Third, the special sacramental power of popes and bishops,
through grace, gives them supernatural access to truth. 33
Fourth, while recognizing that the magisterium can err in authoritative,
noninfallible teachings, these teachings ought to be
followed because “even when it is not clear that the bishop’s or
pope’s teaching is proposed infallibly, one has a good reason for
assuming that his teaching pertains to divine revelation.” 34
Fifth, the juridical model is based on a hierarchical ecclesiology
represented, for example, in Humani Generis and Lumen
Gentium 25. There is a curious tension here between the BGT reliance
upon Humani Generis to defend the proper relationship
between the magisterium and theologians and GRISEZ’S critique
of this relationship prior to Vatican II. As he notes, “before Vatican
II, too much conformity was demanded of Catholic theologians.
Their work was so closely integrated with the magisteri-
29
SYNOD OF BISHOPS, “A Message to the People of God,” Origins 15/27 (December
19, 1985) 441-50, at 447-48. Cited in GRISEZ, “How to Deal with Theological
Dissent” 443.
30 Cited in ibid. 444. See also, JOHN KIPPLEY, Fellowship of Catholic Scholars
Newsletter 8 (September 1985) 9 (cited in MCCORMICK, Critical Calling 25).
31
GRISEZ, “How to Deal with Theological Dissent” 460.
32
GRISEZ, Christian Moral Principles 853, 856.
33 Ibid. chapt. 35.
34 Ibid. 852 (emphasis omitted).

THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM 181
um’s work that there was virtually no room for them to propose
views which the magisterium could not at once accept and approve.”
35 Revisionism would certainly agree with this statement.
Furthermore, revisionism would posit the statements of Humani
Generis used by GRISEZ to defend his juridical model as both a reflection
and confirmation of this unhealthy relationship.
Finally, material for debate in this model presumes issues
open to discussion. The reliance upon, and authority granted to,
PIUS XII’s Humani Generis substantially limits this material. PIUS
XII declares, “but if the Supreme Pontiffs in their acts, after due
consideration, express an opinion on a hitherto controversial
matter, it is clear to all that this matter, according to the mind
and will of the same Pontiffs, cannot any longer be considered a
question of free discussion among the theologians.” 36 This statement
applies to noninfallible pronouncements and is sometimes
expressed in the Latin aphorism, Roma locuta, causa finita. As
we shall see below, this last premise is intimately linked to the
debate over what belongs to the secondary object of infallibility.
Revisionism and the Dialogical Model
Revisionism qualifies or rejects these premises, rejecting also
the BGT’s high court or juridical model. Instead, revisionism
posits a dialogical model for the relationship between theologians
and the magisterium. Revisionism’s response to the BGT’s
premises focuses first on the term “respect.” “Respect” should entail
not only allowing theologians to present their arguments, but
also the magisterium’s seriously and accurately considering the
content and meaning of those arguments without an inherent
bias in favor of those theologians who merely support a traditional,
non-infallible, position. As it stands, and as Veritatis Splendor’s
misrepresentation of proportionalism made evident, 37 there
35
GRISEZ, “How to Deal with Theological Dissent” 456-57.
36
DENZINGER, 2313.
37 See, for example, JOSEPH SELLING and JAN JANS (eds.), The Splendour of
Accuracy: An Examination of the Assertions made by Veritatis Splendor
(Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos Publishing House, 1994); and a number
of articles written by revisionist moral theologians in The Tablet 247 (1993)
published shortly after the encyclical.

182 TODD A. SALZMAN
is a magisterial presupposition against revisionism that makes
such respect and unbiased appraisal of arguments problematic
in the current situation. Second, given that rational arguments
are not a sufficient criterion for determining and formulating authoritative,
noninfallible teaching, they are certainly a necessary
criterion. When there are sound reasons and arguments for challenging
what may, by definition, be an erroneous teaching, those
arguments should be given due consideration. How those arguments
relate to, and utilize, other sources of moral knowledge
must be analyzed and discussed in their entirety.
Third, given the accessibility to the truths of natural law
through right reason, revisionism would qualify the BGT’s epistemological
claim concerning the relationship between knowledge
and grace. Certainly God’s grace, as promised to the
Church and in a special way to the magisterium, facilitates the
process in the discernment of truth, but it does not dispense the
Church from the very human tasks of gathering information and
evaluating that information. 38 It is in this process that the development
of moral doctrine takes place as history has shown. 39
Fourth, revisionism would accuse the BGT of advocating a
certain “creeping infallibility,” to use the words of CHARLES CUR-
RAN, 40 regarding the faithful’s response to noninfallible but authoritative
judgments. In the view of some revisionists, GRISEZ
calls for greater respect and authority to be given to such judgments
than is warranted by their status. GRISEZ writes, “when a
faithful Catholic’s best judgment is formed, as it should be, by
the Church’s noninfallible teaching, the Catholic might possibly
be following a false norm. Yet God has provided no better norm
for his or her current belief and practice.” 41 To give such judgments
this authority in cases where there are strong contrary arguments
is to both deny the role and function of the primacy of
38 See MCCORMICK, Notes on Moral Theology: 1965 through 1980 (Washington,
DC: University Press of America, 1981) 262-66.
39 See JOHN T. NOONAN, “Development in Moral Doctrine,” TS 54 (1993)
662-77.
40
CURRAN, Catholic Moral Tradition Today 226.
41
GRISEZ, Christian Moral Principles 884.

THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM 183
conscience 42 and to ignore history. First, Christian tradition has
consistently defended the authority of conscience in moral matters.
AQUINAS writes regarding the application of knowledge to
action, “conscience is said to bind by force of the divine precept.”
43 That is, as long as one acts according to one’s well
formed and informed conscience, even in the case of invincible
ignorance and an erroneous judgment of conscience, that conscience
maintains its dignity. 44 While it certainly is the case that
one who informs one’s conscience according to the noninfallible
authoritative teachings of the magisterium is not morally culpable
if this teaching is erroneous, it does not follow that, given serious
reasons that conflict with the claims of those teachings,
one who acts against them is morally culpable. Revisionists argue
that while there is always a strong presumption of truth in
favor of magisterial teaching, if there are serious reasons for
questioning that teaching, one can indeed knowingly and willingly
act against such a teaching on the authority of conscience.
One only need look at the history of the Church to see that, especially
in questions of morals, the magisterium has erred on
noninfallible judgments, even grievously. 45 POPE JOHN PAUL II’s recent
acknowledgement of the sins of the sons of the Church
would seen to attest to this fact. 46 If individual Christians err, including
those acting in a magisterial capacity, it is proof not of
the limits of the Holy Spirit but of the limits of human beings to
respond faithfully to the Spirit. All human beings, including
members of the magisterium, are subject to sin and its impact
on the discernment of truth. And while the Church as a whole
42 Code of Canon Law c. 752 and the commentary 548.
43
AQUINAS, De Veritate, q. 17, a. 3. See JOHN MAHONEY, The Making of
Moral Theology: A Study of the Roman Catholic Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1987) 192.
44
POPE JOHN PAUL II, Veritatis Splendor par. 62; and The Universal Catechism
of the Catholic Church (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994) par.
1793.
45
NOONAN, “Development in Moral Doctrine”.
46
JOHN PAUL II, “Jubilee Characteristic: The Purification of Memory,”
Origins 29/40 (March 23, 2000) 648-50. See also, INTERNATIONAL THEOLOGICAL
COMMISSION, “Memory and Reconciliation: The Church and Faults of the
Past,” Origins 29/39 (March 16, 2000) 626-44.

184 TODD A. SALZMAN
cannot err in matters of belief, 47 discerning the implications of
that belief for moral teaching is an ongoing process. The Church
has erred in moral matters in the past. However, the Church as
a pilgrim Church in the process of becoming provides hope that
error will not persist in the long term.
Fifth, revisionism would contrast the ecclesiology developed
by the BGT and their reliance upon Humani Generis and Lumen
Gentium 25, with that developed elsewhere in Lumen Gentium
and other Vatican II documents. For example, Gaudium et Spes
reflects a communion ecclesiology:
With the help of the Holy Spirit, it is the task of the entire People
of God, especially pastors and theologians, to hear, distinguish,
and interpret the many voices of our age, and to judge them in the
light of the divine Word. In this way, revealed truth can always be
more deeply penetrated, better understood, and set forth to greater
advantage. 48
One might ask how such ecclesiological models at variance
with one another could evolve from the same Council? Not only
does the hermeneutical lens determine one’s interpretation of these
documents, but also, as MCCORMICK notes, “it is a known and acknowledged
fact that the documents of Vatican II contain perspectives
and statements that are ill at ease with each other.” 49 In revisionism’s
ecclesiology, legitimate and respectful dissent is a part of
the dialogical model between theologians and the magisterium. It
is not a cancer to be eliminated but a service to the Church in her
ongoing journey to discern how we respond to complex moral
questions through an ongoing reflection on Revelation.
Finally, while the BGT would strictly limit those issues that
are open to discussion between theologians and the magisterium,
revisionism would maintain that all noninfallible magisterial
pronouncements are open to scholarly investigation.
The revisionist dialogical model is based on the two components
of dialogue itself, listening and speaking. For theologians,
47 Lumen Gentium par. 12.
48 Gaudium et Spes par. 44.
49 MCCORMICK, Critical Calling 103.

THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM 185
the listening pole entails several dimensions. First, as Catholic
theologians, they must listen to the magisterium and its authoritative
teaching as the Holy Spirit guides it. This is so because
the magisterium is not just another source or authority for theologians.
It is a religious authority. As such, it is to be trusted because
Christ has promised that he will not abandon his Church
to error. 50 Those who are in positions of authority within the
Church have been promised the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and
this fundamental truth does not allow the theologian to view the
authority of the magisterium as an equal, much less a competing
authority, among others. Second, theologians must listen to
the Holy Spirit guiding them in their own spiritual journey. This
journey includes all dimensions of their lives, including scholarship.
There is a scholarly pneumatology within the theological
discipline. (Indeed, I would see the call to be a theologian as a
vocation, just as the call to be a priest, married, or celibate is a
vocation. One is not limited to a single vocation in life.) Third,
theologians must listen to their own scholarship and research,
including all the sources of moral knowledge, and must try to
discern the truth in community in light of that scholarship. In
light of these three components, theologians must speak. Dissent
is not the purpose of the listening process, but can certainly
be a component of this process when there are serious reasons
for questioning noninfallible magisterial teachings. Revisionist
theologians, in fact, dissent on a very narrow range of ethical issues.
Their dissent, however, has attracted a disproportionate
amount of attention. In other words, the issues on which there
is dissent are rather miniscule in comparison to the agreement
between theologians and the magisterium. For its part, the magisterium,
both bishops and pope, must engage in much of the
same processes of listening, as do theologians. Granted that the
magisterium is promised the guidance of the Holy Spirit, as are
the faithful as a whole, the Holy Spirit can only do so much. The
work of the Holy Spirit produces its effects through finite and
50 See JOSEPH KOMONCHAK, “Authority and Magisterium,” in WILLIAM W.
MAY, ed., Vatican Authority and American Catholic Dissent: The Curran Case
and its Consequences (New York: Crossroad, 1987) 103-14, at 110-11.

186 TODD A. SALZMAN
sinful human beings, who, as history has shown, can fail to cooperate.
Because of human finitude and sin, this cooperation is
not always present, either for theologians or the magisterium.
Given the profound role of the magisterium to teach authoritatively
within the Church, it has a greater burden, and thus a
greater responsibility, in learning and searching out truth in light
of “the signs of the times.” Part of this learning and searching entails
not only the magisterium’s own listening in the form of discernment,
research, scholarship, and prayer, but also dialoging
with theologians in order to aid the magisterium in this process.
Thus, while maintaining a central position in the learning-teaching
process, the magisterium cannot dispense with the process.
“Universal Consensus,” Theologians and the Magisterium
The different ecclesiological models and models of the relationship
between the magisterium and theologians lead to two
fundamentally different hermeneutics of Church documents on
the criteria for determining whether or not a pronouncement of
the ordinary universal magisterium is infallible, the second issue
to be addressed between the BGT and revisionism. Similar to
the investigation of Scripture and its methodological function in
ethical theory, 51 the selection of Church documents, and their interpretation
and application, both shape and reflect one’s theory
as well. While a detailed investigation of these texts would take
us beyond the scope of this work, I will focus on a paragraph
from Lumen Gentium used by both the BGT and revisionism.
Based on different interpretations of this text each theory derives
very different conclusions on its implications for tradition
as a source of moral knowledge.
Lumen Gentium 25 states the following with regard to the
51 WILLIAM C. SPOHN, What Are They Saying about Scripture and Ethics?
(New York: Paulist Press, 1995 rev. ed.) 13-20; and “Morality on the Way to
Discipleship: The Use of Scripture in Veritatis Splendor,” in MICHAEL E. ALL-
SOPP and JOHN J. O’KEEFE, eds., Veritatis Splendor: American Responses
(Kansas City, MO: Sheed & Ward, 1995) 83-105, at 87-89.

THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM 187
infallibility of the ordinary universal magisterium:
Although the individual bishops do not enjoy the prerogative
of infallibility, they can nevertheless proclaim Christ’s doctrine infallibly.
This is so, even when they are dispersed around the world,
provided that while maintaining the bond of unity among themselves
and with Peter’s successor, and while teaching authentically
on a matter of faith or morals, they concur in a single viewpoint as
the one which must be held conclusively. 52
GERMAIN GRISEZ and FRANCIS A. SULLIVAN have extensively debated
the numerous conditions laid out for declaring a teaching
of the ordinary universal magisterium infallible, especially with
regard to the magisterium’s teaching on artificial birth control. 53
A particularly contentious point of debate between these two
scholars on this paragraph from Lumen Gentium concerns the
criteria for determining whether or not a judgment has been
proposed conclusively or definitively and is thus infallible. One
way of determining whether or not this is the case is explained
in the 1983 Code of Canon Law, namely, that such a teaching has
been infallibly defined must be “clearly established.” There must
be “universal consensus” on this teaching. 54 What are the episte-
52 Lumen Gentium par. 25.
53 The following literature traces the genesis and development of this debate.
It begins with a paper published by GRISEZ and JOHN C. FORD, S.J., on
the infallibility of the Church’s teaching on artificial birth control: “Contraception
and the Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” TS 39 (1978) 258-
312, and continues with the following works: FRANCIS A. SULLIVAN, Magisterium;
GRISEZ, “Infallibility and Specific Moral Norms: A Review Discussion,”
Thomist 49 (1985) 248-87; SULLIVAN, “The ‘Secondary Object’ of Infallibility,”
TS 54 (1993) 536-50; GRISEZ, “Quaestio Disputata: The Ordinary Magisterium’s
Infallibility: A Reply to Some New Arguments,” TS 55 (1994) 720-32,
737-38; SULLIVAN, “Reply to Germain Grisez,” TS 55 (1994) 732-37; and SUL-
LIVAN, Creative Fidelity 105-06.
54 Both GRISEZ and SULLIVAN recognize that canon 749.3 applies to “defined
doctrines.” However, based on theological reasons, Sullivan would expand
the requirement of “clearly established” to doctrines “infallibly taught
by the ordinary universal magisterium” (“‘Secondary Object’” 549; and
GRISEZ, “The Ordinary Magisterium’s Infallibility” 730-31).

188 TODD A. SALZMAN
mological criteria for determining such a consensus? Whose
“universal consensus” is required? Is it a universal consensus of
bishops, theologians, the faithful, or solely a “firm and consistent”
teaching of the papacy? How important is theological consensus
in determining whether or not an infallible statement has
been issued by the ordinary universal magisterium? Given the
importance of such a statement, it would seem that there would
be no doubt, especially among theologians and bishops, regarding
the status of such a teaching. In his final point in one of their
exchanges, GRISEZ asserts,
for theologians, lack of consensus for a position is no argument
against it, and an alleged consensus for a position is a bad argument
in its favor…. Methodologically…this at best provides an
unreliable sign of where the truth might lie. And logically, it provides
no justification for participating in the alleged consensus; invoked
as a response to a reasoned theological argument, it is fallacious.
55
In his reply to GRISEZ on this particular exchange between
the two, SULLIVAN deems it important enough to their overall dialogue
to focus on “the significance of the fact that there is no
evidence of a consensus among Catholic theologians” on the infallibility
of the teaching by the ordinary universal magisterium
prohibiting the use of artificial contraception. 56 Given this lack
of consensus for the FORD-GRISEZ thesis on the infallible teaching
on artificial birth control developed in an earlier article, 57 SULLI-
VAN maintains that “it can hardly be ‘clearly established’ that the
official doctrine on artificial contraception has been infallibly
taught….” Consequently, “it does not qualify as irreformable
teaching.” 58 The “consensus of Catholic theologians” is a basic
consideration of SULLIVAN’S response to GRISEZ for determining
55
GRISEZ, “The Ordinary Magisterium’s Infallibility” 732.
56
SULLIVAN, “Reply to Germain Grisez” 732.
57 “Contraception and the Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium”
258-312.
58
SULLIVAN, “Reply to Germain Grisez” 733.

THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM 189
whether or not this (or one may presume any) doctrine has been
infallibly taught by the ordinary universal magisterium. To support
his argument, SULLIVAN cites PIUS IX’s letter Tuas Libenter
and a more recent statement by the International Theological
Commission, On the Interpretation of Dogma. 59 Whereas GRISEZ
“belittles the importance of such a [theological] consensus,” 60
according to SULLIVAN, both of these documents highlight its importance.
With regard to the former document, SULLIVAN concludes:
Given the connection that Pius IX saw between the fact that a
doctrine was being taught by the ordinary universal magisterium,
and the presence of a constant and universal consensus among
Catholic theologians upholding that same doctrine, it follows that
in the absence of such a consensus among Catholic theologians, it
would be difficult to maintain that a doctrine had been taught by
the ordinary universal magisterium as definitively to be held. But
this is precisely what Grisez wishes to maintain. 61
While GRISEZ acknowledges, “Sullivan has drawn from Tuas
Libenter a theological argument for the importance of the consensus
of Catholic theologians,” it is authentic, and not alleged
consensus that fulfills its stipulations. 62 One might pose the following
question to GRISEZ: what constitutes the difference between
these two types of consensus? Why does the pre-1962 consensus
of bishops and theologians that he and FORD cite in favor
of the infallibility of the norm prohibiting the use of artificial
birth control represent an authentic consensus, 63 and therefore
a legitimate component to “help gauge the ‘weight of this uniform
teaching,’” 64 whereas any subsequent lack of consensus
59 See Origins 20/1 (17 May 1990) 7.
60
SULLIVAN, “Reply to Germain Grisez” 735.
61 Ibid. 736-37.
62
GRISEZ, “The Ordinary Magisterium’s Infallibility” 738. See also, Living
a Christian Life 263-64.
63
FORD and GRISEZ, “Contraception and the Infallibility of the Ordinary
Magisterium” 278-80.
64
GRISEZ, “The Ordinary Magisterium’s Infallibility” 737.

190 TODD A. SALZMAN
among both bishops and theologians 65 that challenges their conclusions
is not an authentic lack of consensus that should also
help in analyzing its authority? GRISEZ maintains that, given the
state of theology today where “some contemporary theologians
deny infallibility altogether, and quite a few deny that it can extend
to specific moral norms,” as well as the fact that “neither
uninterrupted Christian tradition nor repeated and forceful papal
reaffirmations of a traditional teaching impress those who
deny it…the absence of theological consensus about the status
of moral teachings no longer has the significance it would have
had in 1863.” 66 In addition, radical dissenting theologians have
influenced bishops as well, 67 thereby lessening even the bishops’
credibility in contributing to “authentic consensus.” 68 GRISEZ attributes
this state of the theological discipline, as well as what he
regards a crisis in the Church, to a radical dissent that gained a
foothold at Vatican II and has spread like a cancer within the
Church. In order to correct these ills and establish “authentic
consensus” among Catholic theologians, the BGT would establish
a right relationship between the magisterium and theologians.
This right relationship consists of the juridical model presented
above.
What are we to say concerning this exchange between
GRISEZ and SULLIVAN on “universal consensus” between theologians
(and bishops) as a consideration for determining whether
or not a doctrine has been infallibly taught by the ordinary universal
magisterium? First, GRISEZ’S statement that, methodologically,
consensus or the lack thereof is an “unreliable sign of
where the truth might lie” is true, but requires qualification.
Lack of consensus is unreliable in that it may not indicate pre-
65 GRISEZ explicitly admits this lack of consensus on the issue of artificial
birth control: “For, in view of the silence up to now of virtually all the
bishops on the teaching’s infallibility, as well as the absence of the consensus
among theologians who have dealt with the issue, most of the faithful who
lack theological training will be unable to see that this teaching has been
proposed infallibly” (ibid. 732).
66 Ibid. 738.
67 GRISEZ, “How to Deal with Theological Dissent” 454 and 464.
68 GRISEZ, “The Ordinary Magisterium’s Infallibility” 732.

THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM 191
cisely where the truth might lie, but it can certainly indicate
where the truth does not lie. Perhaps it is an indication that we
need to search out truth elsewhere in light of the sources of
moral knowledge in the historical, cultural context in which we
live. Second, to my knowledge, and as SULLIVAN’S own response
to GRISEZ makes clear, no one uses the argument of consensus,
in se, “as a response to a reasoned theological argument.” That
is, no theologian would, or has, responded to GRISEZ’S argument
that, in spite of your reasoned argument for artificial birth control
as an infallible norm, the lack of consensus of theologians
on the status of this teaching invalidates your argument. The
lack of consensus is not merely a numbers game; it is reflective
of the strengths or weaknesses of the arguments proposed behind
consensus or lack thereof. Therefore, revisionism would
agree with GRISEZ that consensus, in itself, proves nothing.
Third, and more to the point, SULLIVAN’S and GRISEZ’S exchange
on the role and function of theological consensus as a
consideration for determining whether or not the ordinary universal
magisterium has issued an infallible statement seems to
be given too much importance in their exchanges. It seems that
this would be a crucial consideration to the question of infallible
pronouncements by the ordinary universal magisterium only
if universal consensus were a necessary condition for an infallible
teaching, or somehow constitutive of it. While such theological
consensus is certainly not essential for this determination,
however, the connection between a lack of theological consensus
and a teaching can be enlightening on two accounts.
First, the arguments proposed by theologians that challenge a
particular magisterial teaching may, through an ongoing dialogue
between theologians and the magisterium, indicate that
the teaching needs to be explored, refined, clarified, or in extreme
cases, abandoned. Second, the role and function of theological
consensus in one’s ethical method indicates how one perceives
the relationship between theologians and the magisterium
and indicates, more basically, the ecclesiology of a particular
ethical method. As indicated above, the arguments and reflections
proposed by many revisionist theologians based on the
four sources of moral knowledge, which is at the heart of the
lack of theological consensus on the teaching on artificial birth
control, have not been adequately responded to by the magis-

192 TODD A. SALZMAN
terium. Rather, the response has been an authoritative reaffirmation
of a traditional teaching. It is clear that what is at the
heart of the debate over theological consensus and infallible
teachings by the ordinary universal magisterium is as much (if
not more) about authority, its exercise, role, and function in the
current magisterium, as about the theological arguments for or
against a particular ethical issue.
GRISEZ’S identification of the lack of consensus amongst
bishops with the influence of radically dissenting theologians
that rules out authentic consensus, and his interpretation that
radical dissent reflects a cancer in the church, represents a serious
statement on how the Holy Spirit works within the Church.
One could reasonably assert that GRISEZ’S position on authentic
and alleged consensus is intimately tied to a very narrow, papal
ecclesiology. That is, it is not the college of bishops who are
God’s voice on earth, but only those bishops who conform to papal
statements unconditionally. Such an ecclesiology virtually
rules out authentic pluralism within the Church. Not only do
GRISEZ and SULLIVAN differ on the criteria for establishing “universal
consensus,” but the BGT and revisionism also disagree
fundamentally on the proper object of the ordinary universal
magisterium’s infallible teachings.
Tradition and Ethical Method: the secondary object of
infallibility?
Both the BGT and revisionism agree that if a natural law
norm is also contained in divine revelation, then that norm falls
under the auspices of the primary object of infallibility. They further
agree that any infallible teaching of the magisterium belonging
to the primary object of infallibility requires an assent of
“divine and Catholic faith.” A point of contention concerns those
norms that belong to the secondary object of infallibility, i.e.,
truths not contained in divine revelation, but which are required
for revelation’s explanation and defense. The BGT maintains
that the ordinary magisterium has taught infallibly such specific
natural law norms; revisionism denies this claim. In this section,
I will present two fundamental differences between the theories
that draw from tradition yet support contradictory posi-

THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM 193
tions on this issue: First, the distinction between two types of
moral truths; second, the distinction between the first principles
of the natural law and the secondary precepts that are derived
from them.
A fundamental question that divides revisionism and the
BGT is whether or not specific natural law norms have been, or
even can be, taught infallibly by the ordinary universal magisterium.
In other words, are such norms (e.g., forbidding contraception)
necessary to safeguard and defend the deposit of faith
or revelation? The question is about the appropriate object of
such infallible teachings. According to the BGT, the teaching
prohibiting artificial birth control, for example, “is at least connected
with [revelation] as a truth required to guard the deposit
as inviolable and to expound it with fidelity.” 69 In this sense, the
norm forbidding artificial birth control and similar norms are
“truths of salvation,” i.e., they are moral truths in which the
charism of the magisterium, through the guidance of the Holy
Spirit, is equipped to teach infallibly. JOSEF FUCHS, S.J., responds
to moral theologians (among them could be included GRISEZ and
FORD) who have attempted to argue that such norms are “truths
of salvation;” in so doing, he distinguishes between two types of
moral truths. 70 According to FUCHS, moral truths can be divided
into those that relate to moral goodness and moral rightness;
these two categories of moral truths distinguish the magisterium’s
teaching charism and the nature of its competence. Moral
goodness pertains to the person as such and his or her character,
motive, disposition, etc. Fundamentally, it asks whether or
not the person is open and committed to God’s self-giving love.
It is the vertical dimension of the person that relates to the person’s
salvation. Moral goodness, however, is always realized in
the world of other persons. This is the horizontal dimension of
the person and is designated by moral rightness. Moral rightness
is concerned with the kind of activity that facilitates human
well-being. Strictly speaking, the adjective “moral” pertains to
69
GRISEZ and FORD, “Contraception and the Infallibility of the Ordinary
Magisterium” 287.
70 “Moral Truths – Truths of Salvation?” in Christian Ethics in a Secular
Arena (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1984) 48-67.

194 TODD A. SALZMAN
goodness alone. It is used with rightness only in an analogous
sense. That is, “‘moral’ in its proper and formal sense refers only
to persons and their free attitudes and decisions, but, because
personal moral goodness contains concern for the well-being of
the human world as its moral task, it urges ‘right’ activity within
this world; and only because of this relationship between personal
goodness and material rightness, this rightness is also
called moral rightness.” 71 Truths of salvation pertain to moral
goodness whereas material norms indicate right or wrong behavior.
According to FUCHS and other revisionist theologians, 72
only the former can be considered as the proper object of the
secondary object of infallibility and are within the infallible
competence of the magisterium to teach.
To defend this assertion FUCHS has recourse to Scripture, tradition,
and magisterial documents. The upshot of his argument
is three-fold. First, these sources reveal that, whereas the magisterium
can teach infallibly on questions of natural law that are
revealed, it has not taught infallibly on non-revealed questions
of natural law (e.g., contraception). Second, there is agreement
among theologians that the competence of the magisterium to
guide the Church community is promised by the Holy Spirit.
There is disagreement, however, on the nature of this competence
and how it applies to questions of right/wrongness and
material norms. MCCORMICK, for example, notes “one can be
competent without being infallibly competent.” In comparison
to pre-Vatican II magisterial teachings, MCCORMICK demonstrates
that the documents of Vatican II and many subsequent
magisterial teachings have clearly limited the nature of the
magisterium’s competence to judge in the area of
rightness/wrongness. 73 Finally, FUCHS and other revisionists
71 Ibid. 52. See also, JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J., who has written extensively
on the goodness/rightness distinction in moral theology: Goodness and
Rightness in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae (Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 1992); “Distinguishing Charity as Goodness
and Prudence as Rightness: A Key to Thomas’s Secunda Pars,” Thomist 56
(1992) 389-411; and “What is Good and What is Right? A New Distinction
in Moral Theology,” Church 5 (1989) 22-28.
72 SULLIVAN, “Secondary Object”, n. 60; MCCORMICK, Critical Calling 98-99.
73 See MCCORMICK, Critical Calling 96-100, 147-62.

THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM 195
would classify norms such as those prohibiting contraception,
masturbation, reproductive technologies, etc., as moral truths
that pertain to material norms of rightness and wrongness, not
truths of salvation that pertain to moral goodness. As such, they
cannot be considered as the proper object of infallible teaching.
One of the texts that FUCHS and many other revisionists cite
to justify their argument against the plausibility of teaching nonrevealed
infallible natural law norms is Gaudium et Spes, paragraph
33: “The Church guards the heritage of God’s Word and
draws from it religious and moral principles, without always
having at hand the solution to particular problems.” 74 Religious
and moral principles relate to truths of salvation and moral
goodness, whereas solutions to particular problems relate to
material norms and rightness/wrongness. The BGT gives two responses
to revisionism’s use of this and similar texts to argue its
position. In his response to revisionists who make “some play”
with this and similar texts to deny that absolute specific moral
norms exist, JOHN FINNIS asserts that revisionists have committed
a non sequitur by overlooking the distinction between “not
every” and “not any.” In doing so, they move from “‘The church
cannot give a specific answer to every moral question’ to ‘The
church cannot teach with definitive authority any specific moral
norm.’” 75 In his references, he cites SULLIVAN, FUCHS, and GERARD
HUGHES, S.J., as theologians who have repeatedly committed this
non sequitur. According to FINNIS, then, revisionists have taken
great liberty in their hermeneutic of passages from Vatican II to
deny that some specific moral norms have been taught infallibly
by the magisterium.
GRISEZ has another response to revisionism. In his response,
he cites a passage from Gaudium et Spes that substantiates that
there are some specific moral norms whose truth precludes substantial
revision: “Contemplating this melancholy state of humanity,
the Council wishes to recall first of all the permanent
binding force of universal natural law and its all-embracing
74 WALTER M. ABBOTT, S.J., Documents of Vatican II (New York: America
Press, 1966) 232 (emphasis added), see also, n. 90.
75 FINNIS, Moral Absolutes 92.

196 TODD A. SALZMAN
principles. Man’s conscience itself gives ever more emphatic
voice to these principles.” 76
In response to GRISEZ’S point, revisionism has recourse to
AQUINAS’ Summa Theologiae. RICHARD MCCORMICK and JOHN MA-
HONEY note that AQUINAS distinguishes between the first principles
of natural law and secondary precepts or certain detailed
proximate conclusions that flow from those principles. 77 Whereas
the first principles of natural law cannot change and are,
therefore, absolute, the characteristics of the secondary precepts
or application of the first principles are, in the words of MC-
CORMICK, “provisionality, flexibility and contingency.” 78 In contemporary
theological terminology, we could say that these secondary
precepts are material norms that relate to rightness and
wrongness and are subject to change, clarification, and evolution
in light of their ongoing dialogue with the signs of the times
(e.g., history, culture, and tradition).
The BGT recognizes AQUINAS’ distinction between principles
and their application as well. It further recognizes that revisionism
cites this article from AQUINAS “to support their view that one
must decide in each case whether a received moral norm must
be fulfilled or is overridden by other considerations.” 79 In response
to revisionism’s use of AQUINAS, GRISEZ notes the following.
First, while it may be the case that AQUINAS’ statement may
be true “with respect to most specific norms,” he does teach,
“that there are norms that do not admit of exception.” 80 Second,
he posits that THOMAS’ assertion, drawn from ARISTOTLE’S physics
distinguishing between what is universal and absolute versus
what is contingent and changing, is fallacious. It is based on a
misperception of the existential, moral domain and the natural
world.
76 Documents 292, par. 79. See GRISEZ, “Infallibility and Specific Moral
Norms” 274.
77
AQUINAS, S.T., I-II, q. 94, aa. 4-5. MCCORMICK, Critical Calling 150-51;
and JOHN MAHONEY, Making of Moral Theology 189-90.
78
MCCORMICK, Critical Calling 151.
79
GRISEZ, Christian Moral Principles 268.
80 Ibid. 269.

THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM 197
The whole morally significant content of one’s action must be
intelligible, since one is responsible only for what one understands.
For this reason, proposals one adopts by choice never are morally
particularized by unique, unrepeatable, material, contingent factors.
The really unique aspects of one’s action make no difference
whatsoever to the morality of what one does. 81
FINNIS also acknowledges revisionism’s use of this passage
from AQUINAS. He asserts that revisionism makes “much play”
with this statement to show “that derived moral norms, since
they involve contingent particulars, hold not universally but only
generally (ut in pluribus), subject to exceptions (ut in paucioribus).”
82 FINNIS points out, however, that while many positive
norms admit of exceptions, there are negative absolute norms
that apply “always and everywhere without exceptions.” 83
What can be said of this seemingly interminable debate between
revisionism and the BGT and their conflicting interpretation
of tradition as to whether or not the ordinary magisterium
has taught infallibly specific natural law norms that belong to
the secondary object of infallibility? There are at least three
methodological differences that shape each school’s hermeneutical
lens for interpreting tradition. The first entails what each
school considers to be the moral realm. In their responses to revisionists,
neither GRISEZ nor FINNIS (who specifically cites FUCHS’
article, which we discussed earlier) consider the distinction of
moral truths, i.e., goodness and truths of salvation or rightness
and the fulfillment of human well-being. The distinction between
these terms and the norms that correspond to each reflect
a more foundational view of the moral realm itself.
Many revisionists evaluate the rightness or wrongness of an
act in terms of the human person adequately considered and
how the act impacts its dimensions, aside from the subjective
motivation or moral goodness of the agent choosing the act. 84
81 Ibid. (emphasis added).
82
FINNIS, Moral Absolutes 90.
83 Ibid. 91. See also, GRISEZ, Christian Moral Principles 269.
84 See LOUIS JANSSENS, “Artificial Insemination: Ethical Considerations,”
Louvain Studies 8 (1980) 3-29.

198 TODD A. SALZMAN
The relationship between the act and its impact on those dimensions
defines objective morality for revisionism. So, for example,
whereas giving alms for the sake of vainglory is morally
blameworthy (bad), what of the impact of that act on the poor?
Revisionism would say that the act is right, but the motive and
act defined in terms of the motive, is morally bad. The BGT,
however, does not view the moral realm in these terms. For the
BGT, “moral acts are objectively constituted by what people
think they are doing. Subjective morality is in the possibility of a
person’s confusion and/or error about the moral goodness or
badness of his or her act, and in the possibility that a person’s
freedom to choose is blocked or impeded.” 85 In the case of almsgiving,
then, the BGT would say that the act is morally bad since
the agent thinks that he is doing the act to gain praise rather
than to relieve the suffering of the poor. The BGT does not have
the ethical tools to evaluate the impact of the act, in se, on human
well-being detached from the subjective goodness/badness
of the moral agent. So, for example, regardless of whether or not
a person actually performs an act, intention itself is morally decisive
in the BGT’s understanding of objective morality. A person
who thinks about murdering another person is a murderer, regardless
of whether or not he commits the act of murder. 86 Objective
morality, then, resides within the willing subject, regardless
of the impact of carrying out one’s intentions in actions and
their impact on human well-being. The BGT, however, is not entirely
consistent in its claim. For instance, if a couple thinks that
they are practicing responsible parenthood by using artificial
birth control, why would this not determine the objective morality
of their act? While the BGT posits a moral order where there
is an intrinsic relationship between certain acts (e.g., artificial
birth control) and the will choosing the act (a contraceptive
85
GRISEZ and BOYLE, “Response to Our Critics and Our Collaborators”
231.
86 See for example, GRISEZ and JOSEPH BOYLE JR., Life and Death With Liberty
and Justice (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press) 393. See
EDWARD VACEK’S response to this assertion (“Contraception Again – A Conclusion
in Search of Convincing Arguments: One Proportionalist’s [Mis?]Understanding
of a Text,” in Natural Law and Moral Inquiry 50-81, at 52-53.

THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM 199
will), revisionism would deny this moral order and, consequently,
this intrinsic relationship. It is on the basis of this moral order
that the BGT posits specific natural law norms that belong
to the secondary object of infallibility that have been taught by
the ordinary universal magisterium. Though GRISEZ and BOYLE
claim that they are confident that their position on the objective/subjective
distinction, as well as other distinctions, “consistently
develop[s] Catholic tradition,” 87 their assertion is certainly
debatable. 88
The second methodological difference is in how each theory
defines and classifies a norm. Determining whether or not a specific
natural law norm has been taught infallibly by the ordinary
universal magisterium depends, in large part, on this definition.
89 Many revisionists recognize three types of moral norms,
material, formal, and synthetic. Material norms are premoral,
non-absolute norms that indicate certain premoral disvalues (or
values) that tend to have a negative (or positive) impact on human
well-being, and pertain to rightness and wrongness. Formal
norms are moral, absolute norms that indicate a morally good
or bad character, motive, or disposition and pertain to moral
goodness (i.e., truths of salvation) or badness. Synthetic norms
are moral absolutes that describe an act (killing) the motive
(malevolence) and circumstances (unjustified) such as do not
murder.
The BGT recognizes revisionism’s distinction between various
types of norms (material and formal), but proposes another
type of specific moral norm. “The description of the act goes beyond
mere behavior [material norm], yet does not go so far as to
build in the moral determinant [formal or synthetic norm].”
Such norms can be absolute norms if they are “formulated with
respect to the moral act, which includes the wrongful choice.” 90
87
GRISEZ and BOYLE, “Response to Our Critics and Our Collaborators”
231.
88 See for example, MAHONEY, Making of Moral Theology ch. 5.
89 See my “The Basic Goods Theory and Revisionism: A Methodological
Comparison on the Use of Reason and Experience as Sources of Moral
Knowledge.”
90
GRISEZ, Christian Moral Principles 257.

200 TODD A. SALZMAN
Therefore, any choice of an act prohibited by the norm would
necessarily be morally bad. Since a specific norm entails a presumption
about the nature of the will that chooses an act proscribed
by the norm, there can be absolute specific natural law
norms. Such norms would be the proper object for the magisterium’s
teaching on the primary (part of revelation) or secondary
(truths closely associated with revelation) object of infallibility.
Revisionists, however, refer to such norms as synthetic
norms. For example, whereas murder and lying are always
morally bad, killing and falsehoods are not always such, precisely
because the former include a description of a disordered
will whereas the latter do not.
For revisionism, the possibility of evolution, change, and development
– in a word, historical consciousness – within the human
experience, rules out, by definition, material natural law
norms that could be taught infallibly by the magisterium. A necessary
prerequisite for infallibility is that a teaching is irreformable,
that is, “the formulation [of an infallible teaching]
can be improved, but the meaning must be retained.” 91 According
to SULLIVAN, however, “we can never exclude the possibility
that future experience, hitherto unimagined, might put a moral
problem into a new frame of reference which would call for a revision
of a norm that, when formulated, could not have taken
such new experience into account.” 92 In response, GRISEZ cites
genocide as a specific moral norm that is an absolute and, therefore,
could be considered the subject of an infallible judgment
by the magisterium. 93 No future experience could put genocide
into a new frame of reference that would transform the norm
prohibiting genocide from an absolute to a non-absolute norm.
As noted above, however, the point of contention here would not
be on whether or not genocide is an absolute norm, but on the
nature of the norm being debated. Revisionism denies the existence
of absolute material norms, not absolute synthetic norms
that include both a description of the act and the moral nature
91 SULLIVAN, “‘Secondary Object’” 546.
92 SULLIVAN, Magisterium 152.
93 See GRISEZ, “Infallibility and Specific Moral Norms” 274.

THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM 201
of the will choosing the act. Genocide, like murder, by definition
contains its very moral condemnation in the term itself. Both
schools would agree that the norm prohibiting genocide is a
moral absolute, yet they would disagree on the appropriate actdescriptions
in other specific moral norms.
In GRISEZ’S quotation cited above on AQUINAS’ use of ARISTO-
TLE, there is some ambiguity in how we are to interpret GRISEZ’S
final sentence. What does GRISEZ mean when he writes: “The really
unique aspects of one’s action make no difference whatsoever
to the morality of what one does”? This question reveals the
third methodological distinction between the BGT and revisionism.
While both schools agree that certain actions are always
wrong (e.g., murder, theft, or adultery), they disagree fundamentally
on the morally relevant circumstances that can determine
whether or not an individual situation corresponds to the
act defined and prohibited by a norm. 94 Much of this debate centers
on the definition of the object and the traditional sources of
morality. 95 Why is it that the unique aspect that a person is becoming
intoxicated in lieu of an anesthetic in preparation for a
painful operation is morally significant to the description of the
act and the application of the norm prohibiting the act (“one
should not drink oneself into a stupor”) 96 whereas the fact that a
married couple is using a condom to prevent the spread of an
STD is not an aspect that justifies redefining the act and the
norm prohibiting that act? 97 Is that not precisely what AQUINAS
94 AQUINAS, S.T., I-II, q. 100, a. 8, ad 3. See MCCORMICK, Critical Calling
150; MAHONEY, Making of Moral Theology 190; and GRISEZ, Christian Moral
Principles 268-69.
95 See BRUNO SCHÜLLER, S.J., “Die Quellen der Moralität: Zur systematischen
Ortung eines alten Lehrstücks der Moraltheologie,” Theologie und
Philosophie 59 (1984) 535-559; JOSEPH SELLING, “Veritatis Splendor and the
Sources of Morality,” Louvain Studies 19 (1994) 3-17; “The Fundamental Polarity
of Moral Discourse,” in TODD SALZMAN, ed., Method and Catholic Moral
Theology: The Ongoing Reconstruction (Omaha, NE: Creighton University
Press, 1999) 21-43, at 26-37; and my Deontology and Teleology: An Investigation
of the Normative Debate in Roman Catholic Moral Theology (Leuven:
Peeters Press, 1995) 267-503.
96 GRISEZ, Christian Moral Principles 258.
97 GRISEZ, Difficult Moral Questions 160; and WILLIAM E. MAY, “AIDS,

202 TODD A. SALZMAN
means in asserting that, while general principles hold, their specific
application varies according to the unique context or circumstances?
Certainly revisionism would agree that unique aspects
make no difference to morality if those aspects are not
morally significant. However, GRISEZ does not provide a clear definition
for what he considers to be the “unique aspects of one’s
actions” or criteria for determining whether or not they affect
the morality of what one does. For if it is the case that “one’s
morally significant act will include only what one deliberately
chooses to do and permit – that is, what one understands about
what one is doing – and one’s practical understanding can be
wholly determined by moral principles,” 98 what purpose do specific
norms play? In addition, does not this open the door to
rampant subjectivism and voluntarism that the BGT clearly rejects?
For the BGT, it seems that dispensing from some (but not
all) of the “unique aspects of one’s action” is essential to posit
certain specific norms as absolutes and, therefore, as the appropriate
object of the secondary object of infallibility taught by the
ordinary magisterium.
Conclusion
Some have claimed that the methodological debate between
the BGT and revisionism is interminable due, in large part, to a
“theoretical gulf” between the principles and methods of each
theory. 99 An investigation into the methodological differences
between these two theories tends to support this claim. Not only
is it clear that the BGT and revisionism have very unique understandings
of Tradition and tradition as sources of moral
knowledge that shape their ethical theories, but also the other
Marriage and Condoms,” Ethics and Medics 13 (September 1988) 3-4. For revisionist
perspectives on this issue, see JAMES F. KEENAN, ed., Catholic Ethicists
on HIV/AIDS Prevention (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 2001).
98 GRISEZ, Christian Moral Principles 269.
99 See for example, GRISEZ and BOYLE, “Response to Our Critics and Our
Collaborators” 229. One must note too, however, that fundamental theological
and ideological differences divide these two theories and shape their respective
methods.

THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM 203
sources of moral knowledge (reason, experience, and Scripture)
and the hermeneutic of those sources impact their perception of
Tradition and tradition as well. Methodology is a dialectical
process of creating a synthetic whole out of the various sources
of moral knowledge. As a theological ethic, the BGT has a clear
hierarchy of the sources of moral knowledge. Tradition, specifically
the magisterium as the teaching authority in the Church on
faith and morals, is at the pinnacle of this hierarchy and functions
as a hermeneutical lens for its interpretation of revelation
and human experience. For revisionism, while recognizing the
preeminence of the magisterium as a source of moral knowledge,
it must be evaluated in its teaching capacity on moral issues
in light of all the other sources of moral knowledge. The
theological justification for revisionism’s perspective lies in Tradition
and the fundamental shift in ecclesiology at Vatican II
from a hierarchical model to a communio model.
Throughout the history of Christianity, polarity has been an
essential dimension of Catholic moral discourse. 101 It is necessary
to recognize the polarity in ethical discourse and the
methodological sources that are at the root of it in order to open
up possible lines of discourse for discovering common ground
between the two theories. While this paper has attempted to
shed light on the former issue, the prospects for discovering
common ground between the two theories requires further investigation.
102
TODD A. SALZMANN
100 See RAPHAEL GALLAGHER on his discussion of polarity in moral theology
since Vatican II (“Change and Continuity in the Human Condition: The
Implications of GS paras. 4-10 for Moral Theology,” Studia Moralia 35 (1997)
49-69, at 63-66).
101 I would like to thank my colleague at Creighton University, DR. JULIA
FLEMING and DR. ROBERT J. CAIN and MRS. BARBARA CAIN, as well as the anonymous
reader from Studia Moralia for their comments and suggestions in reviewing
this manuscript. I am also indebted to the Summer Faculty Development
Grant provided by Creighton University Graduate School for its generous
financial support to facilitate the completion of this article.

204 TODD A. SALZMAN
—————
Todd A. Salzman is Associate professor in the Department of
Theology at Creighton University, Ohama, Nebraska, USA.
Todd A. Salzman es professor asociado en el departmento de theología
de la Universidad Creighton, Ohama, Nebraska, USA.
—————

StMor 40 (2002) 205-236
JOSEPH CHAPEL
PHILOSOPHY IN THE ONGOING RENEWAL
OF MORAL THEOLOGY:
DIALOGICAL PERSONALISM REVISITED
Introduction
In the wake of Pope John Paul II’s encyclical, Fides et ratio, 1
the relationship between philosophy and theology has moved to
the forefront of discussion – a discussion which likewise sheds
light on the contribution of philosophy to the ongoing renewal
of moral theology.
Indeed, the Holy Father calls for a revitalized relationship
between philosophy and theology in which philosophy will once
again assist theology in discovering the proper place of faith in
understanding our very existence. It is necessary to recover the
fundamental understanding that at the heart of life and faith
there is an “encounter, unique in kind,” by which, “God chose to
reveal Himself,” and make His will known to us, so that,
“through Christ, the Word made flesh, man has access to the Father
in the Holy Spirit and comes to share in the divine nature.” 2
This is the defining reality for the human person, originating
completely in God’s gratuitous goodness, “moving from God to
men and women in order to bring them to salvation. As the
source of love, God desires to make himself known; and the
knowledge which the human being has of God perfects all that
the human mind can know of the meaning of life.” 3
It was for this reason that Jesus came into the world: to live
among men and women, speaking in a human way the very
words of God, the intimate desire of God to bring all people to
1 JOHN PAUL II, Fides et ratio: On the Relationship between Faith and Reason
(Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1998) (hereafter FR).
2 FR, 7, citing Dei Verbum, 2.
3 FR, 7.

206 JOSEPH CHAPEL
salvation. 4 Such knowledge is not contrary to reason, yet it is beyond
the grasp of reason alone. It is this encounter or “dialogue”
between God and man that even philosophically grounds human
existence and meaning.
Philosophy will assist fundamental theology in demonstrating
that while faith, as a gift from God, is not based on reason,
faith nonetheless finds expression through reason. At the same
time, reason on its own has limitations: “it becomes apparent
that reason needs to be reinforced by faith, in order to discover
horizons it cannot reach on its own.” 5
Likewise, moral theology may have, “an even greater need of
philosophy’s contribution,” 6 for Christian life in the Spirit requires
the use of reason and the exercise of conscience for the
application of both general and specific teachings and precepts
to the concrete situations of life. For this reason, “moral theology
requires a sound philosophical vision of human nature and
society, as well as of the general principles of ethical decisionmaking,”
7 if it will assist the believer to grow in this freedom and
responsibility.
What is needed is a philosophy that is authentic and autonomous
in its own proper method, yet does not prescind from
or exclude the significance of faith. However, much of the philosophy
of recent centuries stands in stark contrast to the biblical
sense of the human person as founded in relationship with
God and the community. Specifically, there has been such a radical
shift in philosophy toward the autonomous subject, that the
way to understanding the “things above,” the transcendent,
seems at times to be closed.
Yet, for the brief period from World War I through World
War II, a philosophical thread emerged which spoke to some of
these issues: dialogical personalism. The failure or limits of sci-
4 FR, 11.
5 FR, 67, citing JOHN PAUL II, Letter to Participants in the International
Congress of Fundamental Theology on the 125th Anniversary of “Dei Filius”
(30 September 1995), 4: L’Osservatore Romano, 3 October 1995, 8.
6 FR, 68.
7 FR, 68.

DIALOGICAL PERSONALISM REVISITED 207
ence experienced in the horrors of the First War provided the
immediate backdrop for this dialogical philosophy to emerge, as
a reaction to the universal doubt of Cartesian thought and to
German Idealism, which knows the idea or representation but
not the reality of “things-in-themselves.” Consequently, modern
man and woman are left with a great inward focus on thought,
reason and idea, but little sense of relationship with God and
neighbor as foundational for the human person.
However, in light of the tremendous evils experienced in
World War II, the dialogical personalism of the interwar years
was eclipsed, on the one hand, by existentialist philosophies that
tended in many cases towards nihilism and despair, and on the
other hand by analytic philosophies which took up narrower
questions such as the limits and functions of language and logic.
Because such philosophies either prescind from faith, are
neutral or even dismissive of faith, philosophy after World War
II once again offered little avenue for dialogue with theology.
This article will not take up the relative merits of any of
these philosophies, but rather, will simply revisit the dialogical
philosophy of the interwar years. Dialogical philosophy will not
of itself meet every need of a modern dialogue between philosophy
and theology, but its recovery will offer several fruitful avenues
of discussion and reflection for theology in general, as
well as for moral theology in particular.
A brief overview of dialogical philosophy, focusing on the
thought of Franz Rozensweig and Martin Buber, two key figures,
will precede a more detailed treatment of the work of Ferdinand
Ebner. Although little known, especially among English language
readers, Ebner’s thought is seminal and, as the only Roman
Catholic of the group, his frame of reference provides some
specific orientation for our topic. Finally, some implications and
avenues for dialogue and reflection will be drawn from Ebner’s
work as helpful in the dialogue between faith and reason, philosophy
and theology, to which the Holy Father invites us.
Over the last century or more, philosophers of various
stripes have examined the issue of the isolated autonomous subject
in the world of ideas. Pragmatists, such as C. S. Peirce,
William James and John Dewey, each examined the close link
between thinking and doing. “Analytical” philosophers – from
Bertrand Russell, to the Vienna Circle, to Ludwig Wittgenstein –

208 JOSEPH CHAPEL
examined the complex of problems surrounding the imprecise
use of language (opening the way to critical theory, structuralism
and semiotics). In the attempt to step back from experience
in order to understand it, the phenomenology of Edmund
Husserl and others is an influence and a bridge to the existentialist
philosophies that were to come. Meanwhile, such varied
thinkers as Wilhelm Dilthey, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg
Gadamer, Gabriel Marcel and Paul Ricoeur take up diverse
hermeneutical issues of interpretation and their relationship to
human historicity.
These diverse contemporary philosophies offer a backdrop
against which to situate the work of the “dialogical philosophers,”
who viewed dialogue in authentic relationship as constitutive
of the human person.
The Dialogical Philosophers
While earlier thinkers such as Blaise Pascal, Ludwig Feuerbach,
Søren Kierkegaard and Max Scheler had all struggled with
the turn to the subject and its implications for the reality of the
“I” and the “other,” and their place in the universe, dialogical
personalist philosophy as such only began to take shape in the
wake of World War I. At issue was a loss of confidence in the sufficiency
of reason and the possibilities of human and social
progress, a confidence which had begun with the Enlightenment
and endured as Idealism into the twentieth century.
The drastic experience of the war put an end to the optimism
of Idealism and was, perhaps, the spark for a general renewal
of faith life which accompanied a new attitude of realism,
in which God is not a mere “idea,” nor man a mere “moment”
within that idea. Rather, God and man are two realities, infinitely
different and unequal, but nonetheless, in essential relation
one with the other. The “I” of each man is fully constituted only
by entering into personal relation with the “thou” of others, and
above all, with the Thou of God; true “reality” is to be found in
this dialogical environment.
The most prominent dialogical philosophers – Franz Rosenzweig,
Martin Buber and Ferdinand Ebner – share a remarkable
similarity of thought due not to the limited contact they had

DIALOGICAL PERSONALISM REVISITED 209
with one another’s work, but rather deriving from das neue
Denken, “the new thinking,” Rosenzweig’s term for this reaction
against the Cartesian and German Idealism of the time.
While in the trenches of Macedonia during World War I, witnessing
the daily death of his companions, Rosenzweig wrote
his major work, The Star of Redemption, in which he made his
break with philosophical Idealism. 8 At the heart of this shift, Idealism
could not provide Rosenzweig with an explanation for the
carnage of war with its death, loneliness and hate. He came to
see Idealist optimism as merely utopian and instead found authentic
reality in the nearness of concrete beings, and in particular,
in the profound mystery of living relationships between persons.
His system requires one to start from experience, to recognize
speech as the entrance to the essence of being, and the rejection
of a monism that would deny reality. Thus it hinges on
concrete dialogue in relationship rather than solitary, abstract
thought.
There is a threefold reality of Man-World-God, which is not
known by rational deduction and which is beyond our rational
understanding – a threefold working of God, prior to reason, of
creation, revelation and redemption. While God is beyond human
knowledge, the believer experiences God’s working by being
receptive to it; he encounters God by being God’s trusted
child. For Rosenzweig, creation is a dialogical process: it begins
with God’s address to man, which is the source of dialogue between
God and humans. Thus, a key element of God’s creation
as a dialogical process is his gift of speech which is, “the creator’s
morning gift to mankind, and yet at the same time it is the
common property of all the children of men, in which each has
his particular share and, finally, it is the seal of humanity in
man.” 9
The better known Martin Buber sums up the core of dialogical
philosophy right in the title of his seminal work, I and
8 FRANZ ROSENZWEIG, The Star of Redemption (Stern der Erlösung), trans.
William W. Hallo of 2nd edition, 1930 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1971).
9 ROSENZWEIG, The Star of Redemption, 110.

210 JOSEPH CHAPEL
Thou 10 : one comes to self-identity only in relation to the other.
His starting point is the reality of the “I” and the “Thou” which
pertain to a personal world of “relation” and “meeting,” in contrast
to an impersonal world of “experience” which is the reality
of “I-It”:
Basic words are spoken with one’s being. When one says You,
the I of the word pair I-You is said, too. When one says It, the I of
the word pair I-It is said, too. The basic word I-You can only be
spoken with one’s whole being. The basic word I-It can never be
spoken with one’s whole being. 11
There is risk in the I-Thou relation for there can be no withholding
of self for the whole being is involved. If not, it becomes
an I-It relation because part of the self is holding back as a spectator.
Everything is risked, because the I addresses the Thou
with the whole self, with no defensive position to run to. At the
same time, the Thou must be met in the freedom of otherness,
which means, to respond with total unpredictability. If responses
are calculated, if the I asks itself what kind of impression it is
making on the Thou, then the relation is to an It, not a Thou. So,
the I-Thou relation requires a total listening, always in the present,
without calculating with prejudgements from the past.
What makes such an I-Thou encounter possible is the zwischen
(the Between), a grace that is between the I and the Thou,
and which overcomes their isolation, which Buber interprets in a
religious sense. God is the origin of this grace and He makes every
encounter of the I and the Thou possible: “Every particular Thou
is a glimpse through to the eternal Thou; by means of every particular
Thou the primary word addresses the eternal Thou…” 12
The centrality of God as “the eternal Thou” or “absolute
Thou,” addressed in the second person rather than spoken about
10 MARTIN BUBER, I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970); earlier English 2nd edition, trans. Ronald
Gregor Smith (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958).
11 BUBER, I and Thou, 54.
12 BUBER, I and Thou, 75.

DIALOGICAL PERSONALISM REVISITED 211
in the third person, is emblematic of Buber’s thought in I and
Thou, an insight he owes directly to Ferdinand Ebner. Although
Buber himself maintained that he encountered Ebner’s work,
“too late to affect my own thought,” 13 his dependence on Ebner
for this key insight has now been well documented. 14 Because
Buber’s name is practically synonymous with I-Thou thought,
what would merely be an historic footnote is significant here because
it demonstrates the decisive influence of the lesser known
Ferdinand Ebner as foundational and decisive to any understanding
of dialogical philosophy.
Ferdinand Ebner: Dialogical Personalism
While the carnage of World War I caused Ferdinand Ebner
13 RIVKA HORWITZ, “Ferdinand Ebner as a Source of Martin Buber’s Dialogic
Thought in I and Thou,” in Martin Buber: A Centenary Volume, eds.
Haim Gordon and Jochanan Bloch (New York: KTAV, 1984), 122.
14 See HORWITZ, “Ferdinand Ebner,” 123: the concept of God as “the eternal
Thou” or “the absolute Thou” appears in Buber for the first time in early
1922, in a series of lectures entitled, Religion as Presence, delivered just as
Buber was reading Ebner. In these lectures Ebner’s influence is very clear,
but became less obvious later for, “a few months later, when composing the
lectures into a book, Buber took out the concepts closest to Ebner’s, so that
they are less evident in I and Thou.” In HORWITZ’S judgment, “Buber received
the concept of divinity as developed in I and Thou from Ebner. On every page
of the book, Ebner recognizes God as the ‘true Thou’ who cannot be God in
the third person; but this is one of the decisive innovations of I and Thou,
that God can never be grasped in the third person, but only in presence. The
similarity exists not only in the substance of the concept, but also in the
whole structure and development of the idea… ‘Thou’ as the basic and fixed
name of God is found in Buber’s writings only after his encounter with the
writings of Ebner.” See also RIVKA HORWITZ, Buber’s Way to I and Thou: An
Historical Analysis and the First Publication of Martin Buber’s Lectures Religion
As Presence, (Heidelberg: 1978). See also JOHN OESTERREICHER, The Unfinished
Dialogue: Martin Buber and the Christian Way, (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel
Press, 1987), 31.: “Rivka Horwitz has pointed to Ferdinand Ebner as the
source of Buber’s own dialogic thought, particularly the postulate that God
must be addressed not as the remote ‘He,’ but as the ever present ‘Thou.’ In
my opinion, Ebner and Rosenzweig even outrank Buber.”

212 JOSEPH CHAPEL
(1882-1931) to despair of the value of philosophy as he had
known it, the scandal of Christian fighting against Christian,
brought Ebner to an interior conversion toward Christ. A sickly
man, both physically and psychologically, Ebner became a daily
reader of the Gospel Word, yet remained somewhat aloof from
the institutional Church until returning to the sacraments near
the end of his life.
Ebner would bristle at being called a “philosopher” or a
“theologian”; his thought and his sometimes polemical, aphoristic
style do not fit neatly into any one discipline. He attempts no
“system” of philosophy or theology but he hits the core of dialogical
thought by offering a particular way to “read” some
philosophical and theological questions.
The core of Ebner’s major work, Das Wort und die geistigen
Realitäten (The Word and the Spiritual Realities), 15 is the notion
15 FERDINAND EBNER, Das Wort und die geistigen Realitäten. Pnuematologische
Fragmente (Innsbruck, 1921), republished in Schriften, vol. 1: Fragmente,
Aufsätze, Aphorismen. Zu einer Pneumatologie des Wortes, ed. FRANZ SEYR (Munich:
Kösel Verlag, 1963), 75-342 (hereafter WR); English translations are taken
and used with permission from HAROLD JOHNSON GREEN, “The Word and the
Spiritual Realities: A Translation of and Critical Introduction to FERDINAND
EBNER’s Das Wort und die geistigen Realitäten and a Comparison with Martin
Buber’s Ich und Du” (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1980), (hereafter
Green). Part I is the “Critical Introduction” and is paginated in Roman numerals;
Part II is the actual translation, paginated in arabic numerals.
Throughout his life, Ebner made “aphoristic” notes on his wide-ranging
studies, some of which were published posthumously as Wort und Liebe (Regensburg:
Friedrich Pustet, 1935), a title given by the editor, HILDEGARD JONE,
which contains Ebner’s 1916-17 diaries, Aus dem Tagebuch 1916/17, and his final
work, Aphorismen, written in 1931 at the request of his friends, Hildegard
Jone and Josef Humplik. Both were republished in EBNER, Schriften, vol. 1, 19-
74 and 909-1014 respectively. In 1949, HILDEGARD JONE edited another selection
from Ebner’s 16 diary notebooks, entitled Das Wort ist der Weg (n.p.: Herder,
1949), but it was not included in the Schriften, nor is it any longer in print, and
thus the Italian translation of Ebner’s Das Wort ist der Weg will be used here: La
parola è la via, edited and translated by EDDA DUCCI and PIERO ROSSANO (Rome:
Anicia, 1991). Translations into English are my own, except where noted.
While there is little written in English on Ebner, an Italian journal has
recently devoted an entire issue to his thought. See the Italian edition of
Communio: Rivista Internazionale di Teologia e Cultura 175-176 (January -
April 2001).

DIALOGICAL PERSONALISM REVISITED 213
that human speech is constitutive of human existence: humans
are given the “word.” It is only in the word, in language, that an
“I” meets a “Thou,” that relationship and self-identity can occur,
and this word is given in Jesus Christ, the Word made flesh: Jesus,
the Logos of St. John’s Gospel, mediates between God and
man and “stands” between I and Thou. It is through Jesus that
it is possible to address God in the human thou.
For Ebner, the key to the meaning of life, to the centrality of
relationship, and to God’s continuous action in His creation, is
found in the I-Thou question: why the I can never be found in itself,
and so must look in the thou, while the false I will try to
possess the thou as an object of power. This is the heart of Ebner’s
critique of idealist philosophies and thought: reality, truth,
and personal identity are not ideas, nor are they to be found in
ideas, therefore, Descartes’ cogito must be rejected, for the existence
of the I can’t be founded or proved by solitary thinking, but
only in relation with a thou.
While philosophy had focused so much on the abstract
problem of how the I might reach the world and the world might
reach the “I,” the question remained of how the “authentic” relation
is individualized – this is the concrete problem for man:
just how might the I reach the thou and the thou reach the “I.”
Ebner rejects any access to the true self through the world of
ideas. Likewise, man cannot know another person through an
idea, but only in the spirit; and further, man cannot know God
without knowing his fellow man:
The man whose I has found his thou in God, finds his thou also
in every man whom he encounters along the road of life. Jesus
ought to have said: “You have seen your brother, therefore you have
seen your God.” But the I of the one who cannot find his thou in
man has not yet found it in God either… The relationship of man
with man cannot and should not be based on anything other than
a spiritual base. The idea is never capable of being the link between
the I and the thou, between man and man. In the final analysis a
man’s relationship with the other must be based on his relationship
with God. 16
16 EBNER, Aus dem Tagebuch 1916/17, in Schriften 1:56.

214 JOSEPH CHAPEL
Man’s own existence presupposes the existence of God: the
fact that man for himself can neither choose to be born nor
refuse ever to die (nor can he choose his height, race, eyes and
hair, etc.) makes his limitedness or creatureliness available to
his own experience. Though man may struggle for more control
over his existence, he experiences himself as created, and must
seek to know his creator, the one whose existence, unlike his
own, is not relative, but absolute.
For Ebner, the path of discovery begins in the word which,
in its being spoken, presupposes the Thou to whom it is spoken,
and since the Thou in its ultimate basis is God, then the existence
of man in his spirituality (as opposed to his I-aloneness)
has the existence of God as its presupposition. Man, created by
God, discovers his own identity in relationship with the Eternal
Thou, in Jesus who is the Word. Only this I-Thou relationship
with God equips man to encounter the other, not in the realm of
ideas, but as a true thou in authentic relationship. Ultimately, for
Ebner, the solution of this question of idea and reality is found
in Jesus who is the Word and who by His word shows man the
way from the I toward God:
The idea is not a spiritual reality but only the dream of one...
There are only two spiritual realities: God and the I. The life of the
spirit in man moves between these two. Through his teaching Jesus
has prepared the end… of every idealism; through his life he
has given a start to what could be called the realism of the spirit.
He has showed man the way from the I toward God. He is, according
to His precise word, the way, the truth and the life. 17
Ebner’s dialogical philosophy is a response to the problems
of Cartesian and German Idealism, and to the whole modern
philosophical tradition which is stuck in what he calls Icheinsamkeit,
or “I-aloneness”: the philosophy of the ego locked in upon
itself. Thus, classical philosophy, which in its reflection discovered
only the “idea,” did not properly grasp the significance
and meaning of the I, which came to be known only later
17 EBNER, Aus dem Tagebuch 1916/17, in Schriften 1:63-64.

DIALOGICAL PERSONALISM REVISITED 215
through the “religious factor,” through the spirit of Christianity.
Even with the turn of philosophy toward the subject, the I has
been examined only in relation to itself, in its “I-aloneness,”
which is not the real I, but only Pascal’s moi, 18 an infinitely small
man in the universe – grammatically speaking, not a first person
subject, “I” (je), but merely a smaller, third person object, “me”
(moi).
For Ebner, this I-aloneness is the result of an action of the I:
the I secluding itself from the Thou. The existence of the real I,
then, “does not lie in its being related to itself, but rather... in its
relation (Verhältnis) to the Thou.” 19 Outside the I-Thou relation,
there is no I at all.
The true I, then, can never be the abstract, “ideal” I of philosophy.
The real I “comes to expression in the fact that I am and
that I can say that of myself,” 20 that is, because man is given the
word. The I exists in relation to the Thou. The I depends on the
Thou and the Thou depends on the word. It is this I-Thou relation
which shows man his relation to God: in the ultimate
ground of our spiritual life, God is always the true Thou of the
true I in man. Conversely, at the same time, God makes of man
His Thou:
In the spirituality of his origin in God, man was not the “first”
but the “second person” – the first was and is God. And here this
“first” and “second” actually express the spiritual hierarchy, in contrast
to their grammatical usage. Man was the “person addressed”
by God, the Thou of the divine Word which created him. Yet since
18 In searching for the meaning of his own personal existence in a rational,
Cartesian I, what Pascal found was not man in dynamic relation as a
self-affirming subject, “I am,” but the contrary, insignificant man, an infinitely
small and limited moi over against the vastness of the universe. For
Pascal, the I’s aloneness is not due to its self-sufficiency and autonomy, but
rather, in its smallness it is the I of despair. The moi only moves beyond this
meaningless aloneness through the spiritual activity of the heart: “The heart
has its reasons, which reason does not know… It is the heart which experiences
God, not the reason.” See BLAISE PASCAL, Pensées, bilingual edition,
trans. H. F. Stewart (London: Routledge, and Kegan Paul, 1950), 627.
19 GREEN, 10; WR, Schriften 1:84.
20 GREEN, 13; WR, Schriften 1:86.

216 JOSEPH CHAPEL
it was God himself who spoke, the Thou was not the one it otherwise
always ultimately is, God, but precisely man. 21
God is always the true Thou of man’s I. But in creating man,
God “addressed” him, so here man becomes the thou of the divine
Word which created him. In this one case the perspective
for understanding the spiritual is reversed.
In Ebner’s view, it is unlikely that a truly godless person or a
true atheist could exist, because man’s existence, created by
God, presupposes God, for it is still based on the “God-relationship,”
even when man acts in a godless manner:
We all live by the grace of God, and there is not a man who, in
the innermost part of his heart, does not know of God, does not believe
in God. Yet there are others who cannot put their trust in divine
grace, who secretly do not know how to live, and therefore in
their hidden helplessness and concealed from the eyes of all others,
suffer continually. 22
Those who deny their belief in God to themselves – denying
what dwells in the depths of their consciousness and constitutes
its essence and core – do not recognize God’s spirit present within.
This is their affliction and torment. How to discover the presence
of God’s spirit in man?
Having the Word: the Miracle of Language
For Ebner, the key fact that reveals the presence of the spirit
in man is that man “has the word” (Wort haben). Distinctive in
Ebner is the word as the “objective” vehicle that constitutes a
person and mediates the I-thou relationship. If “having the
word” is key to our human, “speaking nature,” what caused the
passage from nothingness to being? How is it that we “have the
word”? “Man has the word because Someone has called to him,
Someone who is word. Man is one called, one addressed: a proof
21 GREEN, 24; WR, Schriften 1:97.
22 GREEN, 27; WR, Schriften 1:100.

DIALOGICAL PERSONALISM REVISITED 217
is the ‘nature of the thou’ (Duhaftigkeit) of his consciousness,
synonymous with having the word.” 23
The very heart of Ebner’s thought is found in the first words
of the Gospel of John: “In the beginning was the Word.” 24 This is
the originating, creative, divine Word, which is before all things
– before history, before man – through which everything was
made, but was made flesh and became man: “everything that is,
is by means of the word,” 25 and Jesus Christ is the Word that
founds that word.
This creative, Johannine inspired word is the “body” of interhuman
dialogue, which constitutes or “places” (setzt) man’s
being. The Word (Verbum), the divine Thou of the Father, gives
origin to being. The word that “places” (setzt) being acquires its
meaning in the midst of a phrase (Satz). This is the foundation
of Ebner’s pneumatological thought: “The word is the primary
fact, the ‘place’ [position] of spiritual being – the relation between
the I and the thou – and of being in general. The logos is
not only a presupposition for thought but also for being.” 26
God created man by speaking to him: “I am and through me
Thou art.” 27 Thus, God placed the I in man: the I, created in the
relationship to his true Thou, to God, becomes conscious that he
exists and that God does not cease to address the word to him.
And man responds: “You are, and through You I am.” 28
The Prologue to John also announces the Word made flesh,
as a second creation for man, a rebirth, which reveals the ultimate
spiritual meaning of being for man as interpersonal life in
dialogue: “the light of man is in the word. Through it, consciousness,
as a fact of natural life, is transformed into self-con-
23
EDDA DUCCI and PIERO ROSSANO, in the introduction to their Italian
translation of EBNER’S Wort und Liebe, entitled Parola e Amore (Milan: Rusconi,
1983), 28, citing Ebner without further reference.
24
JOHN 1:1.
25
EBNER, Notizen (16. Juni 1922), in Schriften 2:301.
26
EBNER, Zum Problem der Sprache und Des Wortes, in Schriften, 1:65.
27
GREEN, 23; WR, Schriften 1:96.
28
DUCCI and ROSSANO, introduction to Parola e Amore, 28, citing Ebner
without further reference.

218 JOSEPH CHAPEL
sciousness, as a fact of spiritual being.” 29 Consciousness of God’s
existence, placed within the essence of man is, “nothing other
than language, understood in the depth of its essence…, the spiritual
fact of ‘having the word...’” 30
In the word man has knowledge of God, but with the Fall,
consciousness of God’s existence darkened again. The “human”
word created by man begins here, and with it, his history: “This
‘human’ word is not the same, though presupposing it, as the
word through which the spiritual life in man, the I in its relation
to the Thou, is created. The human word testifies to that word
which..., since it constitutes all history, has no kind of history itself.”
31 The divine, originating Word became historical; the divine
Word meets the human word in human history, in the Incarnation
of Jesus Christ: “And the Word was made Flesh and
dwelt among us.” 32
The I exists in relation to the Thou, and the word is the spiritual
essence of language which takes place between the I and the
Thou. In Ebner’s view, the fact that language happens at all is always
a miracle, for in order to be myself I have need of the other,
and the other likewise has need of me, yet neither of us can
ever create the conditions of communication: “We remain
locked in mutual need. Nevertheless, language and communication
happens. I do not create this language, but receive it as a
gift. In this sense language has a transcendent origin.” 33
Language is a miracle whose origin is beyond the I or the
thou, yet language is the vehicle between the I and the thou; we
should be astonished at the fact that language exists. In its deepest
ontological sense, Ebner considers language to be the gift of
being, for it is through language that being reveals itself, in conversation
and in temporal events. Thus, in Ebner’s very particular
use of the terms, the origin of language is word.
Ebner distinguishes between the Word, which is divine, and
29
EBNER, Zum Problem der Sprache und Des Wortes, in Schriften, 1:654.
30
GREEN, 24; WR, Schriften 1:97.
31
GREEN, 20-21; WR, Schriften 1:96.
32
JOHN 1:14.
33
JOHN O’DONNELL, “The Trinity as Divine Community,” Gregorianum 69,
1 (1988), 12.

DIALOGICAL PERSONALISM REVISITED 219
words, which are the condition needed for human language and
dialogue to be possible. Because the human person has the
Word, he can speak. It is God, always the true Thou of the true
I in man, who ultimately addresses man in and through the
word, which, “in the ultimate ground of its being-given-to-man,
is from God.” 34
The I-Thou relation, which arises in man from the divinely
originated word, expressed as language, does not occur at some
point after the I has existed for itself in aloneness. Rather, the I-
Thou relation is the pre-condition: for the existence of the I, “is
objectively identical with the fact that man ‘has the word.’” 35
While some evolutionary theories claim that language is a
process of imitating animal sounds, Ebner insists that language
itself is what separates man from the animals. It is not the simple
process of the brain getting larger that causes consciousness.
There must be a “leap” which animals will never make. “The animal
screeches, howls, roars, etc., but nonetheless remains
mute… Man, on the other hand, ‘has the word.’ And only because
he has the word can he also be silent.” 36 Conversely, animals
have no I because they lack word and language: “It is characteristic
for man that he can express something, and also has
something to express. The animal can express nothing precisely
because it ‘does not have the word.’ But it also has nothing to
express – and for the same reason.” 37
The word makes man free. Animals must obey instincts, but
man, because he can name or concretize his experience in word,
can gain a distance of perspective and then choose in freedom.
In this sense, Jesus the Word frees man in the word.
Word and Love: The Spiritual Realities
Having the word is that leap from animal to man, and it is a
miracle, yet invisible to science, for God becomes visible only in
the eyes of faith, in the interiority of prayer. God is grasped in
34 GREEN, 17; WR, Schriften 1:90.
35 GREEN, 18; WR, Schriften 1:90.
36 EBNER, Aphorismen, in Schriften 1:914.
37 GREEN, 18n.; WR, Schriften 1:90n.

220 JOSEPH CHAPEL
the intimate bond between word and love, which Ebner describes
as two great miracles in which the spirit is at work, and
which encompass all of reality:
The Word embraces and carries language – not only language,
but the whole man, and not only man, but the being of the whole
world – and therefore it is more than language, more than our spoken
words. It embraces everything which we cannot express, for
which our language does not have the right word. It embraces God,
because God embraces the Word. And it embraces Love. 38
In His will to save man communally, God sent His word and
His love. Ebner argues that authentic community is based on
trust in the word, which makes it possible to relate with others
as persons – a personal dialogue that always leads to God. In
true community, the word is accompanied by love, which is the
Spirit allowing men to live in communion with God and in true
reciprocal relation with one another.
For Ebner this combination of word and love is the linchpin
of man’s I-Thou relation: man knows the reality of God not by
logical proof, but rather in recognizing his absolute dependence
on God, in the fact that the I in man is dependent upon a relation
to the Thou, outside of which it does not exist at all. God becomes
more palpable for man when his I-Thou relation with
God comes to living expression in word and love: We are “hearers
of the word” because God gave us the word; we are “doers of
the word,” insofar as the word we have heard endures as love,
which the word demands we fulfill in our lives. In this way, word
and love are the two key realities of the spiritual life; they form
the link between the I and the thou and bring man to salvation
for they save him from being closed within himself.
Bringing to Speech: Thought Becomes Word
This spiritual significance of language begins with the fact
38 EBNER, Aphorismen, in Schriften, 1:1009, cited and translated in
HAROLD STAHMER, Speak That I May See Thee!: The Religious Significance of
Language (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 236.

DIALOGICAL PERSONALISM REVISITED 221
that the word “occurs” between the first and second persons. In
being spoken, language presupposes that the relation of the I to
the Thou is a personal one. Precisely because man “has the
word,” the very potentiality of “speaking” brings with it the possibility
of “being addressed” as a person, as the Thou, “the ‘addressability’
in the other, and this belongs just as much to the
essence of personality as the potentiality to express ‘self,’ in
which the ‘I’ emerges.” 39
Bringing thought to speech, in words, liberates the I, for the
strong desire and longing to be known and to express oneself to
the other demonstrates that one’s spiritual life is always oriented
to the spiritual in the other person. The vehicle of this spiritual
relation is the word. Even one’s own solitary thinking is in
the word: “Even if I were closed within myself before others and
I were to occupy myself only with the clarification of my
thoughts, I would desire that relationship – whose vehicle is the
word – because I need it for this clarification.” 40
In the relationship between thought and word, Ebner does
not believe that there are thoughts which cannot be expressed.
Bringing one’s interior life into word regulates thought, especially
the content, for in coming into word, thoughts are discovered
and understood, in an immediate sense, as an expression of
one’s interior life, as an immediate sense of being, consciousness
and existence.
Allowing thoughts to come into speech brings them out of
the private realm and into the public realm – consciously before
God. Word adds a “communicative tension” to the concept of
mere thought, a tension that is the urge or desire to communicate,
so the word brings thought up to the brink of dialogue and
allows the thought to take root in the person’s being.
Word mediates reason but it also founds our origin and
communal existence in relation. Yet, thought which is not
grounded in authentic relation may remain at the level of monologue.
Not to experience a communicative tension to move beyond
monologue of thought and into speech means to ignore the
39 GREEN, 14; WR, Schriften 1:87.
40 EBNER, La parola è la via, 123.

222 JOSEPH CHAPEL
thou, to stay closed in my thoughts, closed to the world and others,
to let thought remain mere abstract thinking, unconnected
in relation with others. In this sense, the word can be abused using
it idly for chatter, instead of speaking only those words born
of interior silence animated by the mystery of the spirit.
Sin: Failure to Open to the Thou
For Ebner, the dialogical word gives life to relationship, so
that even in silence the word is authentic and directed to a dialogue
partner. We can retreat from this encounter into “I-aloneness”
(Icheinsamkeit), an inauthentic world of idea or “dream of
the spirit” (Traum vom Geist), a kind of slumber from which
modern culture cannot awake on its own – but only by waiting
for and responding to God’s call. Such a “closing of oneself to the
Thou” (Duverschlossenheit) is the heart of sin.
This has a bearing on how good and evil will be understood.
“The fundamental error of idealist ethics: that good and evil
have to do with the individual founded in himself. But all good
and all evil have to do with the I with respect to the thou. One is
good or bad only in relation to another.” 41 Sin, then, is not an
“idea,” but is in the realm of broken relation:
Every experience convinces that the full realization of the I is
in the vital discovery of the authentic Thou, the dialogue partner
that makes all the richness of his own being resound and that
shows the true sickness of closure, of isolation; the seriousness of
a spiritual sickness that can weaken the I to the point of death
without having found the Thou. The Light calls this darkness by its
true name: sin. 42
In Jesus darkness is overcome. In the Word made flesh,
“contempt for man” (Menschenverachtung) is definitively elimi-
41
EBNER, La parola è la via, 196.
42
DUCCI & ROSSANO, introduction to Parola e Amore, 30, citing Ebner
without further reference.

DIALOGICAL PERSONALISM REVISITED 223
nated, not by the force of ideas but by lived reality. Jesus definitively
shows how the I reaches the thou and the thou reaches the
I: each moves along two routes – towards God and towards man.
Because of Christ’s Incarnation, between God and man there is
now man, and in man there is now the privileged manifestation
of God.
Ebner’s thought is profound: any attempt to find the thou in
God alone is destined to fail because one doesn’t know how to
find the thou in man. Any road toward God that does not pass
through man is blocked. Man must search for God not only within
himself, but also in his neighbor, for man’s relationship with
God always begins by relating to concrete man. This means that
the I of man must make the leap from the experience of the
“Thou-God” to the experience of the “thou-man.” God is not metaphysically
remote from us but rather quite near and accessible:
We are therefore not to dream of Him. Whoever does that does
not want to see Him in the reality of His nearness. One could thus
even say that God is near to us not only spiritually but also physically:
near to us in everyone, and above all in the man next to us,
the neighbor… God is near to us in the man whom we, emerging
from our I-aloneness, make the true Thou of our I, which obviously
does not mean simply to look at him in his humanity as God.
What you have done to the very least of my brethren, you have
done to me… 43
The nearness of God is discovered in the I-Thou relation
with the neighbor. The true I is always in relation to a Thou such
that the “being-for-itself” of the I in its aloneness is not an authentic
part of the spiritual life of man, but is a consequence of
“secluding himself from the Thou,” which is, “nothing other
than the ‘fall from God,’ the attempt of man to exist in godless
‘inwardness’ (Innerlichkeit)…; it is the first abuse and perverted
use of the ‘freedom,’ of the ‘personality’ of existing, implanted into
man by God.” 44
43 GREEN, 210-211; WR, Schriften 1:268.
44 GREEN, 18; WR, Schriften 1:91.

224 JOSEPH CHAPEL
Where the Fall is acknowledged, man’s predicament in the
world, especially in his spiritual existence in the world, can be
properly understood. Man became the “slave to sin,” forfeiting
that aspect of his personality that exists only in its relation to
God: by trying to be “free,” in the sense of absolute independence
or “I-aloneness,” man turns away from the other, and
avoids the Thou, in violation of the very definition of being a
person, an I, given by God in the word. This is the Fall. In trying
to be more free and independent, man ends up less so. Yet, when
the I moves out of this “I-aloneness,” there is an unfolding and
openness to the Thou which,
… has the meaning of an offering. God is the “being to whom
we sacrifice.” What does man sacrifice? Everything which he has
grasped as his own in his I-aloneness and taciturnity before the
Thou… The I must give up all that belongs to it, everything that it
grasped or willed to grasp… 45
For Ebner, there is not sin as such; there is sin only in man,
and then only insofar as it is revealed to him in faith. This is not
a theological consideration of objective matter, but rather an assertion
that sin is a “relational” reality. Therefore on the part of
the subject, sin is only subjectively possible once the reality of
the I-Thou relation is recognized, and in the final analysis, this
is always in reference to the I-Thou relation with God: “Man discerns
his ‘mortal sin’ in that action through which … he consciously
and deliberately affirms and approves of his fall from
God, the I-aloneness of his existence, the ‘original sin.’” 46 While
in reality there are many transgressions,
there is only one sin, the sin: only the single sin of interior closing
before God and before men… Born into evil itself is the fact
that man closes himself off and “does not come to the light…” All
evil happens in the “closure” of the I to the thou, in “aloneness.” 47
45 GREEN, 211; WR, Schriften 1:268-269.
46 GREEN, 252; WR, Schriften 1:307.
47 EBNER, Aphorismen, in Schriften 1:997-998.

Return to the Word
DIALOGICAL PERSONALISM REVISITED 225
Every aspect of spiritual life, even sin, has a direct and essential
relationship to the word, because that life was created
through the word: “All being, which has fallen from God and has
become wordless, is destined to return again to the word – in
man and through him.” 48
There is a concrete moral dimension to Ebner’s thought in
the fundamental premise that we are created in the Word: God
calls to us in love, and we are free to respond to that love or not.
The call-response dynamic of I-thou relationship has an ethical
content in the sense that the moral life is our response to God,
and at the same time one’s behavior is good or bad mainly in the
context of relationship with others. Humans are the animals
that speak, but there is an ethical or “responsible” dimension
such that speaking orients our existence toward the thou, that is,
we do not speak as isolated individuals but within relationships,
which presumes an orientation toward communal life.
While Ebner does not develop the theme, if the moral life is
a lived response to God’s address, this suggests a “moral” dimension
to sacraments. Ebner’s understanding of the “dialogical”
power of the word coincides with the Church’s traditional
understanding of the sacraments as “efficacious.” Aware of the
necessity for formal expressions of man’s I-Thou relation with
God, Ebner is sensitive to the the risk that the sacraments might
be celebrated as empty, external forms if they lack a contact with
life. On the other hand, in Ebner’s view, when an institution, as
a “sacrament,” in its spiritual reality, is structured in a way that
engages the personal and dialogical dimensions of life in the
faith, then it truly is an authentic Christian sign.
Ebner offers no extensive application of his thought to the
sacraments which, from a post-Vatican II vantage point, seems
a weakness in his thought. Still, Ebner points in this direction:
in sin, being falls from God and thus loses the word, and is destined
to return again to the word – in man and through him.
This “return to the word” suggests an opening to sacraments in
48 GREEN, 266; WR, Schriften 1:320.

226 JOSEPH CHAPEL
general, and to Eucharist and Confession more specifically, for
in Ebner’s sense of the word, external signs and gestures have a
place in interpersonal communication, for the word is perceptible
and real when persons encounter and communicate with
each other. In a wide sense all sacrament can be seen as word,
as a medium for the encounter of man with God. However, Ebner
does not go this far, but leaves this fruitful avenue for later
reflection by others.
Ebner Appraised
It is difficult to sum up the work of this rather original
thinker, as his work does not fit neatly into any single category.
Without question, the serious reader will find difficulties in Ebner’s
fragments, discovering that they are:
… inchoative and polemical in nature, and require that the reader
think through the thoughts only begun in them, and systematize
for argumentation’s sake that which is frequently confessional
rather than conceptual. Further, the fragments evidence
through[out] a fundamental inconsistency, one which Ebner himself
was deeply aware of yet could not avoid: the mode of presentation,
namely philosophical discourse, stands in diametrical opposition
to the content therof, namely the word and the spiritual realities
of the I and the Thou. 49
Methodologically, although Ebner rejects philosophy, he is
in the predicament of making his case using philosophical argument
and speaking in the “objective,” third person as philosophy
demands. Likewise, in Ebner’s thought, the relationships between
reason and faith and between philosophy and theology ultimately
remain somewhat fluid and are not completely resolvable.
Because the centrality of the word is the basis of reason in
man, Ebner fluctuates between the philosophical and the theo-
49 GREEN, Part I, 100 [c]; citing and trans. BERNHARD CASPER, Das Dialogische
Denken: Eine Untersuchung der religionsphilosophischen Bedeutung
Franz Rosenzweigs, Ferdinand Ebners und Martin Bubers (Freiburg: Herder,
1967), 259f.

DIALOGICAL PERSONALISM REVISITED 227
logical: that man is addressed by the word means that man’s existence
has a religious basis such that, “the existence of
man... has the existence of God as its presupposition. In other
words, it means that man was created by God.” 50
Ebner’s understanding of the centrality of word is theological,
but at the same time anthropological in the sense that it defines
man, but the precise line between the divine, creative Word
and the human word is unclear. Likewise, the line between Godhuman
relation and strictly human relations is unclear: it is
clear in Ebner that the God-human relation is somehow different
than strictly human relations, but it is not clear how, other
than to say that the human to human relation concretizes the
God-human relation.
Despite his aphoristic style and the difficulties of his
thought, Ebner undertook a most challenging task: in trying to
overcome the limits in idealistic thought and move beyond the
possibilities of the “sciences,” he circles around and around his
points, trying to express something spiritually elusive, beyond
the immediate sense of his words. The reader, having entered into
Ebner’s mode of expression and style, is rewarded by the originality
and richness of his thought.
Even with his ambiguities, Ebner makes a substantial
achievement in his presentation of I-Thou relation, an advance
that is somewhat taken for granted, having now been assimilated
by other thinkers. 51 It is Ebner who places the origin of all relation
squarely in God, identifying God as the “eternal Thou,”
who reveals Himself as such to man. This revelation awakens
man from his “dream of the spirit”; in recognizing the eternal
Thou, man discovers the I in himself, and so can recognize the
other as his thou.
More than this, Ebner moves beyond other dialogical
philosophers, with his very original presentation of the word as
the centerpiece of this revelation and discovery within I-Thou
50 GREEN, 23; WR, Schriften 1:96.
51 Directly in such authors as Romano Guardini, Bernard Häring, and
Hans Urs von Balthasar; indirectly in many authors right up to the present
such as René Latourelle, Edward Schillebeeckx, Karl Rahner, Walter Kasper,
Joseph Ratzinger and John Paul II.

228 JOSEPH CHAPEL
relations. Here, Ebner breaks some new ground. He accepts the
view of the eighteenth century Sturm und Drang philosopher, Johann
Georg Hamann, that logos is reason, and thus to be human
is to speak. 52 Language philosophers take up this theme as well,
trying to explain the workings of language in human interaction,
but Ebner asks instead: why, and from where, does man have the
word?
This is Ebner at his most original and his key contribution
to this study: God spoke creation into existence, for His Word is
action. Man’s “forgetfulness” of God in the Fall and his concomitant
“dream of the spirit” are remedied in the same creative
Word, who was in the beginning and is God. Jesus, the Word
made Flesh, is God’s self-revelation as eternal Thou, the Word
spoken to man to “re-awaken” him from his “dream of the spirit,”
from his state of I-aloneness (Icheinsamkeit) which is isolation
and monologue. The Word breaks through such that man
discovers the Other, the eternal Thou, and in so discovering, his
isolation ends; monologue becomes dialogue in man’s discovery
of his own “I” necessarily reflected by the discovery of the Thou.
In the same discovery, man’s relation with human “thous” is redefined
by the very same Word.
For Ebner, while the word is clearly foundational for human
identity, the question of how language operates as such remains
pending. The relationships between word and language and between
word and sacrament provide fruitful avenues for study in
dialogue with language philosophy and sacramental theology.
Implications
Having examined the thought of Ferdinand Ebner in some
detail, it is worthwhile to briefly highlight a few ways in which
52 The Sturm und Drang (Storm and Stress) movement of 1770’s Germany
proposed that for life to be meaningful, it had to be lived with one’s
full energies applied to religion, poetry and discourse, at the same time embracing
nature, feelings and mystery. The movement has echoes in later
19th century romanticism and 20th century existential and language
philosophies.

DIALOGICAL PERSONALISM REVISITED 229
the recovery of his dialogical personalism can contribute to the
dialogue between philosophy and theology – including moral
theology – called for in Fides et ratio.
The Holy Father urges a recovery of philosophy’s relationship
with theology so that the proper place of faith in understanding
our very existence can likewise be recovered. In order
to achieve a true global ethics, a philosophy in which is found,
“even a glimmer of the truth of Christ, the one definitive answer
to humanity’s problems, will provide a potent underpinning for
the true and planetary ethics which the world now needs.” 53
This relationship of philosophy and theology – reason’s contribution
to faith – is a delicate one. The Holy Father is careful
to note that faith and revelation do not negate or reduce the
rightful autonomy and discoveries of reason, but at the same
time, reason is not absolute in itself and must constantly question
and be open to questioning. 54 In this way, philosophy and
theology are necessarily linked in a mutual relationship by
which each illuminates the other.
Jesus came into the world as, “the eternal Word who enlightens
all people, so that he might dwell among them and tell
them the innermost realities about God. Jesus Christ, the Word
made flesh, sent as ‘a human being to human beings,’ ‘speaks the
words of God,’ and completes the work of salvation which his
Father gave him to do.” 55 This is a knowledge that is not contrary
to reason even as it is beyond the knowledge of reason alone.
The Holy Father situates this encounter in dialogue between
God and man within the Vatican II understanding of God’s revelation
found in Dei Verbum, 56 an understanding with many
points of reference in Ebner’s thought.
As Joseph Ratzinger pointed out some years after the Council,
Dei Verbum 2 reflects a very different understanding of God’s
revelation, considerably influenced in this century by the dialogical
personalism of Ferdinand Ebner, Martin Buber and oth-
53 FR, 104.
54 FR, 79.
55 FR, 11, citing Tertio Millenio Adveniente (10 November 1994), 4; Jn
1:1-18; 3:34; 5:36; 17:4.
56 FR, 7-12: “Chapter 1: The Revelation of God’s Wisdom.”

230 JOSEPH CHAPEL
ers in which, “we first have a reference to God Himself, ‘in his
wisdom and goodness,’ thus giving a far greater emphasis to the
personal and theocentric starting point when compared to Vatican
I…” 57 Here, God’s will is “sacramentum,” “a sacramental
view, which sees law and grace, word and deed, message and
sign, the person and his utterance within the one comprehensive
unity of the mystery.” 58 The mystery is the mystery of God which
is, “ultimately nothing other than Christ himself – it is the person.
From this there follows an understanding of revelation that
is seen basically as dialogue….” 59
In the reading of Scripture, “a dialogue takes place between
God and man,” which reaches its highest point when the
Church, “listens to the word of God in common in the sacred
liturgy and within this framework itself experiences the active
presence of the Logos, the Word in the words.” 60 God’s dialogue
is always actual; as I-Thou dialogue it always takes place in the
present tense. In Dei Verbum 2, Jesus’ words, “no longer do I call
you servants... but... friends,” are given,
here and now with the intention of forcing us to reply. Thus
we can see how the idea of revelation also outlines a conception of
man: man as the creature of dialogue who, in listening to the word
of God, becomes contemporaneous with the presentness of God
and in the fellowship of the word receives the reality which is indivisibly
one with this word: fellowship with God himself. 61
Likewise, in Vatican II there is a deepening understanding of
revelation as, “a totality, in which word and event make up one
whole, a true dialogue which touches man in his totality, not only
challenging his reason, but, as dialogue, addressing him as a
57
JOSEPH RATZINGER, “Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation,” in
Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, ed. Herbert Vorgrimler and others
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), vol. 3, 170-171. See Dei Verbum, 2
and Vatican I, Dei Filius in DS3004f.
58
RATZINGER, 171.
59
RATZINGER, 171.
60
RATZINGER, 271; citing Dei Verbum, 25.
61
RATZINGER, 171, citing John 15:15.

DIALOGICAL PERSONALISM REVISITED 231
partner, indeed, giving him his true nature for the first time.” 62
Thus in the New Testament, “instead of words, we have the
Word. Christ no longer speaks merely of God, but he is himself
the speech of God; this man is himself and as an entity the Word
of God that has made himself one of us… In him God has, as it
were, said himself.” 63 Therefore, God’s revelation does not talk
about something that is somehow external to the person; rather,
revelation is concerned with, “the relation of the human ‘I’ to the
divine ‘thou,’ so that the purpose of this dialogue is ultimately
not information, but unity and transformation.” 64
In this understanding of revelation as dialogical, the considerable
if indirect influence of Ferdinand Ebner is so apparent
that Ebner has been called, “the secret philosophical inspiration
of modern theology.” 65 Yet, as René Latourelle observed, it is surprising,
given the symbolic aspect of Word as the mode of God’s
self-communication that, “there are very few theologians who
elaborate these notions of word.…” 66 It is this mystery that Ebner
examines from so many perspectives – how the I-thou dynamic
of God calling to us and our responding is constitutive of
being.
Philosophy is necessary to this theological enterprise for,
without it, as the Holy Father maintains, “it would in fact be impossible
to discuss theological issues such as, for example, the
use of language to speak about God, the personal relations within
the Trinity, God’s creative activity in the world, the relationship
between God and man, or Christ’s identity as true God and
62 RATZINGER, 172.
63 RATZINGER, 175, commenting on the use of Hebrews 1 in Dei Verbum
4, and citing René Latourelle, Theology of Revelation (Théologie de la Révélation)
(New York: Alba House, 1966) and KARL RAHNER, “The Development of
Dogma,” Theological Investigations 1 (London: Darton, Longman & Todd,
1961), 39-78.
64 RATZINGER, 175.
65 JURGEN MOLTMANN, Anfänge der dialektischen Theologie, 1 (Mn: n.p.,
1966), xvii, cited in HANS WALDENFELS, “La comprensione della rivelazione nel
XX secolo,” in La rivelazione, trans. Maria Christina Laurenzi (Palermo: Edizioni
Augustinus, 1992), 452.
66 LATOURELLE, Theology of Revelation, 208.

232 JOSEPH CHAPEL
true man.” 67 Although human language cannot completely express
the reality of God, “faith clearly presupposes that human
language is capable of expressing divine and transcendent reality
in a universal way….” 68 In this way, the word of God is a divine
word, although expressed in human language.
However, philosophy needs to go beyond more limited existential,
hermeneutical and linguistic questions, to examine the
more radical questions about the fundamental meaning of personal
existence, being and God. Otherwise, philosophy offers
less to theology than it might for, in the Holy Father’s estimation,
people are settling for, “partial and provisional truths, no longer
seeking to ask radical questions about the meaning and ultimate
foundation of human, personal and social existence. In short,
the hope that philosophy might be able to provide definitive answers
to these questions has dwindled.” 69
As a Catholic thinker, Ebner’s notion of God as the Eternal
Thou and his understanding of “Word” as foundational – to be
echoed later in Dei Verbum – make a substantial contribution
here: faith and reason meet in our human nature, we are created
in the Word, the Word of faith who is Jesus Christ, while at
the same time, it is “having the word,” which is the very manifestation
of reason. Because the central reality of man and
woman is the fact of being created by God, their very identity is
found as dialogue partners with the Eternal Thou.
Ebner does not substantially develop this relationship between
word, language and reason, which is a central theme for
language philosophy. Rather, Ebner’s significant contribution is
to provide the theological link to Jesus Christ, the Word made
flesh, as the foundational word that undergirds human language
which mediates reason.
The dialogical reality of the relationship between God and
man founded in Jesus Christ, the Word made flesh, suggests an
invitation both in God’s “call,” and at the same time, in man’s
ability to “respond.” In Ebner’s thought, this “ability to respond”
67 FR, 66.
68 FR, 84.
69 FR, 5.

DIALOGICAL PERSONALISM REVISITED 233
– the very meaning of “responsibility” – suggests a fundamental
moral dimension in our dialogical relationships with God and
neighbor.
The fact of “having the word,” makes man free. Animals do
not speak and consequently do not possess reason with its capacity
for abstraction, for stepping back to a “distance of perspective,”
to make choices rather than respond to instinct. The
fact that man speaks, as Ebner makes clear, is the manifestation
of reason, of abstract thought, of perspective and of choice. Because
man chooses, man is free. In the word, Jesus Christ, the
Word made flesh, makes man free – a foundational condition of
moral life.
But man can hide from such freedom and retreat into a
world of monologue and ideas. Where there is fragmentation of
knowledge, as John Paul II notes, the sense that meaning can no
longer be sought or found may lead to, “a kind of ambiguous
thinking which leads it to an ever deepening introversion, locked
within the confines of its own immanence without reference of
any kind to the transcendent.” 70 In such a framework, there is no
longer a basis for “moral” decisions, which are replaced by institutional
or “pragmatic” considerations, by which the Holy Father
explains, “anthropology itself is severely compromised by a
one-dimensional vision of the human being, a vision which excludes
the great ethical dilemmas and the existential analyses of
the meaning of suffering and sacrifice, of life and death.” 71 The
result is a kind of solitary nihilism in which, “the neglect of being
inevitably leads to losing touch with objective truth and
therefore with the very ground of human dignity.” 72 This in turn
brings a loss of the sense that man and woman are made in the
image and likeness of God, and leads, “little by little either to a
destructive will to power or to a solitude without hope.” 73
This “solitude without hope” is the very “I-aloneness” of
which Ebner spoke, an “introversion” which hides from dialogue
and encounter, a “closure to the thou” which is the very
70 FR, 81.
71 FR, 89.
72 FR, 90.
73 FR, 90.

234 JOSEPH CHAPEL
heart of sin. Ebner argues that one is not good or evil in relation
to oneself, but only in relation to another. Therefore, sin is not
an “idea” but is concretely an issue of broken relation, of turning
from authentic I-thou dialogue with God and neighbor. This
has been the heart of the Fall from the beginning: in trying to be
absolutely “free” in the sense of absolute independence, man
turns away for the other, avoiding the Thou. In trying to be more
free and independent, man ends up less so.
The understanding that God’s word can be expressed in
some fashion in human language, as the Holy Father notes,
points up the importance of philosophy for moral theology’s
treatment of, “moral law, conscience, freedom, personal responsibility
and guilt, which are in part defined by philosophical
ethics.” 74 All of these are mediated in language and the path back
to God in the moral sphere is through the word. In Ebner’s
terms, because every aspect of spiritual life, including sin, has a
direct relationship to the word, because all life is created
through the word: “All being, which has fallen from God and has
become wordless, is destined to return again to the word – in
man and through him.” 75
Thus the moral core for Ebner is this: we are created in the
Word, God calls to us in love, and we are free to respond to that
love or not. Our choice to respond or not respond is a moral
stance toward relationship with God and others, or toward a retreat
into self. This is a freedom that can be misused. There is an
ethical or “responsible” dimension in the fact that unlike animals,
we speak: speaking orients us toward the thou; we do not
speak as isolated individuals but within relationships and we are
“good” or “bad” within relationships, which of itself suggests our
human orientation not to solitary isolation, but to communal
life.
In considering the relationship between faith and reason
and the need for a revitalized dialogue in which philosophy will
once again assist theology in discovering the proper place of
faith in understanding our very existence, this article has not at-
74 FR, 66.
75 GREEN, 266; WR, Schriften 1:320.

DIALOGICAL PERSONALISM REVISITED 235
tempted to analyze the merits of the various philosophies of recent
centuries. Rather, the goal has been the “recovery” of dialogical
personalist philosophy, particularly as found in the work
of the Catholic thinker, Ferdinand Ebner, as a helpful platform
for such a dialogue today.
Still, Ebner does not bring us all the way; his thought is not
a destination. Rather he provides a bridge to further reflection –
Ebner gives us the why of language, the underpinning of the
faculty of reason, that is, why man has the use of language and
why having the word is foundational to our identity as rational
beings, why we are founded in the word, in Jesus Christ, the
Word made flesh. But Ebner does not really provide the how of
language, for this we must turn to the philosophy of language –
how language operates and works as such – for language is needed
to discuss theology, including these very moral issues.
In this sense, Ebner clearly opens the way to fruitful dialogue
between the operation of language in language philosophy
and its efficacious use in sacramental theology, in which the reality
of man, as a speaking being created by God in Jesus Christ,
is made manifest in the intensive moments of sacramental celebrations.
Further reflection is needed on the application of dialogical
thought in the concrete relationship between language
philosophies and sacramental theologies and their further implications
for living out a moral life day to day, a topic to be taken
up in a subsequent article.
Immaculate Conception Seminary JOSEPH CHAPEL
School of Theology
Seton Hall University
South Orange, New Jersey 07079
USA.
chapeljo@shu.edu
—————
The author is a priest of the Archdiocese of Newark and Assistant
Professor of Theology at Immaculate Conception Seminary
School of Theology, Seton Hall University, South Orange, New Jersey,
USA.

236 JOSEPH CHAPEL
El autor es sacerdote de la arquidiócesis de Newark y profesor
auxiliar de teología en la Immaculate Conception Seminary School
of Theology en la Universidad de Seton Hall, South Orange, New Jersey,
USA.
—————

StMor 40 (2002) 237-258
MARTIN MCKEEVER, C.SS.R.
CAN ANYTHING GOOD COME OUT
OF POSTMODERNISM?: A READING OF ZYGMUNT
BAUMAN’S POSTMODERN ETHICS
IN THE LIGHT OF FIDES ET RATIO
Fides et ratio (September, 1998) has recently emphasized the
importance of studying philosophy for a more adequate articulation
and communication of the christian faith in contemporary
culture 1 . The encyclical conceives of the proper relationship
between faith and reason, and hence between theology and philosophy,
as a kind of virtuous circle in which each stimulates, enhances
and perfects the other. Faith serves reason in these ways
by proclaiming with conviction the truth of Revelation as the ultimate
and universal truth about human life; reason serves faith
by critically posing the ultimate questions about human life and
by refining the articulation and systematic expression of the answers
to these questions. While presenting this conception of the
relationship between faith and reason as the ideal, Fides et ratio
clearly laments the fact that this relationship rarely exists in
practice in modern and postmodern culture.
The concern of this piece is not with the broader question of
the relationship between faith and reason, but is rather limited
to the implications of this question for morality, understood
here as the practical and theoretical pursuit of what is good. A
superficial reading of the encyclical might lead one to conclude
that it is not much concerned with morality, being focussed primarily
on Revelation, epistemology and cultural change. Read
with due attention, however, it becomes clear that what the en-
1 This article was first published in Portugese in a recent number of
Fragmentos de Cultura dedicated in part to the theme of faith and ethics, see:
M. MCKEEVER, Alguma Coisa Boa Pode Sair do Pósmodernismo?: una leitura
de ética postmoderna de Zygmunt Bauman à luz de Fides et ratio in Fragmentos
de Cultura 11/4 (2001) 501-520.

238 MARTIN MCKEEVER
cyclical has to say about Revelation, epistemology and cultural
change has profound relevance precisely for morality. In fact, a
good case could be made for arguing that one of the central concerns
of Fides et ratio is the way in which morality has been affected
by sweeping cultural change.
The cultural change referred to in the encyclical is in the
first instance what we might call modernity, meaning by this
word the whole gamut of economic, political, social and philosophical
mutations which have been in evidence since the Enlightenment.
Given the broader theme of the encyclical, the aspect
of modernity which receives most attention is philosophical
thought, particularly in its relation to christian faith. While this
remains a primary focus of the encyclical, there is no doubt that
the more recent form of cultural change which is referred to as
postmodernity also constitutes a major source of preoccupation.
Both in general philosophical terms and in specifically moral
terms postmodernism is seen as an ambiguous phenomenon
which threatens to undermine confidence in reason and drive
contemporary society into nihilistic attitudes.
It is ironic that among the many postmodernist authors who
write passionately about moral questions, there are so few who
attempt to articulate a systematic account of ethics. Perhaps such
a project appears inherently recidivist to the postmodern mind in
that it is held to repeat the modernist mistake of trying to impose
rational schemes on chaotic human reality. Whatever of that,
amid the oceanic bibliography on postmodernism there is a noticeable
dearth of studies which spell out the implications of postmodernism
for ethics as a discipline. 2 The result is that one is gen-
2 A selection of studies which at least broach the subject, albeit in diverse
perspectives, might include: LEVINAS, E. Etica come filosofia prima (Milano:Guerini,
1991); MÜLLER, D. L’éthique protestante dans la crise de la
modernité (Paris: Les éditions du cerf, 1999); VATTIMO, G. Etica de la interpretación
(Buenos Aires:Paidos, 1992); KEARNY, R. “Ethics and the Postmodern
Imagination” in Thought: A Review of Culture and Ideas, 62:224 (1987)
39-58; FRATALONE, R. “Etica teologica e le istanze della postmodernità” in
Quaderni di Synaxis10, Prospettive etiche nella postmodernità (Milano:San
Paolo, 1994) 52-82; MCKEEVER, M. “Postmodern with a difference: Simone
Weil’s ethico-theological critique of totalitarianism in L’enracinement” in
Studia Moralia 37 (1999) 185-214.

CAN ANYTHING GOOD COME OUT OF POSTMODERNISM?... 239
erally left to suppose or imagine what kind of understanding of
ethics underlies the position which a given postmodernist author
adopts on important moral questions such as social oppression in
capitalist culture, conventional and nuclear war, biomedical research
and techniques, feminist and gender issues, human rights
and so forth. One of the few postmodernists who has attempted
to articulate a postmodern ethics is the British sociologist Zygmunt
Bauman. In his work Postmodern Ethics 3 , this author proposes
a vision of morality which reflects the critique of modernism
germane to postmodernist thought.
This article will attempt a systematic comparative study of
the understanding of morality articulated in Bauman’s work and
that articulated in Fides et ratio. The method to be employed
here will involve three stages: first, we will allow Bauman to
“speak for himself”, as it were, through close reference to Postmodern
Ethics (and at the same time to speak for other postmodern
authors, upon whom he draws heavily). Second, we will
attempt to articulate the moral import of the broader argument
of Fides et ratio. Third, we will revisit Bauman’s account of
morality in order to identify and analyse the key points of contrast
with the Catholic position. A careful reading of these two
texts in this light should afford some interesting answers to such
topical questions as the following: What is the importance of
postmodern philosophy for ethics in general and for theological
ethics in particular? What aspects of postmodern ethical
thought does christian ethics reject as incompatible with christian
morality and why?
Morality according to Zymunt Bauman’s Postmodern
Ethics
In this section, Bauman’s thought will be presented synthetically
in the form of the following three tenets which, it is hoped,
adequately present his argument:
3 BAUMAN, Zygmunt. Postmodern Ethics. (Oxford UK & Cambridge USA:
Blackwell, 1993). Portugese translation: Ética pósmoderna (São Paolo:
Paulus, 1997).

240 MARTIN MCKEEVER
a. The modernist project of making progress by regulating human
conduct through the use of instrumental reason has
been discredited
b. Spontaneous moral impulse is the only source of morality
c. The moral self is constituted by its responsibility for the
Other
Without for the moment offering any critique of Bauman’s
position, we may summarize his thought by offering a gloss on
each of these tenets in turn.
The modernist project of making progress by regulating
human conduct through instrumental reason has been unmasked
and discredited
It is important to notice that this tenet is actually a very
short story. It expresses in telegraphic form a narrative of
modernity and postmodernity which is recounted in the opening
chapters of Postmodern Ethics. Perhaps the best way of introducing
Bauman’s understanding of morality is to retell the story
he recounts in these chapters in an abbreviated form.
Modernity, according to Bauman, began with the dawning
of Renaissance humanism, when western society cast off the
shackles of an oppressive feudal, monarchical and ecclesiastical
hegemony (22, 23). In the name of critical reason, the spurious
authority of such institutions as the Church and the feudal system
was challenged by the philosophes (25). Having emancipated
themselves from clerical and monarchical domination, the
thinkers of the Enlightenment set out to construct a new system
of ethical and political authority based on their understanding
of human nature (25). This newfound freedom was not, however,
enjoyed by all: a “great schism” (23) opened between the enlightened
élite and the uneducated and turbulent masses (23). In
the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, teachers
and legislators were assigned the task of formulating and promulgating
the new codes which were to replace those of feudalism
(27). In the absence of clerical authority, these codes and
practices were to be based on the authority of reason itself.
From then on, people would be good because they would see

CAN ANYTHING GOOD COME OUT OF POSTMODERNISM?... 241
that it is reasonable to be good, that is to say, they would be convinced
that being good corresponded to their own interests and
amour propre (27). Translated into the social and political realities
of modern life this meant the production and imposition of
laws which were to promote the good of all and ensure permanent
stability and security (28). In the course of time, however,
the modern state took on increasingly oppressive forms, often
degenerating into colonialism and totalitarianism and thus ending
up in contradiction with its own professed ideals.
In Bauman’s narrative, it is at this point that postmodernist
thought offers an alternative to the illusions of modernism, not
least in the sphere of ethics. It is only in comparatively recent
times, continues Bauman, that we have been able to see through
the illusions of the project of modernity and challenge the new
hegemony of reason and of the State:
Postmodernity, one may say, is modernity without illusions (the
obverse of which is that modernity is postmodernity refusing to accept
its own truth). [...] The truth in question is that the ‘messiness’
will stay whatever we do or know, that the little orders and ‘systems’
we carve out in the world are brittle, until-further-notice, and as arbitrary
and in the end contingent as their alternatives.(33)
Like other postmodern authors, Bauman is quick to point
out that the “post-” involved in postmodernism is not a merely
chronological specification (10). It is rather a predominantly
qualitative specification: postmodernism does not just look back
at modernism, it looks down on it! To be postmodern is to locate
oneself chronologically and qualitatively in a narrative which recounts
modernism, it is to consider oneself among those who
have passed beyond a wrongheaded vision of the world (“we
now know...” is one of Bauman’s favourite phrases) and are in a
position to see what was wrong with modernity.
Bauman goes on to praise some of the characteristics of
contemporary culture which, in his view, postmodernism has
brought in its train. The abortive modernist effort to disenchant
the world has been defeated and we are enjoying a new appreciation
of mystery; passions and spontaneous human inclinations
(107), the constituents of true personalism, have been rehabilitated
after suffering under modernist suspicions and repression

242 MARTIN MCKEEVER
(34); the destructive effects of technology on the social order
have been exposed and are being challenged (201).
The postmodern perspective consists in the conviction that
not only did the modernist project fail but that it had to fail. In
this perspective the history of the modern world, particularly in
terms of the expansion of the State, the growth of colonial empires
and the emergence of the various totalitarian systems, is
reread as the story of a destructive form of civilization which
should not be spread. In this sense postmodernism can be seen
to include a powerful ethical critique of modernity.
Spontaneous moral impulse is the only source of morality
If the first tenet attempts to encapsulate the broad narrative
of modernity as presented by Bauman, this second tenet expresses
his moral vision in a more specific manner: it represents,
that is, a conclusion about morality which Bauman arrives at in
the light of the story just told.
Bauman’s conclusion is based on a radical distinction he
perceives between a discredited, systematic, universalist, foundationalist,
heteronomous ethics (21, 60, 61) and a modest,
spontaneous, responsible and autonomous morality (12, 32, 71).
The reasons for his rejection of heteronomous ethics, already intimated
in the narration of modernity, are developed by Bauman
in his discussion of “elusive universality” and “elusive foundations”.
The philosopher’s preoccupation with universals, he suggests,
is a reflection of the legislator’s project of universalization.
In other words, Bauman wishes to “unmask” the quest for universals
in philosophy as a furtive collusion with the political authority
of the modern State (38). In ethical terms, universal laws
are presented as valid for every reasonable creature but in fact
serve primarily as legitimizations of local political interests (42).
With the demise of the claims of the modern State to regulate
moral life, Bauman notes a developing tendency among
“communitarians” to propose norms not in the name of humanity
but rather in the name of some particular grouping (44), defined
by some specific characteristic (religion, gender, sexual
orientation etc.).
Bauman considers such claims a variation of the spurious

CAN ANYTHING GOOD COME OUT OF POSTMODERNISM?... 243
claims of the ethical systems of modernity in that they attempt
to substitute “heteronomous ethical duty” for “autonomous
moral responsibility.” All such attempts to universalize, he
maintains, are inherently depersonalizing in that they reduce
the human individual to an interchangeable entity (47) and
thereby deny or curtail “individual moral discretion.”
Over against this unacceptable attempt to control human
behaviour through imposed ethical codes, Bauman proposes a
concept of morality as “moral condition” and “moral impulse”.
This condition begins where ethics ends. To be universalizable,
that is to be expressable in terms of rules, morality would have
to be “calculable” in the sense that it would involve purpose (54),
reciprocity (56) and contractuality (58). Following Levinas, Bauman
conceives of morality as being intrinsically uncodifiable because
the moral subject is not interchangeable (the moral “we”
is not the plural of “I”). The moral subject must respond to the
Other not on the basis of rules formulated elsewhere but as a
unique and irreplaceable individual prompted by his or here
own moral impulse (86) which is of a thoroughly personal nature
(60). The obligations of the moral subject are addressed “to
me and to me only”(51) and my moral responsibility is not universalizable.
A moral relationship is thus essentially asymmetrical
and non-reciprocal, at least at the outset. In fact, the test of
moral authenticity is the genuinely autonomous nature of any
moral act: if it has been decided by others, or if it is calculated
and reasoned, then it is not really a moral act at all (123).
Morality, unlike ethics, Bauman argues, is inherently and
profoundly ambivalent (42) and cannot be contained in the neat
categories of modernist ethical thought. It is not the product of
any code, it is not subject to being guided by rules, it is not
founded on anything but itself, it is not a calculation or a purpose,
but rather a spontaneous, pristine, brute fact. It does not
alter the messiness and ambivalence of everyday life (78), but
can nonetheless be discerned as a stubbornly perduring reality.
It is only by replacing the modernist obsession with foundations
and universals with the humble stone of moral impulse that we
can rightly understand morality. Consequently morality is the
realm of “perpetual and irreparable anomie” which defies all social
regulation of an ethical kind.
Despite these sweeping claims, Bauman insists that he does

244 MARTIN MCKEEVER
not wish to join with those sceptics who celebrate the demise of
any moral vision or value. Those who live in postmodern culture
must simply accept the ambivalence inherent in morality and
acknowledge the consequent impossibility of building a coherent
ethical system, much less of imposing it.
The moral self is constituted by its responsibility for the
Other
Having abandoned most of the categories in which ethics is
traditionally construed (rationality, purpose, judgement, foundations
and universality) Bauman proceeds to elaborate upon
his conception of “morality beyond ethics”. This is based on the
idea of “the moral self” construed in contradistinction to the calculating,
rational, ethical self. The moral self is the unique, personal,
autonomous being who precedes all reasoning, calculation
and regulation and who transcends all roles imposed by heteronomous
authorities. The morality of the moral self is precisely
what remains when all such ethical considerations are
eliminated or what is already there before they arise.
This self is constituted by the spontaneous response to the
Other as Other. To be a moral self is to accept the call of the Other,
to acknowledge the Other as Face and therefore invested with
an irreplaceable authority (75). It is precisely this response to
the command of the Other which makes the moral subject an individual.
The moral self is not just “with” the Other, but “for” the
Other in that it recognises itself as responsible for the Other as
Face, that is as a unique and mysterious presence rather than as
an interchangeable social unit. In order to be true to his own declared
principles, Bauman’s moral self must precede ontology
(72), since ontology already implies reasoning, calculation and
regulation. The moral self is located in a space “better” than being,
in that being for is superior to simply being with. To be moral
just is to be able to hear this command and respond to it (72).
Thus far Bauman’s attempt to articulate his view of morality.
In accordance with the plan outlined above, we will now proceed
to study the very different vision of morality to be gleaned
from Fides et ratio. Having done so it will be possible to revisit

CAN ANYTHING GOOD COME OUT OF POSTMODERNISM?... 245
these key themes of postmodern ethics and articulate a critique
of them from the point of view of Catholic ethical thought.
Morality according to Fides et ratio
The subject of Fides et ratio, as noted above, is a good deal
wider than the question of morality in that it treats the entire
question of the relationship between faith and reason. It must be
stressed, however, that the understanding of morality represented
in the encyclical is fully integrated into, and inseparable
from, a certain vision of the appropriate relationship between
theology and philosophy. It would be a grave mistake to imagine
that one could grasp the moral import of this encyclical by simply
extracting the various sections in which the theme of ethics
is explicitly broached. While it is beyond the purpose of this article
to study the broader questions in depth, the only way to understand
adequately the vision of morality being proposed is to
take note of the philosophical and theological context in which
it is set.
The key features of the teaching of Fides et ratio which have
direct import for the understanding of morality presented in the
encyclical might be articulated under the following major
themes:
a. reason is the key natural resource in the human quest for
meaning
b. the ultimate truth about human life is revealed in Christ
c. the truth revealed in faith and the truth perceived by reason
are not alone compatible but ultimately complementary
Reason is the key natural resource in the human quest
for meaning
Although, in general, Fides et ratio could be described as expository
and didactic in style, it includes a strong element of
narration. This is particularly in evidence in the treatment of Sacred
Scripture, the Fathers and Tradition, but is also present in
the brief accounts of the history of human philosophical en-

246 MARTIN MCKEEVER
deavour. It is worth reconstructing this “brief history of reason”
which underlies the main argument of the encyclical.
Stimulated by a native sense of wonder (§ 4) at the marvels of
the created world, the human being, from earliest times, has posed
himself (herself) questions about the ultimate meaning of his own
existence and that of the world (§§1, 64). Human beings, in fact, are
naturally philosophical in that they have an innate and profound
desire for meaning. Faced with the perennial and lacerating questions
of suffering, death and moral evil, they have searched relentlessly
all through history for an overarching explanation of human
life in which they can have confidence and trust (§ 26).
At different times and in diverse cultures this natural tendency
to reflect has taken on more rigorous and systematic
forms which have issued in formal philosophical reflection (§ 7).
Such reflection has been possible because of the remarkable capacity
of the human individual not only to know, but also to
know that he knows. A rigorous use of this capacity has allowed
human beings progressively to establish laws of coherence and
criteria of truth for their rational reflection. A practical demonstration
of this universal capacity of reason to be critically selfreflective
is seen in the convergence of various cultures in the establishment
of certain commonly shared standards and moral
norms (§§ 2, 4)
Fides et ratio proceeds to recount some of the influences of
contemporary cultural trends on this perennial quest for meaning.
In so far as contemporary culture is thought of as modern, a number
of alarming tendencies are noted: a disproportionate focus on
the limitations and conditions of human subjectivity at the expense
of the more ultimate questions (§ 5), the reduction of the
role of reason to an instrumental and technical level (§ 47), the
separation of philosophy and theology (§ 45 ), the excessive claims
of autonomy on the part of individual reason (§ 80). While these
negative aspects are preponderant, some positive developments
are noted in terms of a deeper understanding of human beings and
an improved respect for their dignity (§§ 38, 76).
In more recent times, the encyclical continues, the culture in
which we live has taken on many of the characteristics of “postmodernity”(§
91). The alarming influences of this tendency are
even more destructive: a loss of faith in the capacity of reason
(§§ 5, 6), the fragmentary and sectorial nature of knowledge

CAN ANYTHING GOOD COME OUT OF POSTMODERNISM?... 247
(§§ 5, 85), a broad cultural tendency toward scepticism, nihilism
and wilful pluralism (§§ 5, 90), the reduction of the quest for
meaning to a provisional, ephemeral quest (§ 91) and so forth.
In short, human reason, having made some progress
through the centuries in the acquisition of truth, has suffered in
modern times under the excesses of modern critical rationalism
and is currently being exposed to the even more devastating assault
of postmodern nihilism (§ 9).
It is precisely in this cultural context, as a response to this history,
that the encyclical wishes to affirm and encourage the role
of reason in the quest for the meaning of human existence. There
are numerous texts in which the value and dignity of this fundamental
natural resource are affirmed: reason opens up the horizon
of “ personal self-consciousness”(§ 1); if employed rightly, it
is capable of grasping the first principles of truth (§§ 4, 49); of its
own nature, it is capable of recognising the transcendent nature
of truth (§ 49); it can and should aspire to the intelligible articulation
of the fundamental and universal truths at the level of
metaphysics and of theology (§§ 20, 77 ). Not least, reason is indispensable
in guiding the human being in making moral choice:
No less important than research in the theoretical field is research
in the practical field – by which I mean the search for truth
which looks to the good which is to be performed. In acting ethically,
according to a free and rightly tuned will, the human person
sets foot upon the path to happiness and moves towards perfection.
(§ 25)
If we recall the destructive and disorientating tendencies of
modern and postmodern culture, the vital importance of reason
in guiding the human quest for the good is all the more
clear. Aware of its own dignity, reason will not limit itself to
functional and technical matters but open itself to the deeper
truths of its own being and of transcendence. The whole argument
of Fides et ratio hinges upon the capacity of human reason
to know the truth, both at a speculative and at a practical
level. Only in the horizon of universal and objective truth can
the questions of the good and the right be adequately posed
and rightly answered. If reason can grasp the “truth of values”
(§ 25), then this truth will prevent it falling victim to the mod-

248 MARTIN MCKEEVER
ernist illusion of a completely self-founding autonomy or the
postmodern reduction of all moral good to the ephemeral and
the relative.
The ultimate truth about human existence is revealed in
Christ
Against this background image of a needful and searching
human being, open to the truth which reason can discover, the
encyclical gradually articulates its central message: the ultimate
and fundamental answer to the human quest for meaning is to
be found in Revelation. Given all that has just been said about
the importance of reason, this affirmation constitutes an audacious
claim, which requires some justification and explanation.
The fundamental justification of such a claim is that the author
of this truth is not the speculative power of the human
mind but God. The human mind seizes the truths of Revelation
not by dint of its own power (§§ 7, 15) but in faith, by the grace
of the Spirit (§§ 15, 61). Fides et ratio includes extensive narrative
accounts of the ways in which God has revealed Himself in
history and of the culmination of that Revelation in Christ. Such
affirmations clearly ascribe a certain priority to Revelation with
respect to reason, without denying the legitimate and important
role of this later. This primacy of Revelation is articulated in
terms of the two orders of consciousness (natural and supernatural),
the saving purpose of Revelation, the authority of God as
one who reveals Himself in history, obedience as the appropriate
response and the role of the Church as the servant of the revealed
truths of faith. The conclusion of the encyclical is that
without recourse to faith, without the message of salvation in
Christ, our human condition would remain an “insoluble enigma”(§
12) which could easily conduce to despair.
It is only within this context of faith in the Word of God as
the source of revealed truth that the vision of morality presented
in Fides et ratio can be understood. Germane to this vision of
faith is the conviction that human beings are in need of salvation,
that their natural powers of knowing the truth have been
damaged through sin and that the highest good for human beings
is to be more fully united with God, the Supreme good (§

CAN ANYTHING GOOD COME OUT OF POSTMODERNISM?... 249
41). This being so, the act of faith, by which the human being
freely assents to the truth of Revelation, and entrusts himself to
God (§ 33) is itself a profoundly moral decision:
This is why the Church has always considered the act of entrusting
oneself to God to be a moment of fundamental decision
which engages the whole person. In that act, the intellect and the
will display their spiritual nature, enabling the subject to act in a
way which realizes personal freedom to the full. [...] It is not just
that freedom is part of the act of faith: it is absolutely required. Indeed,
it is faith that allows individuals to give consummate expression
to their own freedom. Put differently, freedom is not realized in
decisions made against God. For how could it be an exercise of true
freedom to refuse to be open to the very reality which enables our
self-realization? Men and women can accomplish no more important
act in their lives than the act of faith; it is here that freedom
reaches the certainty of truth and chooses to live in that truth. (§ 13)
Fides et ratio thus proposes that the truth of Revelation,
freely embraced in faith, can serve as a point of departure and a
point of orientation for reason in its quest for meaning (§ 6). The
ultimate and fundamental nature of revealed truth should inspire
and reassure reason in its endeavour to confront the ultimate
questions of life, particularly in a cultural context which
tends to be marked by doubt and suspicion. The proposal of the
encyclical at the level of ethical theory is that, assisted by the
truth of faith, reason should aspire to develop a metaphysic of
the good in the sense of a comprehensive, objective and universal
understanding of who human beings are and what is good
for them (§§ 36, 98, 105).
The truth of faith and the truth of reason are not alone
compatible but complementary
In the Introduction to Fides et ratio, faith and reason are depicted
graphically as the “two wings” upon which the human
spirit raises itself up in search of the truth. In the course of the
encyclical, the respective qualities and competencies of faith and
reason are treated in some detail. While insisting on a legitimate

250 MARTIN MCKEEVER
distinction, the encyclical is at pains to point out that this does
not mean that there is a fundamental conflict or competition between
the two.
On the contrary, a harmonious relationship between faith
and reason is presented in the form of a circularity within which
reason can investigate, by means of its own resources and methods,
the truth of Revelation affirmed by faith:
In the light of these considerations, the relationship between
theology and philosophy is best construed as a circle. Theology’s
source and starting-point must always be the word of God revealed
in history, while its final goal will be an understanding of that word
which increases with each passing generation. Yet, since God’s
word is Truth (cf. Jn 17:17), the human search for truth – philosophy,
pursued in keeping with its own rules – can only help to understand
God’s word better. [...] This circular relationship with the
word of God leaves philosophy enriched, because reason discovers
new and unsuspected horizons. (73)
The underlying principle here is that the truth is one (§§ 34,
53, 71), both in the sense that what is true must be true everywhere
and necessarily, but also in the sense that the ultimate
truths of faith cannot contradict the truths of reason (§§ 27, 34,
51) and that human beings need some unitary, definitive explanation
as the foundation of their thought and action (§ 27).
Within this fundamental unity, complementary functions
can be discerned. Reason is necessary both in order to receive
the revealed message, auditus fidei, and in order to articulate the
experience of faith, intellectus fidei (§ 65). When this later takes
the form of a systematic and organic presentation, it needs philosophy
in order to ensure its own internal intelligibility and coherence.
In this sense we can speak of the need for philosophical
mediation (§ 69) of the faith. At the same time faith helps
reason not to become too narrow or too presumptuous, it both
expands the horizons of enquiry and tempers the pride of the intellect.
This complementarity of faith and reason has major implications
for the understanding of morality presented in the encyclical.
The point of departure of any such reflection is the acceptance,
in faith, of the Revelation in Christ of God as the

CAN ANYTHING GOOD COME OUT OF POSTMODERNISM?... 251
Supreme Good (§ 57). The goodness of God is therefore both the
ultimate horizon in which the goodness of human actions is to
be discerned and the goal to which they aspire. Right reason
guides the human being in the choice of particular actions
which will lead to a life in conformity with the truth of Revelation.
Within this schema the false autonomy of reason which
leads to rationalism and possibly totalitarianism is replaced by
the free choice of the human being to obey, in trust, the one authority
of the truth (§ 79).
Over against this account of how things should be the encyclical
presents a description of the “nefarious separation” by
which reason has assumed an illegitimate and destructive autonomy
(§ 80). Cut off from the guidance and inspiration of the
truths of faith, reason slips into various forms of aberration,
most notably that of nihilism (§§ 90,98). This is construed as the
denial that any universal truth can be known or that any opinion
is of more value than another. Such a nihilistic stance within
philosophy is thus an example of the kind of “presuppositions
and conclusions” which are incompatible with christian faith
(§ 50).
The encyclical specifically rejects a concept of truth as consensus
and the utilitarian and pragmatic modes of ethical thinking
which follow from this:
In brief, there are signs of a widespread distrust of universal
and absolute statements, especially among those who think that
truth is born of consensus and not of a consonance between intellect
and objective reality. (§ 56)
The ultimate expression of the harmony between faith and
reason finds expression in such a science as moral theology. In
view of the particular challenges presented by postmodern culture,
the primary call has to be the production of a “metaphysic
of the good” based on a recognition of the truth of Revelation
and the truth of reason (§§ 67, 68, 98). Only such a vision of the
good will be able to withstand the pressures of subjectivist, utilitarian
and pragmatist ethics.
Thus far our attempt to articulate the moral import of the
teaching of Fides et ratio.

252 MARTIN MCKEEVER
It is beyond the scope of this piece to enter into the profound
and complex issues which this teaching raises both at an epistemological
and theological level. 4 In the context of this article, the
teaching of the encyclical as it pertains to ethics is intended to
serve as a point of reference in the process of evaluating the vision
of morality presented by Bauman. It is to this task that we
now turn.
Critical observations on Bauman’s position in the light
of Fides et ratio
It is abundantly clear from these two contrasting visions of
morality that the differences between postmodernism and
Catholicism on this score, at least as represented by Zygmunt
Bauman and John Paul II, are very pronounced. We are confronted
here not simply with differing opinions on specific
moral questions, but with radically diverse ways of understanding
morality itself. One might say that we are dealing with a
metaethical rather than an ethical divergence. In this final section
we will attempt to highlight and analyse some of the major
aspects of Bauman’s thought which account for this stark contrast.
A convenient way of arranging these observations will be
to revisit the three tenets in which Bauman’s vision was originally
articulated and note the main divergences with the
Catholic position.
The first of these tenets was: “The modernist project of making
progress by regulating human conduct through the use of instrumental
reason has been discredited”. As it stands, there is no
patent contradiction between this tenet and the vision presented
in Fides et ratio. One might even argue that there is a certain degree
of convergence in so far as both Bauman and the encyclical
express a negative judgement on the excessive rationalism of
modernity. The idea that human technology and bureaucracy
4 For a series of interesting current articles on the broader philosophical
and theological issues raised by Fides et ratio see: Revista Eclesiástica
Brasileira, Volume LIX, Fasc. 233, Março 1999, 30-66; Rivista di teologia
morale 121 (1) gennaio-marzo 1999, 3-61.

CAN ANYTHING GOOD COME OUT OF POSTMODERNISM?... 253
are adequate to the task of organizing society in a just manner
for the benefit of all is rejected in both texts. Furthermore both
texts show an awareness of the way in which an excessive rationalism
has been responsible for the establishment of totalitarian
power systems. 5
Such convergences of judgement, while interesting in their
own right, prove to be of secondary importance relative to the
divergences which emerge if one analyses the grounds upon
which these judgements are based and the alternatives which
are proposed. Bauman’s conclusion, as we saw above, is to drastically
reduce our expectations of human reason, abandon all illusions
of universality and foundations in ethics and accept that
morality is chaotic, ambivalent and sporadic. Such a stance is
radically incompatible with the Catholic vision. It would represent,
in fact, an instance of what Fides et ratio calls the kind of
thought which encourages a “distrust” of reason and undermines
confidence in the ability of human beings to discover the
truth about themselves and about what is good for them. While
sharing the judgement that modernity is excessively rationalistic,
Fides et ratio proposes that reason has a legitimate and indispensable
role in the moral life. The alternative to the approach
of modernity is not a nihilistic abandonment of all confidence
in reason, but a more moderate role for reason, which is
open to the mystery of transcendence and has the humility to
learn from other sources.
The difference between Bauman and John Paul II as regards
this first tenet, therefore, consists not in the critique of the excessive
rationalism of modernity, on which point there is some
convergence, but rather in the role reason is understood to play
in ethics. We will examine this point more closely in our study
of the second tenet, but it is important to note that this tenet is
based on two fundamentally different ways of reading history.
One way of expressing this would be to say that the two visions
of morality have their roots in the different narratives examined
above. The narrative within which John Paul II propos-
5 If we interpret the relevant sections of Fides et ratio in the context of
the social encyclicals of John Paul II this point is all the more obvious.

254 MARTIN MCKEEVER
es his vision is none other than the history of Western culture
and the history of salvation. From within these intertwined histories
the Pope believes it is possible to arrive at a metaphysics
of goodness which can provide the necessary objectivity and
foundations for a contemporary morality.
It we compare Bauman’s narrative with this one, a number
of factors emerge which help us understand why his vision of
morality is so different from that of Fides et ratio. One of the
most obvious of these is the comparative brevity of Bauman’s
narrative. At times he writes as if ethics, and indeed the world in
general, began with modernity. There is scant reference to the
centuries of moral reflection which precede the Enlightenment.
A second characteristic of his narrative is the manner in
which it divides history into epochs, most particularly those of
modernity and postmodernity. Like many postmodernist authors,
Bauman’s thought is defined in terms of what he wishes
to reject, that is to say modernity. He does not explicitly suggest
that in 1789, or 1871, or 1918, or 1945, or 1968 the world, or
even the “western world”, suddenly stopped being modern and
became postmodern. While avoiding such a preposterously
crude idea, he does nonetheless suggest that we have moved into
a new form of culture called postmodernity, without ever explaining
what has happened to modernity, not to mention those
forms of culture which existed before modernity. The primary
problem here is not simply the vague chronological and thematic
parameters but the reduction of history to a succession of
epochs, which does not do justice to the complex relationship
between past and present. Finally, we may note in passing the
stridently “secular” nature of Bauman’s narrative. As John Milbank
6 has argued so forcefully, the option of narrating history in
terms of secular reason is not a neutral, self-evident and “objective”
choice, but is itself a form of rationality which will shape
and often predetermine the course of one’s narrative.
As regards the first tenet, therefore, there is a limited convergence
between Bauman and John Paul II on the excesses of
5 MILBANK, J. Theology and Social Theory, Beyond Secular Reason. (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers, 1990).

CAN ANYTHING GOOD COME OUT OF POSTMODERNISM?... 255
rationalism, but a radical divergence on the role than reason
should play in morality. If John Paul II disagrees with some of
the excesses of modernity he is even more dubious about the
kind of scepticism which leads to a total distrust of reason.
Hence the irony of those passages in which the Pontiff of the
Catholic Church exhorts philosophers to take courage and have
confidence in the key resource of their science.
The second tenet in which Bauman’s vision was articulated
reads “Spontaneous moral impulse is the only source of morality”.
Here the divergence with Fides et ratio becomes categorical and
diametrical in that what Bauman is proposing negates the possibility
of ethics as understood in the encyclical. As we have
seen, the Catholic vision of morality hinges on an acknowledgement
of the truth and a realization of one’s autonomy by obedience
to the truth about what is good. The two central themes in
Bauman’s position which deny this possibility are his disassociation
of morality and ethics and the idea of moral ambivalence.
In his account of morality Bauman ascribes a kind of messianic
role to “postmodern ethics” in that it saves and liberates
people from the strictures of the ethics of modernity. The agenda
here is again set by modernism, most obviously by the efforts
of natural law theorists to establish the foundations of morality
in nature or in history and by Kant’s effort to construct an ethics
which can be universalized. It is important to notice that Bauman
does not refute these theories but simply takes it for granted
that they have been surpassed. He then goes on to debunk not
natural law or the categorical imperative, but the very idea of
foundations and universals, indeed the very idea of ethics. His
attempt to separate ethics and morality is simplistic in itself and
becomes highly tendentious when he seeks to set up an autonomous
postmodern morality against a heteronomous ethics.
This is to move too quickly from a partly justified critique of excessive
codification in modernist ethics to a rejection of all
codes and an identification of morality as that which lies beyond,
or comes before, all codes. Operating on the presupposition
that morality cannot be expressed in a code, he presents a
postmodern morality as a kind of surrogate ethics. It is one thing
to acknowledge the existence of a variety of codes, it is a second
thing to induce from this fact that there are no standards of
judgement between the codes and it is a third, and much more

256 MARTIN MCKEEVER
serious thing, to say that morality is precisely no code.
Perhaps the key word in Bauman’s ethical vocabulary is
“ambivalent”. His use of this concept is at times quite equivocal.
It not exactly a mind-blowing revelation to observe that human
beings are neither simply bad nor simply good, but rather
morally “ambivalent”. In so far as this phrase denotes this fact it
states an important, if rather obvious, truth. But in order to be
able to say even this, some measure of assessment, judgement
and evaluation is necessary. It is one thing to acknowledge that
human beings sometimes do what is good and sometimes do
what is bad, it is quite another to conclude from this that they
do not or cannot know what is good or bad. It is perfectly possible
to acknowledge the moral ambivalence of human conduct, in
the sense of acknowledging de facto that people do right and
wrong, without accepting that morality is inherently ambivalent
in the sense that Bauman suggests.
As regards the second of the tenets, therefore, it can only be
concluded that Bauman deludes himself in thinking that his
“spontaneous morality” is an alternative to ethics. Ethical theories
are distinguished from one another by the way they conceive
of the good. Bauman’s proposal that the human good is a
matter of spontaneous and ambivalent impulse is one theory
among others, not an alternative to theory. Varieties of moral
scepticism, relativism and nihilism are not peculiar to postmodern
culture but have accompanied moral reflection from the earliest
times. It may be true that they are more in evidence in contemporary
culture than ever before, but this is to describe contemporary
culture not to create a new ethical theory.
The third tenet formulated above reads “The moral self is
constituted by its responsibility for the Other”. As with the first
tenet, there is nothing immediately and obviously objectionable
in this statement from the point of view of a Catholic ethical vision.
Indeed, Fides et ratio reminds us that a good deal of the
personalist heritage of Western culture is owed to the prominence
given to this theme by Christian theology. If this tenet is
understood as emphasizing the centrality of altruism for ethics,
as construing the human being as inherently social and only
conceivable in relation to others and as stressing the mystery of
personhood, then it can be said to converge with the christian
ethical vision. It might be thought of as one of those germs of

truth which the encyclical acknowledges to be present in otherwise
erroneous philosophical theories.
Read, however, in the context of Bauman’s broader theory it
is clear that the tenet could be interpreted as saying much more
than what has just been indicated. Divergences emerge if, for instance,
as Bauman clearly intends, the “moral self” does not include
the capacity to reason, the capacity to evaluate one’s own
actions relative to some objective standards of truth and goodness
and the capacity to freely commit oneself to the obedience
of an ethical code which one has not oneself formulated.
Conclusion
CAN ANYTHING GOOD COME OUT OF POSTMODERNISM?... 257
There seems to be little doubt that, measured against such a
vision of morality as we find in Fides et ratio, Bauman’s “postmodern
ethics” proves to be quite incompatible with the mainline
christian ethical tradition. Does this mean that “nothing
good can come out of postmodernism”? Without denying the potentially
destructive nature of this vision of morality, it is possible,
by way of conclusion, to enumerate a certain number of positive
aspects of a direct and indirect nature.
Postmodernism, including the version of morality proposed
by Bauman, does constitute a critique of modernism. If it is true,
contrary to what postmodernists believe, that the dominant cultural
form is still modernity, then postmodernity can help the
christian in formulating a critique of that culture.
Even though Bauman’s understanding of morality proves incoherent
and superficial by the standards of Catholic ethical
thought, it can nonetheless be of service in describing (rather
than prescribing) how considerable numbers of people live their
lives in contemporary culture. The challenge to the christian,
and particularly to the theologian, is then to achieve as much
clarity as possible concerning the divergence between a postmodern
understanding of ethics and a Catholic one. Only someone
who is clear about this difference will be able to understand
and possibly overcome the considerable obstacles which stand
in the way of communicating a christain ethical vision in contemporary
culture.
Another good thing which might come out of postmod-

258 MARTIN MCKEEVER
ernism is an enhanced appreciation of the way in which morality
is influenced by broader cultural change, not least by changing
philosophical thought. In this sense one good thing that has
already come out of postmodernism is Fides et ratio itself in so
far as it is an attempt to respond to the challenges of postmodernism
by refining the articulation of the christian faith.
—————
MARTIN MCKEEVER, C.SS.R.
The author is an invited professor at the Alphonsian Academy.
El autor es profesor invitado en la Academia Alfonsiana.
—————