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Chapter 8 n Attacking Access Controls 265<br />

What is more surprising, on <strong>the</strong> face of it, is that <strong>application</strong>s can still be<br />

vulnerable even if <strong>the</strong> platform-level rule denies access to both <strong>the</strong> GET and<br />

POST methods. This happens because requests using o<strong>the</strong>r HTTP methods may<br />

ultimately be handled by <strong>the</strong> same <strong>application</strong> code that handles GET and POST<br />

requests. One example of this is <strong>the</strong> HEAD method. According to specifications,<br />

servers should respond to a HEAD request with <strong>the</strong> same headers <strong>the</strong>y would use<br />

to respond to <strong>the</strong> corresponding GET request, but with no message body. Hence,<br />

most platforms correctly service HEAD requests by executing <strong>the</strong> corresponding<br />

GET handler and just return <strong>the</strong> HTTP headers that are generated. GET requests<br />

can often be used to perform sensitive actions, ei<strong>the</strong>r because <strong>the</strong> <strong>application</strong><br />

itself uses GET requests for this purpose (contrary to specifications) or because<br />

it does not verify that <strong>the</strong> POST method is being used. If an attacker can use a<br />

HEAD request to add an administrative user account, he or she can live without<br />

receiving any message body in <strong>the</strong> response.<br />

In some cases, platforms handle requests that use unrecognized HTTP methods<br />

by simply passing <strong>the</strong>m to <strong>the</strong> GET request handler. In this situation, platformlevel<br />

controls that just deny certain specified HTTP methods can be bypassed<br />

by specifying an arbitrary invalid HTTP method in <strong>the</strong> request.<br />

Chapter 18 contains a specific example of this type of vulnerability arising<br />

in a <strong>web</strong> <strong>application</strong> platform product.<br />

Insecure Access Control Methods<br />

Some <strong>application</strong>s employ a fundamentally insecure access control model in<br />

which access control decisions are made on <strong>the</strong> basis of request parameters<br />

submitted by <strong>the</strong> client, or o<strong>the</strong>r conditions that are within an attacker’s control.<br />

Parameter-Based Access Control<br />

In some versions of this model, <strong>the</strong> <strong>application</strong> determines a user’s role or access<br />

level at <strong>the</strong> time of login and from this point onward transmits this information<br />

via <strong>the</strong> client in a hidden form field, cookie, or preset query string parameter (see<br />

Chapter 5). When each subsequent request is processed, <strong>the</strong> <strong>application</strong> reads<br />

this request parameter and decides what access to grant <strong>the</strong> user accordingly.<br />

For example, an administrator using <strong>the</strong> <strong>application</strong> may see URLs like <strong>the</strong><br />

following:<br />

https://wahh-app.com/login/home.jsp?admin=true<br />

The URLs seen by ordinary users contain a different parameter, or none at all.<br />

Any user who is aware of <strong>the</strong> parameter assigned to administrators can simply<br />

set it in his own requests and <strong>the</strong>reby gain access to administrative functions.

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