Seadet-i Ebediyye - Endless Bliss Sixth Fascicle

18 – THIRD VOLUME, THIRD LETTER
This letter, written for Sayyid Muhibbullah Manqpûrî,
expatiates on the meanings secreted in the statement termed
Kalima-i-tawhîd:
May hamd be to Allâhu ta’âlâ, and salâms and perfections be
over His born slaves whom He has chosen and loves! ‘Lâ ilâha ill-Allah!’
This statement means: Allâhu ta’âlâ, alone, has the right
of ulûhiyyat and ma’bûdiyyat. He does not have a partner, a coowner,
or a likeness. He is the Wâjib-ul-wujûd; His existence is
definitely indispensable. Attributes and symptoms of imperfection
and creatableness do not exist in Him. Ma’bûd means ‘something
worshipped’. ’Ibâdat means ‘to serve as a qul’, ‘to worship’, i.e.
khudhû’ and tezellul. In other words, it means to humiliate oneself.
A Being who possesses all Attributes of Perfection, Highness, and
Goodness, who does not have any imperfection, who is needed by
all beings so that they may exist and continue existing, who does
not need anything for anything, who, alone, can be of benefit or
cause harm to all, and nothing can be of benefit or cause harm to
anything else without His permission and order, and who always
exists and the only Being who always exists, all others being
nonexistent both in the beginning and in the end, is the only Being
to be worshipped. Only such a person is possessed of the right to
be worshipped. And such a person is Allâhu ta’âlâ, alone, and no
one else; nor can another such person exist. If we should say that
another person also possesses these attributes of perfection, then
That other Person cannot be said to be ‘another person’. Being
another person will require being a different person. If we should
think of such another person as a person different from Him and
other than Him, then that second person will be short of fulfilling
the conditions for ulûhiyyat and ma’bûdiyyat. So he will not have
the right of ulûhiyyat and ma’bûdiyyat. For, in order for that
second person to be different from the first one, the second person
will have to lack one of the attributes required for being a ma’bûd,
which in turn means imperfection on the part of the second one. If
we should suppose that the second one has all the attributes of
perfection and yet let him retain one of the attributes of
imperfection so that it should be different from the first one, this,
again, will mean imperfection on his part. For instance, supposing
he is a being not needed by all, then why should those who do not
need him need to need him? Supposing he needs something in a
certain respect; this also will means imperfection. Supposing
– 231 –