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Christopher Wood christopher.wood@clsa.com +852 2600 8516<br />
Meanwhile if there is an area of American finance likely to blow up in a coming downturn, where the<br />
dynamic is driven by the unwind of QE-driven asset inflation, it is most likely to be the so-called<br />
“private equity” industry which has been the biggest winner in this ten-year cycle since the global<br />
financial crisis. The best summary of this industry in a single sentence was written by an old friend<br />
of GREED & fear’s, Michael Lewitt, in the September edition of his monthly report, The Credit<br />
Strategist: “Private equity often consists of nothing more than substituting debt for equity on a<br />
company’s balance sheet, firing employees, cutting R&D and capex, and paying out a bunch of fees<br />
to private equity firms (and in exchange for this they get a carried interest tax break!)”.<br />
GREED & fear could not put it better. Meanwhile, GREED & fear recently came across an interesting<br />
critique of private equity which is worth reading (see American Affairs Journal article “Private Equity:<br />
Overvalued and Overrated?” by Daniel Rasmussen, Spring 2018). The writer of this article reports<br />
how his firm, Verdad, compiled a comprehensive database of 390 private equity deals. In 54% of the<br />
transactions examined, revenue growth slowed. In 45%, profit margins contracted, and in 55%,<br />
capex spending as a percentage of sales declined. The author went on to note that there is a big<br />
difference between what private equity used to do, namely buying companies at 6-8x Ebitda with<br />
debt at a reasonable 3-4x Ebitda, and what private equity does today, which is buying companies at<br />
10-11x Ebitda with debt at 6-7x Ebitda. In a further sign of excess, Rasmussen describes how<br />
private equity funds are now coming up with so-called “long-dated funds” with longer lockup<br />
periods, and buying companies from other funds they manage. The author writes: “This shell game<br />
of overpriced deals getting pawned off to other pools of capital is evidence of rising private equity<br />
froth”.<br />
Figure 16<br />
Global private equity dry powder (cash reserves)<br />
1,200<br />
(US$bn)<br />
Global Private Equity Dry Powder<br />
1,000<br />
800<br />
600<br />
400<br />
200<br />
0<br />
Dec 07 Dec 08 Dec 09 Dec 10 Dec 11 Dec 12 Dec 13 Dec 14 Dec 15 Dec 16 Dec 17 Sep 18<br />
Source: Preqin<br />
The excesses have only grown since this article was published with the latest estimates GREED &<br />
fear has read indicating that the global private equity industry now has US$3.1tn in assets under<br />
management with US$1.1tn in cash, or so-called “dry powder”, to invest (see Figure 16), according<br />
to private equity data provider Preqin. The obvious problem in the making is the debt the private<br />
equity industry has taken on to finance these deals.<br />
This leads on to the risk highlighted by the ever sensible BIS research department in its quarterly<br />
review published in September. This is the resurgence in leveraged finance, comprising high-yield<br />
bonds and leveraged loans, which has doubled in size since the financial crisis. Total leveraged<br />
finance rose from US$1.25tn at the end of 2008 to US$2.79tn at the end of 2Q18, while within this,<br />
Thursday, 22 November 2018 Page 8