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WWRR Vol.2.015

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Christopher Wood christopher.wood@clsa.com +852 2600 8516<br />

Meanwhile if there is an area of American finance likely to blow up in a coming downturn, where the<br />

dynamic is driven by the unwind of QE-driven asset inflation, it is most likely to be the so-called<br />

“private equity” industry which has been the biggest winner in this ten-year cycle since the global<br />

financial crisis. The best summary of this industry in a single sentence was written by an old friend<br />

of GREED & fear’s, Michael Lewitt, in the September edition of his monthly report, The Credit<br />

Strategist: “Private equity often consists of nothing more than substituting debt for equity on a<br />

company’s balance sheet, firing employees, cutting R&D and capex, and paying out a bunch of fees<br />

to private equity firms (and in exchange for this they get a carried interest tax break!)”.<br />

GREED & fear could not put it better. Meanwhile, GREED & fear recently came across an interesting<br />

critique of private equity which is worth reading (see American Affairs Journal article “Private Equity:<br />

Overvalued and Overrated?” by Daniel Rasmussen, Spring 2018). The writer of this article reports<br />

how his firm, Verdad, compiled a comprehensive database of 390 private equity deals. In 54% of the<br />

transactions examined, revenue growth slowed. In 45%, profit margins contracted, and in 55%,<br />

capex spending as a percentage of sales declined. The author went on to note that there is a big<br />

difference between what private equity used to do, namely buying companies at 6-8x Ebitda with<br />

debt at a reasonable 3-4x Ebitda, and what private equity does today, which is buying companies at<br />

10-11x Ebitda with debt at 6-7x Ebitda. In a further sign of excess, Rasmussen describes how<br />

private equity funds are now coming up with so-called “long-dated funds” with longer lockup<br />

periods, and buying companies from other funds they manage. The author writes: “This shell game<br />

of overpriced deals getting pawned off to other pools of capital is evidence of rising private equity<br />

froth”.<br />

Figure 16<br />

Global private equity dry powder (cash reserves)<br />

1,200<br />

(US$bn)<br />

Global Private Equity Dry Powder<br />

1,000<br />

800<br />

600<br />

400<br />

200<br />

0<br />

Dec 07 Dec 08 Dec 09 Dec 10 Dec 11 Dec 12 Dec 13 Dec 14 Dec 15 Dec 16 Dec 17 Sep 18<br />

Source: Preqin<br />

The excesses have only grown since this article was published with the latest estimates GREED &<br />

fear has read indicating that the global private equity industry now has US$3.1tn in assets under<br />

management with US$1.1tn in cash, or so-called “dry powder”, to invest (see Figure 16), according<br />

to private equity data provider Preqin. The obvious problem in the making is the debt the private<br />

equity industry has taken on to finance these deals.<br />

This leads on to the risk highlighted by the ever sensible BIS research department in its quarterly<br />

review published in September. This is the resurgence in leveraged finance, comprising high-yield<br />

bonds and leveraged loans, which has doubled in size since the financial crisis. Total leveraged<br />

finance rose from US$1.25tn at the end of 2008 to US$2.79tn at the end of 2Q18, while within this,<br />

Thursday, 22 November 2018 Page 8

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