A MUSICAL VOYAGE - Royal Australian Navy
A MUSICAL VOYAGE - Royal Australian Navy
A MUSICAL VOYAGE - Royal Australian Navy
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- 102 –<br />
SPEECH BY THE DIRECTOR OF MUSIC<br />
ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA<br />
GIVEN AT KINGSGROVE RSL (2010 AND 2011)<br />
Thank you for the invitation to present an address at this ceremony marking this<br />
Anniversary of the Battle of the Coral Sea. I would like to acknowledge the staff and cadets<br />
from Training Ship SIRIUS for their fine turn out today and the men and women of the<br />
Sydney detachment of the <strong>Royal</strong> <strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> Band for their musical support. In<br />
particular, I acknowledge the veterans gathered here today for their contribution to the<br />
nation during times of conflict; but also for their ongoing contribution to the fabric of<br />
<strong>Australian</strong> society. So we have present here today past, current and, hopefully, future<br />
generations of <strong>Australian</strong> seafarers in the company of veterans of the <strong>Australian</strong> Defence<br />
Force.<br />
As the Director of Music for the <strong>Royal</strong> <strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> I am mindful that musicians<br />
embarked in HMAS AUSTRALIA during the Battle of the Coral Sea would have been at action<br />
stations as members of gun crews, as shell bearers in magazines, in transmitting stations, as<br />
first aid parties and as lookouts. So I am pleased to also pay respectful gratitude to those<br />
former members of the <strong>Royal</strong> <strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> Band.<br />
In early 1942 as the list of military defeats for the <strong>Australian</strong>, British, American and Dutch<br />
military and naval forces began to mount, the feeling in the general populace of Australia<br />
must have been one of depression and a general expectation that the Japanese would<br />
invade at any moment. It is a fact that the Japanese forces were conducting preparations<br />
for the capture of Port Moresby, the Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa. The<br />
object of their plan was to extend and strengthen the Japanese defensive perimeter as well<br />
as cutting the lines of communication between Australia and the United States.<br />
It is important to note that the occupation of Port Moresby would have cut off the eastern<br />
sea approaches to Darwin and provided the Japanese <strong>Navy</strong> with a secure operating base on<br />
Australia's northern doorstep. The Battle of the Coral Sea prevented the direct assault of<br />
Port Moresby by sea, buying time and keeping open the northern sea lanes, and it made<br />
possible the successful defence of the Kokoda Track and the eventual recapture of New<br />
Guinea.<br />
The Battle of the Coral Sea was one of the major air and naval engagement of World War II.<br />
It was also the first naval engagement in history in which two fleets clashed, but neither<br />
fleet saw each other—it was fought entirely with aircraft. Australia’s part in the battle<br />
consisted of the heavy cruiser, HMAS AUSTRALIA, the light cruiser HMAS HOBART, and<br />
aircraft flown from bases in Queensland by both <strong>Australian</strong> and American crews.<br />
In late April 1942, US Intelligence detected a major Japanese flotilla heading toward the<br />
Coral Sea. The Japanese codename for the flotilla was Operation MO. Its objective was the<br />
invasion of the small but strategically important, Papuan town of Port Moresby. Admiral<br />
Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, responded by deploying his two available<br />
carrier groups. Rear Admiral Fitch, commander of Task Force (TF) 11 embarked in USS<br />
LEXINGTON, was ordered to sail and join Rear Admiral Fletcher's TF17, which was centred<br />
on the USS YORKTOWN in the Coral Sea. TF44 was deployed from the south under the<br />
command of Rear Admiral John Crace RN. This combined force, under the command of Rear<br />
Admiral Fletcher, was designated TF17.<br />
For the purpose of my short address I will focus TF44 which comprised HMAS AUSTRALIA<br />
(flagship), HMAS HOBART and USS CHICAGO supported by the destroyers USS PERKINS and<br />
WALKE.<br />
Early on the morning of 7 May, Admiral Fletcher split his force by detaching TF44 to cover<br />
the Jomard Passage and intercept the Japanese invasion force: this was an extremely risky<br />
decision and perhaps the most important in the entire battle. For not only did Admiral<br />
Fletcher weaken his own air defences; but he also exposed Admiral Crace’s ships to the<br />
possibility of air attack without hope of fighter protection, as had occurred five months<br />
earlier with disastrous consequences when Her Majesty’s Ships PRINCE OF WALES and<br />
REPULSE were sunk by 86 Japanese aircraft.<br />
<strong>Royal</strong> <strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> Band: A Musical Voyage