On-line journal no. 4 – July 2012 - Modelling the New Europe

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On-line Journal Modelling the New Europe Issue no. 4/2012 launched immediately after, but to complement it and to complement also the “pre- accession with Turkey and the Strategic partnership with Russia. 44 Although, Russia did not participated at the Joint Statement discussion in 2008 (affirming that it preferred an EU-BSEC Statement), it expressed its support regarding the increased role of the European Union and agreed with document’s adoption. 45 Four years later, despite EU’s great expectations, the Synergy did not prove to be an effective tool for regional cooperation and Russia’s policy towards Black Sea region was not influenced by its actions. Moreover, the last registered report regarding its implementation dates back in 2008 and no over significant improvements could be observed since then. This illustrates once again the Russian role in maintaining the regional deadlock. EU seems unable to implement a regional policy within the Black Sea with or without its biggest strategic partner in the East. The next step in the chronological scheme of cooperation was the establishment of a public-private partnership. The German Marshall Fund created the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation (2007) in order “to promote regional, cross-border ties in the public, private, and non-profits sectors and good governance in the Wider Black Sea region, to rebuild trust in public institutions, to affirm the value of citizen participation in the democratic process, to strengthen a critical set of institutions.” 46 In this initiative Russia is represented by two oblasts, Krasnodar and Rostov and if we are to interpret the BST success in these areas after the first year of cooperation, one would have to conclude that the BST strategy towards them is definitely lacking. The first year implementation report admits that the BST was designed as an “opened to see how” space in Russia and that in 44 Black Sea Synergy, Delegation of the European Union to Russia, [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/fields_cooperation/regional_issues/black_sea_synergy/index_e n.htm] 1 June 2012 45 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament , Report on the first year of implementation of the Black Sea Synergy, 2008, p. 6 46 Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation: [http://www.gmfus.org/grants-fellowships/grantmaking-programs/black-sea-trus] 3 June 2012 29
On-line Journal Modelling the New Europe Issue no. 4/2012 the future it has to better define what role it can play there and especially how it can make a difference. 47 The Russian trend of reluctance or non-involvement towards Black Sea initiatives continued for the year 2008 when other cooperation schemes have emerged. Russia was involved neither in the Union of Black Sea and Caspian Confederation of Enterprises, nor in the Regional Cooperation Council and it was sceptic regarding the implementation of the Black Sea Euroregion. All the forums and initiatives declined by Russia had a very short life, fading into oblivion several years after their initiation. This should be a signal for the European Union to focus its strategy towards the Black Sea region in such a manner as to offer the opportunity to collaborate with Russia in those sectors that already proved to function. In other words, before creating a strategy for the Black Sea region, EU should develop and establish a specific and constructive regional collaboration plan with Russia, other than the wider scheme included in the Strategic Partnership. This is undoubtedly a difficult mission since Russian foreign policy until now has focused on creating and maintaining security gaps leaving no alternative of engagement. From our analysis, we can draw the conclusion that until now, cooperation with Russia could be successfully achieved only on bilateral bases and only on security and economic sectors. Despite being praised for its pragmatism and its “tenaciously realistic approach to international affairs” 48 , Russia had a contradictory position regarding the differentiation between internal and external regional actors. As Makarychev argues, “Russia welcomes investment from external financial resources (from US and Japan) in regional projects, but 47 Mariana Milosheva and David Krushe, Review of the first year of Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, [http://www.pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADS397.pdf] 3 June 2012 48 Joseph Wood, “The Kremlin’s behaviour limits the scope of Western engagement” in Brussels Forum Paper Series, 2009, pp. 3-39 30
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On-line journal no. 4 – July 2012 - Modelling the New Europe

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