40 years of DAI

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Back on the Growth Path Don Mickelwait was not one to beat around the bush. In a late 1981 report to the Board of Directors, he bluntly admitted that “DAI has muddled so successfully in the past that a grand strategy has not been imposed.” Indeed, through the first half of the 1980s, the “creative opportunism” marketing strategy had kept the revenue coming in even if it had not lifted DAI above its plateau. During the same period, little thought had been given to the role that corporate structure played in stifling or facilitating growth. Although there had been attempts to rationalize the structure of the company in the early 1980s, the prevailing arrangement had been a simple distinction between short-term and longterm contracting, the latter being defined as engagements lasting more than one year. By 1985, however, that distinction had grown increasingly meaningless. Barclay found that it was nearly impossible to manage the work and ensure high-quality performance when “everybody was floating around.” Some type of divisional structure was required, but what would it look like? In mid-1985, Barclay invited management specialist Stark Biddle to analyze the company and work with management to define its internal structure. Biddle facilitated a process that settled some key issues; his indepth knowledge of DAI led to him being asked to join the Board of Directors later that year. Three divisions were created: one for Development Management and Planning, a second for Private Sector Development, and the third for Agriculture and Technical Services. All these groups answered to Max Goldensohn, recently returned from the field, where he had served as Chief of Party in North Shaba. A proven manager and natural “traffic cop,” Goldensohn was named Vice President of Operations. This By 1986, DAI placed project work into three divisions to manage its increasingly wide variety of jobs. This would not be the last time the company would be restructured. 29
Don Mickelwait went back to Harvard for more training and returned with a new marketing enthusiasm for bringing in business. It paid off. 30 restructuring was intended to provide more autonomy to staff and create a more responsive organization. Most importantly, it was intended to enable the company to grow. But the question remained of where new growth and profitability would come from. By the end of 1986, DAI’s revenues reached $8 million, but it was only a break-even year. Despite the restructuring, legacy practices and procedures stood in the way of growth in the mid-1980s. Proposal writing, for example, remained all art and no science in the early 1980s. As Peter Reiss recalled, “Somebody got an RFP, took it into an office, closed the door, and basically they said, ‘Come out when you’ve finished it.’” Clearly, DAI needed some schooling, so Mickelwait enrolled in a part-time executive training program at Harvard Business School. He returned from the first sessions “charged up,” and urged his colleagues to become much more aggressive about sending people out on “recon” to secure advance information for upcoming proposals and line up potential team members. Mickelwait himself frequently walked the halls of the USAID/Indonesia mission, popping into offices, asking questions, and, whenever he could, reading any competitor’s proposal that might be lying around. Word traveled fast. “They used to send messages out saying, ‘Mickelwait’s coming, lock your door,’” he admitted. His enthusiasm sometimes drew similar responses at DAI. When Mickelwait returned from marketing trips with big ideas, staffers warned of “another solar flare” liable to shake up the company. Barclay did his best to moderate the ups and downs of the mercurial leader. The new energy and market focus would soon start to pay dividends. DAI was a different company from the one that had gambled with its balance sheet at the Homestead. Mickelwait set a conservative tone by mandating a potluck, bring-your-own-bottle office holiday party in December 1986. But he and Barclay, with the Board’s approval, were determined to move ahead. If consistent profitability was still elusive, DAI’s founder had learned two very important things. The first was that with USAID decentralizing much of its decision making to overseas missions, there was “a multitude of contracting windows” with more new bidding opportunities than DAI had previously recognized. The
Page 3 and 4: 2 DAI, Bethesda, MD 20814, USA www.
Page 6 and 7: FOreWOrd There are three reasons we
Page 8 and 9: chapter One Something to believe In
Page 10 and 11: Chapter One Something to Believe In
Page 12 and 13: Development By 1979, the notion tha
Page 14 and 15: It was Charles Franklin “Charlie
Page 16 and 17: law in Delaware, where many small c
Page 18 and 19: ects in Africa. Hatch held a newly
Page 20 and 21: Most staff members who joined DAI i
Page 22 and 23: tise, energy, and especially money.
Page 24 and 25: Barclay encountered Charlie Sweet,
Page 26 and 27: after Barclay. In early 1978, he be
Page 28 and 29: norm after this. The offering docum
Page 30 and 31: gathered in the well-appointed surr
Page 32 and 33: Chapter Two Learning by Doing, 1981
Page 34 and 35: spending, and demand in the technic
Page 36 and 37: several senior managers, including
Page 40 and 41: second was that the firm was ready
Page 42 and 43: spurs and become assets in the firm
Page 44 and 45: A Different Direction By 1981, soon
Page 46 and 47: in rural enterprise development and
Page 48 and 49: cided to begin providing annual cas
Page 50 and 51: DAI began to grow again, he grew re
Page 52 and 53: front, it seemed likely that ICF wo
Page 54 and 55: Chapter Three The Fresh Faces of De
Page 56 and 57: household word. USAID had commissio
Page 58 and 59: epublics. For the work in Poland, D
Page 60 and 61: tion. Calculating the growing impor
Page 62 and 63: to development policy, but no chang
Page 64 and 65: to realizing Mickelwait’s vision
Page 66 and 67: in the forefront, serving an unprec
Page 68 and 69: find alternatives as long as the Go
Page 70 and 71: Transition These successes and fail
Page 72 and 73: Mickelwait knew that Barclay had in
Page 74 and 75: Chapter Four Farther and Faster, 20
Page 76 and 77: Barclay could not have known then t
Page 78 and 79: Tactical deployment of grants was t
Page 80 and 81: DAI on track to cross the $100 mill
Page 82 and 83: ECIAfrica as a reliable service pro
Page 84 and 85: highly successful. Said Abu Hijleh,
Page 86 and 87: able expertise in federal procureme
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When new projects first appeared in
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Transformation and Transition The e
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to improve as soon as this change o
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Chapter Five Pulling Together, 2005
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in the ESOP were distributed throug
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Ownership, however, could be figura
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advantage, USAID would favor a comp
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As Jim Boomgard noted, “Developme
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governments on all levels to better
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In his role as COO, empowered by Ba
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the mid- and late 2000s, the compan
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the mid-1990s, DAI had begun to ext
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immense—and DAI’s projects are
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ard Winkler. Few will dispute that
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DAI Advancing Human Prosperity
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