40 years of DAI

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When new projects first appeared in Afghanistan, early in 2002, DAI fielded a team to restore irrigation systems in Helmand Province, another to establish a central microfinance facility that would support local lenders, and a third to work with the rural development ministry to implement the countrywide National Solidarity Program (NSP). Jointly implemented by Germany’s GTZ International and DAI, the NSP was widely recognized as an effective model for matching donor resources (in this case, a World Bank loan) with community priorities. The first three years of work in Afghanistan were productive and almost entirely free of security incidents. By 2005, however, the revival of the Taliban insurgency and the weakness of the Afghan government darkened the picture, forcing DAI, like other project implementers, to take many more precautions to protect offices, residences, and staff travel within the country. The onset of the war in Iraq posed interesting choices for the firm. In the run-up to the March 2003 invasion, DAI found itself one of three firms prequalified to bid on a contract to deploy several hundred expatriate local government experts, which would bring in new revenue of $300 million, and possibly much more. After extensive internal discussion—which occurred in an open-book atmosphere so that DAI employees could appreciate the pros and cons of the decision—Michael Morfit’s governance team concluded that the downside risks (doubts about the scope of work, especially the huge emphasis on high-cost expats, and serious concerns about security in the midst and aftermath of war) outweighed any benefits to DAI. Barclay and the other members of the executive team concurred with the no-bid decision. “Even at our size, that contract was big enough to turn the company upside down if things didn’t go according to plan,” Barclay recalled, “and we didn’t much like the plan.” Simultaneously, however, DAI produced a concept paper, and later a full proposal, to manage an OTI grants program modeled on SWIFT that would rely much more on Iraqi personnel and local organizations, and use in-kind grants to ensure that the resources produced tangible results. The choice of Getu Reta to lead this team gave everyone confidence: he had worked with Kurdish groups in northern Iraq after the first Gulf War and had done an excellent job as Chief of Party on DAI’s Timor-Leste program with OTI. Among the team’s first initiatives was to set up a communications center in Umm Qasr, DAI was in Baghdad soon after U.S. troops captured the city in 2003. The need for fast implementation made DAI one of USAID’s principal implementing partners. 79
People with guns, in canoes or otherwise, were somewhat common in DAI work areas, but by 2001, armed soldiers were protecting some of DAI’s own offices. 80 just across the border from Kuwait, and find a meeting place for the city’s town council. Bigger tasks soon followed in dealing with the looting that followed the fall of Baghdad. To help get the national ministries back on their feet, DAI implemented a $4.1 million “ministry-in-a-box” program that provided standard office equipment to every agency of the Iraqi government. OTI’s effectiveness in those early weeks was noticed by the Coalition Provisional Authority, and soon the CPA and USAID quadrupled the budget. By its close in mid-2006, the Iraq Transition Initiative had disbursed some 5,000 grants valued at more than $350 million across every province in the country. In contrast to the vast amounts wasted or stolen from many bigticket reconstruction contracts, ITI was efficient, lean, and gave value for money. From the beginning, security was a serious concern in Iraq. DAI’s ITI team was first stationed in Baghdad’s Green Zone, in one of Saddam Hussein’s palaces, communicating by satellite phone and using sleeping cots as desks. But staying in the safety of the Green Zone would compromise the team’s efficiency and ability to work with Iraqis. Within two weeks, employing the networks of an Iraqi firm DAI had been using in the northern, Kurdish city of Erbil, the DAI team moved into a safe area in the Mansoor District and began hiring Iraqi staff. Working through Iraqi firms based in Erbil but with nationwide and interethnic networks, ITI hired Iraqi guards, most of whom were peshmerga fighters from the north, to provide low-profile but robust security. The presence of live-in Kurdish security caused neighbors to assume ITI was a Kurdish construction firm with expatriate engineers, an accidental cover that suited the team well. By late 2004, Baghdad had become too danger- ous for such low-profile measures to protect DAI’s expatriates. But raising that profile, by bringing in expatriate security providers and putting in blast structures, would make offices targets and endanger Iraqi staff moving in and out of the compound every day. Instead, DAI opted to manage Iraqi staff in Baghdad and other high-risk areas remotely, from the relative safety of Erbil, with expatriates visiting Baghdad only when required and using communications technologies to stay in close touch with local teams. This arrangement permitted DAI to tap local knowledge and maintain capacity in Baghdad and elsewhere without jeopardizing Iraqi and expatriate staff. Figuring out how to operate in high-risk environments was becoming a core competency of the firm.
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2 DAI, Bethesda, MD 20814, USA www.
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FOreWOrd There are three reasons we
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chapter One Something to believe In
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Chapter One Something to Believe In
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Development By 1979, the notion tha
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It was Charles Franklin “Charlie
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law in Delaware, where many small c
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ects in Africa. Hatch held a newly
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Most staff members who joined DAI i
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tise, energy, and especially money.
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Barclay encountered Charlie Sweet,
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after Barclay. In early 1978, he be
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norm after this. The offering docum
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gathered in the well-appointed surr
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Chapter Two Learning by Doing, 1981
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spending, and demand in the technic
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several senior managers, including
Page 38 and 39: Back on the Growth Path Don Mickelw
Page 40 and 41: second was that the firm was ready
Page 42 and 43: spurs and become assets in the firm
Page 44 and 45: A Different Direction By 1981, soon
Page 46 and 47: in rural enterprise development and
Page 48 and 49: cided to begin providing annual cas
Page 50 and 51: DAI began to grow again, he grew re
Page 52 and 53: front, it seemed likely that ICF wo
Page 54 and 55: Chapter Three The Fresh Faces of De
Page 56 and 57: household word. USAID had commissio
Page 58 and 59: epublics. For the work in Poland, D
Page 60 and 61: tion. Calculating the growing impor
Page 62 and 63: to development policy, but no chang
Page 64 and 65: to realizing Mickelwait’s vision
Page 66 and 67: in the forefront, serving an unprec
Page 68 and 69: find alternatives as long as the Go
Page 70 and 71: Transition These successes and fail
Page 72 and 73: Mickelwait knew that Barclay had in
Page 74 and 75: Chapter Four Farther and Faster, 20
Page 76 and 77: Barclay could not have known then t
Page 78 and 79: Tactical deployment of grants was t
Page 80 and 81: DAI on track to cross the $100 mill
Page 82 and 83: ECIAfrica as a reliable service pro
Page 84 and 85: highly successful. Said Abu Hijleh,
Page 86 and 87: able expertise in federal procureme
Page 90 and 91: Transformation and Transition The e
Page 92 and 93: to improve as soon as this change o
Page 94 and 95: Chapter Five Pulling Together, 2005
Page 96 and 97: in the ESOP were distributed throug
Page 98 and 99: Ownership, however, could be figura
Page 100 and 101: advantage, USAID would favor a comp
Page 102 and 103: As Jim Boomgard noted, “Developme
Page 104 and 105: governments on all levels to better
Page 106 and 107: In his role as COO, empowered by Ba
Page 108 and 109: the mid- and late 2000s, the compan
Page 110 and 111: the mid-1990s, DAI had begun to ext
Page 112 and 113: immense—and DAI’s projects are
Page 114 and 115: ard Winkler. Few will dispute that
Page 117: DAI Advancing Human Prosperity
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