40 years of DAI

DAI subsidiary
ECIAfrica grew
quickly and was
earning significant
revenues by 2004.
72
Building a Global Network
DAI’s Board had accepted the logic of market
diversification in the 1999 strategic plan and
kept management’s feet to the fire on this issue
even as traditional business growth was
dramatically exceeding plan targets. Global
expansion through local companies organized
in a network configuration intrigued Barclay and
became his top priority. He saw great potential
for decentralized local business units to win
and execute business with clients beyond the
reach of the Bethesda-based team, if those
units could draw on DAI’s worldwide experience
while tapping their firsthand knowledge of their
clients’ needs. Assembling the right pieces in
this global/local puzzle proved quite difficult, for
a number of reasons.
By 2000, the company had a presence in several
countries, ranging from the Bannock (Europe)
and ECIAfrica (southern Africa) subsidiaries to
remnants of the Asia marketing network created
in the 1990s. Improving and expanding the subsidiary
companies was the preferred alternative.
Barclay believed that by sourcing local consulting
talent, and fielding managers on the ground
to develop close relationships with new clients,
the subsidiaries could offer more cost-effective,
more competitive services than those DAI typically
included in its proposals to USAID. He
put this commitment to globalization front and
center in management discussions and, in the
fall of 2002, laid out DAI’s “2010 Global Leadership
Vision” in a presentation to the Board.
The executive team, and some Board members,
were unsure if the network model could
really work. The record of DAI’s subsidiaries
was mixed. MAS, a bank training subsidiary
attached to DAI headquarters, had been shut
down in 1999 due to a lack of business, and serious
accounting problems in MAS would come
back to haunt DAI several years later. Progress
in London was disappointing, because Bannock
Consulting had never aligned itself with the DAI
corporate strategy and failed to capitalize on
the parent company’s experience and assets.
Heavy turnover in Bannock’s management
ranks began to cripple the company in 2003.
ECIAfrica provided a better example in certain
respects, although its success would not be
sustained after DAI’s seconded management
team rotated back to Bethesda. The team of
Adam Saffer and Bill Grant had positioned