40 years of DAI

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household word. USAID had commissioned DAI and another firm to do a “stocktaking” of the many and various efforts to assist people owning and running very small businesses. Such businesses usually had only one or two employees and participated in the informal economy— that is, not licensed, not keeping books, and not paying taxes. For more than four months, Boomgard comanaged the microenterprise stocktaking with a brilliant economist from the other firm, but the study fell seriously behind schedule, and the USAID officers supervising the work became seriously worried. Barclay asked them to give Boomgard sole authority to complete the study, promising them that DAI would absorb any additional costs if it ran over budget, and assuring them that they would be fully satisfied with the final product. Boomgard delivered, and the guarantee was fulfilled. In the process, he became convinced that when the next multiyear microenterprise research and development opportunity came around, DAI could win the contract. One day late in 1988, Boomgard invited Mickelwait and Barclay to lunch and laid out his idea. It would require his full-time attention over several months and a significant proposal investment, and it was something of a gamble, since the economist’s firm had managed the predecessor contract. Nevertheless, he said, “I would like to have your blessing to establish DAI as a leading player in this field.” Mickelwait and Barclay did not have to consider long. “Go for it,” they replied. The stocktaking report, which had been widely read, was certain to influence USAID’s RFP, because it highlighted areas where further “action research” should be undertaken. To prepare for it, Boomgard assembled a team in DAI and worked closely with experts from such institutions as ACCION International, which had been involved in Latin American microlending since the 1970s, and Michigan State University, where much of the leading academic work on small and micro enterprises was being done. The RFP for Growth and Equity through Microenterprise Investments and Institutions (GEMINI) looked much as Boomgard had expected. After Jim Boomgard (center) led DAI’s successful efforts in the field of microenterprise development. Here he is shown with Maria Otero, then of ACCION International, and Doug Salloum of the Calmeadow Foundation. 47
DAI’s first, large foray into microenterprise paid off with the GEMINI project. Through its many publications, GEMINI energized the intellectual debate over microenterprise development. 48 a grueling proposal process and stiff competition, DAI was awarded the GEMINI contract in the final days of September 1989, the end of the U.S. government’s fiscal year. It was an auspicious victory. The contract was administered in Washington but allowed USAID missions across the globe to “buy in,” adding country program funds to access the expertise of DAI and its subcontractors. The face value of the five-year core contract was $5.7 million; however, the cumulative buy-in activities over that period amounted to much more. As the implementer of GEMINI, DAI was—in Boomgard’s words—“the center of the universe,” and top microenterprise talent worldwide was soon knocking at DAI’s door. By the end of 1989, with strong support and guidance from Elisabeth Rhyne, who directed GEMINI for USAID, Boomgard had an out- Photo by Jorge Vinueza standing core team in place: Maria Otero from ACCION, Nan Borton from DAI, and, later, Matt Gamser, who joined from ITDG in the United Kingdom. Some of GEMINI’s earliest endeavors were applied research studies exploring the links between microenterprise and gender, poverty lending, and the growth and dynamics of intermediary institutions. The GEMINI team was soon producing high-quality technical reports at a steady clip. By 1991, field activities were under way in half a dozen countries. The work was varied, but it usually involved appraising local industries, identifying obstacles to and opportunities for growth, and providing technical assistance to government agencies and local institutions that supported microenterprise development. GEMINI drove the message, which became gospel, that microfinance was banking and that, to succeed, microfinance institutions needed to behave like banks. The launch of GEMINI field activities coincided with the appearance of new development opportunities unprecedented in DAI’s history— rapid changes were sweeping through Central Europe, and the Soviet Union had begun falling apart. In 1990, USAID decided to place a long-term policy advisor in Poland, where the Solidarity movement had paved the way for a democratic transition and the new government was starting to put open-market policies in place. In 1992 came a call for small business advisory services in Mongolia and a handful of tasks involving field assessments in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, all former Soviet
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2 DAI, Bethesda, MD 20814, USA www.
Page 6 and 7: FOreWOrd There are three reasons we
Page 8 and 9: chapter One Something to believe In
Page 10 and 11: Chapter One Something to Believe In
Page 12 and 13: Development By 1979, the notion tha
Page 14 and 15: It was Charles Franklin “Charlie
Page 16 and 17: law in Delaware, where many small c
Page 18 and 19: ects in Africa. Hatch held a newly
Page 20 and 21: Most staff members who joined DAI i
Page 22 and 23: tise, energy, and especially money.
Page 24 and 25: Barclay encountered Charlie Sweet,
Page 26 and 27: after Barclay. In early 1978, he be
Page 28 and 29: norm after this. The offering docum
Page 30 and 31: gathered in the well-appointed surr
Page 32 and 33: Chapter Two Learning by Doing, 1981
Page 34 and 35: spending, and demand in the technic
Page 36 and 37: several senior managers, including
Page 38 and 39: Back on the Growth Path Don Mickelw
Page 40 and 41: second was that the firm was ready
Page 42 and 43: spurs and become assets in the firm
Page 44 and 45: A Different Direction By 1981, soon
Page 46 and 47: in rural enterprise development and
Page 48 and 49: cided to begin providing annual cas
Page 50 and 51: DAI began to grow again, he grew re
Page 52 and 53: front, it seemed likely that ICF wo
Page 54 and 55: Chapter Three The Fresh Faces of De
Page 58 and 59: epublics. For the work in Poland, D
Page 60 and 61: tion. Calculating the growing impor
Page 62 and 63: to development policy, but no chang
Page 64 and 65: to realizing Mickelwait’s vision
Page 66 and 67: in the forefront, serving an unprec
Page 68 and 69: find alternatives as long as the Go
Page 70 and 71: Transition These successes and fail
Page 72 and 73: Mickelwait knew that Barclay had in
Page 74 and 75: Chapter Four Farther and Faster, 20
Page 76 and 77: Barclay could not have known then t
Page 78 and 79: Tactical deployment of grants was t
Page 80 and 81: DAI on track to cross the $100 mill
Page 82 and 83: ECIAfrica as a reliable service pro
Page 84 and 85: highly successful. Said Abu Hijleh,
Page 86 and 87: able expertise in federal procureme
Page 88 and 89: When new projects first appeared in
Page 90 and 91: Transformation and Transition The e
Page 92 and 93: to improve as soon as this change o
Page 94 and 95: Chapter Five Pulling Together, 2005
Page 96 and 97: in the ESOP were distributed throug
Page 98 and 99: Ownership, however, could be figura
Page 100 and 101: advantage, USAID would favor a comp
Page 102 and 103: As Jim Boomgard noted, “Developme
Page 104 and 105: governments on all levels to better
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In his role as COO, empowered by Ba
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the mid- and late 2000s, the compan
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the mid-1990s, DAI had begun to ext
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immense—and DAI’s projects are
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ard Winkler. Few will dispute that
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DAI Advancing Human Prosperity
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