40 years of DAI

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able expertise in federal procurement policy and practices. He convinced about a dozen development firms to join the association and became co-chair of PSC’s newly created International Development Task Force. After Barclay testified on Capitol Hill on behalf of the group in 1994, USAID began to recognize the PSC as the voice of the development contracting community. But while the task force tried to engage USAID procurement officials in an effort to streamline procedures and save costs, progress in resolving these issues was frustratingly slow. Running parallel to the PSC industry initiative was a much broader new coalition that took shape in 1995 after conservative Republicans took control of Congress and declared their intent to slash international affairs spending. “We must all hang together, or most assuredly we shall all hang separately” was the rationale behind the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, which united NGOs, contractors, businesses, and faith-based organizations to defend the international affairs budget. While playing defense, the Campaign emphasized that this component of the budget represented “just 1 percent” of total federal spending. Later it was able to play offense, vigorously supporting the increases in foreign affairs spending that occurred after the September 11 attacks. Barclay was among the Campaign’s founding board members and later became president of its nonprofit educational arm. Here, as in the PSC, it was as much DAI’s standing in the community as his personal efforts that propelled the firm into a leadership role. Higher Visibility and Risk DAI was proficient at managing complex projects aimed at effecting policy change and strengthening public sector institutions. In one case, however, success had unintended and uncomfortable consequences. When DAI won USAID’s Accelerating Growth, Investment and Liberalization with Equity (AGILE) contract in the Philippines in 1998, its main emphasis was on breaking down barriers to investment, competition, and trade, and bringing new vigor to the Philippine economy. It soon became clear that a broad range of policy and regulatory weaknesses, including compromised regulatory institutions and systematic corruption in the government procurement process, was one of the biggest barriers to growth. In 2001, the election of a new President, Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo, brought a pledge to improve governance, and her team turned to USAID for help in delivering on its promises. At first, this seemed DAI’s AGILE work in the Philippines involved breaking down trade barriers and improving economic competitiveness. 77
David Tardif-Douglin found himself in hot water in the Philippines. He went on to serve on DAI’s Board. 78 to be an administration willing “to break some rice bowls” in the name of reform. Under AGILE, DAI’s mainly Filipino team conducted a comprehensive diagnostic study of government procurement of goods, services, and civil works. It then helped draft procurement reform legislation and supported groups advocating for its passage. DAI was proud of this work on behalf of the Philippine government, and featured results from AGILE on the company website. But in early 2003, in the middle of a heated debate on legislation to combat money laundering, a member of the Philippine legislature stumbled upon this profile and began to call into question DAI’s role in framing Philippine economic policy and influencing the legislative process. Soon, Manila newspapers were spinning hyperbolic tales about DAI and calling AGILE a “wellentrenched, USAID-funded American lobby group” and even a “shadow government.” That the AGILE team had accomplished a great deal was hard to dispute, and some in the Arroyo government stood up for DAI during the ensuing controversy. But Chief of Party Ramon Clarete and his deputy, David Tardif-Douglin, had to endure harsh, theatrical questioning in hearings before the Philippine Senate while USAID and the U.S. Embassy winced and waited for the storm to blow over. Not long afterward, AGILE was branded with a new acronym, and the team was instructed to lower its profile and stick to less controversial topics. While praised for the impact of its technical work, DAI found itself without a chance to compete for the follow-on contract, which was placed under an IQC in which DAI had no role. AGILE was something of a wake-up call, teaching DAI that simply doing good technical work was no guarantee of peace and quiet. After September 11, 2001, “keeping a low profile” became not merely a figure of speech but also a matter of physical security, indeed life and death. It was in 2001 that Tony Barclay first appreciated how much security now mattered. When visiting a microfinance project in Haiti, he encountered men in camouflage with machine guns patrolling DAI’s project office. “Do these guys work for us?” he asked Chief of Party Robert Dressen with a gulp. They did. It was the first time the company’s CEO had seen armed guards protecting a project office during daylight hours; it would hardly be the last.
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2 DAI, Bethesda, MD 20814, USA www.
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FOreWOrd There are three reasons we
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chapter One Something to believe In
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Chapter One Something to Believe In
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Development By 1979, the notion tha
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It was Charles Franklin “Charlie
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law in Delaware, where many small c
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ects in Africa. Hatch held a newly
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Most staff members who joined DAI i
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tise, energy, and especially money.
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Barclay encountered Charlie Sweet,
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after Barclay. In early 1978, he be
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norm after this. The offering docum
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gathered in the well-appointed surr
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Chapter Two Learning by Doing, 1981
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spending, and demand in the technic
Page 36 and 37: several senior managers, including
Page 38 and 39: Back on the Growth Path Don Mickelw
Page 40 and 41: second was that the firm was ready
Page 42 and 43: spurs and become assets in the firm
Page 44 and 45: A Different Direction By 1981, soon
Page 46 and 47: in rural enterprise development and
Page 48 and 49: cided to begin providing annual cas
Page 50 and 51: DAI began to grow again, he grew re
Page 52 and 53: front, it seemed likely that ICF wo
Page 54 and 55: Chapter Three The Fresh Faces of De
Page 56 and 57: household word. USAID had commissio
Page 58 and 59: epublics. For the work in Poland, D
Page 60 and 61: tion. Calculating the growing impor
Page 62 and 63: to development policy, but no chang
Page 64 and 65: to realizing Mickelwait’s vision
Page 66 and 67: in the forefront, serving an unprec
Page 68 and 69: find alternatives as long as the Go
Page 70 and 71: Transition These successes and fail
Page 72 and 73: Mickelwait knew that Barclay had in
Page 74 and 75: Chapter Four Farther and Faster, 20
Page 76 and 77: Barclay could not have known then t
Page 78 and 79: Tactical deployment of grants was t
Page 80 and 81: DAI on track to cross the $100 mill
Page 82 and 83: ECIAfrica as a reliable service pro
Page 84 and 85: highly successful. Said Abu Hijleh,
Page 88 and 89: When new projects first appeared in
Page 90 and 91: Transformation and Transition The e
Page 92 and 93: to improve as soon as this change o
Page 94 and 95: Chapter Five Pulling Together, 2005
Page 96 and 97: in the ESOP were distributed throug
Page 98 and 99: Ownership, however, could be figura
Page 100 and 101: advantage, USAID would favor a comp
Page 102 and 103: As Jim Boomgard noted, “Developme
Page 104 and 105: governments on all levels to better
Page 106 and 107: In his role as COO, empowered by Ba
Page 108 and 109: the mid- and late 2000s, the compan
Page 110 and 111: the mid-1990s, DAI had begun to ext
Page 112 and 113: immense—and DAI’s projects are
Page 114 and 115: ard Winkler. Few will dispute that
Page 117: DAI Advancing Human Prosperity
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