Independent Review of MSHA's Actions at Crandall Canyon Mine

the 9:00 a.m. briefing. At this time, they were informed that this low oxygen level could not
sustain life. Stickler encouraged them not to lose hope because there were still too many
unknowns. They also were encouraged by Murray on August 11 th that no one had given up
hope, because this reading may not mean anything. They were told that the drill steel may
have drifted from its intended target into a mined-out area (gob), which would explain the low
oxygen reading. It was later determined that the drill had drifted, but that it still intersected
the section where the miners were working at the time of the bounce. Some of the family
members stated that they could not recall being told that the borehole had intersected the
section. This information would have clarified that the miners were potentially exposed to the
low oxygen level that would have reduced their chances of survival.
In another situation, the families were told that the seismic location equipment had detected a
repetitive signal shortly after the No. 3 borehole had penetrated the coal bed which could have
been indicative that the miners were trying to signal the rescuers. The MSHA person
operating the seismic equipment did not believe that this tapping could be from the miners
because of the rhythm and duration of the tapping. Nevertheless, before this questionable
information could be re-evaluated, it was shared with the family members. Thus, a new sense
of hope was offered once more.
While the repetitive signal was detected when pounding on the drill steel in the No. 3
borehole, the seismic equipment indicated that the signal was coming from a location
approximately 700 feet from the No. 3 borehole. To further investigate the possibility that the
tapping may have been from the trapped miners, another borehole (No. 4) was drilled into an
area of the mine that was about 700 feet outby the No. 3 borehole. Examinations and testing in
the area where the No. 4 borehole penetrated the mine did not detect any signs of the trapped
miners.
It was later determined that MSHA’s seismic location system had picked up what was
described as a “sympathetic oscillation”, or a repeated sound vibration similar to an echo.
Jeffery Kravitz, Chief of Scientific Development for MSHA’s Technical Support, felt these
vibrations were not generated from the mine. Rather, he thought the vibrations were created
from rescue workers pounding on the drill steel in the No. 3 borehole in an attempt to contact
the trapped miners.
Conclusion: MSHA did not always provide clear and accurate information regarding the
mine accident to the families.
MSHA did not correct or contradict misleading or incomplete information presented by
Murray during the family briefings.
Recommendation: Family members should be given clear and accurate information
associated with events surrounding an accident. All information relating to missing or
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