Independent Review of MSHA's Actions at Crandall Canyon Mine

Other specialists had limited inspection experience outside their specialized area, but were
sometimes required to conduct complete inspections. An example of this occurred at Crandall
Canyon. A specialist was assigned to help inspect the surface electrical components at the
mine. The regular inspector was moved to another mine, so the specialist was required to
conduct most of the underground inspection as well. During this inspection, several
inspection items required by procedure and policy were not conducted or documented,
including the quarterly respirable dust survey. The specialist stated “It was my understanding
that I was helping with the EO-1 to the best that I could and that as things progressed, if there
was more help needed, I would be directed. As far as taking the initiative to go and review
what all had been done or what might be done, that wasn’t my responsibility.” He also stated
that he assisted on regular inspections because the Price Field Office was doing everything
they could to ensure all required inspections were being conducted.
During the time that the plans for mining the North and South Barriers were being reviewed
for approval, District 9 was not fully staffed in the roof control branch. The roof control
branch consisted of a supervisor, Billy Owens, one engineer in the district office, and one
specialist in each of the Delta, Colorado, and the Price, Utah Field Offices. Owens reviewed
plans and revisions when they were submitted because no one else was available, especially
when the engineer was away attending inspector training classes at the National Mine Health
and Safety Academy in West Virginia. The specialist in Delta was also away from her duties
for an extended period of time for various reasons. The specialist in Price also had collateral
duties as a special investigator, and eventually took that position full time. The Price specialist
was also a member of MSHA’s Mine Emergency Unit and assisted in mine rescue contests,
both of which took time away from his specialist duties. District 9 tried to hire an additional
engineer, but was unsuccessful.
The specialist groups’ inadequate staffing levels also contributed to a failure to adequately
conduct certain reviews. Section 75.223(d) provides that the roof control plan for each mine
shall be reviewed every six months. Section 75.370(g) states that the ventilation plan for each
mine shall be reviewed every six months. The ventilation branch was also responsible for
reviewing and approving Emergency Response Plans and Seal Construction plans, both of
which were required as a result of the fatal accidents in 2006. One purpose of the six month
reviews is to ensure the plans continue to be adequate for the conditions of the mines.
However, in District 9 these required reviews were not being conducted by specialists as
historically had been done throughout MSHA. William Reitze, Ventilation Branch Supervisor,
stated, “we've done two, maybe two in the last year, year and a half.” Owens stated, “I'm
lucky to get --- with the diminishing staffing that I've been having over the recent years, I'm
lucky just to get plans out in some sort of timely manner without even considering a six month
review of a plan." He also stated, “But instead I get memos everyday telling me take your
specialist out and do EO-1s, take your specialist out and do initiatives.” William Knepp,
Assistant D9 Manager for Technical Programs, stated, “We can't do six month reviews
142