Independent Review of MSHA's Actions at Crandall Canyon Mine

elieved that a higher stability factor should be employed. Owens accepted the resolution
of this inconsistency by the consultant increasing the stability factor from .37 to .40.
Conclusion: District 9 answered an informal submittal for a plan revision with a formal
written response from the District Manager. MSHA has historically required that plan
deficiencies identified in writing be answered with a written response. Owens, by resolving
the inconsistencies via phone calls, and then failing to document the specifics of such a
resolution, did not adhere to MSHA practices.
The resolution of the inconsistencies, as explained by Owens, was lacking detail and
substance. Despite the vague nature of the operator’s response to the five inconsistencies,
MSHA conducted no further ARMPS analyses, and made no other attempt at verifying the
consultant’s methodology.
Recommendation: The District Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) should be modified to
require a written response from the mine operator when plan deficiencies have been identified
in writing.
Issues identified with supporting data should be adequately resolved, with any follow-up
information verified by MSHA.
3) Failure to properly consider the impact of the March 10, 2007 bounce in the North Barrier
section prior to approving retreat mining in the South Barrier section. On March 10,
2007, a significant bounce occurred during retreat mining on the North Barrier section of
Crandall Canyon Mine. A large amount of coal was expelled from the ribs, damaging
ventilation controls and causing the operator to cease mining operations in this area.
Section 50.2 defines and accident as, “a coal or rock outburst that causes withdrawal of
miners or which disrupts regular mining activity for more than one hour” and “an
unplanned roof or rib fall in active workings that impairs ventilation or impedes passage.”
As such, it is required under § 50.10 to be immediately reported to MSHA. The bounce that
resulted in the mine manager’s decision to withdraw from the North Barrier section met
the criteria of § 50.2 but was not immediately reported to MSHA.
Despite the failure to comply with Part 50, mine management did have several discussions
with MSHA District personnel on March 12 th and 13 th in which “bouncing” was mentioned.
Notes taken by Owens indicate a 12:00 noon phone call on March 12 th from Laine Adair,
General Manager for the Crandall Canyon Mine, in which pillar bouncing is mentioned.
Similarly, notes taken by William Reitze, District 9 Ventilation Branch Supervisor,
pertaining to conversations with Adair on March 12 th and 13 th repeatedly use the word
“bounce.” The calls with Reitze pertained to an issue with constructing seals for the area,
which ultimately escalated to the point where Davis was involved. As part of the seal issue
discussion, Davis was informed that the section was being withdrawn due to bounces. A
March 13 th e-mail from John Fredland, Technical Support seal specialist, to Davis
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