Independent Review of MSHA's Actions at Crandall Canyon Mine

The RCD specialists stated that they were not debriefed on a regular basis after their
underground evaluations, which were almost on a daily basis. They stated that at times they
would discuss their observations with the persons-in-charge, but this depended on whether
the persons-in-charge were at the mine and available. Often they would just stop by the
command vehicle when they arrived on the surface and talked to whoever was there. Again,
as with the inspectors and the rescue team members, there was no formal protocol to ensure
that their information was consistently elevated to the persons-in-charge. Since the RCD
specialists were at the mine because of their expertise in ground control, it was critical for
them to be regularly debriefed so that the results of their evaluations could be shared with the
persons-in-charge.
There was no documentation or information provided to ensure that company personnel were
regularly debriefed during the rescue operation. A significant shortcoming related to this was
when approximately twelve miners asked to be withdrawn from the rescue area. MSHA’s
persons-in-charge said they heard about this but never followed up to interview the miners or
find out what their concerns were. Experienced miners, working diligently to try to rescue
their fellow co-workers, don’t usually ask to be withdrawn without good reason. It would
appear that this would have been information that they would need to know.
Inspectors stated that they were calling information outside to the command center at regular
intervals. Each hour they would report distance of advance, location of the last Rocprop
installed, and air and gas readings. They would also report events that happened, such as
bounces or equipment breakdowns. This information was entered in the command center
logbook. It is important to note that information noted in a log book is not nearly as
informative or descriptive as that provided in personal debriefings. Inspectors must be
concise when calling outside, and scribes can only abbreviate versions of discussions. This is
why personal debriefings are vital to acquiring detailed information and accounts of
occurrences that may be critical to managing and directing the operation. This was not taking
place at Crandall Canyon. No one could confirm that there was an established system or
procedure for conducting debriefings.
MSHA personnel indicated that they were never asked their opinions about the operation,
their ideas were never solicited, and they weren’t made to feel comfortable in voicing their
opinions. Although Stickler stated, “My approach has always been to try to build teamwork
when you're involved in these things”, and “I tried to do the same thing at Crandall Canyon”,
it appears this did not occur. One inspector stated, “He doesn't seem very approachable” and
“The way he was conducting himself, he just didn't seem like he wanted to be talked to.”
Many other MSHA personnel made similar comments.
MSHA personnel also indicated they were intimidated from offering information because of
circumstances that occurred. Several MSHA personnel stated that, during the course of the
rescue operation, Stickler threatened to fire them or send them home if they could not record
footage advancement measurements the way that he wanted them recorded. One MSHA
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