Independent Review of MSHA's Actions at Crandall Canyon Mine

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completion rate decreased dramatically. While the decrease in completed inspections was not a nationwide problem, the shortage of inspectors was the key factor in the failure to complete the mandated inspections. 100.0% 99.0% 98.0% 97.0% 96.0% 95.0% 94.0% 93.0% 92.0% 91.0% 90.0% 89.0% 88.0% 87.0% 86.0% 85.0% 84.0% 83.0% 82.0% 81.0% 80.0% 98.6% 99.5% 99.1% 98.3% 97.9% 98.1% CMS&H Inspection Completion Rates FY 2000 to 2007 98.5% 99.2% 98.9% 98.2% 99.5% 98.8% 98.8% 99.0% 98.9% 97.9% 98.2% 98.1% 93.6% 94.7% 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Fiscal Year SUR and FAC UG ALL MINES As shown by the table below, on January 31, 2003, District 9 had a staffing level of 27 underground Coal Mine Inspectors (UG CMI) and 15 underground specialists. At the time of the August 6 th accident at Crandall Canyon, District 9 had a staffing level of 20 total UG CMIs and 13 specialists. In three years, District 9 lost nine enforcement personnel, a decrease of 21 %. 140 94.1% 83.1% 86.4% 84.6%
As of this Date # of D9 UG CMIs # of D9 UG Specialists Price F.O. # of UG CMIs Castle Dale F.O. # UG of Specialists Price F.O. Castle Dale F.O. # of Inspectable UG Mines Price F.O. 1/31/2003 27 15 9 4 2 1 9 5 4/30/2003 27 15 9 4 2 1 9 5 7/31/2003 26 15 9 4 3 1 9 5 10/31/2003 26 15 9 4 3 1 9 5 1/31/2004 26 15 9 4 3 1 8 5 4/30/2004 26 15 9 4 3 1 8 6 7/31/2004 25 15 9 3 3 1 8 6 10/31/2004 24 15 9 3 3 1 9 5 1/31/2005 24 15 9 3 3 1 9 4 4/30/2005 25 16 9 3 3 1 13 0 7/31/2005 27 14 9 2 3 1 13 0 10/31/2005 26 13 9 2 3 1 13 0 1/31/2006 23 11 8 2 1 1 13 0 4/30/2006 21 13 9 Closed 3 Closed 13 0 7/31/2006 21 13 9 Closed 3 Closed 13 0 10/31/2006 20 13 8 Closed 3 Closed 13 0 1/31/2007 21 13 8 Closed 3 Closed 13 0 4/30/2007 21 13 9 Closed 2 Closed 13 0 7/31/2007 20 13 9 Closed 2 Closed 13 0 As of January 31, 2003, the Price and Castle Dale Field Offices had a combined total of 13 underground inspectors conducting inspections at 14 underground mines. After the closure of the Castle Dale office in April 2006, there were a total of nine inspectors required to inspect 13 mines. At the time of the August 6, 2007, accident at Crandall Canyon, these levels remained unchanged. USE OF SPECIALISTS IN DISTRICT 9 The decrease in the number of regular inspectors caused Coal Mine Safety and Health (CMS&H) to use specialists to ensure that mandated inspections were completed. This was a nationwide problem, and District 9 was no exception. For example, one District 9 specialist stated “I do regular inspections,” and “I go all over the place to do regulars.” Using specialists in this way removes them from their normal duties. This can also create problems in the quality of inspections. Some specialists had not conducted complete regular inspections for a number of years, and were not familiar with many of the changes in inspection policies and procedures. 141 Castle Dale F.O.
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Independent Review of MSHA’s Acti
Page 4 and 5:
Protective Ground Support Used Duri
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Location of March Bounce Last Known
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Federal Mine
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• Persons who could have contribu
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There was no lack of hard work and
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BLM INSPECTIONS OF CRANDALL CANYON
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oxygen and dust into the fresh air
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MSHA’S ACTIONS PRIOR TO AUGUST 6,
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that the proposed retreat sequence
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On February 23, 2007, District 9 re
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technical guidance from someone exp
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District management’s oversight w
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elieved that a higher stability fac
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questions were asked in an attempt
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offset between crosscuts 139 and 14
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To determine the validity of the in
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disapproval to the District Manager
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amendments for the South Barrier re
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The following table contains certai
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The Price Field Office did not inve
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The inspector stated that this even
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conducted every seven days. However
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Recommendation: MSHA should establi
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DIRECTION AND ACTIVITIES DURING THE
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111-8, which was in effect at the t
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MSHA Person-In-Charge of Mine Rescu
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Davis stated that when Stickler and
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There was also no verification that
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employee stated, “Everybody got f
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Underground Phone Communication Sys
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PROTECTIVE GROUND SUPPORT USED DURI
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equipment to tram in and out of the
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Top of Rockprop Bottom of Rockprop
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Canyon the inby end of the ropes wa
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educed to writing and served to the
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planned to film the underground res
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Stickler stated that family members
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Conclusion: MSHA failed to enforce
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Later on August 6 th , a mine rescu
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anybody sit down with the MSHA peop
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EXPLORATIONS During the underground
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since the ribs could not further ex
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DRILLING OF BOREHOLES Boreholes pla
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pump for a period of time, the meas
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After this hole was drilled, MSHA
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The borehole showed there was no vo
Page 98 and 99: RISK VERSUS VALUE In all rescue and
Page 100 and 101: stoppings to crosscut 95 would also
Page 102 and 103: section were equipped with Self-Con
Page 104 and 105: data, the idea was not pursued any
Page 106 and 107: for an hour and one-half and then w
Page 108 and 109: sampling equipment to their truck a
Page 110 and 111: Agency. The handbook consisted of 9
Page 112 and 113: updates and briefings on the rescue
Page 114 and 115: Utah Governor Jon Huntsman, Jr., MS
Page 116 and 117: Stickler contradicting or correctin
Page 118 and 119: trapped miners should, to the exten
Page 120 and 121: Conclusion: The MSHA person-in-char
Page 122 and 123: An attachment to the policy sets fo
Page 124 and 125: air and water waiting for us to com
Page 126 and 127: Davis did clarify that there was no
Page 128 and 129: the family and press briefings, and
Page 130 and 131: emergency with role-playing by all
Page 132 and 133: MINER ACT AND MINE EMERGENCY EVACUA
Page 134 and 135: Post-Accident Communications The MI
Page 136 and 137: Recommendation: The Agency should d
Page 138 and 139: At the time of the accident, the ER
Page 140 and 141: locations, and along normal travel
Page 142 and 143: CMS&H STAFFING AND RESOURCE UTILIZA
Page 144 and 145: CMS&H STAFFING LEVELS District staf
Page 146 and 147: In addition to the decreased levels
Page 150 and 151: Other specialists had limited inspe
Page 152 and 153: ALLEGATIONS OF INFLUENCE BY THE MIN
Page 154 and 155: GENERAL CONCLUSION Internal Reviews
Page 157: APPENDIX A LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIE
Page 160 and 161: Moore, III, Clarence W. ...........
Page 163: List of Ground Control Panel Member
Page 167: Event Number Activity Code Genwal R
Page 171 and 172: Borehole #3 Location: #4 Entry, X-c
Page 174 and 175: Oxygen Content of Air: Sign and Sym
Page 177 and 178: EFFECTIVE DATE: 12/22/2006 EXPIRATI
Page 179 and 180: Act, Pub. L. No. 109-236, June 15,
Page 183: APPENDIX G PROGRAM POLICY LETTER NO
Page 186 and 187: 2006. The MINER Act requires that t
Page 188 and 189: The above table is based on the 199
Page 190 and 191: 2. Inflatable shelters or equivalen
Page 193: APPENDIX H PROGRAM INSTRUCTION BULL
Page 196 and 197: I. Quantity of Breathable Air. In d
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What is MSHA's authority for this P
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NORTH BARRIER Last Known Location o
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Independent Review of MSHA's Actions at Crandall Canyon Mine

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