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Beyond Borders: Global biotechnology report 2010

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exercises the option, it typically takes<br />

responsibility for further development<br />

and commercialization. As noted in the<br />

Financing article (“A higher bar”), the<br />

Novartis Option Fund has also been active<br />

with similar arrangements. The Novartis<br />

Option Fund is, however, investing as a<br />

financial investor first, and normally does<br />

not take on option on the biotech company’s<br />

lead program.<br />

In prior years, we have discussed another<br />

type of option arrangement — the structure<br />

used by Symphony Capital to strike deals<br />

with several biotech firms — as a financing<br />

transaction. In these deals, the biotech<br />

company contributes assets to a newly<br />

formed entity that is funded and controlled<br />

by Symphony, but it retains an option to<br />

acquire the new entity or individual assets<br />

over a defined time period. The success of<br />

the Symphony funding model depended in<br />

part on a healthy equity market so that the<br />

biotechs could access capital to exercise<br />

the options at higher valuations than when<br />

the structure was put in place. Given the<br />

more restrictive fund-raising environment<br />

in 2009 and the fact that even positive<br />

clinical news didn’t always move a<br />

company’s stock, Symphony renegotiated<br />

the option terms of several existing deals<br />

in 2009, including those with Alexza<br />

Pharmaceuticals, Dynavax and OXiGENE,<br />

thus becoming a significant equity holder<br />

in these companies.<br />

Tying the knot<br />

Over its 20-year history, the<br />

Roche-Genentech alliance was incredibly<br />

productive for both parties. We have often<br />

wondered why we haven’t seen more<br />

examples of such deal structures — once<br />

referred to as “the 60% solution” in<br />

honor of Roche’s ownership stake in<br />

Genentech — as it allowed Genentech to<br />

grow and adapt largely insulated from<br />

short-term stock market pressures.<br />

In last year’s <strong>report</strong>, we featured an<br />

innovative partnership between Purdue<br />

Pharmaceuticals (and affiliates) and Infinity<br />

Pharmaceuticals that was intended to<br />

achieve the same objective — albeit with<br />

Purdue holding a minority ownership<br />

interest. With a secure source of financing,<br />

the transaction allows Infinity to allocate<br />

resources to the most promising product<br />

candidates, which may not always be the<br />

most advanced items in their pipeline.<br />

A 2009 version of this structure can be<br />

found in the expansion of an existing<br />

alliance between sanofi-aventis and<br />

Regeneron which is focused on the<br />

development of monoclonal antibodies.<br />

Under this arrangement, sanofi-aventis<br />

will pay Regeneron US$160 million<br />

per year over seven years to conduct<br />

research activities. Sanofi-aventis has<br />

the option to take over development of<br />

the resulting product candidates as they<br />

enter clinical trials. The parties share<br />

the profits from the resulting drugs, with<br />

sanofi-aventis receiving a preferential<br />

profit split until reimbursed for half of the<br />

clinical development costs of the product.<br />

This allows Regeneron to focus on early<br />

discovery and preclinical activities and<br />

only pay for clinical development of drugs<br />

that are approved. Of course, Regeneron<br />

can agree to take on clinical development<br />

for any drug that sanofi-aventis takes<br />

a pass on. Sanofi-aventis is also a 19%<br />

shareholder in Regeneron, but its stake<br />

cannot exceed 30% without approval<br />

from Regeneron. Like the Purdue-Infinity<br />

transaction, the deal does not give sanofiaventis<br />

any board seats. (For more on<br />

the motivation behind this transaction<br />

see “Succeeding together” by Leonard<br />

Schleifer, Regeneron’s CEO.)<br />

While not all biotech companies will have<br />

the technology platform for this type of<br />

arrangement, those that do may want to<br />

consider the option of “getting engaged”<br />

with a larger, patient and strategically<br />

aligned partner.<br />

United States<br />

M&As<br />

The saga of Roche’s acquisition of the<br />

minority interest in Genentech finally came<br />

to close in March 2009 when the biotech<br />

company’s board agreed to a price of<br />

US$95 per share, or nearly US$47 billion<br />

(more than Merck paid for all of<br />

Schering-Plough). This deal closes the<br />

book on the most successful and lucrative<br />

alliance in the history of the biotech<br />

industry. Because of the outsized nature of<br />

the deal and the fact that Roche previously<br />

controlled a majority of Genentech, we<br />

have decided to omit the transaction from<br />

the analysis and charts in this article.<br />

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