Lousia Ovington independent investigation report ... - NHS North East

CHAPTER 5 – INVOLVEMENT WITH POLICE AND PROBATION
One of the problems was that there were two different systems of recording in place
in Teesside (Hartlepool) and Durham; this meant that information (for example, in
relation to serious domestic incidents) might have been, in Probation Manager 1’s
words “lost”. This itself would have militated against a proper understanding of risk.
The panel noted that the care coordinator expressed her concerns about risk to
probation more than once and was told that Louisa Ovington either did not fit the
criteria for a ‘public protection meeting’ or that in probation’s views there were “no
current risk of harm issues”, despite the reports that Louisa Ovington had made
threats to kill Mr Hilton. Probation Manager 1 expressed surprise to the panel about
probation’s response; she suggested that the care coordinator could have made a
referral to MAPPA herself; however she conceded that if the care coordinator had
specifically raised the issue of MAPPA with probation it would have been reasonable
for her to accept their view. The panel however noted that probation, with the police
(and later the prison service) constituted the MAPPA ‘Responsible Authority’ (and that
the County Durham Probation Service acknowledged the strengths of the MAPPA
system in their third annual MAPPA report in 2003/4, at a time when Louisa Ovington
was behaving as though she was out of control and was causing great concern to the
health and social care agencies).
The terminology in relation to public protection at this time was confused; the terms
public protection meeting and risk meeting and MAPPA seem to have been used
loosely and interchangeably. (Probation Manager 1 also told the panel that at the time
there was confusion about the various MAPPA levels; the terminology is now clearer.)
What was clear was that the care coordinator had serious concerns, which had been
expressed to the CMHT, Staff Grade Psychiatrist 1, the CRT and probation and that
she looked to probation as the persons who had the necessary expertise to make a
decision on whether the level of risk was serious enough to warrant a multi-agency
response. When they decided it was not, she presumably accepted that view. (It is also
of note that the probation officer who prepared the PSR which preceded the CRO had
assessed the risk as high and the OASys assessment had indicated that a referral to
MAPPA was called for).
The panel’s view is that according to the criteria at the time, as set out in the guidance
for probation 90 Louisa Ovington would not have fitted MAPPA Categories 1 or 2.
However, given the commission of several offences showing that she was capable of
causing serious harm to the public, given her general forensic history, her alcohol and
drug misuse, her mental health problems, her frequent threats to kill, her frequent use
or threat of the use of knives, her chaotic and unstable lifestyle and her out of control
behaviour particularly in 2004, she would have been likely to fulfill the criteria for
Category 3. She would probably have been managed at level two, which would have
enabled all the agencies dealing with her ( health, social care, drug and alcohol teams,
housing, police and probation), to share their knowledge formally.
90 MAPPA Guidance Probation
111