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Lousia Ovington independent investigation report ... - NHS North East

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CHAPTER 9 – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS<br />

134<br />

than he did. For those six months, Consultant 2 appears to have been the<br />

nominated care coordinator. It was Staff Grade Psychiatrist 1 who was following<br />

Louisa <strong>Ovington</strong> up in outpatients and only he who (in theory) was seeing her<br />

regularly. Social Worker 7 worked well with the other agencies involved with<br />

Louisa <strong>Ovington</strong>, attempting to arrange case conferences and MAPPA meetings.<br />

CPN 2 was only involved with Louisa <strong>Ovington</strong> for a couple of months before the<br />

homicide occurred.<br />

It is quite clear in the guidance produced by the Department of Health in 1999<br />

that the appointment of a care co-ordinator was a key component in ensuring<br />

the success of Effective Care Co-ordination. It is reasonably clear from the<br />

records who had this responsibility at any given time apart from one spell in<br />

2004. What is less clear however is how well this responsibility was discharged.<br />

There were some attempts made at pulling together interested parties to CPA<br />

meetings although these were infrequent and poorly attended. (There was<br />

however evidence of good practice in calling CPA meetings at moments of<br />

crisis or acute concern, although the nature of these last minute meetings meant<br />

that, often, essential professionals could not attend) .With the exception of<br />

Social Worker 4 and Social Worker 7, the panel’s view is that the Louisa<br />

<strong>Ovington</strong>’s care was poorly coordinated. There was little or no overview and the<br />

impression was one of ‘fire-fighting’ when necessary and dealing with issues<br />

as they arose. There was no sense of purpose or direction with resolving her<br />

psychological problems and very little progress with her social issues. The<br />

guidance outlined by the Department of Health in 1999, provided a clear vision<br />

of the role of the care co-ordinator and with it the opportunities to plan care and<br />

commit resources. There is little evidence of this occurring.<br />

b) CPA levels/Section 117 Mental Health Act – It was unclear at times what level of<br />

CPA was in place and it appears from the records that it may have varied<br />

between ‘standard’ and ‘enhanced’. The panel was surprised that, given the<br />

history of violence, arrests, convictions, behavioural disturbances and abuse of<br />

drugs and alcohol which required almost a constant multi-agency involvement,<br />

Louisa <strong>Ovington</strong> was not maintained on enhanced CPA and subject to regular<br />

CPA and Section 117 reviews. In the case of Section 117 this was a statutory<br />

obligation deriving from her very first stay in hospital and in addition following<br />

her detention under Section 37. It should never have been overlooked.<br />

c) Care planning forming the basis of treatment – Key components in ensuring the<br />

successful application of the CPA are the systematic recording, reviewing<br />

(incorporating the views of all relevant parties) and auditing of care plans. The<br />

panel could find little documentary evidence that this consistently occurred. It is<br />

clear however that on the occasions when care plans were completed,<br />

compliance with CPA objectives was patchy and the policing of this was minimal.

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