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Lousia Ovington independent investigation report ... - NHS North East

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hours. They did not have access to the CMHT notes. In Louisa <strong>Ovington</strong>’s case, she<br />

said, they were not made aware, for example, that she had been in hospital for 18<br />

months on a Section 37. She also stated that the crisis resolution service had no<br />

access to CPA information or risk assessments. Their own risk assessments tended<br />

to be based purely on what limited information was available at the time, but were<br />

updated subsequently. She said that the service was not equipped to deal with<br />

personality disordered clients and she felt that dealing with someone like Louisa<br />

<strong>Ovington</strong> was not, according their criteria at the time, appropriate.<br />

Team Manager 2, who was in charge of the team, took a broader view of the function<br />

of the CRT service. It was evident that he was concerned about the general mental<br />

health service response to Louisa <strong>Ovington</strong> at this time. He also expressed his concern<br />

about the lack of an overall agreed care plan, in view of the fact that Louisa <strong>Ovington</strong><br />

was coming into contact with criminal justice services as well as health services. He<br />

told the panel “It felt like we couldn’t get a grip of the situation as an overall service.<br />

I felt we were just kind of mirroring some of her behaviour in the presentation. Our<br />

response was becoming chaotic as well”.<br />

He felt that in the light of the number of referrals received in a very short period of<br />

time they needed “an over-arching care plan” to ensure that they all had a shared<br />

understanding of what her needs were and what their roles were within that. In<br />

September 2004 Team Manager 2 urged multi agency action in relation to Louisa<br />

<strong>Ovington</strong> and expressed his concern to Staff Grade Psychiatrist 1, Social Worker 7 and<br />

others.<br />

Team Manager 2 told the panel that Staff Grade Psychiatrist 1 responded to phone<br />

calls from the crisis resolution service and made himself available for appointments,<br />

within two to three days of a request. However, he commented that when you have a<br />

doctor working with the crisis resolution service (as they sometimes had) it gives you a<br />

“much, much better system”.<br />

MAPPA 80<br />

CHAPTER 1 - NARRATIVE OF KEY DATES AND EVENTS<br />

The issue of whether Louisa <strong>Ovington</strong> should have been referred to MAPPA is quite<br />

confused. The terminology has changed somewhat; at that point in time the words<br />

public protection/risk meeting seem to have been used interchangeably with MAPPA<br />

and there is no clear idea about what the difference would have been between a ‘risk<br />

meeting’ and a ‘multi-agency meeting’. What is clear is that Social Worker 7 was<br />

concerned about Louisa <strong>Ovington</strong>’s risk to the public; that over a period of a week<br />

or so she raised this matter with probation several times and that probation did not<br />

accept that it was necessary to have a public protection/risk meeting - even after<br />

Louisa <strong>Ovington</strong> had said that she may be driven to attack Mr Hilton. Probation<br />

80 See Chapter 5 for an explanation of the MAPPA process<br />

63

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