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Dividing Ireland: World War I and Partition

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132 THE EASTER RISING AND AFTERMATH<br />

trained state, would be unable to bring any considerable military<br />

operation to a successful conclusion without help from an external<br />

source. Even their plan for dealing with an insurrection in Dublin<br />

depended upon relief coming, or a diversion of British forces being<br />

brought about by the end of a week, or at most ten days, after<br />

hostilities began. Moreover, when it was considered that their<br />

forces were spread out all over <strong>Irel<strong>and</strong></strong> <strong>and</strong> were in contact with<br />

larger British forces, the IRB had decided that it would be<br />

impractical to prepare a general mobilisation for concentration on<br />

any given point. Therefore, while hoping for the co-operation of<br />

German forces <strong>and</strong> supplies, but being in complete ignorance of<br />

the form that co-operation might take, the number of forces sent<br />

to assist, the place of l<strong>and</strong>ing, or the ultimate objective, the IRB<br />

had come to the decision that there were three things they could<br />

immediately set about:<br />

1 The reinforcement of the (German) l<strong>and</strong>ing forces both with<br />

trained <strong>and</strong> untrained Volunteers.<br />

2 The disruption of the means of transport where it might be<br />

used by the British, at strategic points.<br />

3 The seizure <strong>and</strong> occupation of the capital city of Dublin, the<br />

arrest of British officials <strong>and</strong> military officers, the placing of a<br />

guard over the banks <strong>and</strong> British commercial interests <strong>and</strong> if<br />

possible the installation of a military Governor.<br />

It followed from the state of British forces, argued Plunkett, that<br />

<strong>Irel<strong>and</strong></strong> could be taken by a coup de main; with the Irish Volunteer<br />

forces reinforcing an invading German army by causing transport<br />

disruption, the blowing up of already-selected railway points,<br />

bridges, canals <strong>and</strong> viaducts, as well as the prearranged taking of<br />

the capital. Plunkett claimed that these plans allowed the project<br />

to ‘assume the appearance of feasibility’ as far as the internal<br />

campaign was concerned. He envisaged German forces, with arms<br />

for 40,000 Irish Volunteers, coming up the Shannon <strong>and</strong><br />

disembarking at Limerick, a city with large food resources. The<br />

British forces there, if indeed there were any at present, were only<br />

a few hundred, entailing no necessity for any military blow to be<br />

struck there. Messengers in motor cars would immediately leave<br />

with news of the invasion <strong>and</strong> in a few hours Dublin’s Irish<br />

Volunteers would know of it <strong>and</strong> an all-<strong>Irel<strong>and</strong></strong> signal would be<br />

given. The Irish Volunteers <strong>and</strong> a ‘large number of the population<br />

of Kerry <strong>and</strong> Clare’ would be the first to arrive at Limerick <strong>and</strong><br />

offer their services.

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